On May 3, 1913, less than 48 hours after Germany and France declared war on each other, the French ambassador to St. Petersburg, Paleolog, drove to the Winter Palace to meet the Tsar and pleaded with him to immediately order the Russian army to take an offensive, otherwise France would be in danger of ruin.

Because Russia owes France a lot of debt, and most of its domestic assets are controlled by French capital, Tsar Nicholas has long been a cannibalistic soft-mouthed and short-handed; In the face of the French ambassador's plea, Nikolai immediately took a big deal, claiming that Russia's "original goal was to annihilate the German army" and listed the war against Austria as an inconspicuous second priority. At the military parade held exclusively for the French, looking at the heroic posture of the Russian Guards, the golden iron horses rolling forward, Paleolog's original heart finally regained confidence in the future war.

For some reason, the Russian giant bewitched Europe as if by magic. Although their army had many shortcomings and a bad reputation, they were severely taught a lesson by the Japanese in the war against Japan that had just ended, and they were disgraced; However, the scene of millions of vicious, cruel and fearless Cossack cavalry sweeping the charge and sweeping everything is deeply rooted in the heart of every European. In the minds of the European powers, Russia is undoubtedly a titan giant: slow and bloated at the beginning of mobilization, once its war machine is in motion, it will use its almost infinite manpower and resources to overwhelm its opponents like a tsunami.

In the second decade of the 20th century, Britain and France were both apprehensive by the earth-shattering energy of the industrial empire of Germany; However, the thought of a Russian bear to the east as an ally made them feel relieved and slept soundly. Since the war against Japan. The Russian Army began to purge the internal incompetence and corruption. Britain and France were convinced that they had achieved decisive results. French politics. "An extraordinary impression of Russia's growing power, its amazing resources, its potential and its boundless wealth." British Foreign Secretary Edward? Gray agreed: "The Russians are so rich in resources that even if we don't support them, the Germans will be exhausted in a long time." ”

In the eyes of the French, whether or not Plan No. 17 against Germany would be successful, and whether the march to the Rhine would be invincible, would be a matter of paramount importance that had a direct bearing on the perils of their nation. In order to guarantee that they would be able to crush the German army in front of them. The French army, which was weaker than Germany in terms of strength due to its lack of population, had to rely on Russia to contain a large number of German troops on the Eastern Front. The problem, however, was that Russia had to attack in the rear of the German army at the same time as the German and French offensives and on the Western Front; That is, as far as possible, to act after 15 days of mobilization. The French also knew that it was impossible for the sluggish and bloated Russian giants to be mobilized in the same fifteen days as Germany and France; However, they still insisted that the Russians should immediately start fighting with the strength at hand 15 days after mobilization.

However, launching an offensive when the mobilization has not yet been completed and a large number of troops and materials are being assembled is undoubtedly a rather risky taboo. In order to make the Russians willingly sacrifice blood for the sake of France. It must be completely "brainwashed": just a year after the conclusion of the Triple Entente, General Dibay, then chief of staff of the French War Department, visited St. Petersburg. He began to instill in the Russian General Staff the idea of the need to seize the initiative, that is, the tactic that is currently being regarded as the supreme treasure of the French army - the desperate attack.

The brainwashing of the French was a great success. Ever since the defeat in Manchuria, the Russians have been desperate for the humiliating humiliation of being beaten and defeated by the Japanese, and they should also seek a way to cheer up their self-esteem because of their weak military strength. When France's offensive theory was translated into Russian, it was like a morning bell and a loud sound of the drums, dispelling the gray and black gloom that had long shrouded the Russian army, and making the Russian officers and men who had seen the blue sky through the clouds and mist fall into a frenzy and be fascinated. The Russian General Staff, which had received the glittering theory of "desperate attack," was also full of self-confidence and high spirits, and they thought that they had completely mastered the way to victory, and they took all the big things into France's promise to attack, and even increased it. In 1912, General Gillins, who was the commander-in-chief of the Russian Northwest Army Group, assured Xia Fei who was visiting St. Petersburg that Russia would gather 800,000 troops to attack East Prussia after the 15th day of mobilization, which made Xia Fei happy.

However, this is nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Russians. Because from any point of view, their army is completely incapable of attacking as it was intended.

Sending a large army to fight a modern war in the territory of an enemy country is a move full of complications and extremely dangers, and it is necessary to do a good job of painstakingly and accurately organizing and formulating effective operational plans. The organizational confusion and crudeness of the Russians had long been notorious in all wars: the delivery of winter clothes to the officers and men of the fleet who were suffering from the scorching heat and the blowing of coal dust in the equatorial region, and the replenishment of the idols of the army units in desperate need of shells on the Manchurian front, were all good things that the Russian logistics department had done. After so many years of shackling the country by the Tsarist regime, the words heroic and wise in the Russian officer corps have nothing to do with it: a large number of uneducated and unskilled people have risen through the ranks by bribery and backing, while the truly ambitious and talented handsome people are few and far between, and they can hardly reach the top. One of the most exhaustive tasks of the Russian officers was to fight cards. After the Russo-Japanese War, although Russia made a lot of efforts to eliminate the accumulated shortcomings of the army, and dismissed more than 340 generals from their posts in a row, the Russian political system was still the same one: after the dismissal of a group of officers who had been given a vegetarian meal, another group would appear on the stage.

In terms of tactical concepts, there is a difference between the Russian army and the German army, which is equipped with a large number of technical weapons, and there is a difference of half a century. The Russian Minister of War, General Sukhhomlinov, undoubtedly contributed to this situation. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, Sukhhomlinov was a young and courageous cavalry officer who was awarded the St. George Cross, so he was convinced that what he learned in that war was an eternal truth. He had attended a gathering of instructors at the Staff College, at which he was interested in "new tricks" such as heavy artillery suppression and machine-gun cover, rather than sabers, flagpole spears, and white-knuckle combat, and he immediately reprimanded them. He said indifferently that he could not hear the term "modern warfare": "This was the case in the wars of the past, and the wars of the present are still like this." These things are nothing more than tricks and tricks, and I didn't read a military manual twenty-five years ago. A few years later, he dismissed five instructors from the Staff College because they were all preaching heresy about the "organization and conduct of shooting."

As Sukhhomlinov stubbornly clung to the outdated experience of white-knuckle warfare, and insisted that Russia's defeat at Manchuria was due to the mistakes of the commanders, and not to the lack of training, preparation, and supply; Under the leadership of the Minister of War, who firmly believed that bayonets were better than guns and shells, from 1907 onwards, the Russian Army's readiness for war could be imagined. The Russian Army simply refused to go to the trouble of building factories to produce artillery, rifles, and ammunition; While Britain, France, Germany, Austria and other powers were suffering from insufficient funds for their armies and finding it difficult to buy more for their armies, Sukhhomlinov did not even run out of funds for the Russian government's special arms production.

By the time the war began in 1913, Russia had an average of only a measly 600 rounds of ammunition per cannon, compared to 2,000 to 3,000 rounds per cannon for the other four major European powers. In terms of artillery firepower, although the Russian army did not abandon heavy artillery like the French army, it was still at an absolute disadvantage compared with the German army: a Russian infantry division had only six field artillery batteries, while the German infantry division had twelve field artillery batteries and two heavy artillery batteries. The entire Russian Army had only fifty heavy artillery batteries, while the Germans had four. In terms of the number of machine guns, the Russian Army, which was completely unaware of the role of machine guns, was even more different from the firepower configuration of the German Army, which had a platoon of heavy machine guns in every infantry battalion. The war depended primarily on the contest of firepower between the two sides, and Sukhomlinov had always scoffed at such admonitions.

In addition to the disadvantage of weapons and equipment, the Russian army is also full of cracks and cracks in high-level personnel. After the outbreak of war, the tsar's uncle Nikolai? Grand Duke Nikolayevich was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army: Tall, with a handsome face, Grand Duke Nikolai, who for many years held the post of commander of the Guards, was one of the few reformists in the Russian army with considerable talent, and was deeply loved by soldiers and officers. However, both Sukhkhomlinov and the tsar himself were extremely disgusted with Grand Duke Nicholas. The former is due to the stark contrast between the archduke's handsome, capable, radiant and open-minded image and his short, fat, incompetent, and scheming, and his heart is intertwined with jealousy and hatred; The latter was due to the Grand Duke's contempt and offense for Rasputin, the "saint" who repeatedly used "divine magic" to heal Crown Prince Alexei, and his extremely high prestige in the army even overwhelmed the tsar himself, which the tsar could not tolerate without disgust and jealousy. Both the Emperor and the Minister of War hated the Commander-in-Chief, stood by and stood by in many ways, ready to remove him from power and replace him. It was under such circumstances that the Russian Army ushered in the outbreak of the Great War in Europe. (To be continued......)

PS: Thank you book friends for the support of the February 30th Ring Book and the original monthly pass of Volcanic Wind Forest ~~~