Negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands reached an impasse, and although Japan was willing to force the Dutch East Indies into submission by force, Japan was forced to restrain itself due to the strong obstruction of Britain, France, and the United States in Southeast Asia.

Since the Dutch side could not open the situation, the Japanese government had to turn its attention to the Indochina Peninsula, which is connected to Chinese mainland, so this territory is also the most coveted place in Japan. The Indochina Peninsula is now in a three-state situation, with Britain and France in addition to its native kingdom of Thailand. If Japan wants to enter Southeast Asia, it is necessary to deal with these countries, so the Japanese government feels that it is necessary to talk to Britain and France, and if they can take the initiative to cede some benefits, Japan does not mind resolving this issue peacefully.

Thailand was an important link in Japan's southward expansion, and before that, Japan and Thailand had concluded a treaty of good-neighborliness and friendship between Japan and Thailand, which had strengthened relations between Japan and Thailand. In order to strengthen relations with Thailand, the War Department, the headquarters of the Japanese army, set up the Military Attaché Office of the Army stationed in Thailand in Thailand. Army Attache Tamura and Thai Prime Minister Luang Phibun have a close relationship, which has further deepened Prime Minister Luang Phibun's pro-Japanese attitude.

However, Thailand had a hard time from the 19th century onwards, with French Indochina to the east and a large number of French troops stationed in the country. To the west of Thailand was Burma, which at this time was a British colony with a large number of British troops, known as the Anglo-Burmese Army. Because the British power has penetrated Thailand for many years and is deeply rooted, and Prime Minister Luang Phibun has a certain limit to his political power, the strengthening of substantive cooperation between Japan and Thailand has been hindered from time to time.

The question of the separability of relations between Britain, France, and the Netherlands has been debated in Japan for some time. For now, inseparability has prevailed. Not long ago, a case of the "Outline of Measures for the South" was largely drawn up among the officers below the head of the department in charge of the War Department in the base camp. This scheme believes that Britain and the Netherlands are one and cannot be separated. It envisaged seizing the opportunity to use force against the Malay and Dutch East Indies in order to fundamentally resolve the so-called southern question.

However, the head of the military affairs bureau of the Ministry of the Army, Muto, advocated that the navy must play the leading role in the southern issue, so the army side should not submit the case to the navy, and in principle, wait for the proposal of the navy. Subsequently, the 20th squad leader of the War Department of the base camp had the last Osa. The focus of the above-mentioned "Outline of Measures for the South". As a personal idea, it was submitted to the competent officers of the naval side. At this time, the navy officials in charge immediately stressed that the exercise of force against the south is the exercise of force against the United States, and Britain and the United States are inseparable.

Then the officers in charge of the navy came to the general staff headquarters. The main opinion of the naval side was prompted in writing. The gist of it is: The United States and Britain are absolutely inseparable. The use of force against the South is a war against the United States, so preparations in this regard should be promoted. As for preparations for the use of force against Britain and the Netherlands, the navy has long been prepared in this regard. Say. The Army's intention was to use force against the South while making preparations for war against the United States, while trying to avoid war against the United States. The Navy, on the other hand, advocates that once force is exercised against the South, it will start with a war against the United States. It seems that the naval side has a strong view of the inseparability between Britain and the United States, and the Army therefore feels that it is extremely difficult to realize the plan of using force against the South.

After several discussions, the principal responsible persons of the army and navy command reached the following clear conclusion on the issue of the navy's use of force against the south. If Japan were to use force against the Dutch East Indies, Britain would of course have to do it, so it would be necessary to use force against Malays. To this end, the acquisition of military bases in southern French Indochina and Thailand is an indispensable condition, and this is the inevitable conclusion that should be drawn with the concretization of the strategic study of the base camp.

In addition, even if Japan does not adopt such a policy of military expansion into the south, in order to establish Japan's self-sufficiency, it is necessary to make it a priority to acquire strategic materials such as rice, rubber, and tin from French Indochina and Thailand.

Thus, it became a prerequisite to draw French Indochina and Thailand into the Japanese camp first, and it was expected that many difficulties would be encountered in achieving this end. Under these circumstances, it must be estimated that Japan's expansion into southern French Indochina and Thailand would inevitably lead to a deterioration in relations with Britain and the United States. Therefore, at this time, the actions of the Japanese army were still relatively modest, mainly by means of political negotiations.

At the same time as the negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands, Japan also sent negotiating teams to Thailand and French Indochina. Moreover, the Japanese government was very resolute in demanding that the negotiating team acquire military bases in Thailand and the right to march troops in Thailand in any case.

In fact, the Japanese government has already felt that since the Japanese government intervened in the border conflict between Thailand and French Indochina half a year ago, Thailand has recovered the territory of the two border provinces that were forcibly occupied by French Indochina, but after recovering the lost territory, Luang Phibun has begun to detect the ambitions of the Japanese? Songkan began to change politically to a certain extent, alienating Japan and moving closer to the United States and Britain, which made Japan extremely uneasy.

Thailand's important position made it impossible for Japan to lose this nominal "ally", so this time Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka personally led a delegation to Thailand, which was higher than Thailand expected. In the face of Japan's aggressive posture, Thailand's military dictator had no choice but to capitulate. Although Song Kan chose to give in, he did not completely and completely obey the Japanese arrangement. When the Thai cabinet discussed its policy toward Japan, there were serious differences of opinion, and in the end, the prime minister decided to choose a compromise plan, not to sign a military alliance treaty with Japan, nor to declare war on China, but only to allow the Japanese army to use the route.

On August 1, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka and Thai Prime Minister Luang Phibun? The Thai-Japanese Agreement was signed in Bangkok, which consists of three articles:

In order to deal with the situation in East Asia expeditiously, Thailand allowed the Japanese army to pass through the Thai border and did everything possible to facilitate it.

In order to implement the provisions of paragraph 1, the military authorities of the two sides have separately negotiated detailed by-laws.

Japan has pledged that Thailand will be treated with the respect it deserves.

The signing of the "Thai-Japanese Agreement" legalized the entry of Japanese troops into Thailand, and the actions of the Japanese army went far beyond the scope of the treaty. The Japanese army not only quickly occupied Songkhla, but also the new airfield on the outskirts of Pattani. At this time, Bangkok's Manlang Airport was occupied, and the railway and port were also taken over by the Japanese army, and a large number of troops were stationed in various places.

After a great success from Thailand, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka transferred to French Indochina via Thailand on August 3, 1940, where he met with General Ansato of France. Japan's relations with French Indochina have not always been very good, but this relationship has changed somewhat after Japan mediated the dispute between Thailand and France, and this change was caused by Matsuoka Yosuke.

At the beginning of April this year, the mediation talks held in Tokyo were mainly held between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and French Ambassador Amway and Thai Representative Wang. Whiteagen between them. Japan's original policy was to suppress the demands of French Indochina. Support the request of the Thai side. In order to obtain Japan's privileges in Thailand and, if possible, to form a military offensive and defensive alliance with Thailand.

However, Matsuoka's dissatisfaction with the high-handed attitude of the Thai side led the talks to favor French Indochina. At the same time as the talks. There have also been several joint meetings between the base camp and the government. He kept in touch with Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was presiding over the talks.

But. Foreign ministers, however, tend to act on their own assumptions and ignore these established national policies. The base camp felt helpless about Foreign Minister Matsuoka's deviant actions. During this period, the Army, Navy and the government took into account the procrastination of the French side. The use of force against French Indochina has been discussed on several occasions. Around the end of February, the Army and Navy Headquarters, the base camp, even made up their minds to use force for a time.

On 11 April, the mediation was finally successful. With the success of the mediation, an agreement was reached between Japan and France and between Japan and Thailand that neither French Indochina nor Thailand could sign any form of political and military cooperation with a third country. However, the headquarters was disappointed that the Japan-Thailand Agreement and the Japan-French Indochina Agreement, whose main purpose was military cooperation, decided not to hold talks because Foreign Minister Matsuoka decided not to hold talks because he felt that the time was not yet right, and he had to wait for the situation to develop in the future.

As a result of Matsuoka's maintenance, the French General Anli had a favorable opinion of Japan, and then signed the so-called Matsuoka-Anli Agreement with Japan, and although Japan and France had a dispute when they were stationed in northern French Indochina, the apparent intimacy between them seemed to be growing.

Matsuoka went to Hanoi this time mainly to obtain rice, rubber and other important materials, especially rice, as the food crisis in Japan is deepening day by day, and the standard of living of the people is rapidly declining, especially rice, which is a necessity of life. In the past, the main food of the Japanese people was rice, but now rice is evolving into a high-end food, and in the past, Japanese people used to eat rice at least 6 days a week, but now it is a good life to eat fragrant rice two days a week, and most of the time Japanese live on coarse grains.

Regarding the economic negotiations with French Indochina, Matsuoka did not have much confidence. After all, within French Indochina, the Vichy regime and the de Gaulle regime were intrigued, and the Gaullist faction was behind the scenes to instigate anti-Japanese activities. Although it is said that the French general in charge of French Indochina, Anri, had a good impression of Matsuoka Yosuke, but in his bones, Anri was a member of De Gaulle's faction, so the attitude of French Indochina towards Japan can actually be said to be inseparable.

Sure enough, the negotiations were extremely unsmooth from the beginning, and the French did not seem to be at all interested in the series of requests made with Japan, and Anri only entertained Matsuoka Yosuke in Hanoi for a few days out of friendship between friends, and then went into hiding, which made Matsuoka extremely depressed and had to take people back to Japan.

After returning to Japan, Matsuoka Yosuke reported the relevant situation of the negotiations to Emperor Hirohito, and at the same time suggested that the navy and army could prepare for action, and he judged that Britain, France, the Netherlands, and even the United States had reached a tacit understanding, whether it was to negotiate with the Netherlands or France alone, it was just a matter of Japan's wishes, and the above-mentioned countries only wanted to maintain the current situation in Southeast Asia, and if Japan had to intervene, it would definitely be boycotted by these countries.

After the conclusion of negotiations with the Netherlands and France, the Japanese upper echelons already knew that war against Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other countries was inevitable, so the headquarters demanded an accurate judgment of the country's material strength, so the General Staff Headquarters instructed the War Readiness Section of the Ministry of War to study the possible changes in Japan's national material strength if the empire went to war with the United States and Britain in the spring of Showa 16 (1941), or if war was absolutely avoided, and on August 15, the War Readiness Section of the Ministry of War reported the results of the study to the head of the General Staff Headquarters. The main points are as follows:

In the event of a war. Japan's national material strength would be worrisome if it were to wage a protracted war against the United States and Britain. That is, the war will be carried out around the end of the second year, and there will probably still be sufficient potential to destroy the enemy's offensive, but by that time it may be difficult for the time being with liquid fuel, and at the same time, as the war drags on, the economic support for the war may be shaken.

This will be due to the severance of imports and the poor situation in the expansion of production capacity. As long as there is no large amount of depletion of ships, steel and light metals are expected to grow by leaps and bounds year by year, but rare metals and non-ferrous metals cannot make up for the losses caused by the cut off imports by relying only on their small domestic production capacity. It can be perfunctory for two years to gradually deplete reserves, but after the third year, it will gradually fall into the dilemma of a significant reduction in supply. Liquid combustion will be a cause for concern. Between the progress of restoring and exploiting the resources of the occupied territory and the depletion of the reserves. There will be a period of scarcity. In addition, the problem of ships will also become serious, especially as this will lead to a general contraction of industry due to the reduction of coal transportation, and the dilemma of light industrial resources will also add to the problems of domestic problems.

When war had to be started due to the evolution of the situation. In order to alleviate the above worries. In addition to striving for a speedy end to the war against the South. In particular, every effort should be made not to destroy the resources of the Dutch East Indies. In addition, with regard to the issue of ships, it is necessary to give in-depth consideration to the coordination between operations and economics.

At the same time, the War Readiness Section of the Ministry of War conducted a study on Japan's material strength if it could avoid war with Britain, France, the United States, and the Netherlands. And a written document was formed and reported to the base camp. If Japan does not sever diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain economically, if it continues to maintain a certain degree of trade with its colonies in East Asia, and if it can gradually make progress in economic negotiations with the southern regions, Japan's material strength will decline in the first two years, but it will recover to a certain extent year after year.

If diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain are severed economically, the country's material strength will drop sharply, and it will be very difficult for it to recover. In particular, the amount of oil reserves will decrease year by year, and the amount of national strength and war power will decline due to consumption. In either case, it will be difficult to achieve a rapid development of Japan's national strength and a real expansion of its armaments after a few years.

Most importantly, Japan should strive to establish a Greater East Asian Self-Sufficiency Sphere; At the same time, it is necessary to avoid unhelpfully provoking the United States and Britain, rely as much as possible on the resources of the United States and Britain to build up national strength, and be prepared to be able to deal with any situation immediately.

The report of the War Readiness Section of the Ministry of War greatly stimulated the Japanese army and navy, and even more stimulated the Japanese government, and the report fully took into account Japan's material reserves and available forces under various circumstances, including human, financial, and material resources, but the conclusion made the Japanese side extremely frustrated.

For this reason, Japan's top leadership believes that it is necessary to conduct deeper communication with the US Government in order to ensure Japan's supply and reserves of war materials.

Shared responsibility for the negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive agreement aimed at restoring the traditional friendly relations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States is hereby assumed. The two governments will no longer argue about the reasons for the recent estrangement of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and sincerely hope that there will be no more incidents that have worsened the friendly feelings between the two peoples and that their unexpected development will be stopped.

It is the fervent hope of the two Governments that, through the joint efforts of the two countries, a morally based peace will be established in the Pacific region and that a sincere and friendly understanding between the two countries will be reached expeditiously in order to eliminate the deplorable threat of chaos capable of destroying civilization; If this is not possible, it should also be quickly prevented from expanding. Protracted negotiations would be inappropriate and procrastinating in order to take the decisive action mentioned above, and it is therefore recommended that a document be drafted as an appropriate means of morally binding the two Governments and limiting their actions with a view to achieving full cooperation between the two countries.

The said understanding shall be confined to urgent and significant issues and shall be submitted to the Conference for its consideration; As for incidental matters that should be agreed upon by the two Governments from time to time in the future, it would be appropriate not to include them. The two sides believe that the relationship between the two governments will be significantly improved if the following points can be clarified and improved. In view of the above, the following understanding has been reached, and the above understanding, as amended by the United States Government, will be subject to a final and formal decision by the Japanese Government.

In the US-Japan Understanding, the US Government put forward seven issues of common importance to both countries, including the international vision and national outlook of Japan and the United States, the attitudes of the two governments toward the war in Europe, the relationship between the two governments regarding the incident in China, the naval and air forces and maritime relations in the Pacific, the trade and financial cooperation between the two countries, the economic activities of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific, and the policy of the two governments on stabilizing politics in the Pacific region.

After receiving this understanding package from the United States, the Japanese Government was overjoyed, and although it was only a package of understanding, the information revealed by the United States made the Japanese extremely excited, and it was a harbinger of the easing of US-Japanese relations, and if US-Japanese relations could return to the state they had been 37 years ago, Japan would not be afraid of any challenge at all. (To be continued......)