Judging from the losses of ships and troops, the US military can be said to have been completely defeated, sinking a total of 3 heavy aircraft carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 5 destroyers, and another 2 light cruisers and 1 battleship were seriously injured, and more than 6,000 US officers and men were killed or missing. But on the other hand, the number of US aircraft losses is far less than that of the enemy, and the total number of them is 87, most of which are fighters that did not take off on the three sunken aircraft carriers, and because their own fleet is below and the rescue is relatively convenient, the total number of US pilots killed and missing is only 45, while the loss of Japanese and German planes is as many as 214, and more than 200 experienced pilots are killed, missing or captured. It's hard to say who won this battle, but it might be more accurate to say that both sides were defeated.

In particular, the Japanese army had already lost a large number of excellent carrier-based aircraft pilots in the Pearl Harbor incident, and the new ace had not yet grown up and suffered huge losses again, which undoubtedly made the Japanese Navy, which had already begun to lack qualified carrier-based aircraft pilots, even more embarrassed. Perhaps the only consolation for the Japanese is that the Americans are now also short of carrier-based pilots due to the relatively small number of aircraft carriers in the past, and the heavy losses in the Pearl Harbor attack (although the United States is able to fill the gap much faster than the Japanese because of the staggering number of amateur pilots and the excellent pilot training system). ）

In fact, it was precisely because of this that Nimitz finally gave up the idea of letting the American aircraft group in the air attack the Japanese and German fleets in retaliation, because after a long time in the air, they had already used up some of the fuel they carried. The fleet has only one aircraft carrier left for them to land and replenish, and they are simply too busy, if they go to carry out attack missions again, those planes will only crash one after another because of the fuel exhaustion, it is better to let them fly to Australian airfields while there is still fuel in stock, so that even those carrier-based aircraft carriers can continue to fight the enemy as land-based aircraft, and some of these outstanding talents will have to be recalled to China as instructors, and cannot be wasted on the battlefield like cannon fodder

Due to the heavy losses on both sides, the number of carrier-based aircraft remaining in the Japanese-German combined fleet was only able to protect itself. And the air defense capability of the new Pacific Fleet of the United States, which has only one aircraft carrier left, is also much inferior to before. In addition, there were warships that needed to be repaired, so they also chose to retreat temporarily. But in this way, the islands that the US military had previously seized were temporarily preserved, judging from the purpose of the campaign. Or the Allies took advantage of it a little

Except for the Japanese and American armies. The German Far East Fleet did not send many aircraft in this campaign. But the performance was exceptional, surprising to those who had underestimated them before. In fact, if it weren't for the fact that German carrier-based planes took advantage of the fact that the US anti-aircraft firepower and carrier-based aircraft group were led away by more than 200 Japanese planes that penetrated at low altitudes, and unexpectedly sank two US aircraft carriers one after another with fairly small losses, I am afraid that the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea would have been different. Even the entire Pacific War could have reached an early turning point as a result.

However, the fact that it was necessary to rely on the cover of the Japanese army in order to exert its strength also exposed the insufficient strength of the Far East Fleet itself, which directly stimulated the commander of the fleet, Wegener, to put down his pride and make an important decision that affected the entire course of World War II

Born on September 16, 1875 in Wolfgang. Wegener had already signed up for the German Navy in 1894 and was soon joined by Erich Bush, who was a year younger than him and also enlisted in 1894. Raeder became close friends, and neither of them could have imagined that they would become mortal enemies in the future.

In 1912, in the eighteenth year of enlistment, Wegener and Raeder ushered in an important turning point in their lives at the same time: in this year, Wegener became the chief staff officer of Vice Admiral Schmidt, commander of the Navy's First Battleship Squadron; At the same time, Raeder was assigned to Franz, the best tactical commander of the High Seas Fleet. Feng. Under Vice Admiral Hipper, he served as chief staff officer of the 1st Reconnaissance Detachment (Battle Cruiser Detachment). From this time until the armistice of 1918, the huge contrast in the careers of the two men in six years directly caused a huge difference in the strategic thinking of the two men.

In 1915, dissatisfied with the policy of the High Seas Fleet, Wegener began to write three studies on the active offensive and the breakthrough into the Atlantic with active and decisive action: "Reflections on the Maritime Situation in China" (June 1915) and "Can We Improve the Present Situation?" (July 12, 1915) and "Naval Base Policy and the Fleet" (August 1915). These three reports were in fact the core of his later masterpiece, Naval Strategy in the Shijie War. The main thrust of the report was succinct: the Helgoland Bay base was of limited tactical value, and Germany had to rely on submarines to attack the British blockade near the exit from the North Sea, especially the main commercial routes north of the line, to force the Grand Fleet to devote the blockade to the convoy, thus providing the High Seas Fleet with a chance to break out of its cage; Subsequently, Germany would use the fast battle cruiser force as the backbone to occupy the Shetland Islands in one fell swoop, and once and for all the opportunity for the British blockade of the German fleet to be broken; Zuihou, and then a decisive battle with the Grand Fleet in a favorable sea zone selected by Germany.

The core of Wegener's report contradicted the conservative strategy pursued by the High Seas Fleet at the time. Admiral Tirpitz, the Minister of the Admiralty, immediately assigned two staff officers to draft a rebuttal essay attacking the logical errors and loopholes in the Wegener report. Hipper, however, was so impressed by the three papers that he wrote to Admiral Bachmann, the chief of staff of the Navy, suggesting that he further evaluate this line of thought.

It was at this time that Raeder, chief staff officer of the 1st Reconnaissance Detachment, made an unprecedented denial to his old comrades-in-arms. Raeder argued that the capture of Jihua in Shetland, while new, was not possible - the German navy was inferior to the British navy in the number of warships of every class, including battleships and battlecruisers, and it was difficult to obtain the relative force superiority necessary to carry out a surprise attack. The results of the Battle of Dogle Sandbank of the same year confirmed that it was difficult for the German fleet to achieve a complete tactical victory, even under conditions of approximately equal forces, and the submarines themselves could not be used as a tool for sea supremacy. Hipper accepted his advice, and in the end the German High Seas Fleet remained inactive until its final defeat. (To be continued......)