The government did not dare to slack off on the opinions put forward by the navy and army, and Konoe Fumima immediately called a meeting of all the important ministers to study and discuss the matter.

It is not to blame Konoe Fumima for not being assertive, it is entirely because in Japan at this time, the headquarters of the military department is the highest organ of power of the state, although on the surface both the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy are a department of the government, but in fact the power of these two departments is terrifying, nominally demanding the dispatch and orders of the cabinet government, in fact, they can suppress the government and encourage the emperor to remove the cabinet.

The base camp is the military command hub of Japan's foreign wars, and it is the most important military institution independent of the government and parliament, and directly responsible to the emperor. The Japanese Army was modeled after Prussia, the predecessor of Germany, so during the Meiji period, Japan imitated Prussia to establish an army staff directly under the emperor's authority in charge of military orders, and the navy also divided the corresponding military command organs. The power of military orders was separated, and only the military and political powers were vested in the cabinet.

The promulgation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan in 1889 established in the form of law this new military-government relationship. The Constitution stipulates that the Emperor has the power to command the Commander-in-Chief and gives the Chief Military Commander the "power to play the command", that is, all matters related to military orders can be directly reported to the Emperor without going through the Cabinet, and the Emperor will make a decision. This was the "principle of commander-in-chief's independence" that prevailed in Japan before the war.

From a legal point of view, only the emperor can govern the military department, but the modern imperial system is characterized by the "separation of the court and the government", and the emperor is not in charge of the government, and even if disputes are decided at the imperial council, most of them only listen to them and do not answer. Therefore, the army and navy were nominally directly under the emperor's authority, but in reality they were not restrained. In its own right, in the sacred aura of the emperor's authority, the military department became the "core of power" of the Meiji constitution.

But what really makes the Japanese military department the center of waging war and the giant power of kidnapping the government depends on one person, a person who is not a soldier. This person is none other than former Japanese Prime Minister Hirota Hiroki, who should be no stranger to this person, who was convicted as one of the 28 Class A war criminals after the war.

Hirota Hiroki is not as simple as the man who was born as an elite diplomat, he originally wanted to apply for the army non-commissioned officer school to become a professional soldier. After the First Sino-Japanese War. Russia, France and Germany jointly intervened. Forcing Japan to redeem the Liaodong Peninsula for 30 million taels of silver, Hirota felt that being a diplomat was more beneficial to the country than simply wielding a knife and a gun, so he enrolled in Tokyo Imperial University and became a career diplomat.

Hirota did not serve directly in the army. But it has always maintained close ties with the Army. According to information found from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the war. In the 1903 year before the Russo-Japanese War. Hirota, who was still a student at Imperial University at the time, worked as an intelligence officer for the army to collect information on the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria under the guise of "study trips."

Originally, Hirota Hiroki's tuition fees during his studies at Imperial University were paid by the right-wing group Genyosha, and Mrs. Hirota was the daughter of a Genyosha cadre, so Hirota Hirota's performance after entering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a mixture of pro-military and ultra-right. When Shigenobu Okuma's cabinet proposed the infamous "21 Articles on China". Hiroki Hirota is the head of the First Division of the International Trade Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hirota disagreed with the 21 Articles at the time, because in Hirota's view, the "dredging right" of the Yellow River should also be added, so as to ensure the navigation rights of the Japanese Empire in the Yellow River, and to facilitate the entry and exit of Japanese companies in the Central Plains of China.

Hirota's most lethal crimes after the war were the "Hirota Three Principles" when he was foreign minister in the Okada cabinet, and the reinstatement of the "military minister's active military attaché system" that had been abolished by the Yamamoto Gonbei cabinet in 1913 when he was prime minister, which gave the military ministry weapons to kidnap the government.

What is this "military attache system of the Minister of War on active duty", which has such a role, which can be for the Japanese military department to kidnap the government? As a matter of fact, this "military attache system of military ministers on active duty" is a system proposed by Hirota Hiroki to allow military personnel to take power and participate in politics.

In 1929, the economic crisis broke out, Japan's domestic economy was in difficulty, class contradictions were acute, and the fascist forces took advantage of the opportunity to run rampant, they violently attacked bourgeois party politics, vigorously advocated fascist dictatorship and centralization, and created a series of assassinations, coups and other terrorist incidents, constituting a surging military fascism.

1936 "II. After the 26 Mutiny, the puppet regime Hirota Hiroki Cabinet was propped up to power, and the Hirota Cabinet established the policy of governance and reorganized the state institutions in accordance with the will of the Ministry of Military Affairs. First of all, the stipulation that the Minister of the Army and Navy in the Cabinet must be a military officer at or above the rank of lieutenant general on active duty has strengthened the strength of the military department, made the cabinet an instrument of the military department, and strengthened the dictatorship of the people in the country. At the same time, the policy of foreign aggression was established, and the cabinet convened a meeting of the five ministers, namely, the premier, land, sea, foreign, and Tibetan ministers, to formulate a "national policy benchmark."

Its main objective: "In view of the situation inside and outside the empire, the fundamental state policy that the empire should determine is to rely on diplomacy and national defense, to ensure the position of the empire on the East Asian continent, and at the same time to develop towards the southern seas." This is a legal confirmation of Japan's policy of foreign aggression and expansion.

In the past, when the military department intervened in the government, it was often to express opinions on a certain policy or to cabinet members, but by the time of the Hirota cabinet, the military department could completely reorganize and control the government and implement its own program of governance, and the power and domestic and foreign policies of the state had been subordinated to the fascists of the military department. The military department took control of the government, initially put an end to the long-divided "dual government" situation, and reunited the long-divided state affairs and military power under the condition of subordination to the military department, and achieved a new fascist political unity.

Under this system, the Cabinet cannot be formed as long as the Ministry of War does not appoint active military personnel to serve as Minister of the Army and Navy. Ironically, the Hirota Hiroki cabinet collapsed because War Minister Toshiichi Terauchi insisted on resigning.

Although Hirota Hiroki stepped down, this system was completely retained and gradually strengthened, and by the time of Konoe Bunma, the Japanese military headquarters had completely kidnapped the government and become a puppet under the control of the military department, so the government dared to ignore the opinions put forward by the army and navy.

The cabinet meeting, chaired by Fumima Konoe, began at 11 a.m. on January 6 and ended at 6 p.m. In addition to Prime Minister Fumima Konoe, Minister Osamu Tanabe also attended the meeting. At the beginning of the meeting, the chief of the Nagano Military Command Department explained the reasons for the proposal.

Nagano was a major figure in the Japanese Navy's fleet faction and was the vanguard of the war against the United States. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1900 and served as a squadron leader in the Navy's heavy artillery squadron during the Russo-Japanese War. During an attack on Arthur, he commanded the artillery team to hit a Russian ship anchored in Port Arthur, which became his "famous talk", and after the war, he was selected to study at the Naval University, and after being promoted to rear admiral, he became the principal of the Naval Academy on Etajima.

Not long ago, he succeeded the Imperial Family Fushimi Miyashi Hiroko as the chief of the Military Command Department, becoming the supreme commander of the naval forces. If he doesn't do it, it will be Gengo Hyakutake and Mitsumasa Yonechi, two war-avoidance theorists against the United States, who will come to power. So he must do it, and the vice admiral of the Navy at this time is also Ito Junichi, who is hard-liner to the United States. From the very beginning of his tenure, he stood on the standpoint of the navy and actively advocated Japan's "southward expansion" and expansion into Southeast Asia.

At the cabinet meeting, Nagano Shusei said loudly: "In the current dangerous situation, the Great Japanese Empire is having difficulties in all aspects, especially the material is decreasing, that is to say, it is weakening, on the contrary, the Shina and the Americans are gradually becoming stronger. It will decline more and more with the passage of time, and it will be done through diplomacy, and it will have to be endured if it can be endured, but it must be estimated at the right time. ”

"If there is finally no hope for diplomacy, we have to hurry. If I play now, I'm sure there's still a chance to win, but I'm afraid that chance will fade over time. ”

When Fumima Konoe and others mentioned whether the navy had a detailed battle plan, Nagano Shusei said: "The navy has two views on the estimation of war: short-term and long-term. I think it will probably turn out to be a long-term war, so we must be mentally prepared for a long-term war. It is what we hope for the enemy to fight quickly, and if we do that, we can be quite sure of victory if we engage in a decisive battle in our coastal waters. However, I don't think the war will end there, and it may turn into a long-term war. ”

"Even if this happens, it would be advantageous to use the results of victory against a long-term war. On the other hand, it would be painful to turn into a long-term war if there was no decisive battle. Especially because of the lack of supplies, without which a long war could not be fought. Therefore, it is very important to prepare for an invincible position by acquiring supplies and seizing strategic points. ”

Nagano made a very vivid analogy, he said: "It's like a person playing chess in China, and the enemy doesn't have the trick to checkmate us." Even if there is a checkmate trick, as the international situation evolves, there will still be means that can be taken. In short, the war must be fought before it reaches a desperate situation, and it must be decided by our side when it should be started, and it is important that we strike first and move forward courageously, and there is no other way. ”

Obviously, Nagano's analysis conquered the vast majority of people. Prime Minister Konoe and Waiko Toyoda did not express any special objections to the original plan, of course, deep down, Konoe Fumima still did not agree with the war with the United States and Britain and other countries, and the reason why he did not oppose the plan proposed by the army and navy was because he could not influence the decision of the base camp.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Konoe did not deeply consider the impact of this national policy, but still pinned his hopes on opening up the situation through diplomatic talks. Therefore, a group of important ministers of the Japanese cabinet at the meeting passed the bill with only minor amendments to the original bill on the basis of the proposal of Minister Kawakai. (To be continued......)