Chen Hanzhang wanted to brake quickly and concentrate superior firepower in the shortest possible time to solve the idea of the 118th Division first, but it was the main reason why Yang Zhen did not agree with him to do so. In Yang Zhen's view, under the current situation of the entire northwest of Shandong, this is a bit too dangerous.

Even if his movements were fast, it was a division of the Japanese army. Even though this division is a so-called public security division with a two-brigade regimental system, it is after all a fully integrated division and regiment. Even the artillery and other equipment of this division and regiment are inferior to those divisions and regiments of the old qualified three-wing formation.

But it is impossible for this one division to be completely solved in more than ten hours. Especially in the position of the 118th Division, which was not too prominent, and the number of troops he could mobilize was quite limited, it was difficult for him to end the battle before the arrival of Japanese reinforcements.

Judging from the number of troops mobilized by Chen Hanzhang, even if the two brigades of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region on the first line of Guantao are added, they do not have an absolute advantage in terms of troops. If the forces that need reinforcements are eliminated, they can be directly used to encircle and annihilate the strength of the 118th Division, and even at most they can only achieve a ratio of one to one.

This undoubtedly made his quick fix plan to a large extent. Relying on the superiority of firepower, on the terrain of northwestern Shandong, combat operations will indeed be accelerated. But for an army like the Japanese army, superiority in firepower was not the decisive factor in solving the problem.

Once the battle drags on, then the surrounding Japanese forces quickly close in, and the situation will take a sharp turn for the worse. He wanted to deal with the 118th Division in a short period of time, but would the rest of the surrounding Japanese troops move too slowly than him when necessary?

Especially in the case of such a close distance between the battlefields of southern Hebei and northwest Shandong, once the surrounding Japanese army counterattacks, the problem cannot be solved. That is, if you can't fight the tiger, you will suffer from it. After several considerations, Yang Zhen finally did not approve Chen Hanzhang's plan.

On the telegram Yang Zhen sent to Chen Hanzhang, he repeatedly warned him to be steady. The current performance of the 72nd Division will definitely not be an isolated operation, and there must be a different kind of article hidden in it. Judging from the situation of the entire battlefield in northwest Shandong, any action of the Japanese army cannot be regarded as isolated.

At present, it is not clear why the 72nd Division has put on such a formation. We must beware that if we attack the 118th Division first, we will fall into the trap of the Japanese army. At present, we should not act hastily in the course of operational deployment, but should give priority to stability. It is not impossible to attack the 118th Division first, but it is not possible at the moment, and the fighters have not yet reached the most favorable time.

At least on the surface, the distance between the 118th Division and the 72nd Division is still not large enough, and the distance between the 72nd Division to the north is still far from enough. If you really make up your mind to fight the 118th Division, then you still have to find a way to widen the distance between it and the 72nd Division as much as possible.

And the abnormal actions of the 118th Division in the northwestern Shandong battlefield are really eager to open up the connection with the southern Hebei battlefield? Or did the Japanese army consciously throw out the bait and use this 118th Division to pull the entire troop deployment system on the Eastern Front? Or even lure snakes out of their holes and lure the troops of the Eastern Front out of their positions in order to create fighters for them?

In the absence of a real ascertain, any risky action is not rational. Too hasty action could only give the Japanese army an opportunity to mobilize their own forces. Let his nose be led by the Japanese army, and the Japanese army will open up the gap in the deployment of his own troops, and create fighters for the Japanese army.

The Eastern Front cluster is the top priority of this campaign, and it is necessary to calm down when making any determination. That is, do not follow the baton of the Japanese army, and do not be confused by the illusion created by the Japanese army. The current situation in the northwestern Shandong battlefield is far from the time when the final word can be made. Don't always think about a quick victory, and have enough patience to fight the Japanese army.

However, Yang Zhen also asked that Chen Hanzhang must pay close attention to the next move of the 72nd Division. Let Hou Guozhong, who is in charge of the battlefield in northwest Lu, be sure to stare this 72nd Division to death. This 72nd Division will not stay on the front line of Qingliangjiang so honestly, and there will definitely be follow-up actions.

No matter which direction the 118th Division attacks next, the 72nd Division, which is closest to the division, will definitely cooperate. Waiting to see what happens, many times it is not necessarily a bad choice. But on the front line of the museum, we must not relax our vigilance. The next move of the 118th Division is also extremely vigilant.

After the telegram to Chen Hanzhang was sent, Yang Zhen's eyes were fixed on the battlefield in the northwest of Shandong and the battlefield in southern Hebei on the map, two adjacent battlefields. I kept thinking about what kind of thinking the Japanese army was putting on such a posture at the moment.

What kind of connection does the offensive of the 118th Division have with the main force of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, the two divisions on the battlefield in southern Hebei on the line from Quzhou to Anwu, and the 72 nd Division on both sides of the Qingliang River? The Japanese army has put on such a posture in the northwestern battlefield of Shandong, what will be the next target of action?

The red and blue pencils in Yang Zhen's hand drew a line between northwest Lu and southern Hebei on the map. In the surroundings of Quzhou, Jize and Pingxiang, a few circles were drawn. Yongnian's terrain is complex and the surrounding water network is dense, which is quite easy to defend and difficult to attack. At the beginning, it took a lot of effort for the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region to take less than a few thousand puppet troops plus two squads of Japanese troops to hold Yongnian.

Although the Japanese army in southern Hebei advanced in parallel with two divisions and regiments, and also fought fiercely with the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region with a part of its troops, Yongnian was never the main direction of attack. On the contrary, the Japanese army's offensive in the two directions west of Quzhou and Pinghan Road was unusually fierce. The terrain between Quzhou and Guantao is flat, and there is no large river, which can be described as quite easy to attack and difficult to defend.

Judging from the terrain from southern Hebei to northwest Shandong, the actions of the 118th Division in northwest Shandong were simply to open up the connection with the battlefield in southern Hebei? It is somewhat inconceivable that the Japanese army should use a division to open up the connection between two battlefields that are not far away in a straight line when the terrain is favorable and the number of defensive forces is limited.

And as far as the whole battle situation is concerned, it is completely unnecessary. As long as the Japanese army in southern Hebei broke through the Quzhou line, it would be equivalent to advancing hand in hand with the two divisions in the northwestern Shandong battlefield. Moreover, the Japanese army has now taken the entire northwest of Shandong, which has no practical significance for its war situation.

Judging from the forces invested by the Japanese army on the Jinpu and Pinghan lines, its offensive on the Pinghan line was mainly to contain its western cluster. The focus of their attacks has always been along the Jinpu Road. But what is the intention of the Japanese army to do this now? The equal distribution of troops on the front line is a taboo for soldiers, and the Japanese generals will not fail to understand this truth.

Moreover, after the end of the previous stage of the battle, the Japanese army should understand that the current North China battlefield is not the North China battlefield of three or seven years. The situation that they dared to break in alone with one wing was already impossible. But why do they deploy like this?

If the actions of the 118th Division in the northwest of Shandong were just a false shot, the real target would not be Guantao in the west, but Qinghe and Weixian in the north. But the Japanese army hit the museum pottery first, but it went around in a big circle. Attacking from Linqing to Qinghe is more powerful than from the direction of Guantao, both in terms of distance and terrain.

Although Qinghe is on the nodes deployed in the east and west clusters of the Anti-Japanese Federation, it will definitely not need the Japanese army to go around such a big circle from the first line of Guantao. The deployment of the Japanese army in northwest Shandong put on such a strange posture, taking a division as a partial division, which obviously violated the conventional practice, which made Yang Zhen very puzzled.

The red and blue pencils in Yang Zhen's hands slowly extended from southern Hebei to eastern Henan. From Anyang, Tangyin, Jixian, all the way to Kaifeng on the south bank of the Yellow River, the deployment of the Japanese army in eastern Henan was carefully weighed, but nothing abnormal was found in eastern Henan. But when the red and blue pencils in Yang Zhen's hand went around from eastern Henan and turned to northern Henan, he found that he had been ignoring one direction, that is, the battlefield in the southeast of Jin.

Will there be any connection between the Japanese army's efforts in the northwestern Shandong battlefield and the actions of the Japanese army in the battlefields of northern Henan, southern Hebei, and southeastern Shanxi? Is it a strategic coordination with the actions of the Japanese army on the battlefield in the southeast of Jinjin? Could it be that the two battlefields strategically echo each other in order to disrupt their entire troop deployment?

Judging from the telegram sent by the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, the two divisions and regiments deployed by the Japanese army in the southeastern battlefield of Shanxi Province moved extremely quickly and their goals were extremely clear. A division that was attacked by Jincheng was as if it had not seen the troops of the Jin Sui Army that were close at hand. For the Jinsui military defense area west of Jincheng, even the alert troops were not released.

Even along the Qingze Highway behind these two divisions, there were no alert troops to protect their supply lines. Instead, they concentrated all their forces along both sides of the Dan River, with the Qingze Highway as the main offensive route, and rushed and attacked directly in the direction of Changzhi.

Although constrained by the terrain of the Taihang Mountains in the southeast of Shanxi Province, the Japanese army could not hold the entire division into a group, or several divisions and regiments marched in unison, adopting the iron rolling tactics to push flat on the front line, as in the battlefields of northern Henan and northwest Shandong. Instead, they adopted the method of multi-way assault and simultaneous advance, but the Japanese troops on each side were more than one wing. Moreover, the distance between the various divisions of the Japanese army was as narrow as possible.

The Japanese army put on such a posture on the battlefield in the southeast of Shanxi. The two divisions are separated by a shallow water and can easily wade through the Dan River. The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region's plan to take advantage of the favorable terrain in the southeast of Shanxi Province and concentrate superior forces to annihilate the enemy in the course of the movement has come to naught.

On the battlefield east of the Dan River, although the forces of two columns and another brigade were also concentrated, the tactics of mobile ambush were adopted south of Lingchuan Lucun, and a wing of the Japanese army covering the right flank was encircled. And with the strength of two brigades, it was deployed westward along the Dan River in order to contain the main force of the Japanese army in this unit, so as to give the main force the encirclement and annihilation of the wing south of Lucun.

However, the speed of reinforcement of the Japanese troops around it was far beyond imagination. Although under the cover of the fire of the three artillery battalions, relying on the condescending terrain, they ate up half of the Japanese troops in this unit after several charges. However, the Japanese troops who quickly outflanked the other two roads around could only break the siege and evacuate under the siege.

After the battle, the Japanese acted more cautiously. When advancing in the direction of Changzhi, its various units adopted the tactics of front-line horizontal push as much as possible. Except for the shallow and deep detour when encountering an attack, there is no strategy of outflanking in large depth at all.

After breaking through the blockade in front of him, he did not pursue the withdrawn blockade troops in any way, but only attacked desperately in the direction of Changzhi. Even though they suffered a loss west of the Dan River, the Japanese army did not take any retaliatory action in an extremely rare way, and after rescuing the unit, they continued to attack in the direction of North Changzhi.