Rokossovsky absolutely did not expect that he had attracted the attention of Guderian, and at this time he was worried about the shortage of troops, especially technical equipment, and on the other hand, he was not very satisfied with the instructions given by the front.

As a marginal presence of the Ukrainian Front, the 6th Army is actually fighting in Belarus, and its mission is also to garrison the south of Belarus and prevent the second tank group from penetrating deep into Russian territory. After completing this task, the 6th Army was to hand over the defense area to the 16th Army, which was the reserve of the military district, and then move south as a whole to Kyiv with its brother troops in an effort to reopen contact with Kyiv.

As Rokossovsky's superiors, Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko understood the strategic concept of the commander of the military district that it was for the 6th Army to hold on to Mozyr and Kalinkovich and block Guderian. In their opinion, the 6th Army must be nailed to Kalinkovich and must not take a step back.

So are Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko correct in their understanding? It should be said that they did not correctly grasp the true intentions of Triandafilov. As the actual creator of the Soviet Red Army's theory of large-depth operations, a very important reason why Triandafilov invented this theory was that he did not agree with the tactics of hand-to-hand combat around the entire front of World War I. In his opinion, trench warfare is simply a desecration of the art of war, and if all military personnel understand war as a form, then war is not an art, but a mechanized formula and dogma.

Trian Dafilov believes that war should not be such stupid appearance, and that modern war should be moved. A modern army must have considerable mobility and assault capabilities. Even if it's on the defensive. It's not a stupid hard fight. Defensive tactics are also an art, not that when defending, you can only stick to a point or a line, and defense can also be moved.

In Triandafilov's view, it was unrealistic, or even impossible, for the half-crippled 6th Army and the 16th Army in the process of rearmament to hold the Mozyri line and hold Guderian's second tank cluster motionless.

Therefore, the instructions he gave to the Ukrainian Front were: it is planned to use the 6th Army to conduct active defensive operations in the Mozyr area, delay the enemy's second tank group to continue to advance in the direction of Russia, and must not let the enemy cross the Dnieper River one step. Hold out for at least twenty days, after which it was replaced by the 16th Army.

It seems that this order is to let the 6th Army hold on to Moziri, but there is an article in this, first of all, Triandafilov used the term Mozili region, and Mozili and Mozili are completely two different concepts. It would be a mistake to understand the Mozyri region as two small districts, the cities of Mozyr and Kalinković.

If such a mistake was made, there was only one way left for the 6th Army, to hold on to Mozyri and Kalinkovich. Unfortunately, Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko understood it this way, so the task they conveyed to the 6th Army was to hold Mozyr and Kalinkovich to the death. There must not be a step back, and the deadline is twenty days.

Secondly. Trian Dafilov was also worried that the people below would not understand his original intention, and specifically pointed out the Dnieper, knowing that Mozyr is still some distance from the Dnieper, which is equivalent to demarcating a relatively large defensive depth.

Obviously, according to Triandafilov's original intention, he probably hoped that the 6th Army would make full use of the advantages of space, exchange space for time, and hope that they would not be hard capped, but would achieve combat missions in a smart way.

To put it bluntly, Trian Dafilov hoped that the 6th Army would conduct an active defensive operation on the line from Mozyr to Gomel, entangled Guderian, and waited for the 16th Army and other fraternal units to complete the adjustment, and then to attack the 2nd tank group. Instead of letting the 6th Group go head-to-head with the 2nd Tank Group at the beginning.

That is to say, in Triandafilov's view, neither Mozyr nor Kalinkovich has no value in holding on, these two cities can be abandoned, his bottom line is the Dnieper, as long as the German armored cluster is not allowed to cross the Dnieper, Rokossovsky can play to his heart's content.

If the order finally conveyed to Rokossovsky was Triandafilov's original intention, the 6th Army would have been much easier later, and with Rokossovsky's military quality and ingenuity, I am afraid that this task would have been successfully accomplished.

The problem is that after the command of the Ukrainian Front was ordered to Guò, and then interpreted in their own way by Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko, all the painstaking efforts of Triandafilov, who failed to correctly "understand" Triandafilov's intentions, were all in vain.

There may be comrades who want to say it, Terry Andafilov, you too, why don't you make the order clear, break the words and crumple them and make it clear, isn't it just like this? Looking at it this way, the responsibility is on Trianda Filov who doesn't speak human words?

No, a military order is not a contract, and it is not something that must be unconditionally executed after it has been signed by both parties. Because the battlefield is not static, it is not a computer program, every step is interlocking. On the contrary, the battlefield is full of uncertain factors, and it is impossible for any combat order or combat plan to be exhaustive.

In this case, when a superior gives an order to a subordinate, it will not stipulate a particularly clear and detailed "quantity", but will give a certain amount of room for flexibility. Especially when it comes to the strategic level, careful ordering is generally considered as appropriate.

However, this time Triandafilov deliberately did not make it very clear, not entirely for the above reasons, although there are but not the main ones. The reason for Triandafilov's ambiguity comes from pressure from above.

After the end of the Brest blockade, the main forces of the Red Army basically shrank to the Minsk line, and half of Belarus was occupied by the German army. After all, the Germans did not enter the territory of Russia in World War I, did they?

So. The Politburo drew a red line. Asking Triandafilov to stabilize the front line in Belarus and Ukraine, even earlier, that is, to demand that Minsk and Kiev must be held, and it is best not to lose an inch of territory from now on, of course, the Politburo has also given a certain amount of space, and its bottom line is the Dnieper, stipulating that the German army must be blocked in the area west of the Dnieper.

This red line made Triandafilov a little unhappy. Judging from his experience during the civil war, if we want to defeat the strong with the weak and win the big with the small, we must make rational use of the large depth of the Soviet Union's territory, not stick to one city or one pool, and mobilize the enemy extensively, preferably by using a long front to disperse the enemy's superior forces. The Red Army, on the other hand, took advantage of the mechanization superiority that had been basically established before the war to quickly and efficiently hit superior forces to fight a war of annihilation.

Terry Andafilov believes that as long as this set of tactics is carried out. It was inevitable that the German front could be torn apart, and then the enemy would be eaten bite by bite. And now. The Central Military Commission drew a red line for him and stipulated that he must not step on the line. And from the extent of this red line, there is simply not enough space to achieve the purpose of dispersing the German army. In particular, he was quite dissatisfied with the Politburo's demand for not giving an inch, believing that this was simply a fool's behavior.

No matter how dissatisfied Triandafilov was, he could only carry out this order, and even in order to carry out the instructions of the Politburo, he had to order the political commissars to do propaganda and agitation work against his will, encouraging the fighters to fight bloodily to defend every inch of the Soviet Union.

Of course, Trian Dafilov was unwilling to carry out such a rigid demand, and he could not openly contradict the Politburo, so he had no choice but to express this intention very vaguely.

To put it bluntly, it's a workaround. It is a reasonable way for front-line generals to circumvent the unreasonable orders of their superiors, and it can only be understood but not spoken. So why didn't Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko understand?

Well, it's not that they don't understand Triandafilov's painstaking efforts, but that they can't convey orders like this. First of all, Triandafilov's behavior is a side-kick, which is quite dangerous, and if there is a mistake, it is likely to kill himself. It would have been a lot of fun if the people below thought that Triandafilov had acquiesced in their retreat and retreated to the east bank of the Dnieper without firing a shot.

Anyway, Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko did not dare to gamble like this, and they were afraid of taking responsibility. After all, they don't have such a hard backstage as Trian Dafilov, and Li Xiaofeng is the little one who protects them, so the black pot must be carried by them, which really can't be hurt.

Secondly, Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko believe that even if they retreat to the Dnieper, the space for this section is still too small to buy much time. What if the Germans rushed to the banks of the Dnieper in one breath and did not give you much time at all? You must know that the advance speed of the second tank cluster is still very fast, and this distance is not a problem at all.

Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko were worried that if the Dnieper line of defense was lost, the Germans would quickly advance into Russian territory, and then the Politburo would be able to spare them?

Together, the two of them thought that according to Triandafilov's plan, it was too risky. It is better to give Rokossovsky a death order, and let the 6th Army die in Mozyri, and if it can resist for a day, it will be counted as a day. Even if it can't bear the collapse in the end, the Politburo cannot accuse the Ukrainian Front of not doing its best, let alone saying that the Ukrainian Front has violated the instructions of the Politburo. And even if Mozyr collapses, isn't there still the Dnieper line, and the 16th Army? Let them go up again, maybe they can really hold the Germans off the other side of the Dnieper?

Based on such considerations, Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko gave Rokossovsky the order to die. It seems that these two people seem to lack responsibility, and they feel a little useless. But then again, with the state of these two at the time, I am afraid that this is the only way to do it.

The reason is simple, look at what state Shaposhnikov was at this time? Although he is the commander of the Ukrainian Front, to be honest, he does not have a strong backer, whether it is a Trotskyist or a Leninist, he cannot be relied on, and his small shoulders are naturally a little soft.

It is not only a question of backing, but it must also be noted that the Ukrainian Front has suffered great losses before, allowing the German Army Group South to occupy most of Ukraine and besieging Kyiv. Although a large part of the blame for this lies in Tukhachevsky's blind command. But Tukhachevsky has backers. It's still very good. And Shaposhnikov is a bare pole, and even sharing a little responsibility can make Shaposhnikov unable to eat and walk around. It's all too normal for him to be cautious.

Look at Timoshenko again, this is even more lame than Shaposhnikov, belongs to the remnants of the Stalinist clique that was overthrown, is a mess in politics, belongs to the kind of poor worm who can find a bunch of problems and deal with them casually if there is no problem, is he wrong to choose Mingzhe to protect himself?

To put it bluntly, taking on this thing does not mean that there is one. Either you can spare your life, or you have to have a big umbrella. Unfortunately, the vast majority of people in the world do not have these two items, so it is normal to not take responsibility.

How to adapt to this state of not being responsible, and make a career in this extremely unfavorable situation, that is, the difference between mediocre and cattle. Rokossovsky, on the other hand, belongs to the latter group, and in the face of such extremely unfavorable conditions, he did not complain, let alone sit still, but actively used his brains to find a solution.

How to break the chains that bound him. Trying to get as good as possible for himself is his first priority.

Rokossovsky did a good job. He knew quite well that if he was stupid enough to defend it, there would definitely be no bones left, but he couldn't give up on Mojiri and retreat, so he took a compromise approach.

Split the troops at hand in two and regrouped, leaving the incapable infantry in Mozyr and Kalinkovich for street fighting. And the most elite armored units (except for the basically useless part of the T-26) were withdrawn and placed after Kalinkovich to rest and prepare for battle.

"I can only rely on the city to consume the momentum of the enemy's armored forces and disrupt the enemy's rhythm with a small counterattack at the right time......," Rokossovsky later recalled, "Of course, it was not enough to do this, after all, the strength of the 6th Army was really limited, and I realized that there was no solution to the problem of troops." ”

Unfortunately, Rokossovsky could not have received reinforcements from his superiors, and at this time the Red Army generally felt that its forces were stretched and it was impossible to draw out excess forces in either direction. In desperation, Rokossovsky had no choice but to use local materials.

"We have conscripted a large number of citizens to take on the task of building fortifications and monitoring and watching."

This group of temporarily conscripted militia numbered more than 50,000 people, and these lovely working people rushed to repair three lines of defense in a very short period of time, and the hidden bunkers, anti-tank trenches, and firing points were all over every corner of the city, and the depth of defense was as high as 40 kilometers.

A considerable part of the militia also directly assumed the garrison task, and Kalinkovich alone organized 50 militia battalions (100-200 men each), although the combat effectiveness could not be compared with the regular army, street fighting in well-fortified cities could still cause great problems for the German army.

Officially, these valuable militias filled the shortcomings of the 6th Army's tight forces, allowing Rokossovsky to concentrate the main forces in more critical directions and maintain a fairly strong reserve, which was the main reason why the 6th Army was able to hold on.

September 29, 1941. The 10th and 28th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the German 2nd Tank Group, stationed outside Kalinkovich, fired the first shots at the beginning of the German general offensive. At 3 a.m. the engineer unit to which it belonged began to clear the barbed wire and minefields of the road ahead, while the main attacking force, without artillery preparation (since there had been continuous shelling, there was no need for artillery preparation), launched a full-scale attack along the road opened by the engineer half an hour later.

Rokossovsky's first line of defense on the perimeter was not as strong as expected, and it was soon torn open by the enemy's 10th Motorized Infantry Division, and the German grenadiers swarmed in.

The report on the battle at the front that Guderian received that morning was rather optimistic: "Our army is progressing smoothly, the enemy's resistance is not very stubborn, and it is expected that the planned goal will be achieved at 2 p.m. ”

However, the Germans were a little too early in the morning, and in the afternoon, Rokossovsky, who had figured out the direction of the German main attack, immediately ordered the mobile troops remaining in Kalinkovich to counterattack.

In the midst of the confusion, the Germans relinquished the positions they had seized in the morning. This made Guderian frown: "I knew before that today's battle might not go well." We were dealing with a well-prepared and well-prepared Bolshevik supporter. They are extremely fanatical about fighting, and more than once there have been madmen chanting slogans and carrying explosive packs to destroy our tanks......"

Guderian had an ominous premonition of the future battle, and in his report to his superior, Marshal Bock, he said: "The partisans are very active, our army is not well supplied, and the enemy is very tenacious, and judging from the recent changes in the battlefield, it seems that the Bolsheviks are constantly increasing their troops to the front, which shows that they are far from being exhausted, and our army must be prepared for a long battle." (To be continued......)

PS: Bow and thank you for drinking a thousand cups of people who are not drunk, Admiral Hood, Chuanliu Huagui, sweet potatoes in the melon field, book friend 150814121247095 and Comrade Juventus!