Tukhachevsky was in a bad mood, and the Salefa River operation lasted for five days, as a result, the troops not only failed to approach the 3rd and 10th armies under siege, but were repulsed step by step by the German troops that pressed down, and they were getting farther and farther away from the Red Army in the encirclement.

It was not only a matter of distance, but even more terrifying was the fact that the Red Army counterattack troops were under unprecedented pressure. Let's put it this way, the Red Army units at the front are like a dam, and the Germans are floods, and the current situation is that the dam can no longer stop the flood, and it is entirely possible that not only will the embankment gradually begin to overflow, but even the embankment will collapse.

In this case, Tukhachevsky understood even how stupid he was, the Salefa operation was a complete failure! What he needed to do now was not how to rescue the Third and Tenth Armies, but how to safely evacuate the troops on the front line who were confronting the Germans.

But this is not simple, and the reason is also very simple, whoever let Tukhachevsky stud before, gambling will inevitably pay a price. With Tukhachevsky's military literacy, he knew that this time the Red Army was bleeding again?

Even the most optimistic estimates, this time it will have to be at least 10 divisions, if you add the 3rd, 10th and 12th divisions in the encirclement and the 12 divisions that have been annihilated in southern Ukraine, that is, within a month of the start of the war, the Red Army under his command reimbursed 40 divisions, which is a small 800,000 people.

With the total strength of 6 million troops at the time of the Red Army's war, this one lost one-sixth of the stud. If he is held accountable, he, the chief of the General Staff, will definitely have to take the blame and resign. Of course, Tukhachevsky was not afraid to take responsibility when making the decision of the stud. That's how he realized it.

What really disappointed and annoyed Tukhachevsky was. How could his great in-depth operations not be able to do the German blitzkrieg? Let the proud Tukhachevsky admit that he is inferior to Guderian and his ilk, Manstein and his ilk. It would be better to shoot him directly in the head. After all these ups and downs, the only thing Tukhachevsky paid attention to was the war theory he left behind, and how much he wanted to carry it forward with his own hands!

It's a pity that he has basically failed, so how did he fail? Tukhachevsky had been pondering this question since August 1941, and after a long period of reflection and summing up, he came to a conclusion -- there was nothing wrong with the theory of large-depth operations. This is a rather advanced set of theories of war, and it is absolutely correct!

Let's not talk about whether this conclusion is really correct, let's continue to look at Tu Shuai's next summary, he believes that the fundamental reason for the disappointment of the Red Army in the early days of the Great Patriotic War is: first, it did not effectively abide by the theory of large-depth operations.

He said: If, before the Germans declare war, we can take the initiative to attack as Comrade Trotsky envisioned, if we can take advantage of the fact that the main German forces are trapped in France. The result will be different! At that time, the whole world will see the power of the Red Army's operations in great depth, and not be fooled by the so-called lightning tactics of Germany.

The problem of the Red Army was that it was interfered with by the Politburo, and it was never able to make up its mind to stretch out its fists and hit people. As a result, when the Germans provoked a war, they could only passively parry.

Even. Tukhachevsky pointed the finger at Sverdlov and Li Xiaofeng: "These two comrades lack the ability to make decisions, hesitate to make up their minds, and sit back and watch the Red Army miss the fighter, and should bear the main responsibility!" ”

That's Tukhachevsky's first lesson – the pig teammates are dragging their feet. Don't worry, according to Tukhachevsky's observations and personal feelings, another important reason for the subsequent series of huge failures was man-made disasters!

Yes, Tukhachevsky believed that there was nothing wrong with the two large-scale counterattacks he planned, and that the timing was skillful, the ingenuity of his planning, and the suddenness of his planning were rare in the history of world warfare.

So why did the end result be so bad? Tukhachevsky vented indignantly in his memoirs: "When the battle plan left the General Staff and was distributed to the Ukrainian Front, it was resolutely opposed by the conservatives led by Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko. Although with the help of Comrade Trotsky, they did not dare to confront the Military Commission and the Politburo, but they always acted in disobedience. Especially Andrey. Petrolevich, this comrade always looked at me unpleasantly, instructed his clique to secretly drag his feet, and directly led a series of unpleasant problems. Especially after the start of the counteroffensive on the Salefa River, Andrei. Petrovich was even more directly and openly opposed to the decisions of the Military Commissar and the Politburo, and it is well known that his clique was already very powerful at that time, and even Comrade Trotsky's repeated work would not help. ”

Writing this, Tukhachevsky seems to be in an inexplicable indignation, and vigorously attacked Li Xiaofeng: "With Andrei. The bureaucracy and the new military bloc headed by Petrovich completely ruined the possibility of defeating the fascists in the early days of the war, made the war protracted, and inflicted huge losses on the USSR! ”

In 1959, when Tukhachevsky was preparing to publish his memoir entitled "Forgotten History - Tukhachevsky's Personal Experiences of the Great Patriotic War", when the first draft was submitted for deliberation, Shaposhnikov, the director of the General Political Department, who saw the sample, had a crooked nose and was about to shoot the book with a stroke of his pen.

However, a certain immortal, who was the chairman of the Military Commission at the time, did not agree, but collected the book, along with the memoirs of other Soviet generals, in the "Personal Accounts of the Great Patriotic War". This set of personal accounts of the Great Patriotic War includes comprehensive memories of Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Blyukher, Egorov, Ubolevich, Triandafilov and other generals.

Tukhachevsky's accusations are not at all visible in the recollections of other marshals, on the contrary, they are more unanimous in their statement: "The main reason for the huge losses of the Red Army in the early stage of the Great Patriotic War was the unrealistic and whimsical insistence on blind counterattacks by certain comrades, who constantly sent large numbers of Red Army generals to the enemy's mouth, which was even more infuriating." Some people are not only unrepentant but also introspective. He also made a big statement. It's shameless! ”

Among them, the most harsh was Triandafilov, who, in his memoirs, denounced Tukhachevsky as a national thief and shook out all the mistakes made in the early days of the Great Patriotic War. As for Arksnis, who had the greatest contradiction with Tukhachevsky, he also made up for it, calling Tukhachevsky a typical example of blind command regardless of the actual situation, believing that the Great Patriotic War could indeed have fewer casualties, and if it could honestly rely on the inherent positions to consume the German army, and then counterattack, the war could be ended in 1942. And it was precisely Tukhachevsky's recklessness that buried this possibility!

Anyway, before Tukhachevsky published his book, he was not a street rat, and as soon as his book was released, he really turned against his old friends and subordinates. The reason is very simple, these people are not used to Tu Shuai's method of shirking responsibility, and they are not satisfied with his attitude of pretending to be drunk and sober in the world.

Even some of them wrote to the Military Commission without discipline, demanding that Tukhachevsky be severely held accountable for his crimes in the early days of the Great Patriotic War, and that he must be given a little color. However, this construction was rejected by Li Xiaofeng, and Yakov was still very incomprehensible at that time: "Why do you want to cheapen him?" ”

Li Xiaofeng said with a smile: "It's very simple to kill Tukhachevsky or lock him up." But what are the benefits of doing so? Punishing him is tantamount to writing off his past mistakes. Posterity will only remember his merits, and hang him out to make a fool of himself. Posterity will only remember his ugliness. Wouldn't it be better to let him make a quiet fool of himself? ”

A certain immortal is really evil, or Tukhachevsky is really unlucky, there is nothing wrong with writing memoirs to elevate himself and belittle the enemy, anyway, everyone does it. The only caveat is that when most of your enemies are still alive, don't publish it, or you'll be humiliating.

Look at how smart Manstein was, was that book he wrote, "Lost Victory", really objective? I don't think so, and there's nothing wrong with calling it "Failure Is Not My Fault" or "The Art of Dumping the Pot". Anyway, in his book, except for Manstein, the rest of the people are stupid, for example, Hitler is a big fool, Paulus is also a big fool, Maozi is a big fool (except that there are many people), and Americans are all fools (there is a kind of heads-up). Anyway, this memoir of bullying dead people who can't talk is really quite political, "art".

While Tukhachevsky was agonizing over how to safely withdraw his troops from the line of fire, the "Broken Leg 2" operation, which was jointly led by the Navy and Air Force, had also been launched. 100 Tu-3 and 48 Pe-8 were escorted by Pe-2 fighters to cross the Baltic Sea straight to Naben.

It was a bright moonlit night, the moon was bright and the stars were thin, and bombers and fighter planes roared into the dark sky, and quickly disappeared into the sky. Although the main forces of the Luftwaffe had been diverted through Operation Guò, in order to reduce the losses of the bomber formation, the operation would be dominated by low-altitude flights.

The formation will pass through Denmark and Sweden at a height of less than five hundred meters. After arriving on the Norwegian coast, they pulled up the search targets and then carried out low-altitude bombing. Truth be told, this is quite demanding for pilots and navigators. The Air Force almost all the experienced pilots were evacuated to form the formation.

Even so, before launching the operation, the Air Force ordered pilots to intensify their training in low-altitude flight and bomb dropping. As mentioned earlier, low-altitude flight is to avoid the German radar, but why is low-altitude bombing?

After all, both the Tu-3 and the Pe-8 are high-altitude bombers, and the low-altitude performance is really not very good. In fact, there is only one reason why low-altitude bombs are required, that is, precision strikes are aimed at accurately destroying the Knaben molybdenum mine, and high-altitude bombing is difficult to completely destroy the mine unless the number of bombs is enough to cover it in a carpet manner.

However, this novel flight training was soon met with strong protests from the state farms around Leningrad, saying that the low-flying bombers had frightened their cows and hens, causing their milk and egg production to plummet, which severely affected their production plans for the year!

Fortunately, this plan was directly ordered by the Military Commission, and the protests on the farm soon died down, and the Air Force did not have so much time for intensive training. On 30 July, the bombing campaign began with certainty.

In order to help the pilots find all the pits of the Knaben molybdenum mine exactly, the Air Force conducted meticulous aerial reconnaissance and the KGB secretly infiltrated and photographed, and finally produced a highly realistic model that not only included the pit, but also reflected the situation around the mine in detail. It greatly facilitates the pilot's identification of targets.

It's not just a model. Even the Air Force set up cameras directly on reconnaissance aircraft. All the important navigation markers along the way and the topography of the Knaben molybdenum mine were filmed and shown to the pilots on the night of the attack. This greatly deepened the pilots' knowledge of Knaben, allowing them to accurately identify and destroy these pits.

The preparations before the bombing should be said to be quite meticulous, but the top brass of the Air Force, including Arksnis, still did not dare to take it lightly, and even prepared for the worst: "Half of the planes are expected to be shot down!" ”

The roar of the engines was deafening, and the plane vibrated at the end of the runway, as if it was about to shake every part of the fuselage out. The ground crew, who had been busy for a long time, had almost loaded the bombs into the bomb bay.

After a qiē is ready. Pilots, bombardiers, navigators, and machine gunners began to board the plane, which was far less pleasant than in later generations when flying in an airplane. The bombardiers, navigators, and machine gunners were forced to crouch, almost clasping their hands on their knees, to reach the guò front wheel bay, and then walk sideways to their positions. Don't think how spacious this position is, it's actually very small and cramped, and you need to squeeze in.

The bombardier squats on a small stool next to the shooter and observes the bomb field of view, or sits directly on the floor. The navigator sits on a very small stool, which is actually too small to sit on. The rest of the crew climbed into the plane through the bomb bay door, then through the narrow aisle, moving forward to the cockpit or backward to the rest of the fuselage.

The take-off is quite smooth. In good weather, it takes little effort to form the expected formation. At the front of the platoon, the commander of the 1st Squadron, Congreve, locked his car at 240 km/h, and in his plane sat the former commander-in-chief of the enemy's long-range aviation, Major General Lavinsky.

At about three o'clock, the group began to leave Königsberg and enter the Baltic Sea, and when the last planes entered the Baltic Sea, a blinding puff of black smoke could be seen rising from the sea level, at which point the first casualty of the operation, the Pe-8 bomber codenamed "Red Union".

This was only the beginning, and the Red Army pilots would have more trouble before the group finally reached the skies over Knabaen. In general, it is inevitable that there will always be unexpected discrepancies between plans and actual actions. However, such unlucky as Operation Severed Leg-2 is quite rare.

When flying near Denmark, the formation's eyes were lost, three navigators, one crashed, and two were forced to return due to mechanical problems. The loss of three navigators in an instant caught Major Congreve off guard. In desperation, he could only reluctantly pick up this burden.

For long-distance air strikes, a good navigator is half the battle, he must be experienced, calm and courageous, and not let his judgment be interfered with by bad weather, difficult terrain, heavy artillery fire, and other unexpected factors. It is a pity that Major Congreve is a qualified squadron leader, but not a qualified navigator.

In addition to problems with the pilot, close to 20 bombers and fighters were intermittently withdrawn from the formation. The last one to be abandoned was the Tu-3, nicknamed the "Iron Fist of the Workers". It was only 200 kilometers from Knapen at the time, but there he could not hold on, because the oil supply pipe was blocked, the two engines of the guide were stalled, and the captain had to drop the bomb and struggled back to Königsberg.

At about 5 a.m., the group entered Norwegian airspace as planned, and at this point the climb began, and it was at this point that bad luck struck again. Major Congreve could see a huge cumulonimbus cloud coming towards the group at an altitude of 3,000 meters, which led to a series of chaos in the group.

Faced with cumulonimbus clouds that rushed like mountains, Major Congreve ordered the group to form a column and pass through the gaps in the clouds. Regrouping in bad weather is obviously time-consuming and confusing. As a result, the connection between the Tu-3 and the Pe-8 and the escort Pe-2 was severed and almost no contact was lost.

And even worse was to come, because the Red Army fighters were not equipped with wipers, and the torrential rain blurred the vision, and the pilots almost had to put their faces on the windshield to observe.

After this toss, the pilots were exhausted, and the group was forced to distance themselves. And the highly nervous amateur navigator, Major Congreev, also made a mistake, he miscalculated the speed and flew directly over Knaben!

Note that it was not that no one noticed Congreve's mistake at that time, but in order to ensure the suddenness of the air attack, the formation had to implement strict radio control, and the other squadron leaders who followed Congreve could only stare dryly.

This also directly led to the air raid operation being divided into two waves, the Pe-8 and some Tu-3 that lagged behind, about 60 of which pounced on Knaben first after Congreve corrected his mistake, and in the morning wind, they quickly lowered their altitude, aimed at Knaben's pit and dived, until they reduced their flight altitude to 150 meters before they began to drop bombs!

The first wave of attacks took the Germans by surprise, and when the whistling aerial bombs fell from the sky, they were either asleep or had just been laid off with a yawn, and when the loud roar shook the earth of Knaben, they hurried out of the barracks and ran to their positions...... (To be continued......)

PS: Bow and thank you to the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Plane Wanted, Wasters, Millionaires and Comrades hzwangdd!