In Chen Hanzhang's view, the Japanese army has come up with such a deployment method as a whole. Not counting the two divisions attacking southeastern Shanxi, from northern Henan to Bohai Bay, several divisions and regiments marched in unison under the cover of planes and tanks and heavy artillery, and it was indeed quite terrifying in terms of momentum.

However, this kind of desperate gamble in the entire deployment, in which victory is a strategic goal, and the practice of not hesitating to end up at the same end has also given itself considerable room for maneuver and operation. In the entire Shandong battlefield, as long as one of the two routes of the Japanese army is defeated, and then the characteristics of the strong mobility of their troops can be brought into play. Breaking into the back of the Japanese front, there is a lot to be done about this.

As long as he is in the front of northern Lubei, he can entangle the main force of the Japanese army to the death. Even if he was on the battlefield west of Texas, he made a buckle for the 72nd Division, and consciously made the 72nd Division move like a bamboo. However, unless the Japanese army abandons the blockade of the Jiaodong Peninsula, it will be difficult for the Japanese army to withdraw troops to support or cooperate with the 72nd Division.

As long as the 72nd Division is solved by itself, even if the Japanese army urgently transfers a division from the front of Lubei to plug this gap. Then you can also push the front line that the Japanese army originally adopted in northern Lubei, and pull the tactics of tightly hugging together, pulling a mess. When the time comes, it will no longer be difficult to find fighters to strike at them.

However, this premise is that when the 72nd Division is sent north, there will be no accidents on the north bank of the Maji River and the frontal defense of Dezhou, and the Japanese army on the front of Lubei will not be given any chance. And it is necessary to be entangled to the Japanese divisions that attacked from the north of Lubei.

Otherwise, when the time comes, the depth will be threatened, and the direct contact with the West Cluster will be cut off from itself. It became a failure to fight the tiger, and he suffered from it. As for the Bohai Bay line, although it is its most fatal weak point. But with Du Kaishan in Bohai Bay, Chen Hanzhang is not worried.

This time, Du Kaishan, who was beaten and cut by No. 1 and cleaned up a lot, presumably the old problem will not be made again. Even if it can't solve the problem at the root, it will at least converge for a while. As long as Du Kaishan can honestly sit in Bohai Bay, with his own ability, Chen Hanzhang is still quite relieved.

Of course, Chen Hanzhang put the target of the first wave on the 72nd Division in front of Xia Jin, which was also carefully considered. The three divisions of the Japanese army in northern Lubei adopted the tactics of pushing flat on the front line, and the spacing between their attacks was extremely narrow, and they adopted the tactics of attacking in groups.

Not only is it difficult to find fighters by themselves, but even if they find an opportunity to encircle one of them, it will be difficult to complete the total annihilation in a short period of time when the surrounding Japanese troops are hugging each other. If you don't make sure that your main force is not good, you will be entangled by the Japanese army. The most important thing is that on the Shouguang-Yantai highway east of northern Lubei, there is still a division of the Japanese army.

In this way, the strategic landscape appears too narrow. Compared with the battlefield in northern Shandong, the room for maneuver in the battlefield in northwest Shandong is much greater. The two divisions deployed by the Japanese army in this area are actually equivalent to partial divisions. The two divisions each had their own direction of attack, which brought relatively convenient conditions for their own penetration.

And another reason why Chen Hanzhang decided to put the first wave of counterattack on the head of the 72nd Division is much simpler. The division is not only in the direction of the attack, but also in its own position, which is exactly at the junction between the Japanese army in northwestern Shandong and the Japanese army in northern Lu. If the 72nd Division is dealt with first, there will be much more room for maneuver.

In fact, according to Chen Hanzhang's idea, once the Japanese army launched a counteroffensive on the whole front. He took a solid defense on the line from Dezhou to Qingyun, and adopted the tactics of continuous resistance in the northwest of Shandong. Widening the distance between the Japanese army in northwestern Shandong and the Japanese army in northern Shandong, forming a salient at the junction of northwestern Shandong and southeastern Hebei, they looked for fighters to deal with the enemy attacking in the northwest direction of Shandong in one go.

At that time, his goal was not just a 72nd Division. It was the strength of the three divisions that the Japanese army would have invested in the battlefield in northwest Lu, and according to his prediction, it would not exceed all the strength of the three divisions. As long as the enemy forces in the northwest direction of Lu are resolved, it is equivalent to opening a large gap in the entire front of the Japanese attack.

At that time, he was mobilizing reserves, strengthening all the tank forces in his hands, breaking through the canal line from the northwest of Shandong, and outflanking the enemy in Texas in the southeast. Cut off the connection between the Japanese army in northern Lubei and the enemy in Yanzhou, and reopen the ground connection with the Shandong Military Region.

Chen Hanzhang's plan was formulated according to Yang Zhen's plan for the overall deployment of the second phase of the battle. The two large triangular defensive postures deployed by Yang Zhen between the Pinghan Line and the Jinpu Line, with sufficient troops in depth, just gave him this prerequisite for the implementation of this plan.

The deployment of troops in the west of Hengshui in the western cluster can reassure him to attract the Japanese army in northwest Lu to depth, and open the gap between the Japanese army attacking the Japanese army in northern Lu and his own offensive posture. And the bigger this gap, the more beneficial it is for Chen Hanzhang.

However, if Chen Hanzhang's idea is followed, it will require the full cooperation of the main forces of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. Otherwise, it will be difficult for him to mobilize enough troops to carry out this plan while maintaining positive stability. Although Yang Zhen mobilized powerful ground artillery for him, he still needed infantry to solve the battlefield.

The most important thing is that the main force of the tank force is in the hands of Du Kaishan, and he only has an armored brigade and several tank independent regiments in his hands, and the assault force is relatively thin, so Chen Hanzhang can only find a way to replace it with infantry. It's just that at present, the entire operational plan originally drawn up by No. 1 has been adjusted to a certain extent within the operational scope of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region.

Chen Hanzhang, who knew where the No. 1 difficulty was, could only choose to solve one of the two Japanese troops in the northwest battlefield of Shandong Province first under the condition of insufficient troops. As for the remaining part of the Japanese army, it can only be mainly pinned down for the time being. But in Chen Hanzhang's plan, Chen Hanzhang also prepared a very careful plan for the Japanese army on the front line of Linqing.

In fact, in Yang Zhen's original plan, when the troops of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region launched a full-line counterattack by the Japanese army, in addition to resisting along the Pinghan Line with a part of the troops, most of the troops gave way to the front of southern Hebei and moved to the west of Pinghan Road and northwest Shandong. After the main force of the Japanese army passed, it took advantage of its superiority in mobile warfare.

The three brigades that jumped to the west of the Pinghan Line were used to outflank the rear of the Japanese army, and cooperated with the two military divisions in northern Henan to open up direct contact with the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army in the Henan-Anhui Soviet region, and cut off the connection between the Japanese army in front of them and the eastern Henan region. Cooperate with the anti-coalition forces deployed in the depth of the Western Front to encircle and annihilate the Japanese army on the Western Front.

The anti-coalition troops deployed behind the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region took advantage of the congenital geographical conditions of the water network in the upper reaches of the Fuyang River to divide the Japanese attack sequence in order to find the most favorable fighters for the encirclement and annihilation battle. Yang Zhen's plan was to use the enemy on the Western Front to attract some Japanese troops on the Eastern Front, and to solve the enemy on the Western Front first on the premise of reducing the burden on the Eastern Front.

At the same time, the troops transferred to the northwestern region of Shandong Province will cooperate with the troops that originally remained in the northwestern region of Shandong to ensure the defense of the northwestern Shandong region and cooperate with the combat operations of Chen Hanzhang's unit in the Hebei-Shandong border area. However, for Yang Zhen's deployment, the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region resolutely disagreed.

Their intention still depends on the situation, if the Japanese army invests too many troops in northern Henan, they will adopt a force to block the attack layer by layer, and weaken and delay the Japanese army as much as possible. In order to ensure the flank of the Shanxi battlefield, at the same time, for the second line of anti-coalition forces to completely solve the Japanese army to fight for the largest fighters.

And if the number is less than two divisions, it is still necessary to resolutely fight a battle with the Japanese army in the border area of Hebei, Shandong, and Henan, taking advantage of its familiarity with the terrain. The Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region believes that now that the troops are equipped with equipment, if the Japanese army comes, it will be detrimental to the morale of the troops and the restoration of popular support.

His own troops have been operating in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region, and they are not only familiar with the geographical environment, but also have an innate intelligence advantage. There are two more in the northern Henan region, which have already controlled the armed forces of most military divisions in northern Henan, except for the Pinghan line, and can cooperate in operations, and this is the advantage of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region.

At the same time, it fought in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area, and as far as possible, the forces invested by the Japanese army were contained in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area, and the main combat scope of the Japanese army's offensive in southern and northern Henan was limited to the southern Hebei region. It will curb its superiority in battlefield mobility and greatly reduce the pressure on the flanks of the Shanxi and Shandong battlefields.

The most important thing is that the head of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region believes that there is still a considerable distance from the front line of Handan to the battlefield preset by the Anti-Japanese Union for the Japanese army. If the main force of the Japanese army is allowed to go north along the Pinghan Line with all its might, there will be too many variables in the entire battle plan. Once the Japanese army in northeastern Henan broke through the line of Linwei Pass, it only used one force to contain the anti-coalition forces. Most of them turned westward into the Taihang Mountains, which would pose a great threat to the hinterland of the Taihang Military Region.

In the view of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, Pinghan Road is too close to Jijun Pass and Huangze Pass, which connect southern Hebei and southeastern Shanxi and are located in the hinterland of Taihang Mountain. Once the Japanese army turns to the line of Jijun Pass and Huangze Pass before entering the vicinity of Xingtai, Liao County, as the hinterland of the Taihang Military Region, will face a direct threat from the Japanese army. And once the Japanese army breaks into the southeast of Jinjin, then the main force of the Taihang Military Region, which is currently fighting on the Baijin Railway, will face the situation of being attacked by the enemy on its back.

At the same time, although the terrain north of Handan is located on the southern Hebei Plain, there are also many rivers around here that can be used as natural positions. Even if the Japanese army in front of him cannot be completely blocked at the junction of southern Hebei and northwestern Shandong, there is no problem in biting off a piece of Japanese flesh, which can also reduce the pressure on the follow-up operations of the anti-coalition forces.

This request of the head of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region gave Yang Zhen a headache. The most important thing is that at present, the superior of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, Yang Zhen, the old leader of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, does not agree with Yang Zhen's plan on the Western Front. It is believed that no matter from that direction, the troops of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region should try their best to block the Japanese army in southern Hebei and northern Henan.

This old commander's judgment on the counterattack of the Japanese army is almost surprisingly consistent with Chen Hanzhang. Judging from the entire terrain and enemy situation, as well as the traffic environment around the battlefield, he said that the Japanese army would not invest too many troops in southern Hebei. The Japanese army will devote some troops to the Pinghan line, but the Pinghan line will definitely not be the main direction of the Japanese army's attack.

Compared with southern Hebei, Yang Zhen should concentrate his troops on the front of northern Shandong and the northwest theater of Shandong, that is, on the battlefield along the Jinpu Road. As for southern Hebei in the overall battle situation of the Japanese army, it should be a battlefield with a cooperative position, or should the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region play its own role.

Under such circumstances, according to Yang Zhen's plan, there were too many anti-coalition forces in the southern Hebei region, which could easily cause the troops on the eastern front to be unable to meet the needs of the Japanese counterattack. As long as the main force of the Japanese army on the Jinpu line was defeated, although the Japanese army in southern Hebei was backed by eastern Henan, it was in a situation of isolation and helplessness in the whole strategy.

Unless the Japanese army wants to completely bury all the troops it has invested in North China, it can only retreat without a fight. The old marshal believes that Yang Zhen should still focus his strategy on the Jinpu line and the battlefield in northwest Shandong. Concentrate everything to the greatest extent and cut off the enemy's finger with the forces that can be concentrated, which is the strategic thinking of this old commander.