The unprecedented pressure from the people forced Trotsky to think more carefully about whether to abandon Kiev. At least as things stand, the abandonment of Kiev could lead to the Trotskyists being passive at the plenary session of the Central Committee in February. It is conceivable that as long as he continues to insist on abandoning Kiev, Sverdlov will definitely lash out at him at the congress and severely dampen the momentum of the Trotskyists.

Then abandon the idea?

However, what embarrassed Trotsky was how Tukhachevsky's side explained, since November the henchman had been constantly attacked, and he had failed him on several successive military issues. It is conceivable that Tukhachevsky may be very annoyed, and once his attempt is shattered again this time, will he directly pick on him?

Trotsky was in a dilemma, and according to the current trend, there is simply no solution to the best of both worlds, what to do?

In the end, it was Ulitsky who came up with a solution for Trotsky, and his old partner suggested: "At this time, we must not give up Kyiv, and in order to counter Sverdlov's attack, we must not only say anything about abandoning Kyiv, but we must also actively go to relieve Kyiv, and lifting the siege of Kyiv is the best way to fight back against Sverdlov's accusations!" ”

"Natu Khachevsky's ......"

To be honest, Ulitsky was very dissatisfied with Tukhachevsky's recent performance, and the marshal who was deeply trusted by Trotsky did not use the opportunity of the Great Patriotic War to open up the situation for the Trotskyists, not only failed to regain some of the military voice, but became a laughing stock because of a series of mistakes, which led to fewer and fewer Trotskyist supporters in the military.

Ulitsky was anxious in his eyes, he was the same as Trotsky. He had to retire in 1945. It was originally according to Trotsky's vision. He is ready to be replaced by Tukhachevsky. As long as Tukhachevsky did well in the Great Patriotic War, his hopes of entering the Politburo were greatly enhanced.

At that time, in the Politburo, the Trotskyists will be able to retain at least two seats (Radek and Tukhachevsky), and if Smirlov and Sokolnikov can also rise to the top, three seats and one alternate seat. The Trotskyists were able to have at least five years of buffer time, so that they could complete the replacement of the old and the new, and thus hold on for a long time.

And now. The hopeful Tukhachevsky dropped the chain again and again, so that Ulitsky could not stand it, and if Tukhachevsky continued to rot, there would be only one result, and in the next Politburo, the Trotskyists would most likely have only one seat! And that's pretty dangerous!

In Ulitsky's opinion, it is no longer possible to put eggs in the basket of Tukhachevsky, and those newcomers with more potential should be given a chance, and there are still four years to go, if done properly. It can still be taken over smoothly.

What Ulitsky thought, did Trotsky know? It should be clear. But Trotsky could not fully accept it, the reason is very simple, Trotsky saw one thing clearly, who can occupy the advantage in the Military Commission, who can gain a firm foothold in the Politburo, without the support of the military, that is, grass without roots, can not withstand the wind and rain!

Now, the Trotskyists' influence in the military is completely maintained on Tukhachevsky alone, and if Tukhachevsky is abandoned, then the Trotskyists will continue to wrestle with the Leninists, and only one Li Xiaofeng will be able to rush them. Trotsky really couldn't give up Tukhachevsky, not because he didn't want to, but because he couldn't do that.

The question arises, what to do if you want to continue to support Tukhachevsky and avoid the big hole of Kyiv? Ulitsky believes that there is only one way: "first relieve the siege of Kyiv, and then carry out the Minsk counterattack." ”

Ulitsky's reasons are as follows: if we do not relieve Kiev now, at the plenary session of the Central Committee, we will fall into a total passivity and will be beaten to the ground by the Leninists, and at that time, the dominant Leninists will still push forward the motion for the relief of Kiev, and then we will lose our wives and lose our troops.

Therefore, instead of being passively beaten, it is better to take the initiative to change, first cater to the needs of the public, and go to relieve the siege of Kyiv. After success, our Trotskyists have successfully gotten rid of passivity, not to mention, and can still brush up a little prestige. Of course, if it doesn't succeed and fails to break the siege for Kyiv, it's not a big problem. We are fighting back against the Leninists and attacking their decision to free Kyiv. Anyway, we won't lose.

As for the battle of Minsk advocated by Tukhachevsky, it can be placed after the siege of Kyiv is lifted, and if Kyiv succeeds in breaking the siege, it will inevitably deal a major blow to the German army and force part of the German army to turn to Ukraine. In that case, the pressure on the Minsk side will be reduced. When the time comes, we will draw troops from the direction of Kyiv and throw them into the Minsk battlefield, maybe we will be able to defeat the enemy faster!

Ulitsky also believes that it is better to launch a counterattack in Minsk, it is better to avoid winter, to counterattack after the weather warms up in May, to be more prepared, and less disturbed by the weather, how nice!

When Trotsky heard this, he made sense. The front and back are all in place, both plugging the stinky mouth of the Leninists and taking care of Tukhachevsky's emotions, yes, that's it!

Tukhachevsky was naturally not happy about this, and in his opinion, a major counterattack in Minsk would be the most effective, taking advantage of the fact that the Bryansk Front had severely defeated the German army. By the time the troops had relieved Kiev, the Red Army was exhausted from continuous combat attrition, and the German Army Group Center had just recovered after a winter's rest. What good results can be achieved under the trade-off?

What's more, Tukhachevsky is not at all optimistic about being able to relieve the siege for Kyiv, in case the siege fails, the Red Army is full of bags, and at that time there is still any counterattack, it is a blessing to be able to hold the position.

In any case, Tukhachevsky was quite dissatisfied with Ulitsky's proposal, and the two sides quarreled at meetings within the Trotskyists, so much so that Ulitsky finally gave up his harsh words - either accept his suggestion or replace him as chief of the General Staff.

Tukhachevsky was on the verge of dying, but in the end, under Trotsky's persuasion and his own unwillingness to step down, he had to agree to Ulitsky's proposal.

First to relieve the siege of Kyiv, and then to carry out the Minsk counterattack. As the final decision of the Politburo, it was thus decided. But for this strategy. It's not just Tukhachevsky who is not satisfied. Li Xiaofeng actually disagreed.

"Taking things for granted, typical politician-style thinking. It is not easy to lift the encirclement of Kyiv, and it is not even a dream to launch a full-scale counterattack in another direction thousands of miles away after the siege is lifted! ”

Ulitsky also agreed: "Our army has suffered heavy losses since September 1941, and it should have been replenished in winter, but it was more reluctant to carry out a campaign to relieve the siege, and it was even necessary to fight continuously. This is unwise. What's more, the timing of the Minsk battle is not appropriate, it seems that the weather is getting warmer in May, but the thawing of the frozen ground and the melting of ice and snow will inevitably make the roads more muddy. ”

Who's to say it isn't? Russia in May was a big quagmire, and it was really not suitable for military operations, otherwise the German army would not have fought Barbarossa in late June.

Didn't Tukhachevsky know this? No, but the marshal was in too much of a hurry, according to his schedule. 1942 was the year of turning defeat into victory, and he wanted to regain the land he had lost the year in this year. Step by step, the Germans were to be driven out of the territory of the Soviet Union. That would allow him to counterattack in 1943 in an all-out way, to enter German territory in one fell swoop, and finally to end the war by the end of the year.

It has to be said that Tukhachevsky's timetable was too tight and completely out of touch, and in 1941 the Red Army lost about 1 million troops (including captured, killed and wounded) and had to be rested and replenished in order to regain strength. And he has too little time left to rest and replenish, or no time at all.

After all, the soldiers of the Red Army were people, not machines, and it was impossible to clear the customs in one go. According to Tukhachevsky's timetable, in the second half of 1942 the Red Army would be exhausted, and in the end, let alone drive out the enemy, thank God if it did not collapse again.

The correct thing to do is that in the first half of 1942, after launching at most one campaign to relieve the siege of Kiev and stabilize the situation in Ukraine, it should immediately rest and prepare for a German counterattack.

Between April and September, it was better to be on the defensive, to deplete the German army through active defense. At the end of September, we will carry out a counterattack according to our ability, and the counterattack is not aimed at completely expelling the German army, but seizing the initiative on the battlefield and training troops. After entering 1943, a large-scale and all-out counterattack will be carried out.

"We must be prepared for the failure of the Minsk counterattack," Ulitsky said worriedly, "and if the Minsk counterattack is unsuccessful, we will once again be on the back foot." At that time, it was very likely that the enemy would launch a new offensive, and in my judgment, there were two main directions of the enemy's attack, either Bryansk or Kyiv. The latter is more likely. In the event of Kyiv's loss, there is a high probability that the Ukrainian Front will be completely driven out of Ukraine, the front will develop to the north, and the enemy will attack Moscow along Kursk. ”

Ubolevich still had two brushes, he had basically judged the trend on the battlefield in 1942, and under his prediction, in this year, Tukhachevsky could only be disgraced.

"Comrade Mikhail could not afford another defeat, and the Military Commission and the Central Committee had reached the limit of their patience with him. Even within the Trotskyists, opposition to him grew louder and louder, and he had reached the so-called end of his rope......"

Tukhachevsky was not aware of Ubolevich's prophecy to him, and at this time, he was concentrating on the next operation to relieve the siege of Kiev. It may be strange that some comrades are not against this operation, Tukhachevsky? How can you be so concerned?

True, Tukhachevsky is against relieving Kyiv first, but who made this already an established strategy? Moreover, the success of Kyiv's siege relief operation is directly related to whether the Minsk counterattack he advocated will be successful. So even if it is an opinion on the relief of the siege for Kyiv, Tukhachevsky can only pay more attention.

It's just that the focus of the Chief of the General Staff is a little weird, he only cares about which troops to put into the siege of Kyiv, and he is calculating in this regard. In this regard, Shaposhnikov, who was directly responsible for this operation, and Rokossovsky, who was indirectly supported, were in the same stomach.

"Mikhail simply did not want to invest in Kyiv the elite Red Army, especially valuable mechanized units," Shaposhnikov complained to Timoshenko. "He went so far as to say that the reinforcement of two army groups would be enough to relieve Kyiv. Doesn't this bastard know that there is an enemy army of half a million around Kyiv? What is enough for two armies? When our Ukrainian Front is asking for food! ”

Please note. Tukhachevsky did not say that two army groups were capable of fighting half a million German horses, he meant that it would be enough to strengthen two army groups for the Ukrainian Front. It is equivalent to saying that the main force of this siege relief operation is the Ukrainian Front, and the Red Army in other directions is enough at once.

What's even more infuriating is that the two armies that this so-called support to the Ukrainian Front, one of which originally belonged to the Ukrainian Front, is Rokossovsky's 6th Army. Before, in order to win the battle for the defense of Bryansk. The Military Commissar formed the Bryansk Front, of which the Ukrainian Front allocated the 6th Army.

And this time, what Tukhachevsky means is that it will be enough for the Bryansk Front to return the 6th Army, and then another 19th Army will be drawn from the Belarusian Front to support the Ukrainian Front.

To be honest, in such an arrangement, Tukhachevsky was full of small calculations. According to his plan, as the main force of the Minsk counterattack in the future, the Belarusian Front only needs to transfer one army group to participate in the Kiev siege relief operation, and the natural impact on the arms war of the Belarusian side will be minimized. This is naturally a major positive for him.

But. Is it really okay to do this? That's absolutely not possible, not to mention whether it is enough to support the two armies of the Ukrainian Front. There are major problems just to say that these two army groups have been transferred.

For example, the 6th Army of the Bryansk Front, which suffered heavy losses in previous battles, had only half of its strength left in the defense of Bryansk. After a vicious battle, part of its strength was consumed, and it can be said that the group army can actually only be used by one army. What's the use of that?

What's more, the strength of the Bryansk Front was very weak, there were only five armies in total, of which the 6th and 16th armies were still disabled. And the German army in front of them was still relatively strong. Drawing troops from here is a risk no matter how you look at it!

So why did Tukhachevsky take such a risk? Quite simply, save the strength of the Belarusian Front in Minsk. It is not even ruled out that this one is deliberately trying to make Kyiv's siege operation fail. With this amount of troops to relieve the siege of Kyiv, I am afraid that it will be beaten back by the Germans at the beginning. And the sooner the Kyiv liberation operation ends, the more beneficial it will be for the Minsk counterattack. And he can sit back and watch the jokes of his political opponents, so why not?

However, Tukhachevsky's calculation is good, but he can't make a word about how to carry out the siege of Kyiv. Soon, Rokossovsky and Shaposhnikov complained to the Military Commissariat together, strongly condemning the nonsense of the General Staff. In particular, Trian Dafilov, who is the commander of the Central Military District in Moscow, is even more full of firepower and sprays Tukhachevsky in the face:

"The core idea of Comrade Mikhail is still not to relieve the siege of Kiev, or not to implement the decisions of the Politburo and the Military Commission. Such an extremely irresponsible practice was a crime against the soldiers of the Red Army! ”

Soon, a new round of verbal and written attacks against the General Staff broke out in the Military Commission, not to mention that Tukhachevsky was made to pieces, and even Trotsky was also harmed. At the regular meeting of the Politburo, Sverdlov violently attacked him for conniving at Tukhachevsky's disobedience to the Politburo's resolutions, saying that he was engaging in a conspiracy!

Trotsky really did not mean this, although he preferred to start the Minsk counterattack first, but the Politburo had already made a decision, and he could no longer be obsessed. Therefore, he has no intention of making evil and obstructing at all.

Who would have thought that Tukhachevsky would be clever behind his back, which made Trotsky extremely passive, and he really had the intention of arresting Tukhachevsky. This time, even Trotsky could not tolerate it, and he defended and cared for Tukhachevsky again and again, not only did not gain any benefit, but was again and again burdened by him, and to be honest, he was really a little bored.

Especially when he thought of what Ulitsky and Radek had said about Tukhachevsky, Comrade Mikhail was indeed a man of military talent, but he was a bit arrogant, and it was difficult for him to unite with his comrades, and he often refused to accept the correct opinions of others. He is not able to expand our influence in the military, and even has the opposite effect.

Trotsky did not think anything of it, genius is always proud. But he could not accept that the influence of the Trotskyists in the military could not be expanded, and that there was even a counter-effect. At first, he thought that Ulitsky and Raddick were exaggerating, and felt that Tukhachevsky still had a group of important friends, such as Gamalnik and Khalepsky.

But soon Ulitsky and Radek gave a large number of counter-examples, and among the top echelons of the Red Army, Tukhachevsky was not very popular, and even Triandafilov and Ubolevich, who were engaged in the theory of large-depth operations together, parted ways. As for the potential newcomers, whether in the thirties or forties, this one did not unearth many talents, not even as good as Voroshilov, who had already been defeated. That goods also promoted at least a number of generals like Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Konev and the like.

All in all, it's no better than not knowing, and it's more frightening. At this point, even Trotsky had to think carefully about Tukhachevsky's whereabouts...... (To be continued......)

PS: Bow and thank Ma Shen Bobo, Haochuan, sweet potatoes in the melon field, Xicheng, Huyan haha, glorious charter, manifested Huiguang and Comrade Juventus!