Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present. As for the construction process of these industrial bases, it will not be as intense as the construction of the Datongjiang military base in the past, so there is no need for Haihan to intervene in its internal affairs at the risk of offending North Korea.

This book was first published in Genesis, and the following will be re-edited later for anti-theft

Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present. As for the construction process of these industrial bases, it will not be as intense as the construction of the Datongjiang military base in the past, so there is no need for Haihan to intervene in its internal affairs at the risk of offending North Korea. Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present. As for the construction process of these industrial bases, it will not be as intense as the construction of the Datongjiang military base in the past, so there is no need for Haihan to intervene in its internal affairs at the risk of offending North Korea. Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present. As for the construction process of these industrial bases, it will not be as intense as the construction of the Datongjiang military base in the past, so there is no need for Haihan to intervene in its internal affairs at the risk of offending North Korea. Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present. As for the construction process of these industrial bases, it will not be as intense as the construction of the Datongjiang military base in the past, so there is no need for Haihan to intervene in its internal affairs at the risk of offending North Korea. Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present. As for the construction process of these industrial bases, it will not be as intense as the construction of the Datongjiang military base in the past, so there is no need for Haihan to intervene in its internal affairs at the risk of offending North Korea. Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present. As for the construction process of these industrial bases, it will not be as intense as the construction of the Datongjiang military base in the past, so there is no need for Haihan to intervene in its internal affairs at the risk of offending North Korea. Qian Tiandun's main focus is now on military cooperation projects with North Korea after the war, and he really does not have much time to manage these new construction sites. Having said that, as a high-ranking general in the army, these civil affairs were indeed beyond his jurisdiction, so even if Fu Li took the initiative to ask for instructions, he did not plan to interfere in the specific arrangements of these projects. And in Qian Tiandun's opinion, this little conflict that happened at the salt field construction site was really not a big deal, and Fu Li's reaction was a little too intense.

The production bases built in the industrial cooperation plan between the two countries are not entirely funded and developed by Haihan, and the North Korean side has also spent a lot of money in the official name, but this is mainly for convenience, and most of the actual investors are powerful and wealthy businessmen of the North Korean state. In the future, the profits obtained from the production and operation of these places will naturally be distributed to these invisible shareholders according to the share of capital contribution. The conflict of interests between the migrant workers and the overseers on the construction site is essentially a class contradiction in North Korea, which is only exposed in the specific environment of the Haehan construction site.

Since this is an internal contradiction in North Korea, Qian Tiandun does not want Fu Li to take direct intervention, Haihan's diplomatic relations with North Korea are currently in a stage of rapid development, and Shengli Fort also has a long-term plan to build the lower reaches of the Taedong River in North Korea into a heavy industrial base for Haihan in this region, and maintaining stable relations with North Korea is the top priority for Haihan at present.