From a dialectical point of view, any missile guidance method always has its shortcomings, and "anti-radiation guidance" is no exception.

If we only describe the working principle of this guidance method, the so-called "anti-radiation guidance", that is, relying on the electromagnetic signals emitted by the enemy's airborne radar and communication equipment for homing, this simple and clear guidance method does not require the carrier aircraft to provide any target irradiation, and at first glance it seems to be very powerful.

When performing missions on the battlefield, fighter jets in most cases need to use on-board radar or radio equipment to maintain contact; As soon as the enemy's airborne radar is turned on or radio communications are used, the anti-radiation air-to-air missile's homing head is likely to intercept the target at an extremely long distance, often in fact a distance that often exceeds the missile's own range, complete the target locking work before launching, and immediately enter the homing attack once launched.

And, on the other hand, the radar radiation of fighter jets is fired from the front, which means that the closer the enemy aircraft, the more obvious the radar radiation signal is, so anti-radiation air-to-air missiles are very suitable for head-on interception - or rather, they can only be fully effective in the case of head-on interception.

Well, since anti-radiation guided air-to-air missiles, both in terms of guidance and engagement mode, are quite similar to active missiles, then why are the types of such missiles so scarce, in fact, except for the Soviet R-27P, other countries have not developed and equipped with similar anti-radiation missiles?

This is because the guidance method of "anti-radiation guidance" has an inherent defect: the guidance accuracy is not high.

It is not difficult to explain the inherent shortcomings of the anti-radiation guidance method.

First of all. It is possible to compare "anti-radiation guided missiles" with "semi-active radar-guided missiles" and "active radar-guided missiles": although all three missiles use electromagnetic signals for homing guidance. However, the electromagnetic signals received by the homing heads of the latter two are emitted by the carrier aircraft or their own radar. The echo reflected by the target, while the self-guidance head of the former receives direct waves of electromagnetic radiation from the enemy's airborne radar and communication system.

This distinction, which is not principled and is well understood, is reflected in the guidance of missiles but is a serious problem.

Because as a "semi-active missile" or an "active missile", since it is a target reflection wave that receives its own radar, the missile can complete signal coordination with the airborne radar or missile-borne radar before launch, that is, to "align" or "match" the signal; In this way, the task of the missile that goes out is relatively easy, and it only needs to find the echo according to the coordinated signal parameters, enter the direction and cover all the way.

However, anti-radiation bombs do not have such good conditions, and it is impossible to know in advance the parameters of the electromagnetic signals emitted by enemy aircraft. Therefore, it is only possible to prepare a set of receivers and processing circuits with wide bandwidth, that is to say, the signal and the circuit are completely "mismatched," and it is naturally impossible to detect the position of enemy planes to the level of "semi-active bombs" and "active bombs."

If we use a rough analogy, for radar-guided missiles, the target is generally presented as a bright and clear point in the field of vision, or it has a high angle measurement accuracy; In the case of anti-radiation missiles, the target in the field of vision is often just a patch with a blurred boundary, and the accuracy of angle measurement cannot be very ideal.

As we all know, if a missile wants to hit a target, it is a minimum premise to distinguish the accurate location of the target; If you can't even see where the target is, can you expect a high accuracy of hitting?

It is precisely because of this difference in the principle of guidance. As a result, the combat capabilities of anti-radiation missiles are considerably limited.

For example, HARM, which was in the limelight in the Gulf War, although its own technical level is relatively high. However, the accuracy of the hits is often not as satisfactory as the Americans claim to the outside world, and part of the results of the battle are not directly hit by the Iraqi radar facilities, but by the secondary damage effect of the explosion in the vicinity of the radar.

Of course, this may not be a big problem for HARM to hit stationary targets on the ground; However, if we want to design air combat weapons with the idea of anti-radiation guidance, anti-radiation guided air-to-air missiles obviously need to have a minimum of guidance accuracy in order to hit enemy planes flying at speeds of hundreds or even thousands of kilometers per hour.

Aside from anything else, let's just say that the R-27P has been set to hit targets on several occasions, and it can be said that it can basically only hit targets with a basically fixed course and basically stable electromagnetic radiation, and as long as the target maneuvers to evade or implements electronic jamming, the missile will have a large guidance deviation. Not only that, but in some tests, even if the target does not make any maneuvering or electronic interference, the missile will "pass by" the target, because the distance between the two is greater than the detonation distance of the warhead, and there is no way to damage the target in this case.

It is precisely because of this strict defect of the anti-radiation missile that the R-27P, which can be said to be unique in terms of thinking, is not equipped with a large number of Soviet VVS and PVO like the R-27R and R-27T.

Moreover, Long Yun is also very clear that based on the analysis of the actual combat performance of the R-27P, the general view of the Soviet military research department is that the R-27P generally has only two use strategies in real air combat: either when the carrier aircraft is covertly engaged with the enemy, it is used to "sneak attack" the NATO early warning aircraft with very obvious electromagnetic radiation characteristics, or it is to carry out multiple salvos before the carrier aircraft enters the visual air battle, which plays a psychological role of "deterring" the enemy.

But whether it is a "sneak attack" or "shock", it is not Long Yun's purpose now.

Because he has a clear understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of anti-radiation missiles, he knows very well that if he wants to use the R-27P against the "Slammer", he must use the latest anti-radiation guidance technology in the real world to improve it; Not only that, limited by the level of electronic technology of the Soviet Union in the parallel world, in addition to Cheng Dù's limited improvement of missiles, he also needed to think of some design skills and develop new air combat tactics in order to truly deal with the American active missile threat for a period of time.

After two days of intense analysis and study, he basically remembered the required technical information and improvement plan, and Long Yun now has a considerable grasp of this matter; Next, how to turn this kind of technological cheating into reality and reflect it on the battlefield to form a real combat effectiveness depends on our own actions. (To be continued......)