The Baltic Sea has long been thought to be Germany's Achilles' heel in the event of a war between Germany and Russia or other naval powers.

In the 20th century, Britain certainly foresaw this.

In 1781, an army of polar bears captured the port at Fort Col, from where they could capture most of Pomerania, where they wintered and prepared for the spring offensive.

But after the death of the Tsar, Russia signed an armistice with Prussia, so the offensive was never launched.

Militarily, Germany's Baltic coast was arguably the most vulnerable point of World War I.

Even within Germany, fears of plans for a similar Baltic attack were considered one of the greatest threats in Germany's war with the Triple Entente – Britain, France, and Russia.

At this time, most of the German army was distributed on the Western Front and the Eastern Front against the French and Russian armies respectively, resulting in a very small number of troops that could be used for the defense of the Baltic Sea coast. Since the forces of the army had been completely held back by the fighting on the Eastern and Western Fronts, the main defense of the Baltic coast would depend entirely on the German navy, which would also have to face the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea and on the northwest coast of Europe.

However, it soon turned out that the realization of the Baltic attack plan would require the investment of almost the entire main fleet of the Royal Navy.

Obviously, this would leave Britain virtually undefended along the same coast as Germany, and could provoke a counterattack by the German fleet.

And such a counterattack would be almost unhindered, which led to the fact that the British fleet was forced to retreat from the Baltic, and in the end the whole plan completely collapsed.

To avoid the possibility of such a counterattack, Fisher in the autumn of 1914 began to push for large-scale minelaying in the North Sea to stop the German fleet, and planned to build eight specialized fast minelayers. However, this mine-laying plan was never implemented.

In the original idea of the Baltic Plan, Fisher envisaged a small British expeditionary force (about 4 to 5 divisions) landing in Antwerp with the support of a large fleet (this plan was developed in 1908), rather than being consolidated and part of the French defense line as was eventually envisaged.

The capture of Antwerp would be the first step in the next advance along the coastline.

This, if it goes according to expectations, will finally ensure the security of the coastline and allow the fleet to access the Baltic Sea and thus support the landing of Russia.

All this was built on the premise that the Royal Navy would be able to force a breakthrough of the strong defensive lines of the German Navy in the North and Baltic Seas.

Whether all this would lead to Germany's surrender in 1915/16 as one would have hoped would have been a matter of long-debate.

In any case, one thing is very clear to any tactical analyst, professional or amateur - that this will be the only realistic chance that the Entente will be able to end the war before 1916.

Of course, the stakes of this strategy are extremely high, but if you want to defeat an enemy who is equal or even stronger than you, the risks are inevitable.

When Fisher returned to the Admiralty on October 30, 1914, to resume his duties as First Admiralty, the war had broken out less than three months ago.

He began lobbying for the support of Churchill and Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, so that he could embark on an ambitious Baltic attack shipbuilding program, then known as the Northern Waters Offensive.

In the text he left behind, Fisher argued that Britain should not spend huge sums of money on preparing and equipping a large army for war on the continent, but should use these resources to build a strong main fleet with more decisive combat capabilities.

This fleet will be able to break through the Baltic Sea with a strong attack and sweep the German Navy out of the Baltic, thus clearing the way for the landing of the polar bear army on the Pomeranian coast.

He believed that this was the only possible way to defeat Germany in 1915.

A large army can only be victorious after years of fighting each other and shedding blood, and equipping such a large army would also deplete equipment and other resources that Britain can provide.

And if the Baltic plan were to be implemented, Britain would have to provide Russia with these resources, because Russia's own industrial capacity was seriously lagging behind Britain and France, and even far behind the Allies, and it was far behind the Allies to supply the equipment needed for such a large-scale operation.

In this case, Britain would be forced to send more divisions, as the recruits were drafted into Lord Kitchener's volunteer army and sent to the Western Front, which many in power believed to be the only battlefield where both sides could play a decisive role.

The Baltic program, which had been planned in one form or another for many years before the First World War, was eventually shelved, although not completely canceled.

The failure at the Battle of Dardanelles in February and March 1915, combined with the vulnerability of the capital ships to mine and submarine attacks, led to the plan being largely completely abandoned in official circles, and no one had considered it since the spring of 1915.

Although the Baltic program was put on hold, a number of ships designed for it were completed and underwent some degree of modification, including the Valiant class.

By the time she was completed, the draft of the Valiant class was not as shallow as originally planned, but it was clearly much shallower than the vast majority of capital ships of the time, allowing it to pursue German light high-speed ships into shallow coastal waters.

And this is something that other capital ships armed with large-caliber naval guns and even other battle cruisers cannot do.

Some studies suggest that the Valiant was not designed and built specifically for the Baltic Sea program, but more likely as a true "large light cruiser" to overcome the low speed of traditional light cruisers in high sea conditions and thus operate in the North Sea and the North Atlantic.

But these claims, initially dismissed as unfounded, have since proven to be well-founded, completely ignoring the obvious historical record supporting the fact that the ships were designed for this "special strategic purpose".

Even long after they had begun construction, Fisher's letter referred to them as ships designed and built for this "special strategic purpose."

In the end, the actual level of bravery, especially the Fury.

Despite the controversy, it was somewhat of a high-speed, shallow-water heavy gunboat in design, capable of cruiser duty, and armed with battleship- and battlecruiser-class guns—although the Valiant class was armed with only four 15-inch guns and the rage was armed with two 18-inch guns.

In fact, the Fury was eventually completed with only an 18-inch rear turret, and the front turret became, as we know, into a flight deck for carrier-based aircraft.

In his text, Fisher writes that these ships, "including the Fury and her sister ships – they didn't even think about the broadside salvo!"

They were built to conquer Berlin, which is why they had such a shallow draft and such thin armor, so that they could lose as much weight as possible and run faster.

Although shore bombing may have been one of the main design purposes, especially for the Fury.

But Fisher also indicated that these ships, with their heavy firepower, shallow draft, and high speed, would also be used to protect light naval forces, including destroyers, from enemy cruisers.

Their shallow draft, as mentioned above, would ensure that they would be able to pursue the enemy light cruisers into the shallow waters near the shore, thus eliminating the latter's safe zone of escape from the capital ship's artillery fire by escaping into the shallow sea.

This capability would be used not only in the Baltic plan, but also in the North Sea, where German light cruisers could evade the attack of capital ships by escaping offshore at high speeds.

As for the 18-inch guns of the Fury, Fisher wrote in 1919 - with these powerful shells, it was impossible for the Germans to prevent the landing of a million-strong Russian army on the Pomeranian coast!

It could not be a bit of an exaggeration, but if the Baltic plan had been implemented, then it would have been clear that any landing force would have more than welcomed 18-inch naval guns as their support firepower.

The Fury was actually built, and the flight deck was installed in the bow when it was built, and only the stern main turret was retained according to the original design, and the huge 18-inch single-mounted main gun turret can be seen

The design for the Valiant class, which was officially submitted and archived on January 28, 1915, was essentially a scaled-down version of the prestige class, equipped with two twin main turrets instead of three, and the original A turret position was removed.

The two main turrets allowed the Valiant class, while largely similar to the Prestige class, to have a highly recognizable exterior silhouette, ending the history of every British battlecruiser since the Lion having a knapsack bow gun design.

Its armor protection, with the exception of the main turret, gun mount and conning tower, was largely at the same level as that of a light cruiser.

The extreme weakness in armor was thought to be the main reason that prevented them from playing a role as true battlecruisers in fleet engagements.

Comparing prestige and bravery from the side, the biggest difference in appearance is the reduction of one main turret and the single chimney moved back, as is the ratio of the reduced hull to the conning tower

Fisher's successors described the ships in March 1916 as "misnamed ships" that "could not be called battle cruisers at all—no matter how heavy or light, there was no effective armor at all."

Nonetheless, he stated that the ships were indeed classified as light battlecruisers, even though they were not capable of performing many of the tasks required of battlecruisers.

Even in the early stages of the Valiant class design, their sorely lacked armor protection has already received a lot of criticism, especially given the fact that they will eventually serve as capital ships.

In early March 1915, as the Baltic Plan had become unlikely, Fisher asked Incourt to revise the design of the Brave class and strengthen the torpedo compartment protection.

In fact, not only the Brave, but also the prestige-class torpedo compartment protection has been strengthened.

For ships of these two classes, this reinforcement will result in a certain weight gain and a slight increase in draft, effectively making it impossible for the Valiant class to operate in the shallow waters near the Baltic Sea to accomplish the intended "special purpose" as originally envisaged.

Of course, this is not bad news for the Admiralty, after all, there are no more Baltic plans.

Since the Brave class was still on the drawing board at this time, the design refinement was not difficult.

The thickness of the torpedo compartment increased from 0.75 inches to 1.5 inches, resulting in a weight gain of 500 tons, and the draft thus increased by 6 inches (15 cm), which was almost fatal for its intended use.

In contrast, the loss of speed was relatively small, at 0.25 knots.

When informed of the weight gain and the resulting increase in draft, Fisher simply replied:

"This is acceptable, taking into account the strengthening of underwater protection against torpedoes and mines."

This shows that even before the construction of the Valiant class, Fisher no longer considered using it in the Baltic project.

Fisher's successor also wrote in a letter to the Prime Minister in early 1916:

"Fisher says that the ships were built for a 'special strategic purpose,' although personally, given their draft, this 'special strategic purpose' is probably something they will never be able to accomplish."

In the prestige class, plans to strengthen the torpedo compartment were eventually scrapped, as the progress of the two ships had already advanced considerably, and the modification would have led to a significant and unacceptable delay in the construction period.

On March 14, 1915, Fisher officially approved the changes to the design of the Valiant class.

Construction began on 28 March 1915 on the Brave at Ellswick Shipyard in Armstrong, while construction began on 20 April 1915 on the Glorious at the Harland and Wolf Shipyards.

At this time, with the defeat of the Battle of Dardanelles, the end of the Baltic plan was already apparent.

In March 1916, Fisher wrote to the Prime Minister that the Valiant class could still be an effective addition to the fleet, although it was not for which they were originally designed, despite being designed for this "special strategic purpose".

Fisher writes:

"These ships were built for special strategic purposes, but there is no doubt that they were also very useful for the regular operations of the Grand Fleet.

The details need not be mentioned too much, but in my personal opinion they will be equivalent to the capabilities of a large group of light cruisers and destroyers for the fleet commander, both before and after the operation of the Grand Fleet. ”

He goes on to write:

"They were never designed to replace the heavy battlecruisers of the Lion, and thinking about it only adds to the confusion.

They were actually an addition to the heavy battlecruisers, and the same applies to prestige and counterattacks.

More heavy battlecruisers may or may not be needed, but this has nothing to do with the construction of these light battlecruisers. ”

The Brave was launched in February 1916 and the Glory in April.

Sea trials began on 23 October 1916 and in December offshores of Isle Island at full speed, achieving a speed of 31.42 knots at 91,195 hp.

The Valiant underwent limited testing at the Tyne Estuary in November, achieving a speed of 30.8 knots at 91,200 hp.

According to estimates, if the overload is 110,000 horsepower, the Valiant class will be able to reach a high speed of 33 knots.

In January 1917, the Glorious became the flagship of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (leading to further widespread recognition of it as a large light cruiser), and the Brave became the flagship of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron at the same time.

With the heavy losses of the armored cruisers of the 1st Cruiser Squadron in the Battle of Jutland, they will eventually be used to reorganize this squadron.

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