Venezuela's GDP rose between 1990 and 2011, particularly during the administration of President Chávez. Popular with many, Venezuelan street vendors sold a toy model of President Chavez in 2006 as well as the president's iconic red hat.

But Chávez's approach to democracy is motivated more by convenience than by convictions. It was only after his failed coup d'état in 1992 that he embraced elections as a path to power and rarely tolerated dissent that characterizes pluralistic democracy.

At the time of his death in 2013, Venezuela was neither a liberal democracy nor a dictatorship, but a hybrid polity with a political environment clearly tilted toward the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

Liberal democracy has also suffered some difficulties due to the defeat and frequent splits of the political opposition. Perhaps the most short-sighted and pernicious action was the failed military coup against Chávez in 2002, which gave him the opportunity to question the democratic values of the political alliance and allowed him to reorganize the armed forces and turn them into a more ideological institution loyal to the regime.

The general strikes against his government in 2002-2003 also justified his dismissal of some 18,000 Petroleos de Venezuela employees, and subsequent boycotts and demonstrations often helped to consolidate and demonstrate strong support for the regime. In 2005, five main opposition parties withdrew from parliamentary elections due to a controversial voting process, giving Chávez five years of absolute parliamentary votes and full power to enact laws.

Economically, the ruling party has been helped by a surge in oil prices, which rose from $10 per barrel in 1999 to more than $140 in 2008. Chávez, who has plenty of money, has been able to set an ambitious domestic and foreign policy agenda. Government social spending is mainly aimed at the common people, especially through the "Social Mission" program to provide state services such as health, education and subsidized food to the poor.

At the height of the oil boom from 2006 to 2011, the quality of life of the Venezuelan people improved at the third fastest rate in the world, according to the United Nations' Human Development Index. From 1999 to 2009, the poverty rate fell, the unemployment rate fell from 14.5 per cent to 7.6 per cent, GDP per capita increased from $4,105 to $10,810, and the infant mortality rate fell from 20 per 1,000 deaths in 1999 to 13 per 1,000 deaths in 2011.

However, most of these improvements were short-lived. Like the Peres government in the seventies, Chávez's economic improvement masks structural flaws and a deep democratic deficit.

Rather than building Venezuela's foreign exchange reserves or diversifying its investment portfolio to reduce the economy's long-term dependence on oil, Chávez continues to spend aggressively at home and even export oil abroad at favorable prices to nurture regional allies.

He also made three costly policy decisions: the expropriation of private enterprises, the introduction of foreign exchange controls, and the introduction of price controls on many basic necessities. With oil prices falling since 2011 and fewer goods the government can import, the results of these three economic decisions have been devastating.

The first of these is the expropriation or nationalization of many private enterprises, including oil, agriculture, finance, heavy industry, steel, telecommunications, energy, transport and tourism, a process that has been particularly prominent following Chávez's re-election in 2007. Between 2002 and 2006, the government expropriated only 15 private enterprises, while between 2007 and 2012 the number reached 1,147.

President Chavez in the 90s of the 20th century with Fidel Castro

o) formed a friendship alliance and provided part of the oil to Cuba (left). The presidents of Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Venezuela signed an agreement in 2007 to establish the Bank of the South, a monetary fund and lending institution that provides infrastructure and social project support to left-wing countries in South America (right).

The expropriation not only closes the productive sector, but also replaces it with inefficient state-owned enterprises, while also scaring away investors. The expropriation of private enterprises by the state has undermined the production sector, which has led to Venezuela's greater dependence on imports.

The second policy that persists in problems is exchange controls. In an effort to force the ouster of Chávez, the opposition organized a massive general strike between December 2002 and February 2003, which led to the suspension of oil production and the drop of production to one-third of what it had previously been.

To cope with the loss of revenue, Chávez fixed the exchange rate between the local bolívar and the U.S. dollar and authorized the government to approve or reject any U.S. dollar purchase or sale. The measure is a short-term remedy and a ticking time bomb. As the dollar sliped, the black market saw a surge in demand for the currency (leading some Venezuelans to engage in so-called Lasbourg and other forms of arbitrage).

Instead of removing currency controls and normalizing the exchange rate, the Maduro government continues to print more banknotes to further increase the real inflation rate.

In addition, due to exchange controls, private companies cannot import the raw materials they need. Due to the difficulty of importing raw materials, multinational companies such as Bridgestone, Kleock, General Mills and others have withdrawn from the country's market.

In early 2016, The Coca-Cola Company temporarily halted production at two bottling plants due to a lack of sugar. At the same time, the largest brewer in the country, Ce

vece

ía Pola

, which could not produce beer due to the fact that it did not receive foreign exchange for imported barley.

The third harmful economic policy is the government's strict restrictions on the prices of a range of food and commodities. Since the Second World War, Venezuela has maintained price controls on a number of key products to make basic necessities affordable to the poor, but price controls have never been as deep and extensive as Chávezism.

The Chávez and Maduro governments have set prices so low that companies and producers cannot make a profit on the goods, leading to scarcity. As a result, farmers cut back on food, manufacturers cut back on production, and retailers cut down on inventory. The problem is exacerbated by government expropriation, as scarcities such as dairy, sugar and coffee exist throughout the industry, and the government has expropriated these private businesses in the past and are now trying to operate.

All in all, when oil prices are high, Chávez makes economic decisions that make short-term gains but long-term losses. These decisions have become catastrophic due to the fall in oil prices.

Nicolas Maduro: From not very good to bad

After Chávez's death in 2013, his chosen successor, Maduro, narrowly defeated Henrik Capriles of the opposition Democratic Solidarity Round Table (MUD) coalition in the April 2013 elections. The less charismatic Maduro faces falling oil prices and declining approval ratings because of the policies of the late Hugo Chávez, prompting him to associate his political life with senior military officers and the suppression of dissent, transforming Venezuela from a hybrid regime to a thoroughly authoritarian regime.

President Nicolás Maduro used the popular support of the late President Hugo Chávez to gain votes in 2013. The slogan reads: "Chavez, I swear, I vote for Maduro". In 2016, on the third anniversary of Chavez's death, Maduro wore Chavez's signature tracksuit — attending a commemoration of the late president.

First, the military is playing an increasingly important role in the Maduro regime and is in many ways a "de facto subordinate body of Chavezism." After his appointment in July 2016 as head of leadership and personnel coordination for the country's food distribution, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López has become one of the country's most influential leaders.

Since the 2002 coup d'état, Chávez has politicized government institutions, carrying out a series of clean-up operations and a new system of regular transfers, nominating high-ranking military officers close to him to government posts.

Other officials have also been accused of drug trafficking and corruption. Recognizing the enormous power of the military and the vested interests they need to defend by maintaining the status quo, Maduro has nominated military leaders to his cabinet, protected them from foreign accusations, and surrounded himself with military officers.

Despite the detrimental effects of price and exchange controls, levies and controls on food distribution, the Government was reluctant to change course. Instead, Maduro responded by introducing more policies of the kind.

The president's economic advisers have pushed for more state control over manufacturing and food supply, rather than orthodox macroeconomic strategies such as deregulating prices, deregulating complex currency exchange, and reducing the amount of money in circulation.

In addition, officials enjoy easier access to the dollar, so that those who benefit from the exchange system have little incentive to deregulate prices, and it is unacceptable for Chávezism to consider privatizing previously expropriated and nationalized industries. These signs add to the situation in Venezuela, which enjoyed a back-to-back economic downturn in 2015 and 2016.

The oil sector is in poor shape, with Venezuela's heavy crude oil trading at $45-$55 per barrel in 2017. However, production continued to decline as damaged equipment was left idle, and production from existing wells was well below capacity. Unless oil prices rebound sharply or the government secures a new line of credit, up to $10 billion of Venezuela's debt will face default.

Politically, Maduro has clinged to power by increasingly repressive tactics to obstruct or undermine legitimate channels for dissent and political expression. He has imprisoned critics and opponents as political prisoners, purged government civil servants who supported the 2016 impeachment referendum, and militarized most of the public security organs. At the time of Chávez's death, there were more than a dozen political detainees. Today, there are more than 117 in the country.

A protest against the arrest of protesters, with a particular reference to Leopoldo Lopez, a popular politician arrested in 2014. A child demonstrator was her mother, and a political prisoner demanded freedom. A banner from 2014 detailed why Venezuelans are protesting: insecurity, injustice, shortages, censorship, violence and corruption. The red box at the bottom reads: "Protest is not a crime. It's a right. ”。

The country can now be classified as authoritarian thanks to the government's postponement of local elections and the suspension of the presidential impeachment referendum in October 2016. The political dialogue has so far failed to produce any meaningful solution or compromise.

Instead, on March 29, Venezuela's Supreme Court (TSJ) declared that it would assume the parliamentary functions of the National Assembly as long as the democratically elected body remained "abolished" (in contempt of court), effectively tantamount to dissolving the opposition-led parliament until international pressure and behind-the-scenes negotiations led to a reversal.

This move seemed to the opposition as the last straw that broke the camel's back. Thousands of Venezuelans take to the streets every day to protest against the government and demand elections. At least fifty people were killed in the confrontation between the population and the state security forces.

Some long-time retinents on political issues, including Latin American political leaders, major league baseball players, and even Venezuelan conductor Gustavo Dudemer, have come out to condemn the government's repression.

But the government has persevered.

On April 19, during the "Mother of All Marches," protesters were driven by tear gas and pushed into the sewage-ridden Guairé River in Caracas, after which Maduro reposted a photo alleging they were human feces. On 2 May, he demanded a new constitution from the non-democratic Constituent Assembly appointed by him, triggering a further crisis. As the situation worsens, the state may soon collapse.

Politically, it shows that free and fair elections are necessary, but not sufficient for democracy, which requires effective civic participation, political representation, and political equality.

Equally, it shows how easily states can switch between authoritarian, democratic and mixed regimes. In countries like Venezuela, which are less democratized and have limited representation, the risk of democratic backsliding is higher than in places where voters are politically efficient and representative.

Economically, this experience provides a case for the dangers of resource dependence, especially where institutions are inadequate. Oil has fueled Venezuela's economic growth, but it has led to a dependence that is detrimental to development.

Like many commodity-dependent countries, the country's wealth was more illusory in the '70s and early 21st centuries than many believed. It also suggests that the current rise in oil prices will be a moderation rather than a solution, as the same structural problems will continue to plague the economy. Resource-dependent countries need to find ways to break out of the vicious circle of the resource curse in order to build their productive economies.

Finally, the crisis in Venezuela has shown the real and immediate impact of dogmatic policies on the economy and society. There are many weak democracies in the world that depend on oil, but none have experienced this internal collapse of Venezuela.

Chávez, Nicolas Maduro and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela have made (and continue to make) unconspiring political and economic decisions. Just as a crisis as acute as Venezuela is currently avoidable, it is also possible elsewhere.