From the beginning of the fifth year of King Jian of Zhou (581 BC), marked by the diplomatic etiquette of the Duke of Jin Jinggong sending a doctor to visit the State of Chu and repay the diplomatic etiquette of the Emperor of Chu Dazai Zishang (Gongzi Chen) who had sent an envoy to the State of Jin in the previous year, to the summer of the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou (579 BC), under the mediation of Hua Yuan, the ruling secretary of the Song State, the Jin and Chu countries sent high-level representatives (the Jin State is the Shangjun General Xie, and the Chu State is the Dafu Gongzi and Xu Yan) to the Song capital Shangqiu, and held a formal 'meeting of the soldiers' (i.e., ' In order to end, the two princes and overlords of Jin and Chu were finally able to temporarily truce.

And the 'meeting of the soldiers' between Jin and Chu, from the intention of the Duke of Jin Jinggong and the King of Chu to prepare to convene an alliance, to the official meeting of Shixie and Gongzi in Shangqiu, the Song capital, was delayed for more than a year? This is because in the sixth year of King Jian of Zhou (580 BC) during this period, the Duke of Jin Li decided to temporarily negotiate peace with the Qin State, so as to avoid the loss of a large amount of unnecessary national and military strength just after he succeeded to the throne, so that the Jin State could rest and recover first (and then continue to fight with the two strong enemies of Chu and Qin in the future).

Therefore, at the beginning of the sixth year of King Jian of Zhou (580 BC), the Duke of Jin Li specially sent an envoy to the Qin State, and sent a request to the Qin State Emperor Qin Huan Gong to "truce the army and meet the alliance", and "warmly" invited the Duke of Qin Huan to meet with Linghu (Linyi, Shanxi, which belonged to the Jin State at this time) on the border between the two countries in order to hold the alliance meeting.

Qin Huan Gong couldn't trust the character of Jin Li Gong (successive generations of Jin marquis are cunning and changeable personalities, and Qin State also suffered a lot for this), thinking that if he rashly entered the territory of Jin State, it is difficult to guarantee that he will not repeat the previous mistake of Zheng Chenggong and Lu Chenggong being detained and placed under house arrest by Jin State; Therefore, Duke Qin Huan decided not to go to Linghu and the Jin Li Guild to meet and swear an oath, but instead assigned Shi Liang, the doctor of the Qin State, to cross the river and go to Linghu to meet Jin Li Gong instead, and then make a blood alliance with Jin Li Gong.

Seeing that Duke Qin Huan refused to cross the river, Duke Jin Li had no choice but to make blood with Shi Liang, the envoy of Qin, in the east of the river and completed the oath; Subsequently, the Duke of Jin Li sent the Jin Doctor Yin to cross the river and go to the Qin King City (Dali, Shaanxi) on his behalf to form a blood alliance with the Duke of Qin Huan, who was waiting here.

But not long after the Qin and Jin Dynasty's 'Linghu and Wangcheng Alliance' was reached, Qin Huan Gong reneged on his alliance with the Jin State and secretly contacted the Bai Di tribe in the northern part of the Jin State in private, agreeing on a good time and preparing to jointly attack the Jin State; But the Qin and Di families were not secretive, and their small actions of secretly contacting and intending to sneak attack the Jin Kingdom were soon known to the Duke of Jin Li.

At that time, Jin Li Gong was closely watching the upcoming 'Jin and Chu Soldiers' Meeting', and had no extra energy to deal with the Qin State, so Jin Li Gong temporarily put Qin Huangong's betrayal of the alliance aside, preparing to complete the 'Soldiers' Meeting with Chu State first, and then settle the general account with Qin State after stabilizing the situation in the south.

By the autumn of the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou (579 BC), the Jin and Chu 'Soldiers Meeting' had been successfully completed in advance, and the Di people who were instigated by Qin Huan also attacked the Jin State in accordance with the prior agreement, and won a blow; however, the Di people won first and then lost the battle against the Jin, and the counterattacked Jin army was defeated in Jiaogang (Linfen Xi County, Shanxi), and had to flee from the Jin border in embarrassment.

Although the Qin State was making small moves behind the scenes, the Duke of Jin Li still wanted to use the 'meeting of the soldiers' to stabilize the Chu State and improve the strategic stability situation in the south; therefore, the Duke of Jin Li did not immediately launch a campaign to attack Qin, but in the winter of the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou (579 BC), he sent a new army to the Chu State to meet the King of Chu and reaffirm the friendly alliance between Jin and Chu.

The king of Chu Gong attached great importance to Hao Zhi's visit, not only came forward to meet him in person, but also specially arranged a 'big gift' to entertain him, and Chu Sima Zi instead served as the 'xiangli' of the banquet, that is, the host of the banquet, and participated in the meeting together.

However, when Yin Zhi was invited to the banquet, because of the music played at the banquet, he found out that the monarchs and ministers of Chu did not attach importance to the 'Covenant of Soldiers' with the Jin State, as well as the observance of the etiquette of the "Zhou Li", and were still ready to start a war with the Jin State at any time; Therefore, after returning to China, he reported everything he saw and heard in the Chu State and his own response words to the Duke of Jin Li, so that the Duke of Jin Li understood that the 'alliance with the soldiers of the Chu State' was just an expedient measure, and the two countries of Jin and Chu would meet again on the battlefield sooner or later.

Although Yin Zhi had already figured out the attitude of the Chu State, Jin Ligong already wanted to free up his hands to deal with the Qin State that was about to move at this moment, so he did not immediately turn against the Chu State; Even in the winter of this year (i.e., the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou, 579 BC), when the envoy of Chu called off the envoy to Jin in return for his appointment to the Chu state, the prince of Jin Li also personally met with the prince in Chijian, and formed an alliance with him, reaffirming the covenant between Jin and Chu.

After completing the alliance with Chu and stabilizing the 'temporary peace' in the south, at the beginning of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), Duke Li of Jin began to prepare for a crusade against Qin, preparing to deal the most severe blow to this old enemy.

In order to become famous, in March of that year, Jin Li Gong gathered many allies - Qi, Lu, Song, Wei, Zheng, Cao, Di, Teng and other kings of the eight countries, together to go to the capital of the king of Yuyi to worship Zhou Tianzi; Duke Li of Jin also personally went out and stated to King Zhou Jian, the Son of Heaven, many unrighteous things such as Qin's rude betrayal of the alliance and the joint Rong Di's sneak attack on the Jin State, and asked the Son of Heaven to "uphold justice" for the Jin State and send troops to punish the Qin State for betraying the alliance and disrespecting the royal family.

Zhou Tianzi's daily life needs at this time had to rely on the irregular tribute (or alms) of the princes to barely maintain, and the pomp of the 'co-lord of the world' was all in the hands of the 'pro-Zhou princes' headed by the Duke of Jin Li (as for the Chu State, don't mention it, it's good not to come to inquire about the importance of Ding), where is the military strength to teach the rebellious princes in person.

Therefore, King Zhou Jian agreed to the request of Jin Li Gong to 'uphold justice' without hesitation and happily, not only personally reprimanding the Qin State, but also very considerately "entrusted" Jin Li Gong to "crusade against the ministers" instead of himself. In addition, King Zhou Jian also sent the royal family secretaries Liu Kanggong and Chengsu Gong as commanders, leading the "Wang Division" (estimated to be a thousand people) to go out on the expedition, and participated in the invasion of Qin with the alliance of princes led by the Jin army.

And Zhou Tianzi's initiative to express his position so well gave Jin Ligong's action of sending troops to attack Qin a more adequate and justified reason, which was impeccable in patriarchal morality; However, in order to better grasp the supreme advantage of 'public opinion and diplomacy' before the war, Jin Ligong devised a more powerful strategy.

On the fifth day of the fourth month of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), on the order of the Duke of Jin Li, Lu Xiang, a pedestrian and envoy of the Jin Kingdom, successfully arrived in Yongcheng, the capital of Qin (Fengxiang, Shaanxi); And on the main hall of the Qin State Palace, in front of Qin Huan Gong and the Qin State Secretaries and Doctors, Lu Xiang recited the full text of the "Letter of Breaking Friendship with Qin" carefully written by himself and reviewed and approved by Jin Li Gong (there are more than 800 words in the Book of Breaking Friendship, and if you want to read it out without pause and error, Lu Xiang is really attentive).

The real purpose of Lü Xiang's diplomatic rhetoric of 'breaking off diplomatic relations with Qin' can be explained by 'avoiding the important and reversing black and white', and its real purpose is to cover up the reasons for the in-laws and feuds between the Jin and Qin, and to put all the faults and blame on the Qin State, so as to prevent the Qin State from occupying the commanding heights of morality and faith before the war, causing the passivity of the Jin State, and to find a high-sounding excuse for the 'Battle of Qin' of the Jin State Coalition Army in the near future.

After Lu Xiang finished reading the 'Book of Absolute Qin', Qin Huan, who was sitting on the top of the main hall, was expressionless, barely controlled the anger in his heart, and then directly ordered the armor in the palace to fork this shameless pedestrian of the Jin Kingdom out of the main hall, immediately drive out of Yongcheng, not allowed to stay in the territory of the Qin State, and kick back to the Jin Kingdom.

In order to safeguard the dignity and interests of the Qin State, the Duke of Qin Huan also publicly announced the severance of the alliance with the Jin State after the Jin State had issued a letter of renunciation, and then immediately prepared the armaments, grain, and materials before the war, and prepared to engage in armed confrontation with the Jin coalition forces that were about to attack Qin.

In April of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), Duke Li of Jin, who had arranged all the preparations before the war, personally led the army to lead the army, and led the Jin allied army - Jin, Qi, Song, Wei, Lu, Zheng, Cao, Di, Teng and other armies of nine countries, and sent out together with the "royal division" of less than 2,000 people led by the royal secretary Liu Kanggong and Chengsu Gong to crusade against the Qin State that "broke the covenant and refused to accept the decree of the Son of Heaven". Including the 'Wang Shi' who played soy sauce, the number of Jin allied troops reached an unprecedented 120,000 people.

At the end of April, Jin Ligong led a coalition of 120,000 troops across the Yellow River to the Ma Tunnel (Jingyang, Shaanxi) in the territory of Qin, and then garrisoned on the east bank of Jingshui. After learning the news that the Jin allied army had reached the territory of Qin, Qin Huan Gong was not to be outdone, and led 50,000 Qin troops from the Qin capital Yongcheng (Fengxiang, Shaanxi) to the west bank of the Jing River in the Ma Tunnel, and the two armies confronted each other across the narrow Jing River.

On the fourth day of the fifth month, after careful arrangements and preparations for war in advance, the Jin allied army crossed the river under the leadership of Jin Ligong and launched an attack on the Qin army west of the river.

The Qin army had a clear disadvantage in terms of strength, and the Jin army was well-trained and battle-hardened, and after a short but fierce resistance, the Qin army was defeated by the onslaught of the coalition forces; In this battle, the Qin army's generals Cheng Cha and Bu Chang (knight's name) were captured by the coalition forces, and the casualties were close to 30,000.

After defeating the Qin army, Jin Ligong refused to give up, and then led the coalition army to follow the Qin army in close pursuit, and pursued until the vicinity of Hou Li (present-day Liquan, Shaanxi) of the Qin State before stopping the military operation; The Qin army was also chased by the coalition forces all the way and drove back to the national capital Yongcheng, and Qin Huan Gong contracted his forces to defend Yongcheng and did not dare to fight easily.

After the complete victory of the Qin Dynasty, the Duke of Jin Li triumphantly announced the withdrawal of his troops and led the alliance of princes to return to Hedong (east of the Great River, not east of the Jing River), and the land west of the river of the Qin State was occupied by the Jin State, and for hundreds of years, the Qin State failed to successfully regain the land west of the river from the hands of the Jin State (already three Jin).

Regarding the course of this battle, I have written very clearly in my previous article "The Major Events of the State, Zaiji and Rong - The Story Behind the Battle of the Ma Tunnel", so I will not repeat it here; Readers who need to understand the causes and consequences of this war can go directly to the previous article; Thank you.

After the end of this battle, Jin Li Gong relied on the successive defeat of Qi, Qin, Di three sides of the great martial arts, successfully suppressed the expansion momentum of the Chu State, the Jin State of the national momentum also soared, the vassal states to the Jin State unanimously awe, surrender, to the Jin capital Xintian Dynasty to see the Jin Li Gong of the princes and monarchs of the car in an endless stream; As a result, the Jin State re-emerged as the (well-deserved) overlord of the princes.

When the Duke of Jin Li summoned the princes and allies to send troops to attack Qin together, Zheng Guo, who was the new ally (new junior brother) of the Jin State, naturally also received the summoning order; In order to show his loyalty to the Jin State, Zheng Chenggong, the monarch of Zheng State, personally led the army to participate in the battle of the Jin State Alliance; But during the period when Zheng Chenggong led his troops out to fight, Zheng Guo once again had internal strife and turmoil.

In the summer of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), when Zheng Chenggong led his army to the Qin State and went out to fight, he led his subordinates to sneak back to Xinzheng from Zidi, and made a 'request' to the ruling secretary Gongzi Gong (i.e., Zisi and one of the Seven Mu of Zheng Guo) who stayed in Xinzheng - he was allowed to enter the temple of Zheng Guozong to worship his ancestors (Gongziban wanted to test the Zheng people's reaction to their return to Xinzheng and their attitude towards whether they accepted it).

Annoyed and angry, Gongzi Ban led his private troops to attack the private house of the 'Mu tribe' (that is, the descendants of Zheng Mugong, who are not members of the Zheng Guo Mu clan) in Xinzheng City, and also killed two of the seven Mu members - Gongzi Shu (Ziyin) and Gongzi Hua (Ziyu); Subsequently, the Gongzi class garrisoned above the market in Xinzheng, ready to wait and see the situation and take the next move.

On June 17, the Zisi who stayed in Xinzheng gathered the private soldiers of other Mu tribes in Xinzheng City (as well as most of the Zheng Guoguo people who refused to belong to the Gongzi class), and led them to the Zheng Guozu Temple to swear an oath, agreeing to jointly send troops to defeat the Gongzi Ban who rebelled against the Zongmiao Sheji.

Then, Zisi solemnly burned the book of alliance in the ancestral temple, so as to swear to Haotian to eliminate the traitors; Immediately, Zisi led the army to the market, defeated the private soldiers brought by the Gongzi class in one fell swoop, and killed the Gongzi class and his younger brother Gongzi Lu and his sons and nephews Gongsun Uncle and Gongsun Zhi on the spot; The Zheng internal strife and rebellion initiated by the members of the exile office was put down by Zisi.

Soon after the Gongzi Banzuo rebellion was put down, Zheng Chenggong led his army back to Zheng from the Qin front; And after learning that when he was not there, the child's class actually ran back from Xu Guo to make trouble, and almost succeeded, Zheng Chenggong was furious, and the culprit and culprit of this internal strife were detained on the head of Xu Guo, who took in the child's class and intercepted the land.

Zheng Chenggong thinks that the reason why the Gongzi class was able to gather private soldiers to return to China to make chaos was not all taken in and connived at by the feud Xu Guo next door, and Xu Guo also sponsored the land to be used as a rebel base for the Gongzi class; Although Gongsun Shen's fief was Zidi before, Xu Guo accepted the Gongzi class, and incidentally accepted the fief of Gongsun Shen, who was the son of the boy's class, so it was said that the land was now Xu Guo's, which was not wrong at all - Zheng Cheng shouted angrily!

In August of the ninth year of King Jian of Zhou (577 BC), in order to punish Xu Guo for taking in and supporting Gongzi Ban to return to China to make a rebellion, and also privately received the fiefdom of Gongsun Shen, a traitor of Zheng State, causing losses in the territory of Zheng State, Zheng Chenggong ignored the overlords (Jin and Chu) who had previously had an agreement of 'Killing Soldiers', and sent Zheng Guo's ruling son Xi (Zihan) to lead an army to forcibly attack Xu in order to vent his personal anger.

And Zheng Chenggong attacked Xu, there is another unknown reason - Jin and Chu have signed a 'war alliance' before, and Xu Guo is considered an ally of Jin (Xu Guo treats both Jin and Chu equally, and does not deliberately favor one over the other, which is stronger than Zheng Guo), but did not send troops to participate in the Jin State Alliance's battle against Qin (that is, the Battle of Ma Tunnel), which is that Xu State does not respect the two overlords of Jin and Chu; As an ally of the Jin State, Zheng Guo of course had to be upset with the alliance leader, so he specially went to crusade against Xu Guo, thinking that Xu Guo would be punished for 'disrespecting the alliance leader and taking in traitors' (good excuse!). ）

What was the specific process of the battle between Zheng and Xu, and the series of consequences that followed? From the beginning of the fifth year of King Jian of Zhou (581 BC), marked by the diplomatic etiquette of the Duke of Jin Jinggong sending a doctor to visit the State of Chu and repay the diplomatic etiquette of the Emperor of Chu Dazai Zishang (Gongzi Chen) who had sent an envoy to the State of Jin in the previous year, to the summer of the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou (579 BC), under the mediation of Hua Yuan, the ruling secretary of the Song State, the Jin and Chu countries sent high-level representatives (the Jin State is the Shangjun General Xie, and the Chu State is the Dafu Gongzi and Xu Yan) to the Song capital Shangqiu, and held a formal 'meeting of the soldiers' (i.e., ' In order to end, the two princes and overlords of Jin and Chu were finally able to temporarily truce.

And the 'meeting of the soldiers' between Jin and Chu, from the intention of the Duke of Jin Jinggong and the King of Chu to prepare to convene an alliance, to the official meeting of Shixie and Gongzi in Shangqiu, the Song capital, was delayed for more than a year? This is because in the sixth year of King Jian of Zhou (580 BC) during this period, the Duke of Jin Li decided to temporarily negotiate peace with the Qin State, so as to avoid the loss of a large amount of unnecessary national and military strength just after he succeeded to the throne, so that the Jin State could rest and recover first (and then continue to fight with the two strong enemies of Chu and Qin in the future).

Therefore, at the beginning of the sixth year of King Jian of Zhou (580 BC), the Duke of Jin Li specially sent an envoy to the Qin State, and sent a request to the Qin State Emperor Qin Huan Gong to "truce the army and meet the alliance", and "warmly" invited the Duke of Qin Huan to meet with Linghu (Linyi, Shanxi, which belonged to the Jin State at this time) on the border between the two countries in order to hold the alliance meeting.

Qin Huan Gong couldn't trust the character of Jin Li Gong (successive generations of Jin marquis are cunning and changeable personalities, and Qin State also suffered a lot for this), thinking that if he rashly entered the territory of Jin State, it is difficult to guarantee that he will not repeat the previous mistake of Zheng Chenggong and Lu Chenggong being detained and placed under house arrest by Jin State; Therefore, Duke Qin Huan decided not to go to Linghu and the Jin Li Guild to meet and swear an oath, but instead assigned Shi Liang, the doctor of the Qin State, to cross the river and go to Linghu to meet Jin Li Gong instead, and then make a blood alliance with Jin Li Gong.

Seeing that Duke Qin Huan refused to cross the river, Duke Jin Li had no choice but to make blood with Shi Liang, the envoy of Qin, in the east of the river and completed the oath; Subsequently, the Duke of Jin Li sent the Jin Doctor Yin to cross the river and go to the Qin King City (Dali, Shaanxi) on his behalf to form a blood alliance with the Duke of Qin Huan, who was waiting here.

But not long after the Qin and Jin Dynasty's 'Linghu and Wangcheng Alliance' was reached, Qin Huan Gong reneged on his alliance with the Jin State and secretly contacted the Bai Di tribe in the northern part of the Jin State in private, agreeing on a good time and preparing to jointly attack the Jin State; But the Qin and Di families were not secretive, and their small actions of secretly contacting and intending to sneak attack the Jin Kingdom were soon known to the Duke of Jin Li.

At that time, Jin Li Gong was closely watching the upcoming 'Jin and Chu Soldiers' Meeting', and had no extra energy to deal with the Qin State, so Jin Li Gong temporarily put Qin Huangong's betrayal of the alliance aside, preparing to complete the 'Soldiers' Meeting with Chu State first, and then settle the general account with Qin State after stabilizing the situation in the south.

By the autumn of the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou (579 BC), the Jin and Chu 'Soldiers Meeting' had been successfully completed in advance, and the Di people who were instigated by Qin Huan also attacked the Jin State in accordance with the prior agreement, and won a blow; however, the Di people won first and then lost the battle against the Jin, and the counterattacked Jin army was defeated in Jiaogang (Linfen Xi County, Shanxi), and had to flee from the Jin border in embarrassment.

Although the Qin State was making small moves behind the scenes, the Duke of Jin Li still wanted to use the 'meeting of the soldiers' to stabilize the Chu State and improve the strategic stability situation in the south; therefore, the Duke of Jin Li did not immediately launch a campaign to attack Qin, but in the winter of the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou (579 BC), he sent a new army to the Chu State to meet the King of Chu and reaffirm the friendly alliance between Jin and Chu.

The king of Chu Gong attached great importance to Hao Zhi's visit, not only came forward to meet him in person, but also specially arranged a 'big gift' to entertain him, and Chu Sima Zi instead served as the 'xiangli' of the banquet, that is, the host of the banquet, and participated in the meeting together.

However, when Yin Zhi was invited to the banquet, because of the music played at the banquet, he found out that the monarchs and ministers of Chu did not attach importance to the 'Covenant of Soldiers' with the Jin State, as well as the observance of the etiquette of the "Zhou Li", and were still ready to start a war with the Jin State at any time; Therefore, after returning to China, he reported everything he saw and heard in the Chu State and his own response words to the Duke of Jin Li, so that the Duke of Jin Li understood that the 'alliance with the soldiers of the Chu State' was just an expedient measure, and the two countries of Jin and Chu would meet again on the battlefield sooner or later.

Although Yin Zhi had already figured out the attitude of the Chu State, Jin Ligong already wanted to free up his hands to deal with the Qin State that was about to move at this moment, so he did not immediately turn against the Chu State; Even in the winter of this year (i.e., the seventh year of King Jian of Zhou, 579 BC), when the envoy of Chu called off the envoy to Jin in return for his appointment to the Chu state, the prince of Jin Li also personally met with the prince in Chijian, and formed an alliance with him, reaffirming the covenant between Jin and Chu.

After completing the alliance with Chu and stabilizing the 'temporary peace' in the south, at the beginning of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), Duke Li of Jin began to prepare for a crusade against Qin, preparing to deal the most severe blow to this old enemy.

In order to become famous, in March of that year, Jin Li Gong gathered many allies - Qi, Lu, Song, Wei, Zheng, Cao, Di, Teng and other kings of the eight countries, together to go to the capital of the king of Yuyi to worship Zhou Tianzi; Duke Li of Jin also personally went out and stated to King Zhou Jian, the Son of Heaven, many unrighteous things such as Qin's rude betrayal of the alliance and the joint Rong Di's sneak attack on the Jin State, and asked the Son of Heaven to "uphold justice" for the Jin State and send troops to punish the Qin State for betraying the alliance and disrespecting the royal family.

Zhou Tianzi's daily life needs at this time had to rely on the irregular tribute (or alms) of the princes to barely maintain, and the pomp of the 'co-lord of the world' was all in the hands of the 'pro-Zhou princes' headed by the Duke of Jin Li (as for the Chu State, don't mention it, it's good not to come to inquire about the importance of Ding), where is the military strength to teach the rebellious princes in person.

Therefore, King Zhou Jian agreed to the request of Jin Li Gong to 'uphold justice' without hesitation and happily, not only personally reprimanding the Qin State, but also very considerately "entrusted" Jin Li Gong to "crusade against the ministers" instead of himself. In addition, King Zhou Jian also sent the royal family secretaries Liu Kanggong and Chengsu Gong as commanders, leading the "Wang Division" (estimated to be a thousand people) to go out on the expedition, and participated in the invasion of Qin with the alliance of princes led by the Jin army.

And Zhou Tianzi's initiative to express his position so well gave Jin Ligong's action of sending troops to attack Qin a more adequate and justified reason, which was impeccable in patriarchal morality; However, in order to better grasp the supreme advantage of 'public opinion and diplomacy' before the war, Jin Ligong devised a more powerful strategy.

On the fifth day of the fourth month of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), on the order of the Duke of Jin Li, Lu Xiang, a pedestrian and envoy of the Jin Kingdom, successfully arrived in Yongcheng, the capital of Qin (Fengxiang, Shaanxi); And on the main hall of the Qin State Palace, in front of Qin Huan Gong and the Qin State Secretaries and Doctors, Lu Xiang recited the full text of the "Letter of Breaking Friendship with Qin" carefully written by himself and reviewed and approved by Jin Li Gong (there are more than 800 words in the Book of Breaking Friendship, and if you want to read it out without pause and error, Lu Xiang is really attentive).

The real purpose of Lü Xiang's diplomatic rhetoric of 'breaking off diplomatic relations with Qin' can be explained by 'avoiding the important and reversing black and white', and its real purpose is to cover up the reasons for the in-laws and feuds between the Jin and Qin, and to put all the faults and blame on the Qin State, so as to prevent the Qin State from occupying the commanding heights of morality and faith before the war, causing the passivity of the Jin State, and to find a high-sounding excuse for the 'Battle of Qin' of the Jin State Coalition Army in the near future.

After Lu Xiang finished reading the 'Book of Absolute Qin', Qin Huan, who was sitting on the top of the main hall, was expressionless, barely controlled the anger in his heart, and then directly ordered the armor in the palace to fork this shameless pedestrian of the Jin Kingdom out of the main hall, immediately drive out of Yongcheng, not allowed to stay in the territory of the Qin State, and kick back to the Jin Kingdom.

In order to safeguard the dignity and interests of the Qin State, the Duke of Qin Huan also publicly announced the severance of the alliance with the Jin State after the Jin State had issued a letter of renunciation, and then immediately prepared the armaments, grain, and materials before the war, and prepared to engage in armed confrontation with the Jin coalition forces that were about to attack Qin.

In April of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), Duke Li of Jin, who had arranged all the preparations before the war, personally led the army to lead the army, and led the Jin allied army - Jin, Qi, Song, Wei, Lu, Zheng, Cao, Di, Teng and other armies of nine countries, and sent out together with the "royal division" of less than 2,000 people led by the royal secretary Liu Kanggong and Chengsu Gong to crusade against the Qin State that "broke the covenant and refused to accept the decree of the Son of Heaven". Including the 'Wang Shi' who played soy sauce, the number of Jin allied troops reached an unprecedented 120,000 people.

At the end of April, Jin Ligong led a coalition of 120,000 troops across the Yellow River to the Ma Tunnel (Jingyang, Shaanxi) in the territory of Qin, and then garrisoned on the east bank of Jingshui. After learning the news that the Jin allied army had reached the territory of Qin, Qin Huan Gong was not to be outdone, and led 50,000 Qin troops from the Qin capital Yongcheng (Fengxiang, Shaanxi) to the west bank of the Jing River in the Ma Tunnel, and the two armies confronted each other across the narrow Jing River.

On the fourth day of the fifth month, after careful arrangements and preparations for war in advance, the Jin allied army crossed the river under the leadership of Jin Ligong and launched an attack on the Qin army west of the river.

The Qin army had a clear disadvantage in terms of strength, and the Jin army was well-trained and battle-hardened, and after a short but fierce resistance, the Qin army was defeated by the onslaught of the coalition forces; In this battle, the Qin army's generals Cheng Cha and Bu Chang (knight's name) were captured by the coalition forces, and the casualties were close to 30,000.

After defeating the Qin army, Jin Ligong refused to give up, and then led the coalition army to follow the Qin army in close pursuit, and pursued until the vicinity of Hou Li (present-day Liquan, Shaanxi) of the Qin State before stopping the military operation; The Qin army was also chased by the coalition forces all the way and drove back to the national capital Yongcheng, and Qin Huan Gong contracted his forces to defend Yongcheng and did not dare to fight easily.

After the complete victory of the Qin Dynasty, the Duke of Jin Li triumphantly announced the withdrawal of his troops and led the alliance of princes to return to Hedong (east of the Great River, not east of the Jing River), and the land west of the river of the Qin State was occupied by the Jin State, and for hundreds of years, the Qin State failed to successfully regain the land west of the river from the hands of the Jin State (already three Jin).

Regarding the course of this battle, I have written very clearly in my previous article "The Major Events of the State, Zaiji and Rong - The Story Behind the Battle of the Ma Tunnel", so I will not repeat it here; Readers who need to understand the causes and consequences of this war can go directly to the previous article; Thank you.

After the end of this battle, Jin Li Gong relied on the successive defeat of Qi, Qin, Di three sides of the great martial arts, successfully suppressed the expansion momentum of the Chu State, the Jin State of the national momentum also soared, the vassal states to the Jin State unanimously awe, surrender, to the Jin capital Xintian Dynasty to see the Jin Li Gong of the princes and monarchs of the car in an endless stream; As a result, the Jin State re-emerged as the (well-deserved) overlord of the princes.

When the Duke of Jin Li summoned the princes and allies to send troops to attack Qin together, Zheng Guo, who was the new ally (new junior brother) of the Jin State, naturally also received the summoning order; In order to show his loyalty to the Jin State, Zheng Chenggong, the monarch of Zheng State, personally led the army to participate in the battle of the Jin State Alliance; But during the period when Zheng Chenggong led his troops out to fight, Zheng Guo once again had internal strife and turmoil.

In the summer of the eighth year of King Jian of Zhou (578 BC), when Zheng Chenggong led his army to the Qin State and went out to fight, he had changed the monarch without authorization when he was in power, and then was driven out of the country by a coup d'état by the 'Mu people' in China, and went into exile in the land of Xu Guozi (this place was originally the fief of Gongsun Shen, the doctor of Zheng Guo; After Gongsun Shen was killed in the rebellion, he had no owner of the land, so he was accepted by Xu Guo, and then transferred to the Zheng Guo's traitor son Ban of Zheng Guo's former ruling son Ban who took refuge in Xu State, taking advantage of the opportunity of the monarch's foreign and Xinzheng ownerless, suddenly in the middle of the night of June 15 of that year, he led his followers to sneak back to Xinzheng from Zidi, and made a 'request' to the ruling secretary Gongzi Xuan (that is, Zisi and one of the Seven Mu of Zheng Guo) who stayed in Xinzheng - Allow yourself to enter the temple of Zheng Guozong to worship the ancestors (Gongziban wants to test Zheng people's reaction to their return to Xinzheng and whether they accept it).

Annoyed and angry, Gongzi Ban led his private troops to attack the private house of the 'Mu tribe' (that is, the descendants of Zheng Mugong, who are not members of the Zheng Guo Mu clan) in Xinzheng City, and also killed two of the seven Mu members - Gongzi Shu (Ziyin) and Gongzi Hua (Ziyu); Subsequently, the Gongzi class garrisoned above the market in Xinzheng, ready to wait and see the situation and take the next move.

On June 17, the Zisi who stayed in Xinzheng gathered the private soldiers of other Mu tribes in Xinzheng City (as well as most of the Zheng Guoguo people who refused to belong to the Gongzi class), and led them to the Zheng Guozu Temple to swear an oath, agreeing to jointly send troops to defeat the Gongzi Ban who rebelled against the Zongmiao Sheji.

Then, Zisi solemnly burned the book of alliance in the ancestral temple, so as to swear to Haotian to eliminate the traitors; Immediately, Zisi led the army to the market, defeated the private soldiers brought by the Gongzi class in one fell swoop, and killed the Gongzi class and his younger brother Gongzi Lu and his sons and nephews Gongsun Uncle and Gongsun Zhi on the spot; The Zheng internal strife and rebellion initiated by the members of the exile office was put down by Zisi.

Soon after the Gongzi Banzuo rebellion was put down, Zheng Chenggong led his army back to Zheng from the Qin front; And after learning that when he was not there, the child's class actually ran back from Xu Guo to make trouble, and almost succeeded, Zheng Chenggong was furious, and the culprit and culprit of this internal strife were detained on the head of Xu Guo, who took in the child's class and intercepted the land.

Zheng Chenggong thinks that the reason why the Gongzi class was able to gather private soldiers to return to China to make chaos was not all taken in and connived at by the feud Xu Guo next door, and Xu Guo also sponsored the land to be used as a rebel base for the Gongzi class; Although Gongsun Shen's fief was Zidi before, Xu Guo accepted the Gongzi class, and incidentally accepted the fief of Gongsun Shen, who was the son of the boy's class, so it was said that the land was now Xu Guo's, which was not wrong at all - Zheng Cheng shouted angrily!

In August of the ninth year of King Jian of Zhou (577 BC), in order to punish Xu Guo for taking in and supporting Gongzi Ban to return to China to make a rebellion, and also privately received the fiefdom of Gongsun Shen, a traitor of Zheng State, causing losses in the territory of Zheng State, Zheng Chenggong ignored the overlords (Jin and Chu) who had previously had an agreement of 'Killing Soldiers', and sent Zheng Guo's ruling son Xi (Zihan) to lead an army to forcibly attack Xu in order to vent his personal anger.

And Zheng Chenggong attacked Xu, there is another unknown reason - Jin and Chu have signed a 'war alliance' before, and Xu Guo is considered an ally of Jin (Xu Guo treats both Jin and Chu equally, and does not deliberately favor one over the other, which is stronger than Zheng Guo), but did not send troops to participate in the Jin State Alliance's battle against Qin (that is, the Battle of Ma Tunnel), which is that Xu State does not respect the two overlords of Jin and Chu; As an ally of the Jin State, Zheng Guo of course had to be upset with the alliance leader, so he specially went to crusade against Xu Guo, thinking that Xu Guo would be punished for 'disrespecting the alliance leader and taking in traitors' (good excuse!). ）

What was the specific process of the battle between Zheng and Xu, and the series of consequences that followed?