After the unsung hero Qi Zheng brought a wave of "group extermination" of rice borer pests in Jiangyou Province, a group of researchers were left scratching their heads. Look at 1 gross 2 lines 3 Chinese net

The larvae seem to be dead, the adults are not half left, and the eggs don't seem to hatch......

The effect of this pesticide is hell, right?

Qi Zhengke didn't care what the researchers were conjecturing, after solving the rice borer infestation, the problem of rice production should not be big, and he turned his attention to Zhong Huazhi's Jiagu trade.

Jiagu Agricultural Materials and Jiagu Agriculture coordinated rice planting and production to ensure grain supply, and Jiagu Commerce and Trade plunged headlong into the construction of rice storage and logistics.

It seems that there is a disharmony between the production area and the consumer market in our country, regardless of the type of resource, and the same is true for rice.

For example, Jiangyou Province, as the main producing area of early indica rice, has a rice flow to Shanghai and the neighboring Jiangnan and Min provinces.

The quality of mid-to-late indica rice is better than that of early indica rice, and it is the main ration in the south. Mid-to-late indica farmers generally sell the rest as commercial grain in addition to satisfying their own rations. The production and marketing location of mid-to-late indica rice is clear, and the trade flow has been relatively stable for many years.

Domestic rice transportation is divided into short-distance transportation and inter-provincial long-distance transportation, short-distance transportation is mainly road packaging transportation, and cross-high-level official transportation is mainly railway transportation, water-rail combined transportation, highway, waterway and waterway transportation, of which railway transportation is the main mode of transportation.

If road transport and waterway transport are still a bit tricky, in China, Jiagu is not able to intervene in railway transport - of course, except for the "iron boss", no one can intervene.

Therefore, Zhong Huazhi can only focus on warehousing first.

Similarly, in the domestic grain storage, there is also a behemoth that has to deal with it - national grain reserves.

At present, not long after the opening of China's grain market, the local grain enterprises that can really be called large-scale grain enterprises are the national grain and national grain reserves.

China's large-scale grain enterprises are basically state-owned enterprises, and there are certain drawbacks in the system and operation mechanism - whether it is national grain or national grain reserves, the integration of grain logistics operation and supply chain has not yet been fully realized. The state grain reserves have advantages in grain reserves, but there are also scattered management, production and marketing cannot be coordinated, each grain warehouse is independent, and the characteristics of the overall transportation of the enterprise cannot be brought into play

National grain reserves were originally created for the purpose of "food security". Since its birth at the beginning of this century, the country's "big granary" has been implementing the state's policy of purchasing grain from the market, and has been responsible for the purchase and reserve of grain for national policy, the purchase and storage of grain from the state's strategic reserves, and the purchase and temporary reserve of grain from the city for the purpose of regulating the grain market.

Since last year, in order to solve the problem of peasants' "difficulty in selling grain," the state has implemented a policy of purchasing grain from the market. The main body of this policy is the national grain reserves.

The state grain reserves purchase grain from the peasants at market prices, and after leaving the strategic grain reserves, the surplus is sold to various grain enterprises at market prices, and the grain enterprises then sell them to the market.

In order to launch the staple food strategy, the national policy cannot be ignored. Regarding whether the purchase policy of the grain trust market is good or bad, Jiagu also had a special discussion within Jiagu.

In the end, the result of the discussion was that the grain trust market procurement policy is a good thing for farmers, but it is not necessarily a good thing for grain enterprises.

As the name suggests, "supporting" grain prices and stabilizing grain prices.

First of all, there is no doubt that the policy of purchasing grain from the city will increase the peasants' enthusiasm for growing grain and promote the increase of grain production.

Since the market price is higher than the market price, the majority of peasants and grain dealers are more willing to sell their grain to the state grain depot, and grain has entered the state grain storage system in a steady stream.

In the eyes of grain companies like Jiagu, such a policy of holding the market undoubtedly interferes with the market and makes the price unable to reflect the value.

"The initial minimum purchase price was set because the market price was relatively low, and it was set in order to prevent the grain from hurting farmers. However, this price is said to be the lowest purchase price, but from the beginning of the execution, it became the highest purchase price in the market, which actually pulled the price up. Wang Yuye habitually points to the essence.

"Although this regulates the market, there is no market anymore. Zhong Huazhi added.

Qi Zhengzi knows best.

Indeed, because of the distortion of market prices, more than 10 years after the market was entrusted, "difficulty in selling grain" has once again become a social problem.

From a national point of view, the current policy objective is to ensure food security and ensure the efficient supply of agricultural products. To put it bluntly, it is to ensure the increase in the production of agricultural products.

However, after the increase in production, on the one hand, the price of grain has continued to rise, and on the other hand, the main players of the market have stopped collecting it, and only the state reserves of grain have collected it. "The consequence is that the market is seriously distorted, and the grain in the part of the commodity circulation also enters the grain depot of the state's grain reserves. ”

As a result, a private grain enterprise like Jiagu will have a de facto "grain grab" with the state's grain reserves.

Of course, if you compare the amount of inventory, Jiagu Pai Ma is not as good as the national grain reserves supported by the state.

There is no public disclosure of how much grain is stored in the national grain reserves. But according to one source, "the largest stockpile in the world has been built." ”

With such a huge amount of reserves, it will certainly not be possible to rely on the state grain storage enterprise alone. As a matter of fact, more than eighty percent of the collected and stored grain and oil are entrusted to be collected and stored, and the grain and oil temporarily collected and stored are scattered and stored in grassroots grain depots and other places across the country. There are only more than 300 depots directly under the state grain reserves, and the number of entrusted collection and storage points is more than 30 times the number of depots directly under the state grain reserves.

Jiagu also does not need to compare the inventory with the national grain reserves, but only needs a granary that can store grain. And among them, Jiagu saw an opportunity.

The opportunity comes from the predicament faced by grassroots grain depots after the reform of the grain circulation system.

Last year, the state carried out a series of reforms in the grain circulation system. In the course of reform, a grain reserve system at the national, provincial, municipal, and county levels has been established. The county-level grain reserve depot and other three-level grain depots together constitute the national grain reserve system, which undertakes many important tasks such as regulating market supply and demand and stabilizing inter-annual grain output fluctuations.

In addition, because of the gradual implementation of marketization in grain purchase and sales, grassroots grain depots no longer receive state financial subsidies and are completely responsible for their own profits and losses. As a result, some grain depots have difficulties in production and operation and are heavily indebted.

To put it simply, the grassroots grain depots have to carry out the storage business, but the indicators allocated by the state grain reserves are always not fixed, sometimes many, sometimes very little, so the storage fees collected from the state grain reserves are also unstable.

But if you cooperate with Jiagu Commerce, there will be no such problem.

At the beginning of Jiagu Commerce's entry into the staple grain trade, it did not have much of its own grain depot, and the purchased grain happened to have nowhere to store it.

Therefore, in the major grain-producing areas in the south where Jiagu Commerce and Trade marched, the county-level grain depots that were struggling with life and death were desperate for cooperation, and the two sides hit it off.

But in addition to Jiagu, those foreign giants are also very discerning, and they also take a fancy to the opportunities that Jiagu sees.

In the main grain-producing areas of Jiangyou Province, the county-level grain depots that had previously hit off Jiagu commerce and trade are now hesitant because a third party has intervened.

Yihai Group!

At the beginning, the foreign-funded enterprises that wanted to cooperate with Jiagu in the acquisition of the soybean crushing plant were rejected by Jiagu, and Jiagu snatched the largest piece of cake in the merger and acquisition of the crushing plant, and the relationship between the two sides was once like water and fire.

Heaven is a good reincarnation, and now it is the turn of Yihai Group to come over and grab Jiagu's cake.

It's really a narrow road!

......