Report on the French assessment of the Leopard tank

Translation: Dream of sorrow

Proofreading: Dream is sorrowful

Touches: Joshua Astray, dreamy

Professional historians and military history enthusiasts often describe the German Leopard as the best German tank of World War II and even the best tank in the history of World War II. It boasts a powerful and accurate 75mm high-speed tank gun, which is immune to the frontal armor of most Allied anti-tank weapons, and its powerful engine combined with wide tracks and drivetrain gives it unbeatable speed, unmatched off-road ability, and a steady driving experience. What more could a tanker ask for?

In fact, a tanker may need more. The story of the Leopard tank is full of cases closely related to mechanical problems. In the midst of the ambitious German Kursk offensive of 1943 (Operation Bastion), the first appearance of the Leopard was not a sign of good fortune. Two freshly baked tanks that had just been unloaded from the train were destroyed in a fire with their engines! The term "baptism of flames" has taken on a whole new meaning.

Any American and British soldier who has ever faced a leopard on the battlefield has great praise for him (if anyone would ever use "praise" on a feared adversary). Although it has never been a "battlefield monster" like the Tiger Tank, it has become more frequent on the battlefield and has become a real scourge for Allied tankers. However, the German commanders, who had commanded tank units, seemed to have little to say about it.

The Leopard tank entered a dead end in research and development. Many of the vehicles and weapons of World War II continued to wield their surplus value in the years and decades after the war. And many of these key design concepts were "borrowed" from the post-war equipment design. This happened not only with American, Soviet, and British weapons, but also with German weapons - in Spain and Czechoslovakia, the German-made Me-109 continued to be produced and developed, and its improved version remained in service until the early 60s. At the same time, He-111 bombers and Mauser rifles also played a pivotal role in many post-war armies. Some German models of armored vehicles, such as half-tracks and tank destroyers, continued to be produced and enjoyed post-war improvements. But the leopard is a dead end.

Almost, but not really.

After intercepting German technicians and spare parts that had arrived before the German assembly plant was completely destroyed, Britain succeeded in assembling a small number of Leopard tanks after the war. And until all spare parts were used up, the troops of part of the Eastern European countries were armed with captured Leopard tanks. But these countries were under the tight control of the Soviet Union, and were under the construction of their armies just after the end of the war

Strict restrictions. As a result, most of the Leopard units in Eastern Europe have become ceremonial units or tactical reserves, and there are few relevant developments and modifications in the written record. And those Eastern European countries adopted Soviet-style design to build new tank lines, so in the end none of the engineering concepts of the Leopard were brought in.

In the West, however, France also built up Leopard tank units after the war. The reason for this is that France wants to rebuild their own arsenal of democracy, which creates a strong willingness to borrow inspiration from the Leopard or any other German design possible. Indeed, some post-war French design is revealed

Significant impact on German wartime armoured vehicles. But to decide which aspects of the Leopard could be used, which were copied and perfected, or which needed to be abandoned, the French became the first to verify the real combat capabilities of the Leopard tank. This makes the French post-war observation of the Leopard tank particularly remarkable.

Background: Different perspectives during the war years

Almost all of the U.S. soldiers who had faced the Leopard in battle expressed high praise for the characteristics of the Leopard.

By 1945, the countless cries of the U.S. Army tank crews echoed in General Eisenhower's ears. In March 1945, he telegraphed the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd U.S. Panzer Divisions about the situation of the Leopard tank, writing:

From time to time, I would see short articles by journalists quoting non-commissioned officers who were allegedly in our tank formations, to the effect that our people generally think that our tanks are qualitatively inferior to the Germans.

By and large, our men realized that the Sherman would not be able to survive a fierce head-to-head duel with the Panthers. Neither the firepower nor the armor of the active Sherman tanks could face such a duel, and on the other hand, most of them were aware of our ...... We don't want bulky monsters - our tanks already have good reliability, good maneuverability, and the guns on them have been greatly improved. They felt that they had developed something that would allow them to use their sheer superiority in numbers to beat

The strategy of the Leopard tank is to avoid being attacked and to find it before it receives three or four effective attacks.

However, these are only the first impressions I have received from small talk. I am writing this letter to you...... I beg you to write me an informal letter at your leisure and let me know...... Your tank commanders, drivers, gunners, etc., summarize their opinions on these general issues.

General White, commander of the 2nd Panzer Division, felt it necessary to ask him to be considerate before he could reply to General Eisenhower "when he gave (or needed!)" American GIs show themselves ... The traditional enthusiasm shown when equipping the opportunity for any possible shortcomings "This is because, the reviews of the Leopard tank paint a rather poignant picture of contrast.

But it's not just such a pessimistic assessment offered by the "American GIs". General Collier, commander of the 1st Operational Command under General White's 2nd Armored Division, provided this assessment:

The consensus among the entire staff of the 66th Panzer Regiment was that German tanks and anti-tank weapons were far superior to American tanks in the following areas:

・Excellent mud passing force. flotation refers specifically to the tank's ability to travel in a mire environment}

・Better mobility. This is the opposite of the common perception that heavy tanks are slow and bulky.

・German artillery has a higher muzzle velocity and no impressive flare. The resulting straight trajectory gives it excellent penetration and accuracy.

・The 90mm gun, although improved, was still inferior to the 75 or 88 guns.

・The sights of German tanks were undoubtedly superior to those of American tanks. This, combined with the straight ballistics of the artillery, gave the German tank unparalleled accuracy.

・Compared to American tanks, German tanks have better sloping armor and outline

This is far from an optimistic comparison.

German officers did not unanimously praise the Leopard. General Fritz Bayer Rhein, commander of the Panzer Instructor, provided this summary of the Leopard tank after the Battle of Normandy:

When the No. 4 tank can still be used effectively, practice has proved that the No. 5 tank [Leopard tank]

Poor terrain adaptability. The Sherman Tank performs well due to its maneuverability and height...... while the Leopard Tank is difficult to adapt to hedge terrain due to its width. The width of the long-distance running tube and tank reduced its mobility in town and woods operations; The extremely heavy front and light rear body causes it to wear out very quickly and is low

front final drive made of grade steel; weak side armor; The top of the tank was vulnerable to fighter-bombers; Pipes made of porous materials allow gasoline fumes to escape into the vehicle and pose a serious fire hazard; The lack of viewing holes made it impossible to defend against close attacks.

It seems that the "traditional enthusiasm" that General White had predicted may exist on both sides at the same time.

This straightforward analysis of the background of the commanders of both the American and German tanks highlights the interest in a balanced and unbiased point of view.

Next is the perspective that the French can provide.

French post-war experience

The French people came together to rebuild their national military power after World War II. In addition to its close attention to national defenses at the rise of the Cold War, France also had colonial territories around the world and tried to use them as a political force to restore its position on the world stage.

Since 1943, the French army has been re-equipped with American-style equipment and trained according to American doctrine. Several French units fought with great vigour, and in 1944 and 45 they were highly praised by American and British officers on the battlefields of Italy and France.

But in the post-war period, France tried to restore its independent status in its own equipment. Production lines for a wide range of military supplies, including small arms and artillery, have been restarted. But armored vehicle technology has developed rapidly in wartime. France in the post-war period did not have any domestic tank designs worth producing.

So, on top of the American-style equipment provided through Lend-Lease and the post-war military aid program, the French collected hundreds of Leopard tanks lying in their country and abandoned them, and did their best to repair those that might continue to work. They put these tanks into service with the 501st and 503rd Panzer Regiments.

In 1947, the 503rd Panzer Regiment was armed with an entire tank battalion of 50 Leopard tanks, paired with an American-made Sheman tank battalion. The 501st Panzer Regiment was in service with Leopard tanks until 1949 - almost twice as long as Leopard tanks had been in service with any German formation.

at

In 1947, the tank group of the Army Technical Department of the Ministry of Military Affairs (Ministre de la Guerre, Section

Technique de L'Armee, Groupement Auto-Char) published a report on the Leopard tank. The report, titled "Leopard, 1947", depicts French views and recommendations on the maneuvering of the Leopard tank.

The following is an excerpt from the report:

At inclinations of more than 20 degrees, the strength of the turret transmission of the Leopard tank was neither enough to turn the turret nor to hold the turret in place. As a result, the Leopard tank could not shoot on the march when off-road.

Combat reports from World War II indicate that the Sherman was often able to preemptively combat the Leopard, and that the limitations on the movement of the (Leopard) turret were likely to be one of the reasons.

In general, the gun is easy to raise and lower, but it becomes difficult to operate when the compressed nitrogen inside the stabilizer loses pressure.

What the French are describing here is a high-low pneumatic aid used to help hold the bulky KWK42 tank gun in place. The gun itself does not have a "stabilizer" like the gyroscopic stabilizer on the Sherman tank.

The conning tower with seven periscopes provides a near-perfect all-round view. Periscopes damaged by shells can be quickly replaced.

A scissor-shaped periscope with high magnification (gun mirror) was attached to the bracket inside the conning tower.

Later Sherman tanks also had a 360-degree view of the conning tower, but it was not until 1944 that this feature became widespread on American tanks. As early as 1940, there were several Allied reports that praised the view of the German tank control tower.

The gunner had no other viewing equipment other than the (excellent) gunscope. This narrowed his vision and became one of the biggest weaknesses of the Leopard tank.

The two-level magnification of the gunner is unusually clear and the center of the field of view is concise and clear. This made it possible to observe and shell targets at a distance of more than 3000 meters.

Once the commander has locked onto the target, the gunner needs 20 to 30 seconds to prepare for fire. This data is much longer than that of the Sherman tank without a gunner's periscope.

The French have grasped the key issues that had been missing from the previous comparison and commentary on the sighting equipment of the Sherman tank with the Leopard (and other German-made) tanks. Indeed, German optics are of high quality, with excellent clarity and ranging measurements

Reticles are more effective. However, field reports have observed that U.S. gunners can find targets more quickly and put them into the crosshairs. ["Chief" {author of this article} Note: To be clear, this refers to a part of the process of transmitting orders from the commander to the gunner. Due to the fixed magnification of the gunshot, the gunner's field of view is very limited. As a result, when the commander marks the gunner's target, it is even necessary for the gunner to be able to identify or aim at the target

The mark is preceded by a more precise position. U.S. tanks, on the other hand, have a shared (non-magnified) sight, which gives the gunner a sense of where to see the target with the high-magnification sight. On the M1A1 Abrams tank, the three-fold/ten-fold switch of the sight has the same effect. 】

There are no plans to equip the Leopard tank with shaped explosive warheads.

High-explosive shells can be detonated with a 0.15 second delay.

Up to 1500 meters, the PzGr40 has a better penetration depth than the PzGr39, but its trajectory is extremely severe.

The explanation for the delayed detonation of a high-explosive bomb should be the delay when the fuse is operating. When the time-delay setting is applied, it is possible for the warhead to penetrate light bunkers before exploding. This type of setup is used when firing at infantry or anti-tank guns hiding behind buildings or sandbags.

The PzGr40 is a light type of armor-piercing tungsten core, which is equivalent to the British APCR (hard-core armor-piercing projectile), the Russian terminology of the arrow or hard-core, and the U.S. Army's HVAP [translator's language: high-speed armor-piercing bullet}.

The PzGr39 is the more common full-caliber armor-piercing projectile, and in fact the Leopard KwK42 tank gun fires a modified version of this shell, named PzGr39/42.

Forced intermittent firing when the recoil of the gun reaches its permissible limit (ceasefire) is not uncommon in rapid-fire.

The rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute can be used only in exceptional circumstances.

This involves restrictions on the artillery of the Leopard tank. It takes time for the garrison to recover from the forces generated by the constant firing of artillery. Every few rounds, the artillery needed to cease fire for a while. This is not uncommon in high-speed artillery.

When firing shells, the chassis did not show any adverse reactions, regardless of the location of its turret.

The Leopard is a large vehicle with a suspension system that provides excellent stability. Some tanks showed a variety of adverse reactions when firing, especially when firing to the side, but that was by no means a Panther tank.

Mechanical components are designed to last 5,000 km, but many parts are wearing out faster than expected. Tracks and road structures have a life span of 2,000 to 3,000 km. Even on rocky terrain, the tracks are rarely damaged, but the inducing wheels can deform when driving is difficult in {bad conditions}.

The components of the power transmission structure (except for the final drive) have reached their design life. It takes less than a day to replace the clutch.

These comments, based on practical experience, show that in fact the reliability of the Leopard tank can compete with the American or British contemporaries in many respects. ["Chief's Note": By the way, in the case with Tom Jantits.]

During the call, he insisted that there was no documentary evidence of the fact that when the M4 Sherman had a huge reputation for stability, there was no documentary evidence to prove it. To be fair, I haven't seen it either – we've looked for the "mean time to failure" graph together. Availability (e.g., only 99 of a battalion's 100 tanks working on a given day) is a simple indication of the efficiency of the supply chain or the repair work required for some vulnerable components

The amount of haste, not the failure rate of the tank. I will not comment until I have not seen these supporting evidence. 】

On the other hand, the engine cannot run more than 1500 km, and its average life is about 1000 km. The replacement of the engine required eight hours of work by a sergeant (mechanical) and eight personnel with the help of a three-beam crane or a Leopard repair vehicle, a repair tank based on the chassis of a Leopard tank.

The main gun can be replaced in a matter of hours with the same equipment. The German maintenance units showed amazing efficiency.

From this, it follows that the Leopard tank could never be a strategic tank in any case. In order to extend the life of the engines, the Germans spared no expense in transporting them by rail (even short distances of only 25 km).

The definition of "strategic tank" refers to the fact that American and British tanks in the middle and late stages of the war, such as the Sherman, Cromwell, and Comet, were expected to be able to maneuver long distances under their own power when needed. This can not be counted on the Leopard tank.

The real weakness of the Leopard tank lies in its final drive, which is designed to be too fragile and has an average service life of almost 150 km.

"Chief

Long "Note: That's why Mr. Jantith didn't put it in front of it along with the engine parts. Does "reliability" mean "always reliable" or "always reliable when you need it"? So do these defects have the advantage of being more reliable at other times? It is worth mentioning Hillary Doyle's point here that the quality of late Leopard tanks is rarely unacceptable: see Operation Thinktank

ThinkTank, a World of Tanks event in 2012, featured a four-hour interview with six historians about the evolution of armor from the 30s to the 50s. }】

Half of the abandoned Leopard tanks in Normandy in 1944 turned out to be damaged by the main reducer.

A rat poop spoiled a pot of soup. The Leopard tank has a lot of good qualities, but we still find some weaknesses in it.

To avoid damage to these parts, please keep the following in mind: Be especially careful when shifting into a low gear when driving uphill and downhill, on uneven terrain. On top of this, the Leopard tank must not be towed until the final drive is not decoupled {unlinked from the reducer}. Finally, under no circumstances should two joysticks be operated at the same time.

American tankers often observed that the Leopard was able to "turn in place" - it could turn one track forward and the other backward in a given direction. The Sherman tank does not have this ability. But the lessons have taught the French absolutely, absolutely, never to use this feature. Being able to turn in place during a battle is an advantage...... If it doesn't cripple the entire tank later.

Smoke grenades thrown on the aft deck or engine exhaust will start a fire.

The hull of the Leopard tank is watertight designed to allow for wading through water. Unfortunately, this triggers the side effect of fuel and oil accumulation in the engine compartment. German reports often complained about the tendency of the Leopard tank engine to spontaneously combust. France seconded.

The road structure is extremely sensitive to high-explosive shells. High-explosive shells with a caliber of 105 mm and above can disable an entire vehicle (Ramelsma, December 8, 1944).

This is not unexpected. Even the most advanced modern tanks can be damaged by 105-mm high-explosive shells!

Continuous bombardment of the front armor plate by fragmentation or 75 mm ammunition can penetrate it or cause a crack in the weld (Miinsingen, 1946).

Cracking of welds was observed in both American firing tests in the summer of 1944 and wartime tests in the Soviet Union.

In any case, the advantage of the range of the (Leopard) gun should be used to the fullest. Shots at distances of 2,000 meters can also be accurate, and most hits range from 1,400 meters to 2,000 meters. The consumption of ammunition is relatively low - on average the 4th to 5th round can be hit, even with high-explosive shells.

This observation paints a picture of the Leopard tank that most frightens American (and Soviet) tankers. Its guns are accurate and lethal at range, and its armor is able to withstand incoming counterfire. Despite its engine power and speed advantage, the Leopard is often outwitted in close combat. But when the vision is wide, the Leopard is a brutal opponent.

Perhaps most of the French observations of the Leopard are based on their concerns about Chinese armor power in Central and South Asia. When the French government was wary that the Chinese Communist Party had taken over the Soviet-made Stalin tanks, they

It is concluded that the French armed forces in Southeast Asia (present-day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) need strong mobile forces to resist any Chinese intervention. They considered deploying Leopard tanks in the past, but ultimately decided that their remote colonies lacked rail infrastructure and could not provide the support needed by the Leopards.

As a result, they deployed units equipped with American-made M36 tank destroyers. And the Leopard tank, looking at its bravery, can only sigh "This is not a strategic tank".

summary

Many lovers of military history seem to believe in the myth of the incomparable German armored power of World War II. But in fact, any tank has advantages and disadvantages.

French equipment has been in service with Leopard tanks for many years. Their assessment of the Leopard stems from their extensive experience in handling, which provides a unique and unbiased perspective on this charismatic tank.

It is powerful: the artillery is one in a thousand, and the front is extremely well armoured. These features, combined with a well-crafted sighting device, make the Leopard a formidable long-range tank killer.

However, the mobility of the Leopard surpassed the technological level of the automobile industry, which was limited by the times. It was impractical to try to build a 45-ton "medium" tank with a 600 hp engine and steer-in-place using the technology of the German automobile industry in the mid-40s. The result is that it has become a terrible ghost on the battlefield, a lonely soul on the side of the road under the battlefield