This thing was also sent to me by the fragrant girl.,I threw it up directly.,Let's just take a look~.

1. Background

2. AD ID: 011426 (Google searchable)

3. Author: Hurlich

4. Time: The first time the document was written should be around April 1953.

5. Restriction level: From confidential → to the public for public dissemination

Subject: Review

ofSovietOrdnanceMetallurgy

Overview of the level of Soviet military-industrial metallurgy

Description: Most of the Soviet weapons and equipment used in this test were produced in World War II and before. Although a small number of devices were produced closer to the present day (1953), they can also reflect the weapons design standards and manufacturing processes before World War II.

The main contents of this article include:

1. Tests of several wartime tanks and field guns of the Soviet Union

2、JS

Analysis of the armor level of II and T-34 tanks

3. Steel/tungsten core kinetic energy armor-piercing projectile test, high-explosive elastic performance test (most of them were captured during the Korean War, and some of them were recaptured and repaired from the German side during World War II)

This test will consider the above equipment in terms of metallurgical level and mechanical properties, and will also pay attention to the characteristics of the design, manufacturing and processing of weapons; In addition, the performance characteristics of these equipment will be assessed in the context of the information currently available.

PS: In addition, according to the translation custom, "Korean War" is always translated as "Korean War", and the words "domestic" and "domestic" should be known to be made by the United States.

Part I: Artillery Tests

A total of 4 caliber (76mm-122mm) guns were selected for the test of the armament test team, ranging from tank guns to field guns. It is estimated

These guns were all manufactured between 37 and 44 years. Their common feature is that the design is simplified and the production is crude. The tail ring and iron stopper are square-shaped, and the number of sleeves has been reduced to a minimum. These components (packages

including the barrel), the surface of the non-critical parts is rough. However, in terms of the surface finishing of key components such as the guide cone, the chamber, and the tail ring of the gun that is embedded with the arresting iron, it can be compared with the (contemporaneous) American equipment.

For most of the internal concave corners, the inlays are carried out through the tail ring and the inside of the rifling

Observe. A very desirable approach is that this process minimizes stress concentrations. With the exception of the 122mm gun, all the guns were monolithic - the 122mm guns had (additional) sleeves on 1/3 of the length of the tail. The sleeve (with) an external thread is used to screw it together with the tail ring, while the sleeve shrinks at the tail and compresses the barrel as one. The 122mm tank gun (A-19 or D-25T unknown) was designed with most of its weight on the tail end, which maximized the problem of weight trimming. There are two large pieces of cannon tail rings at the tail of the gun, and the clamp ring at the tail tightly fastens the tail ring and the barrel

Rise. As far as artillery is concerned, they are all traditional structural designs as a whole, and have a collar design similar to that of German (WWII) guns. In addition, it is not possible to determine whether the 76mm gun model tested is a tank gun or a field gun.

The chemical composition analysis of the four types of artillery is shown in Table 1:

The barrel of the 76/85/122mm tank gun is made of nickel-chromium-molybdenum-vanadium deoxidized steel, which has a similar content of nickel and chromium. Compared with the same type of artillery steel, the nickel and chromium content of American steel is twice as high. In addition, the material composition of the Soviet 122mm field gun was closer to that of the same type of domestic weapon. The composition of its tail ring, blocking iron, and locking ring is made of nickel-chromium-molybdenum or chromium-molybdenum alloy steel, and the only part made of ordinary steel (containing only a small amount of nickel, chromium, and molybdenum) is the cast muzzle brake on the 76mm gun (with a muzzle brake, it can be determined to be a certain model of ZIS-3, and the field gun is correct).

Overall, in terms of mechanical properties, these guns can be compared with similar weapons produced domestically during World War II. [However] in the incision bending impact (experiment) at low temperatures, these weapons performed poorly and were inadequate compared to today's (process) standards. However, one thing to know is that after all, after World War II, we did not have the hard condition requirements for hardness in our country under low temperature conditions. All that is beyond doubt is that World War II

The American weapons of the same kind produced at the time (at low temperatures) were definitely not much harder than these Soviet-made guns.

By and large, the quality of Soviet artillery steel was somewhat inferior to that of the United States. This is mainly due to the fact that the former contains more impurities and is coarser in its making. With the exception of the (mentioned earlier) 76mm cast muzzle brake, the rest are traditional forging.

(Some words in this sentence are not readable, and the general meaning is translated as follows) The performance of the relatively poor impact of the incision of the artillery at low temperatures reveals that the process of thermal processing is not perfect. Although in some cases, this imperfection can be

The energy is caused by insufficient hardenability due to a very small alloy content. However, the reason for the imperfect hardening process here is that the cooling rate of the steel during the quenching phase is too slow, which also implies that the coolant used in the quenching is likely to be oil or lukewarm water, rather than being quenched directly in cold water.

The barrel of the Soviet artillery is relatively stiff and brittle, so the barrel and tail ring may break during operation (especially when used at low temperatures and high pressures), which will reduce the service life of the weapon.

The barrel diagram is as follows:

Section 2: Tank Steel Armor

The first time the test team was able to get up close and personal with a Soviet tank was in 1943. At that time, the Soviet government sent two tanks (T-34 and KV-1) for performance testing at the Aberdeen ground test site. At that time, the armor on the tank hull and turret (including the welded parts) was cut and disassembled and sent to Watertown Aresnal for alloy composition analysis, and the following conclusions were drawn from these reports:

1. In the analysis we found four types of alloy steels:

Manganese-silicon-molybdenum steel, which is used to make thinner rolled steel

Chromium-molybdenum steel, which is used to make thicker rolled steel

Manganese-silicon-nickel-chromium-molybdenum steels, rolled/cast steels are used, and thicknesses range from 2 to 5 inches.

Nickel-chromium steel, used to cast relatively thick armor.

In manganese-silicon-nickel-chromium-molybdenum steel and manganese-silicon-molybdenum steel, the silicon content is high, about 1-1.5%. In addition, in addition to the application of molybdenum, it seems that there are no other manufacturing process measures related to alloy protection; Also, from the point of view of alloy hardening, the content of these alloying elements is obviously too high.

2. For the armor of the T-34 tank, with the exception of the curved casting part (bowcasting does not know which part) is non-heat-treated, the rest has undergone heat treatment and achieved extremely high hardness (Brinell 430-500). Presumably, this is to ensure that the ability to resist a specific level of armor-piercing projectiles is maximized (although this comes at the cost of reducing the overall resistance of the hull to ballistic attacks); The body of the KV-1 is heat-treated, and its hardness is almost at the level of the United States (Brinell 280-320)

3. The quality of armor steel (Soviet tanks) can be classified from poor to excellent. It is estimated that a wide range of production processes are used in the production of various types of steel. Partially rolled steel

A good diagonal rolling process is used, while others are vertically rolled; The casting process has been widely used. The T-34's cast turret was of good quality, but during inspection, it was found that the KV-1's turret had a considerable number of thermal tears and craters. In addition, the shape of the T-34 did not perform well, and if judged by American standards, it was not up to par. See Figure 2

4. The welding part of the armor adopts a dovetail tenon connection design, which makes the surface of the light armor connected with the heavy part by depression processing or flame cutting method appear relatively flat. This allows the armor to be able to withstand pressure without being limited by the transfer of impulse between the parts, rather than causing stress concentrations. In many cases, the deposited metal between the welds acts more as the "glue" that holds the parts together, rather than as a part of the overall stress bearing. The design of the general welding part looks excellent, but the actual integration and workmanship are much inferior.

5. Low weld penetration, poor melting, severe over-cutting, armor porosity and cracks, which are observed in a considerable number of welds. The main reasons for this can be poor manual operation and improper welding processes. Rough electricity

The appearance of the weld also means a poor level of welding (some of them look like the electrode has been thrown in in a hurry to increase the yield). This obvious drawback, combined with the low strength and poor structure of the deposited metal, makes it possible for welded parts to perform poorly in the face of high-intensity shelling.

6. Ferritic electrodes are the most widely used in welding, although traces of the use of austenitic electrodes can also be found.

In terms of detail, the metal performance of these Soviet tanks produced in the early part of World War II is no different from those captured and restored from the German battlefield at the end of World War II (some of which were captured during the Korean War in 50-52). Among them, the JS-2 was all obtained (and repaired) from the German side of World War II, while the T-34 was captured by both the German side and the North Korean side.

Table 2 shows the composition of the armor of the IS-2 and T-34 in each section

Table 3 shows the composition distribution of ferritic/austenitic electrodes on the tank.

Once again, we have found the distribution of manganese-silicon-molybdenum, manganese-silicon-nickel-chromium-molybdenum, nickel-chromium-molybdenum, etc., in addition to the extremely high hardness of these alloys. Although we found out in the laboratory analysis of Soviet armor

The maximum molybdenum content is 0.38%, but the molybdenum content of the armor as a whole varies from 0.15% to 0.30%, and most parts of the armor are less than 0.25%.

Molybdenum plays an important role in reducing the sensitivity to tempering brittleness of various steels, from heat-treated steels to high-alloy steels. In addition, this element is also widely used in the production of our domestic firearms, armor, and warheads. For Sue

The low molybdenum content of the combined tanks as a whole is speculated to be due to the lack of supply of molybdenum resources in Soviet-controlled territory.

Some tank armor steels, despite their very high hardness levels, surprisingly exhibit high toughness (incredible); Oddly enough, many steels, even the softest, exhibit high levels of brittleness.

We have found that some unalloyed/unheat-treated steels are used in turret seats, cast parts, and base plates. These steels are fragile and sometimes in danger of being shattered even if they are not directly impacted by the warhead

Narrow pass. Unheat-treated tank underbody panels are vulnerable to mine attacks. However, the above shortcomings also need to take into account the fact that the Soviet Union restarted the production of tanks during World War II under the bombing of factories and was forced to meet the urgent production schedule on the premise of sacrificing quality. We cannot arbitrarily speculate that this situation (for some parts of the use of non-heat-treated defective steel) is a kind of obtain

A common practice recognized by the Soviet production authorities. The Russians also know that it is a crime to practice too much metal substitution.

Although the excessive hardness of Soviet tank steel has caused some people to doubt its level of protection, the performance of live ammunition targets on the test site seems to be similar to the slightly softer American steel. Many people habitually associate high hardness with high wear resistance, but of course, considering the premise that this sentence is not bad:

"The diameter of the warhead is less than the thickness of the armor and the angle of incidence is relatively small". Today, the conclusions reached at the ground weapons test site prove beyond any doubt the fact that in most cases, extremely hard steels are significantly inferior in penetration resistance compared to steel of average hardness (280-320B).

Although compared to domestic tanks, the welding of the Soviet side was not very good. But this does not affect its actual performance on the battlefield too much. Despite the defective welding workmanship, inferior performance, and rough manufacturing process, it is still necessary to remember this:

"Soviet tanks were rough and at the same time suitable for the battlefield, which could reduce labor and at the same time not require the precision of the production machine. Considering the combat effectiveness, it is easier to produce than American tanks".

On the battlefield, the number of armoured combat vehicles possessed by the attacking side may well be a key factor in the outcome of the battle – and it is clear that the Russians know better than we do. If you compare the man-hours and equipment resources required to produce the same number of 76mm American (Sherman) tanks and T-34/85s, then the results may be interesting.

Figs. 3, 4 and 5 show the drawings of some of the welded parts, which look very bad - weld cracks, insufficient weld depth, etc., the weld design is basically sufficient. Figure 5 is particularly interesting because it also (additionally) shows us the Soviet-style method of repairing welds – at the lower head and the weld of the cast part of a T-34. Here was a long, deep crack that was repaired by austenitic welding on the outside

The strip is welded to make up for it, so that it is invisible to the naked eye. By the way, the T-34 was fatally wounded on the battlefield not in one place, but in another with an armor-piercing bullet.

III. Armor-piercing shell part

A. Steel armor-piercing projectile

The Soviet steel armor-piercing shells we captured during World War II and the Korean War were very different in design. Basically most of the shells were monolithic. For example, the shell does not have a hood and has a built-in small-caliber explosive part (which looks more appropriate to be classified as an APHE shell).

In addition to the common denominator of design approximation, the other parts are diverse: some warheads are pointed, some are flat, and some have protrusions in the head. Some of the warheads are covered with iron hoods to ensure a good aerodynamic shape; Partially

with a single copper swivel band (some have two); Some are caudal cone-shaped, others are conical bottom columns; Some have deep circular indentations in the front/back of the centering zone (some have one, some have two...... See Figure 6 for details

This (confusing) design is thought to be primarily used against large beveled armor, but it also works well against (Soviet) self-produced steel with high hardness, as well as steel plates at low temperatures (steel that is not properly heat-treated is more fragile at low temperatures).

Large-dip, hard, and brittle steels do not have good resistance to such blunt-shaped shells. Of course, in this case, the path of the shell through the steel plate is more perpendicular to the surface of the armor (LZ note: positive effect) than along the original trajectory. That is, during armor piercing, the shell "stood up" and "chosen" a shorter "path" to "pass" through the armor plate, and in this respect the blunt bullet was different from the pointed one. Generally speaking, the main function of the C (Cap, hood) in the so-called "APC" is to ensure that the integrity of the warhead is not damaged when the shell and the armor come into contact. As a result, the Soviets (presumably a blunt-nosed bullet, described below) warheads without hoods (as a solution they had blunt-nosed bullets).

We speculate that the circular grooves on the edges of the warhead may have been made to create more fragments for effective damage when striking beveled armor. Therefore (to deal with beveled armor) the pointed projectile was changed to a relatively flat profile. And when dealing with armor with a small inclination angle (almost vertical), pointed bullets are more effective. Here's why:

Grooved (blunt-headed) projectiles have less bending moment and instantaneous pressure on impact with armor, but this also reduces their penetration of vertical armor. However, in general, blunt-nosed bullets (with slots) will be more widely used. Because most of the targets that can be solved by point-tipped bullets will not perform very badly with blunt-nosed bullets, and (with slots) will help to improve the armor-piercing ability of blunt-nosed bullets.

Table 4 shows the chemical and physical properties of some steel armor-piercing projectiles.

Again, we found manganese-silicon-chromium steel with a high silicon content (the same as the previous armor composition analysis, although the armor had a higher carbon content), but the molybdenum content was either very little or none. Among them, in the 122mm AP bullet of the largest caliber ammunition studied, the molybdenum content in the nickel-chromium-molybdenum steel detected was only 0.22%. In other words, the slightly less alloy content in these armor-piercing bullets will affect their wearability

A ability to play.

The projectile body has been heat-treated to meet the standard of Rockwell hardness C50. This is significantly softer than the domestic C60-63 standard (especially the front part of the projectile). Incidentally, the alloy steel used in the armor-piercing bullets produced in the United States is doped with 0.50-0.60% carbon to ensure hardness. The purpose of this is to prevent the deformation and fragmentation of the projectile during impact, especially when dealing with small bevel armor.

When dealing with large bevel armor, regardless of the alloy composition and physical properties, the whole piece of pointed bullet will cause the tip to crack at the moment of impact, and this state (the tip is blunt) will be effective against the bevel. Considering the fact that the pointed head would be crushed, the Russians made

The use of blunt-tipped bullets may seem less necessary. Of course, when using APHE shells, blunt-nosed shells are very effective in ensuring the penetration of explosive parts and the penetration of fragments into armor.

In terms of craftsmanship, it can be found that the Soviets uniformly made the hardness of ammunition to the hardness level of C50. The one exception, of course, is the 85mm ammunition (C25). The domestic level is C60-63 at the tip and about C45 at the bottom. This method (of different hardness) ensures the overall integrity of the projectile during the armor piercing process, although by this time the warhead is almost broken

Hoods made by the Soviets are generally made by deep-pressing, stamping processes, and the material is mild steel. The rotary trajectory is made of copper, which of course generally contains 5% impurities.

Just like some other Soviet military products, the steel AP bullet is crudely made in the unimportant parts, and of course it can be compared with domestic products in the (critical) parts such as the rotating belt. When it comes to demanding and expensive components, the Soviets have always focused on frugality. This approach is desirable.

B. HVAP (High Speed Armor Piercing Projectile)

This armor-piercing projectile with a tungsten core part is wrapped in a metal butt to facilitate artillery firing. In the armor-piercing process, the tungsten core will break through the shell to play an armor-piercing role, but in fact, the butt part basically does not play an armor-piercing role. However, the weight of the stock made by the Soviets was heavier. In this way, the cartridge stock may act like a piston when striking the armor, helping the tungsten core to penetrate the armor plate (impact).

The instantaneous partial deformation of the butt transmits kinetic energy to the core of the projectile, increasing the target velocity and armor-piercing ability).

HVAPs captured during the Korean War look quite primitive, similar to the German World War II arrow-piercing armor-piercing shells. Figure 7 shows the shape of HVAP ammunition in three calibers: 45, 57, and 85mm:

The design of these three bullets is very similar: the material is made of mild steel that has not been heat-treated, as shown in Table 5.

The hood is made of sand molded aluminum alloy with a built-in tungsten core and screwed into the projectile body, as shown in Figure 8. In addition, this hood is very similar to the domestic Alcoa212 and 195. The tungsten core is reinforced with lead oxide glycerin cement.

As for the 76.2mm HVAP, the hood is die-cast from mild steel. The tungsten core and projectile body are fixed by curling the tungsten core warhead. This smaller HVAP uses a spring belt made of integral steel bars.

Once again, we found that the processing of non-critical parts is still very rough. In addition, as conjecture, the composition of tungsten core bullets also contains some non-strategic resources. The uniform specifications are as follows: 90% tungsten, 6% carbon and about 4% nickel. It is also known that cobalt is stronger than nickel as a binder, and it also increases hardness and prevents the projectile from shattering. So the use of nickel by the Soviets, according to our extrapolation

It was either due to the lack of domestic cobalt reserves, or the Soviets believed that nickel was sufficient in all respects without the use of cobalt (cobalt is a strategic material).

In the United States, a sufficient amount of cobalt is used as a binder in tungsten core bombs. However, recent studies have shown that reducing the amount of adhesive used can actually help improve the overall performance of armor-piercing bullets, preferably at a cobalt content of 5-8%. In this case, it seems that the direction of our future development of tungsten core bombs (components) may lean towards the side of the Soviets.

In addition, a noticeable difference between Soviet and American HVAP was the difference in weight and size of the tungsten core projectile body (at similar sizes).

Table 5 shows the following information:

Soviet 45mm HVAP tungsten core bullets weighed about 1/2 pound

57mm, 76.2mm, and 85mm HVAP are between 1-4/3 pounds.

In addition, the proportion of tungsten core bullets in the weight of the overall warhead is in the range of 13%-30%.

On the U.S. side, on the other hand, the 76mm M93 HVAP core weighs 4 pounds, and the 90mm M304 HVAP core weighs 8 pounds

The proportion of the bullet core to the weight of the warhead is 45% and 50% respectively (that is, the HVAP in the United States ensures the mass of the sufficient bullet core while relatively reducing the dead weight of the basically useless butt part, which is also the reason why the armor-piercing ability of the 76mm HVAP bullet is better than the 85mm HVAP bullet). Of course, if the Soviets can develop HVAP of similar specifications, then it should not be a problem to significantly improve armor-piercing ability).

The rest are shown in Figures 8 and 9

The structure of the Soviet tungsten core bomb under the electron microscope is shown in Figure 10.It can be seen that the material is very porous, and the crystal particle structure is very irregular. The roughness of the microstructure naturally affects the actual combat application.

Taking into account the shape and light weight of the arrows of the HVAP shells, the effective firing range of the shells was not too far. For the same reason, their performance is obviously a notch worse than that of domestic HVAP. However, judging from the experience of the Korean War, the performance of Soviet HVAP in the short distance is not inferior to that of domestic products.

IV. High-explosive shells

The high-explosive bombs produced in the USSR were similar in appearance to domestic ones in the overall appearance. However, there are some differences in details: the shell of the Soviet high-explosive shell was thicker, perhaps to produce more explosive fragments. In fact, the Soviets focused more on fragmentation than explosive effects. Whether it is a mortar or other high-explosive shells used in artillery, ammunition of a similar caliber is thicker and heavier than the shell of domestic (high-explosive shells).

A very noteworthy detail from the data shown in Table 6 is that the high-explosive shells (of both types of artillery) used by the Soviets were made of cast iron.

Its brittle and hard characteristics ensure that enough fragments can be produced - under the same specification and caliber, the number of fragments produced by cast iron high-explosive shells is about 20 times that of forged steel! A fragmentation restoration of part of the 82mm mortar is shown in Figure 11.

The shell on the picture exploded and produced more than 10,000 fragments. While most of the shards (around 7,500) weigh no more than 2 tiles (1 pound = 7,000 shards).

Ream, 2 grains is no more than 0.13 grams), such a large number of fragments guarantee the lethality of personnel, in fact, even such a small fragment has enough lethal power (the conclusion of field tests during the Korean War).

In addition, an 82mm mortar high-explosive shell can produce about 1,600 fragments of 2-5 grains, 850 pieces of 5-10 grains, 700 pieces of 10-25 grains, and 100 pieces of 25-50 grains. The above specifications of fragments are most effective against personnel in comparison.

At the Aberdeen Proving Ground, we conducted design comparison tests of Soviet 82mm cast iron** and American 81mm M43A1 forged steel**. The object of the shot was a semicircular pine plank of 1 point (1 point = 10mm) thick, with a radius of between 20-40 feet. The results of the test are as follows:

In addition, the "extra" fragmentation of shell shells of Soviet artillery shells behaved as follows:

against a 20-foot board - 8 times the number of hits; 4.3 times the number of breakdowns

against a 40-foot board – 9.1 times the number of hits; 8.1 times the total number of breakdowns

The fragments per square yard (≈0.836 square meters) are scattered as follows:

The above data are taken from the Aberdeen Proving Ground Report and provided by Colonel G.B. Garrett, General Director of the Laboratory/Museum. Date: November 28, 1950

The Soviets had a very ingenious trick (in the selection of calibers), which should also be mentioned here. When they captured the American-made 81mm**, they could still fire it with an 82mm mortar barrel, and our 81mm mortar barrel couldn't do it.

In order to explore the excellent performance of cast iron fragments for nearly half of the time, we selected the 120mm Soviet Type 0843A mortar for experiments. It produces around 23,000 fragments:

10,000 for 2 grains; 2-5 grains for 6000 pieces; 5-10 grains for 3000; 2,300 for 10-25 grains and 900 for 25-50 grains; 300 for 50-75 and 200 for 75-100. The power of such an anti-personnel weapon is terrifying.

From Table 6, the slightly lower quality of cast iron somewhat limited the lethality of the shells, and perhaps for this reason, the Soviets used a shorter mortar barrel (blasting pressure→ low muzzle velocity→ reduced killing range). On the other hand, cast iron blasting produces a shorter shape, close to the cube shape (see Fig. 11), and the fragments of this shape have the most ideal killing distance, which is better than the cannonballs made of forged steel. Once again, we found that the surface of high-explosive munitions is crude, except for the critical rotating cartridge belts and other parts.

Overall Rating:

One thing to keep in mind is that the Soviet weapons tested in this test represent the manufacturing processes and design concepts of the Second World War. The vast majority of this production took place in the 1940-1942 period or even earlier. It is uncertain whether the Soviets still adhered to this design philosophy.

In fact, the long-standing exaggerated rumors about the "strong armor guns" of Soviet tanks have not been interrupted. For example, what is used to resist the compartment armor of chemical energy bombs or something; From the point of view of metalworking, the Soviets were even more

Much more is through the collection of technical intelligence information (espionage?) ) to achieve the improvement of the level of technology, rather than spontaneously through the development of technology, the training of skilled craftsmen and other methods......

Another feature was the "high silicon steel" widely used by the Soviets. By American standards, silicon content was usually no more than 0.4 percent, while the Soviets could have more than 1.5 percent. The practice of producing high-silicon steel by Americans, with few exceptions, is (also).

Produced under the World War II Lend-Lease Act of steel supplied to the Soviets. That batch of steel contained a lot of impurities, including silicon. Silicon itself is not an ideal alloying element and does not exert much of its ability to harden steel plates, in fact silicon can make steel plates brittle in steel with a hardness of 250-300 Brinell. Of course, in the 400-450 range, silicon may have a positive side. However, in any case, alloys with a high silicon content must have such as:

Alloying elements such as manganese, nickel, and chromium are used to ensure hardness, so from this perspective, the application of silicon does not seem so necessary.

It seems that the Soviets had reservations about the use of molybdenum in steelmaking, although this element was indispensable in tempering. Of course, Soviet-made steel plates and armor-piercing shells were not subjected to the process of tempering at the time of the formation of brittle precipitation. In this way, the demand for the use of molybdenum is greatly reduced.

In most cases, the amount of alloying elements in the steel produced in the USSR was not sensible: either too much or too little. Of course, at about the same time (before 1943), the same thing was true of the weapons produced by us Americans. After 43 years, there are production regulations in China, and there are requirements for adding alloy content in steel, which helps to save strategic resources.

Finally, it should be emphasized that if necessary, with the production technology of the Soviets, it is also possible to do well with excellent processing of the finished product. In the same way, they can also make delicate welded seams and cast parts. [However] striving for perfection in the details means wasting time and burning money.

From the point of view of human history, the fine (low-yielding) military industry has not won a single war

Added: Armor tests of the tank of tank No. VI "Tiger" by the British

The results of the examination of the Tiger, chassis number 250570, by the British, did not use the case hardening process, and the thickness and hardness of the parts were as follows:

Thickness mm Bainer hardness

Top of turret 26

290

Cannon shield

100－200280

Turret side 82

255

Top of the hull 26

335

Upper body front 102

265

The front slope of the body is 62265

102 in the lower frontal part of the hull

265

82 on the upper side of the hull

255－260

Lower side of the hull 63

265

Behind the hull 82

255

－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－

The hardness of the armor of the Tiger tank is not very high (there is no record of the application of case hardening technology, the only record of the application of case hardening technology of the Tiger comes from the British speculation that our army encountered a new type of tank in North Africa, all anti-tank guns were ineffective, and it is guessed that the armor used case hardening technology)

The main source of the Tiger defense was its high impact strength due to its high toughness, and this advantage was lost completely after Germany lost the Norwegian molybdenum mines.