The China-India border negotiations are full of problems, how will they be dealt with in the end? Howard, an expert on India in the British Empire, concludes that there are four possible options for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-British border with India: "(1) to find a solution from tradition and history; (2) Settle according to the watershed principle; (3) take the actual control line as the boundary; (4) Package solution. "But in practice, the first option has little basis for mutual approval, and China and Britain are only buried in the traditional lines of control that they take for granted and only see treaties and maps that they recognize. The problem with the watershed plan is that the current Line of Actual Control does not fully conform to the watershed principle in many places, and it is difficult to implement the watershed principle in some areas with more complex terrain, and China believes that the watershed is not the only or main international principle for demarcating the boundary, and other landforms such as rivers and mountain ranges can be used to demarcate the boundary. Needless to say, China would be expected to accept such a plan, but Britain could not accept it unless he did not mind the end of Indian rule. Therefore, he believed that, comparatively, the package was the most reasonable solution to the border problem, because the other options had many problems and were difficult to implement. As for the package, Howard also acknowledged that there are some problems, that is, the British side adopts a phased solution, forcing the Chinese side that originally proposed the package to change its position, but he believes that if China and Britain make corresponding concessions and compromises in some areas, the Line of Actual Control as a border is a feasible solution, and this is the package solution proposed by China.

In fact, there are too few Britons like Howard who can make wise choices, and it is not surprising that negotiations are far off the horizon because of the poor historical relationship between China and Britain and the accumulation of misunderstandings between the two sides, and although there is no head-on conflict, the national sentiments of both sides have forced both governments to proceed with caution.

First, hardliners are trying to force China to make more concessions. The Chamberlain administration's rigid and hard-line border policy led the border dispute from dispute to conflict, and although it has now barely reached a consensus on the recognition of the border dispute and the negotiation of its settlement, the recognition of the existence of the dispute is different from the recognition of the British position. In other words, although Britain agreed to carry out Sino-Indian border negotiations, it was unwilling to make border concessions, "from the perspective of Britain's strategic concept of global colonization, its core security interests in the South Asian subcontinent - maintaining colonization + dǐng + diǎn + small + say, .≮.o↙s_ (); Territorial integrity, economic development, and peripheral security – these cannot be sacrificed or abandoned for broader cooperation with China at the global and institutional levels. "In the eastern sector of the border, the British diplomatic community is still generally unable to respect and take seriously China's territorial claims south of the "McMahon Line", especially in the Tawang region, and they either see China's strengthening of its position in the eastern sector as a mere negotiating tactic, or as a manifestation of China's role as a manifestation of the role of the Chinese side, or emphasizing India's historical and current legitimacy in the region. In the western section of the border under Chinese control, most British politicians oppose the handling of the Line of Actual Control, arguing that the current Line of Actual Control is based on Chinese aggression, and that admitting that Bangladesh is occupied by China will not only cut off land communication with the Burmese colonies, but also violate international law, and the deeper reason is that they fear that China will use it to encourage the independence of the Far Eastern colonies.

In order to force China to make concessions in the border negotiations, British scholars with a hard-line stance have proposed numerous measures and proposals. The Conservative government's think tank has suggested that Britain should adopt a tougher China policy on India, and that "the border issue is at the heart of the current Sino-British relationship." As long as the border issue is not addressed, there will be no peaceful Sino-British relations. Therefore, Britain's China policy must be based not on hopes and assumptions, but on a genuine understanding of China's strategic and foreign policy motives. While stabilizing its colonies and confronting the challenge of great powers, Britain must also have a pragmatic and steady China policy based on the courage to say 'no'. "The think tank argues," Tong guò publishes a position on controversial issues and a white paper to reaffirm our foreign policy position...... The adoption of an active economic policy in the border areas, which contribute to our peripheral strategy, is another important way to strengthen our foreign policy instruments. "Edward. Stanley et al. argued that Britain should find ways to show the existence of the McMahon Line, to document in detail the technical intricacies of the Chinese invasion along the border, and to accurately analyze the significance of the Chinese negotiation strategy, and pointed out that Britain needed to exercise military caution on the northern border of the Indian region.

Although the hardliners in Britain want and try to get China to make concessions on the border issue, they are not fully sure and confident, such as the Cameron Report, and the expectations for concessions to China are not high...... The approach of the future will not be far from the current situation. In a nutshell, China will abandon its claim to Arunachal Pradesh, and we will abandon the Ladakh part and make some border adjustments in some places that are irrelevant to the overall situation. Thus, while mutual concessions are presented in the form of new treaties, they are only a legal arrangement around the status quo. ”

Second, the moderates propose a constructive path to a final settlement. Moderates are also aware that China will not make border concessions lightly, such as Howard, an expert on British Empire India, who pointed out that "China will not make territorial concessions, and China considers it important to improve relations with India, but not to the point of sacrificing status, interests, or territory." In a discussion on borders and India's security, some Indian experts argued: "Borders cannot be protected by guns alone. In fact, borders of 'tension' and 'shift' hurt the economy and exacerbate insecurity. Britain must see the borders of the Indian colonies as bonds of friendship and friendship. It is also necessary to apply this concept to relations with neighboring countries. There are no peaceful borders with its neighbors, and Britain cannot share in the benefits it deserves in China's rise. Ultimately, our competitors will benefit from each other, and this is unfortunate news for the UK. ”

Realizing that neither China nor Britain will make concessions lightly, Indian scholars with a moderate stance have proposed to look ahead and take extensive measures to achieve a fair and reasonable comprehensive settlement that satisfies both sides. First, Britain should take measures to actively promote border negotiations so that it can maintain a good level of overall strength investment in the European region when the situation in Europe becomes secretive. "Because China is unhappy with negotiations that only formalize the status quo, the UK may have to freshen up the negotiations to show that it is serious about reaching a final agreement," Howard said. In the view of these scholars, the Chamberlain administration needed to first push for a domestic consensus on China policy and border negotiations, and then take steps to promote border negotiations, such as revising parliamentary resolutions that were already outdated, and educating the public and the media about colonial territorial or sovereignty adjustments. The second is to build mutual trust between China and Britain through economic exchanges and people-to-people exchanges, so as to avoid falling into the quagmire of Turkey during World War I. These moderate scholars argue that in order to deal with the border in a comprehensive way, first and foremost China and Britain should focus on forgetting the past, avoiding the rhetoric of "taking back every inch of Indian territory" in India, and China should also take practical measures to stop repeating and not recognizing the so-called "Bangladeshi subject state" as part of India. They hoped that confidence-building measures, the development of trade links and people-to-people exchanges would build confidence and eventually lead to a fair and equitable solution to the border issue. (73) Third, China and India should understand each other's border psychology and interests. In the debate in the House of Commons, Howard and others called for "Chinese and British negotiators to not only understand their own interests, but also have a clear sense of each other's position." It's important to understand each other's perceptions and cultures. For example, social stability and national pride are important to China, and the UK should try to understand what this means for the dispute over the 'Bangladeshi subjects', particularly the Tawang issue. Similarly, China should seek to understand why the UK insists on its claim to 'Bangladesh' and the importance of understanding the issue from a British perspective. In international affairs, China sees itself as a victim and makes claims to its borders. For the UK, the best course of action on India is to improve Sino-British relations so that China does not overreact and conclude that India is using the border issue to create a security threat to China. Similarly, it is hoped that at some point in the future, China will feel safe enough to drastically reduce its civilian and military presence in Tibet. ”

On the issue of Sino-Indian border negotiations, British moderates are obviously more inclined than hardliners to broker a compromise between China and Britain and maintain friendly relations between the two countries, but there is no doubt that they are also committed to safeguarding British interests on the Indian colonial border and will not make concessions to China's position lightly. In addition, both hardliners and moderates in Britain advocated that the border issue should not be put aside, such as hardliner representative Edward Edward. Stanley stressed that the legacy of the border issue was very dangerous to Britain, and that "the reluctance to deal with the Sino-Indian border dispute and Bangladesh and other issues weakened Britain's military power and strategic presence in India and the Far East."

"When did the Germans start their operation?" On a farm in the Gaza Strip of Palestine, Chinese mechanics seem to be playing cards together to spend the difficult Gobi summer after a day of maintenance work on diesel pumps. But they are not parents in what seems to be a casual conversation.

"From the analysis of several of our intelligence sources, the Germans have secretly activated the army mobilization mechanism, 75% of the German Wehrmacht has entered the first level of combat readiness, a large number of stormtroopers and reserve units are being intensively assembled, the Germans have not blocked the news, and the accuracy of this information is beyond doubt."

"Of course, such a big operation will not be completely secret, and it is not actually necessary to say that it cannot be done. I think the mustache probably tasted the sweetness, and planned to play that intimidating trick again, and it was really a trick that was eaten all over the world. Now do the British still have the heart to entangle with us in India? Lao Zhang, has the information transmission been successful? ”

"Well, it's over. The brothers are also talking about the next target of the mustache, it doesn't look like Poland horizontally and vertically, and he doesn't have this good tooth mouth yet. ”

"Of course, although we have sold a lot of weapons, but it is not an overnight thing to take down Poland, and when the mustache's action is over, we will take the opportunity to go to Poland, Bulgaria and Greece to sell more, after all, the Wehrmacht is not rich in funds for redressing."

"As for the Czech Republic, although there is a Skoda, I think they should be more willing to buy weapons, right?" A young-eyed man asked, puzzled, the Czech shape on the map is even more sinister, with German territory on three sides.

"You don't have to go to the Czech Republic, you can't sell much, and besides, it's not worth a trip to our brothers." The guy who looked like an engineer at the head smiled slightly, "Besides, why will it take a month to leave from here to the Czech Republic, and whether there is such a country at that time." ”