In fact, there were not many principled differences between China and Britain on the Sino-Indian border issue, after all, the British knew that the colonies had been obtained by the force that had dominated the four seas at the beginning, and the glory of Britain could no longer cover up the weakness of the rising Eastern Empire. Britain, which has always been aware of current affairs, originally had the intention of preserving capital and profit, and was quite sympathetic to ceding Indian land in exchange for the maintenance of its own colonial system. So how should we understand the many difficulties and obstacles in the Sino-Indian border negotiations? At the beginning of the fifteenth year of the Lunar New Year, the international relations scholar Kamenon published a report on the conflict between the British and Chinese Far East Plateaus, which mainly conducted a more in-depth investigation and analysis from the perspectives of power struggle, domestic resistance, national cultural psychology, and third-party factors.

First, the struggle for regional power has hindered China-India border negotiations. The Sino-Indian border dispute was initially caused by British colonial aggression in the last century, but this time after the British took the initiative to provoke the border issue in order to pass on the domestic dissatisfaction with the German-Austrian merger, this border issue was finally intensified, from the perspective of power struggle, this is related to the Indian elite's attempt to establish hegemony in the Himalayas and seek India's independence, which can be said to be India's attempt to resist after the weakening of British colonial power. Indian scholar Keshav?? Mishra believes that the Sino-Indian dispute is not only a border dispute but also a power struggle, and the misunderstanding between the two sides only exacerbates the crisis. In fact, the leaders of various factions in India mainly accuse China of seeking an alternative to Britain's "hegemonic" goal in Asia, especially in South Asia, and hindering the handling of the border issue, such as Sharma and others, who believe that "if the Sino-Indian border issue is not resolved, it is not because the [Anglo-Indian] government has no interest in dealing with the issue on a rational basis, but because there are long-term and ambitious goals under China's strategic stance." "Mohan?? Guluswamy and others have even argued that China is unhindered by public opinion and is reluctant to make concessions on the border issue because of deep-seated hostility and suspicion of India, the only country in Asia that can challenge China for leadership.

Second, internal politics constrain border negotiations. The border issue is a diplomatic issue, and diplomacy is a continuation of internal affairs, and border negotiations will undoubtedly be affected and constrained by various domestic factors. In his paper, Kamenon argues that "the internal political and decision-making processes of both sides can influence how these issues are handled." Britain should undoubtedly be wary of the involvement of this Eastern empire in the South Asian subcontinent, and in fact both domestic security analysts and diplomatic agencies say that .2≦3.o★s_ (); and the military, China's rulers, the National Defense Force, and growing security groups all seek to influence each other's policies,...... Domestic politics has the potential to push bilateral relations in a more conflictual direction. The British scholar mainly analyzed the impact of the two parliaments, governments and the media on border issues, including border negotiations.

Parliament's restrictions on Sino-Indian border negotiations were mainly due to a bill passed by the British House of Commons on November 7, 1918, on the "question of India's regional status". Carmenon argued that Britain needed to revise the 1918 resolution in order to deal with the border dispute, which would be tantamount to making the Chamberlain government admit that it had gone from the last glory of the empire after World War I, and that uncovering the scars of the British would definitely end the lame prime minister's political career. Of course, some scholars believe that this resolution is effectively invalid, because in the case of South Africa, the British Parliament had passed a bill in Guò to make concessions to the local Boers in terms of territory and limited independent rights. However, according to the British Constitution, all territorial changes in India must be approved by the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament, and the British government itself does not have the right to sign treaties with other countries to settle territorial disputes in India.

In terms of Sino-Indian negotiations, the problem of the British government is not only that it does not have the final say, but also that the current government lacks a strong governing foundation, and the handling of border disputes requires strong governments in both countries. Since the end of the First World War, Britain has been governed by the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, which can be regarded as a stable political situation, but no political party can occupy a decisive position in Parliament, and the Chamberlain government has lost points on the German-Austrian merger in Europe, and there is no doubt that the room for concession on the Indian question has become narrow, which is also not conducive to border negotiations with China, "although the whole country is increasingly aware that we have little chance of recovering lost ground - we cannot afford a big war at an unacceptable cost- But at this stage, no British government can make concessions involving large territories, especially those that Britain has to give up under these Chinese aggressions. "The Chamberlain government was unable to reach a compromise with China, nor was it able to move parliament and the public towards a final compromise. Cameron complained that while relations between China and Britain have been more positive in recent years, no prime minister has been able or dared to form a domestic consensus by educating the public about the situation, seizing the opportunity to engage in serious negotiations with China in order to delineate borders commensurate with the strengths of both sides. In such a situation of losing his army and land, it was almost delusional to negotiate with Guò to regain the Indian land that had been forcibly occupied by China, but the way to prevent China from gaining an inch was not the way for Chamberlain to retreat, so he had to delay.

The British media have an unshirkable responsibility for the expansion and difficulty of handling the Sino-Indian border dispute, and it is precisely because of the joint action of the British opposition and the media that the "victim mentality" has become the collective fear and antipathy of the British people towards China. Cameron also noted that "the humiliation of losing the war on the Far Eastern frontier has created a ferocious anti-China wave in the British press, and in this view even any government that dares to try to make concessions will be labeled as betraying national interests." …… The British media has a long history of cheating, and there is usually no wind and waves, so in this situation of internal and external troubles, it is strange that there is no wind and waves. As a result, much of the news in the British media attacking China is a mixture of spontaneous fear, jealousy, anxiety and ranting. For a while, everyone almost thought that the artillery of the Chinese Democratic Empire had landed in Portsmouth" Cameron also believed that the print and radio media in London had a responsibility to show self-control, especially when it came to sensitive issues, and if irresponsible comments and ideas could be avoided, the British government's negotiating position would be greatly enhanced, and the increased room for maneuver might also have the opportunity to completely eliminate the threat of war between China and Britain.

At the same time, Cameron believes that for China, there is also huge domestic pressure to carry out Sino-Indian border negotiations. The rapid development of China's domestic power, especially after the establishment of the empire, and the rise of nationalism, will limit China's territorial claims and lead China towards border compromise. Bascal, editor-in-chief of the Daily Mirror, personally inspected the role of the squadron on the Sino-Indian border issue, and said: "The Chinese National Defense Forces have a great say in border affairs, especially territorial and strategic adjustments,...... The Wehrmacht is responsible for protecting China's territorial integrity and not allowing an inch of territory to be relinquished. They did not say whether the disputed territories could be negotiated on the basis of mutual concessions,...... It seems that the Wehrmacht, on its part, has decided to take a tough* position, and the government cannot openly criticize the army for such an attitude. Previously, China issued entry visas to Brigadier General Justin, who was visiting captured officers in Kashmir, a statement of the Wehrmacht. However, there are also British opposition parties that highlight the domestic pressure of the British government, ignoring China's internal constraints on national sentiments, emphasizing that Britain is a democracy and therefore difficult to reach a consensus, while the Chinese* government, which adopts an imperial system, is more likely to make compromises. Border and territorial issues involve national feelings and national interests, and the British media's view of ignoring the psychology or will of the Chinese people obviously does not help the two countries reach a border compromise.

Third, the influence of cultural and psychological factors on border negotiations. In modern times, China has become the target of bullying by Western countries, the subject countries have been divided one by one, the mainland has also been divided into spheres of influence to colonize, and even ceded a lot of territory, if it were not for the huge land area and the unimaginable population base of Europeans, maybe China would be another India. Although the oppressive acts of Western colonial forces have not caused the Chinese people to lose their sense of national pride, there is no doubt that they have also severely dampened the national psychology of the Celestial Empire, and the nationalist feelings of the Chinese people after the founding of the People's Republic of China are very strong, and it is precisely the lingering "sense of victimization" in the collective psychology of the people, which hinders China and Britain from truly reaching mutual trust, let alone reaching a border compromise along with the border. The Cameron report pointed out that the lack of pragmatism on the British side and the strong nationalist feelings of the Chinese side make it impossible to reach a final resolution to resolve the dispute in the foreseeable future, and the humiliation caused by the Sino-British war in the Indian border area is still clear in the United Kingdom, and the possibility of ceding parts of Punjab and Bangladesh is still a matter of inner feelings for independent people in India, perhaps later when the British withdraw from this land, How Indians get along with their northern neighbors, who occupy a tenth of their country's territory 200 kilometers outside the capital, is a headache.

Fourth, external factors have hindered the Sino-British border negotiations. In addition to the internal resistance and bilateral contradictions between the two countries, the obstacles to the border negotiations are also related to some external factors, and at present, it is mainly the US factor that prevents China and India from reaching a border compromise. Cameron is more concerned about Sino-US relations and their influence; although the United States has not openly intervened in Sino-British border border talks, as two major powers on the Pacific coast, China and the United States have always been politically cold and hot; although the strength of the US Navy is higher than that of China, in the face of the Chinese Army, which has been at war for 30 years, and the Royal Chinese Air Force, which has been the dominant force since its establishment, the United States cannot talk about its military superiority at all. Even if the navy is spread over two oceans, in the Pacific Ocean alone, if there is no Japanese containment, the Pacific Fleet will not have much chance of winning against China's main fleet. The U.S. policy of co-opting Britain to counterbalance China has weakened Britain's willingness to reach a border compromise with China. For example, former intelligence officer Spears believes: "Since the United States intervened in the Sino-British conflict in India, the United States' attitude has changed the shape of South Asia, and Britain has increasingly disregarded the pressure of two-front defense as a decisive factor, and our tilt towards the United States is very obvious, and the government seems to be waiting for the emergence of a geostrategic shift, and is not in a hurry to sign an agreement with China, and any agreement based on the Line of Actual Control in the area where the squadron is stationed seems to be short-sighted." "Sino-British relations have gone through a turbulent period since the United States became increasingly supportive of the British position on India...... The stance of China's state media has become increasingly tough.

The famous Cameron Report, if it had appeared a month or two earlier, might have prevented the mistrust between China and Britain over the long border negotiations, and it was not until the flames of World War II reached the lawns of Westminster Abbey that the British realized what they had missed.