Among the small Entente countries in Central Europe, Romania was the only country that did not have a common border with the Axis powers, and it was also the only country with Russia that had a common border, which gave its policy a greater degree of independence in its relations with Germany. Moreover, it had more immediate stakes with the Little Entente than Czechoslovakia and more with Yugoslavia, because it had more Hungarian minorities than those two countries. However, Romania's dual fear of Germany becoming an aggressor and Russia becoming an ally paralyzed its policy. Hungary's attack on Czechoslovakia, which had formed an alliance with Germany, was different from the Hungarian Hungary that had to deal with the revisionists of the peace treaty when the Little Entente was formed seventeen years earlier, and Hungary could now lead the German army through Hungarian territory to the Romanian border. If Red Russian aid to Czechoslovakia had not been accompanied by his million-strong army, the Red Russian air force would have flown over Romanian airspace, and Romania would have become a battlefield for Germany and Russia, and it was uncertain whether the Red Russian army would have retreated behind the border line of Bessarabia after the war.

Romania has no choice but to prevaricate or talk about such important issues in the strategic chain where the Franco-Czech-Red Russian alliance exists. In March of the same year, in response to a question in this regard, Litvinov said something like this: "If the anti-aggression countries take this issue seriously, a solution can be found...... 'there will be a way if there is determination'"; His words were interpreted to mean that Russia would invade the territories of Poland and Romania if necessary in order to reach Czechoslovakia. But Romania's policy clearly still hopes for collective action. On 2 September, Litvinov conveyed to the French Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, and Maisky to Churchill, the British Foreign Office that the Executive Yuan of the League of Nations should overcome Romania's hesitation in accordance with Article 11 of the League of Nations. It was the antipathy of Britain and France to the League of Nations and collective action that did not allow Romania to suffer the bad reputation of not accepting this establishment. It could now dig strategic trenches behind the unfinished Bukovina-Transylvania railway, which made it impossible for the Red Russians to reach the Bohemian front within three weeks, and legally on the terms of the Polish-Romanian alliance, with which it had to coordinate its policy towards Russia. Thus, Poland restrained Romania with its left hand, making it difficult for it to defend itself, and at the same time beckoned Hungary to attack with its right hand.

Czech sloh ♂dǐng♂diǎn♂ small ♂ talk,.※.※os_(); Vacker's plan of self-defense against Germany assumed an alliance with France in the West, an alliance with Russia in the East, and, if simultaneously attacked by Hungary, an earlier alliance with the Little Entente. The Czechoslovak General Staff estimated that they could dǐng the Germans for three to six months, and even the Hungarians if necessary, so that they could buy time for Russian reinforcements to arrive in time for the French to attack the Rhineland. France betrayed its obligations, and the foundations of this plan were undermined. Sitara wrote in June of the fifteenth year: "But, just as the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am sure that France will not march and England will therefore not intervene." However, Britain, the self-proclaimed mediator, and France, the allies of Czechoslovakia, did not intervene on the side of Czechoslovakia, but on the side of Germany, issuing an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, thus mentally demoralizing the latter's resistance to the enemy.

The first ultimatum issued by France on 21 September declared that Britain and France would no longer intervene in the fate of Czechoslovakia if Czechoslovakia rejected the Anglo-French plan to cede the Sudetenland on the basis of Chamberlain's 15-16 September interrogation of Berchtesgaden. Benes accepted the Anglo-French plan, hoping to gain time to buy off Poland and Hungary, which were concentrating troops along the Czechoslovak border. He said: "I have made plans to deal with all kinds of incidents." On the same day of 21 September, Poland demanded that the question of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia be dealt with immediately in the same way as the Germans in the Sudetenland, and that the 1925 treaty between Poland and Czechoslovakia concerning the national minorities be abrogated. On 22 September, Hungary made the same demand for the Hungarian minority, with a demonstration in Warsaw calling for the establishment of a common border between Poland and Hungary.

On the same day, Sitara made further demands at Goldesberg, and the attitude of the West became ostensibly tougher, and Czechoslovakia announced mobilization on September, which temporarily relieved the Czechs of the pressure on the four powers, and it seemed possible to finally form an alliance against Germany. Litvinov, who was then present at the Congress of the League of Nations in Geneva, reaffirmed on 21 September and on Japan that the Red Russia would undertake its obligations towards Czechoslovakia within the system of collective security of the League of Nations, conditional on the fulfilment of the Franco-Czech Treaty. On September, Russia warned Poland that it would scrap the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact if Poland attacked Czechoslovakia. In this case, Benes's plan to buy Poland was put into action. On September 22, he wrote a personal letter to Polish President Mośižiecki, in which he accepted in principle Poland's request and agreed to begin negotiations immediately; The letter was sent on September 25. Beck rejected this proposal, and he wanted to expose Czechoslovakia to public humiliation. Benes later said that this was the "final decisive reason" for his surrender to Germany despite Russian support. Until this time, Czechoslovakia as a state had not given up the struggle for independence.

While Poland continued to pursue a brutal and predatory policy, the Little Entente was watching the wind and steer. Their purpose is to remain neutral, and it is clear that they will never take a position until the Western powers make a statement, that is to say, before the start of the big war. On September, the Romanian minister in Rome informed Ziano that Romania was rejecting and would continue to reject the Red Russian demands for a free false path for the Red Russian army; He said that Romania was in favour of returning to Hungary the purely Magyalian part of Czechoslovakia, but it was opposed to Hungary's claim that it would support Poland in the event of war between Russia and Poland, and that its alliance with Poland would be placed above its obligations to Prague. On 24 September, the Yugoslav government banned public gatherings in an attempt to ban mass demonstrations not only in support of Czechoslovakia but also against Stojadinovic. The next day, Stojadinovic agreed in principle to a proposal by Romania, whereby the two countries issued an oral joint statement to the Hungarian government, whereby the two countries could agree to a change of the Czech-Hungarian border in favor of Hungary, but only in areas where the Magyars were the majority, and they could not ignore the Hungarian annexation of Slovakia. At Berlin's request, this step did not take place; The plan for this step was the last struggle of the little Entente.

The arbitrary decisions of the great powers are overwhelming. On 29 September, the heads of state of the two Axis powers and two Western countries met in Munich, and they agreed on a partition of Czechoslovakia on a formula similar to what Sitara had demanded in Goldesberg. The Munich Peace Conference, which was notorious and fully in keeping with traditional European politics, was convened that evening, and the second Anglo-French ultimatum was imposed, with unusual arrogance, on the Czechoslovak government. If the Poles were in such a desperate situation, abandoned by all the allies, facing enemies on all sides of the border, they might have to fight. The Czechs, on the other hand, were more cautious and could exercise restraint, or were more aware of the times, and they succumbed. Benes's decision was based on a sober estimate, not only of the strength of the enemy of Czechoslovakia, but also of the balance of forces within the country. For, for for the leaders of the Army and the Peasant Party, the main party, the loss of the Sudetenland was a minor scourge compared to the intervention of the Red Russian army, which used the name of the Anglo-French coalition. If Czechoslovakia were to put up armed resistance in defiance of the Munich state, it would have to rely on the aid of polar bears. This would make it a combination of the Red Label in the ideological struggle between the Peasants' and Workers' Party* countries and the Western countries, and the Red Russia, which was locked in the corners of Europe by China and Britain and France, which would be the fulfillment of the argument propagated by the German leaders of the Workers' Party, and might cut off any last aid from the Western countries. Although the Czechs traditionally had a theory of Slavic cultural superiority, Masaryk and Benes's Czechoslovakia was a Western-style rather than a Byzantine state, and was re-established on the ruins of World War I under the patronage of Western countries. The West has turned its back on it, and it is certain that Russia alone will provide assistance, but it is dangerous, and half the people of the country refuse such assistance; Czechoslovakia was thus forced to place its last hope on a small country to win an unsatisfactory neutrality by subservience to its neighbours. But one will always speculate whether Czechoslovakia's resistance at that time would have hastened the outbreak of war between the great powers, and whether these powers would have adopted different alliances.

There were three notable absences from the Munich Conference: Czechoslovakia, Poland and Russia, each of which had a different significance. This solution arose as a result of the tendency to create a center of great power guidance in Europe and to arbitrarily dispose of the territories and interests of small countries, which Czechoslovakia and Poland had jointly stopped in 1933. The conference marked the end of Poland's delusional desire to become a great power, and the initial comment on Beck's bullying policy was that he was not invited to the Munich Conference. Russia was also not invited to participate, and its exclusion from Eastern Europe this time, although it lasted only eleven months, greatly strengthened its hostility towards the West, and affected its future relations with the West. The Munich Agreement also marked the end of Czechoslovakia's position as the only Western parliamentary state in the central part of Europe. It was abandoned by the West and became a satellite state of Workers' Party Germany, and later became its protectorate, a state of total dependence on Germany, a status of dependency that it refused to accept in September 1938. On that day, there was only one blood-drenched sentence in President Benes's diary: "We have been betrayed." ”