When the shells of the Chinese defense forces fell into the palace, in fact, the British rule in India had almost collapsed, and Vivier did not have the arrogance of the original clamor to occupy Tibet, nor did he have the courage of the Georgian uncle to hold on to Moscow, and fled to Bombay with more than 3,000 British and Indian troops, and only under the protection of the Indian Ocean Fleet could he rest easy. Under these circumstances, Chamberlain did not stubbornly insist on the inherent pride of the British, but put aside his position and expressed his willingness to negotiate peace with China, and was willing to carry out peace talks on the basis of China's proposal.

The Netherlands may not be an influential power, but they also have a large Indonesian colony, they have a say in the Far East, so the negotiation venue of this meeting was set in Jakarta, Vice Foreign Minister Gu Weijun as the chief plenipotentiary negotiator led a Chinese delegation of more than 40 people escorted by the South China Sea Fleet to arrive in Jakarta, facing the Chinese Navy, which has aircraft carriers and 10,000-ton heavy cruisers, the Dutch, who do not have battleships, also know how to retreat and let the South China Sea Fleet be stationed. As the commander of the detachment fleet, Chen Jialiang had to receive local overseas Chinese every day, and finally simply opened the two destroyers 426 Nujiang and 427 Qiantang River and the 814 Yancheng supply ship to overseas Chinese and Chinese. Well, you ask what to do if the local natives want to visit, it's easy to do, if they don't go to school and can't understand the "non-Chinese will not be accepted" sign at the entrance, then let the marines who go with the ship give them a lesson with bayonets and rifle butts, teach them to know the Chinese language, teach them to be able to learn for free, and of course if there is still life.

This time the negotiations are not as-for-tat as the last time, in fact, the first team stopped at Rotak and did not march to New Delhi, China has no ambitions to annex all of India, at least for the time being, then the rest is nothing more than bargaining, and this diplomat is very good at it.

Having said that, demarcating and determining the border is not a simple game of dividing cookies, so after signing a 180-day ceasefire agreement and the beginning of negotiations, Edward Stanley and Gu Weijun returned to their respective countries, leaving a group of experts to play a game of competition on the map, and the expert level of the two sides met round after round. With the passage of three months, the Sino-Indian border negotiations continued and achieved some results¤∟dǐng¤∟diǎn¤∟small¤∟ said, .♂.●os_ (); For example, agreements have been reached on maintaining peace and tranquility along the actual control line, the guiding principles for resolving border issues, and the working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border affairs; Mechanisms for border negotiations between China and the UK at different levels have been established, and so on. However, there are significant differences in the views of British officials and public opinion circles on the progress of the Sino-Indian border talks. British expert on international affairs, special representative of China-India border negotiations. Kamenon spoke highly of the results of the border talks between the two countries. "When we look at our relations and borders, we've actually achieved quite a bit, we've handled bilateral relations very well," Kamenon said. Peace has remained on the border, and we have made progress towards a final settlement. Cambridge scholars of international relations have also acknowledged the achievements made in dealing with the border negotiations between China and India, but are generally dissatisfied with the progress of the negotiations. Gautam?? Das complained: "The substantive position on the dispute is basically the same as after the Second Russo-Turkish War, with diplomatic and military superiority still on the other side." Some conservatives in British political circles even denied the hard-won results of the Sino-British border negotiations between China and India, such as the royal scholar Schaefeld, who believes that a cease-fire agreement to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control is meaningless, because China does not intend to withdraw from the existing control area, and its geographical advantage makes India completely exposed to China's firepower, as long as China has the patience to solve the logistical supply problem, all that remains is the question of when and how to drive British power out of the subcontinent.

As for the responsibility for the slow progress of the border negotiations, there are three main views in British society: first, China has no sincerity and enthusiasm for negotiations; Second, the UK's attitude towards negotiations is not positive; Third, both China and Britain are responsible. In fact, the British mainly accused China of not having the sincerity and enthusiasm to negotiate, for example, the First Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Bulldog, who believed that China had no interest in discussing the border issue, because it would necessarily involve the unacceptable "McMahon Line" that China would not accept, which meant recognizing Tibetan sovereignty, and that China's delaying tactics were part of the volatile game that China was playing with Britain in terms of moving from the principle of piece-by-paragraph to the principle of packaging, and in terms of elevating cultural and commercial ties. The unresolved Sino-Indian border issue lies in the long-term and ambitious goals underlying China's strategic position. In other words, China coveted not only the three mountainous vassal states that had been restored and the barren territories in the mountainous regions of northern India, but more importantly, it had cut off India's access to the Indochina Peninsula, and the next step was to encourage the independence of the colonies in the Indochina region and return to the traditional tributary system of China's suzerain. The French and the Dutch are deeply concerned about this, and in fact, except for the United States, which does not pay much attention to the Philippine colonies, the whole of Europe is looking at the Far East, because the European colonial system for centuries may collapse with a gentle push from China.

However, there are also opposition figures in Britain who believe that Britain bears unshirkable responsibility for the delay in reaching an agreement in the Sino-Indian border talks. Attlee pointed out in a speech that Britain's initial attitude towards negotiations was not positive or even deliberately sabotaged the peace talks, in the hope that the military adventure would bring windfall gains to the Chamberlain government, "The Chamberlain government was a reluctant starter. In the absence of a satisfactory agreement on the border issue, any serious attempt to move toward friendly relations with China will erode the mass base of the ruling party. Other neutral scholars have pointed out that Britain may now be in a diplomatic position to be more anxious to reach a deal. Jeff Piper argues that "the 'abandonment' of any territory as part of 'mutual concessions' is politically unpopular, and from the war waged by Vivill to the Chamberlain government's initiative to sue for peace, the Chamberlain government's basic approach was to leave the Sino-Indian border arrangements for an unknowable future." China, of course, believes that India has no interest in dealing with the problem. ”

In addition, some scholars believe that the border agreement has not been reached so far, and both China and Britain are responsible. Such as Gautam. Das et al. note that "a review of formal negotiations shows that there is no incentive on the sides to reach a negotiating agreement." Progress in the negotiations has been limited, and the interest of both sides appears to be to maintain the status quo. Dr. S. Singh of the Indian National Congress Party also believes that "both China and Britain have legitimate reasons and interests in maintaining peace and are unwilling to change the status quo." However, neither government is currently willing to legitimize the status quo as a formal border. ”

The majority of the mainstream people in Britain and France are dissatisfied with the progress of the Sino-Indian border talks, mainly because they look forward to speeding up the process of Sino-Indian border talks, and it has become a consensus in mainstream European society to handle the Sino-Indian border issue in a peaceful way, of course, not for the sake of regional peace and the well-being of the local people, but for the sake of maintaining the precarious colonial system in the Far East. The cigar-smoking pit bull pointed out: "There are three options for dealing with problems: one is to go to war; the second is to set aside the issue indefinitely; The third is to accelerate the existing dialogue mechanisms so that the public is ready to accept a win-win agreement on border issues...... The first two options are ineffective because neither China nor Britain has the advantage of doing so, and the only option left is to speed up the high-level dialogue mechanism and try to find a solution that can be grudgingly accepted by both sides. However, most British and French politicians have no hope that China and Britain will reach a Sino-Indian border agreement in the near future, and some scholars believe that the Sino-Indian border issue may not be resolved in the future.

The Sino-Indian border negotiations lasted half a year without reaching a final agreement. Das believes that there are a number of issues that prevent the two sides from reaching an agreement, including: because of the "Arunachal Pradesh" (southern Tibetan region of China), the British militant faction may not want to complete negotiations before the European situation is clear; China offered to restore Sikkim and other three countries as Chinese vassals as bargaining chips; The Aksai Chin issue requires India to accept China's actual strategic needs and status quo; The question of sovereignty over parts of Kashmir and Punjab along the Western Sector. In summary, territorial adjustment, confirmation of the Line of Actual Control, and national independence issues are recognized by European politicians as the main problems hindering the Sino-Indian border negotiations.

The confirmation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is also a major challenge in the Sino-Indian border negotiations. Although the Chinese Defense Forces stopped on the outskirts of New Delhi, Ah San seemed to think that God had blessed them, and the Congress Party and other local political factions in India jumped out to play the role of defenders of Indian interests, and marched and demonstrated through guò to call on the British and Indian governments not to compromise with the Chinese, so there are also big differences between China and India on the current Line of Actual Control, and even the British government is not ready to recognize China's actual occupation of northern Punjab and Bengal. Edward. "The differences between the two sides are still there, and they have not abandoned their earlier claims, and there are many disputes between the two sides over the Line of Actual Control (LAC) formed after this year's conflict, not to mention the differences between the two sides on the border treaty," Stanley noted in London. "It is precisely because of the obvious differences between the two sides, coupled with the lack of geographical issues and political trust, that the work of the Chinese and Indian border negotiators to confirm the Line of Actual Control has not been completed, which has led both China and India to constantly accuse the other side of violating their borders and even forming a military confrontation posture on several occasions. According to Dr. Singh, the fact that both countries have sent troops to patrol the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that they claim is not only a declaration of sovereignty, but also a bargaining chip. In addition, there is opposition within the UK to several agreements that have been reached with great difficulty to maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control. Gautamdas, for example, believes that the fact that the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which is the de facto border, is not defined as a product of the war at the beginning of this year, at least that the western sector was imposed by China. He also believes that once Sino-British relations are strained, peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control will be disrupted.

In fact, in the face of the increasingly aggressive Germans, Britain already had the idea of shrinking its strategic forces, but unfortunately the Chamberlain government was not destined to take this substantial step, lest it bury its own political life first. A fruitless negotiation planted another nail in the coffin between China and Britain since Hong Kong's handover, and a year later, when a large amount of Chinese-aided arms was happily dumped at Buckingham Palace by the William brothers of the British, they found that they had to pay such a heavy price for this useless face.