364 Agricultural issues

For the Soviet people, 1945 was undoubtedly a year to celebrate.

In this year, the Soviet Union successfully developed the first atomic bomb of a Eurasian country and "test exploded" it in Fukuoka, Japan, forcing the imperialist country to surrender and ending World War II.

With the surrender of Japan, the Soviet people completely got rid of the suffering of several years of war, and the soldiers who had been drafted for service returned to the rear one after another, engaged in production work, and lived a peaceful and stable life.

Because of the difference in treatment, most of the soldiers chose to work in the factories in the cities after the war, and only a very small number of soldiers from peasant backgrounds were willing to return to the backward villages to engage in agricultural production.

As a result, the entire Soviet Union saw a massive increase in the urban population but a significant decline in the rural population, which not only tightened the housing supply in the cities, but also increased the demand for food in the major cities of the country.

In order to cope with the growth of the urban population, the Soviet government had to increase the amount of grain purchased by the states and member states, but at the same time as the increase in the amount of purchases, the grain production in the rural areas was not increased due to the lack of agricultural labor (many village soldiers went to the cities after the battle), resulting in a shortage of food in a wide range of areas of the country.

Although many of the administrative cadres in the Soviet Union were communist believers and party activists, a considerable number of them were bureaucrats.

These bureaucrats are full of ambitions, and they join the party and become officials purely to give themselves a better life and satisfy their power and material desires.

They often shouted communist slogans, but did not believe in the party and its goals. They often write articles praising Lenin and Stalin, and they can skillfully quote Lenin and Stalin in their speeches, but even the authors/speakers themselves do not believe in the content of these articles and speeches.

Although they did not believe what they said, they had to do it for the sake of their careers.

In the same way, these bureaucrats can do things that go against their conscience for the sake of their careers.

After the Soviet government announced that it would increase the amount of food purchases, the bureaucrats of the local governments often resorted to humane and inappropriate means in order to achieve the goals set by the central government.

In order to collect sufficient quantities of grain in a short period of time, bureaucrats often force the peasants to hand over excess grain in order to meet the grain collection targets set above.

Many peasants, because the bureaucracy had run out of food on hand, began to face the threat of hunger and cold. Some people can borrow food from others (not many people actually have it) or spend money on food to get by, while others are not so lucky, if they don't starve to death, at least one family member will be lost.

Fortunately, these tragedies are only the tip of the iceberg, and the scale of this famine is already small compared to the one at the same time in history.

Thanks to the fact that the Germans did not cross the "Manturov Line" built on the old border of the Soviet Union, the two major production areas of Ukraine and Belarus were not greatly damaged, industrial and agricultural production was still going on, and most of the peasants were still working on their collective farms during the war.

Because of the reduced casualties of the Soviet Red Army, the number of peasants who were conscripted to the battlefield was not as large as in history, and the peasants killed by the Germans were mainly from Western Ukraine, the Baltic states and Western Belarus, and the impact on the rest of the grain-producing regions was not great at all.

In the end, the death toll of the famine was no more than 1,000, and the bureaucrats involved in the forced requisition of food were also investigated by the Central Supervision Commission, and finally punished to varying degrees.

Although the famine was eventually resolved, the media in some Western countries somehow learned of the famine in the Soviet Union, and then reported it in their own countries, blaming the Soviet collective farm system for the cause of the famine, and arguing that Stalin's dictatorship, as well as the planned economy and collective farm system, were "the root causes of hunger and poverty in the Soviet Union."

This viewpoint has been recognized by many people in Western countries, and in the 21st century, these views have become the mainstream of historical circles, and are also widely accepted by the people of the former Soviet Union member states, and even by most of the "Soviet fans" and "communists".

But the opposite is true: it is precisely because of the Stalinist agricultural collectivization program that the efficiency of agricultural production in the Soviet Union has been improved, and the poor peasants of the whole country have been lifted out of poverty, and they have been freed from the plight of the old Russian agriculture that cannot support the cities.

Before the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union in 1928, the old Russian agriculture was simply unable to feed the needs of the cities and could not provide enough food for the rapidly developing industrial, cultural and educational undertakings, which hindered the pace of urbanization and industrialization of the Soviet Union.

Before the collectivization of agriculture, Soviet/Russian agricultural technology was extremely backward, and many Russian peasants were still cultivating using medieval methods.

They live in villages and have to walk miles to get to the fields. A farmer's 10 to 20 acres of land is often divided into a dozen or so plots, spread out widely, and often divided into narrow strips that cannot even turn around.

A quarter of the farmers did not have horses, and less than half had only a pair of horses or oxen, so the ploughing was rare and shallow. At that time, the tools of agricultural labor were only five million, and there were only five million homemade wooden plows without metal; Seeds are scattered to the ground by hand from the apron, often blown away by the wind or eaten by birds, and are rarely tilled by machines.

Although in 1927, Soviet agriculture had recovered from the devastation of the Russian Civil War, and the total harvest also surpassed the pre-war level and even reached a record high.

But while agriculture is harvesting, food is being transported from the countryside to the cities, leaving the cities unable to get enough food to feed their growing urban populations.

Where did the extra food go? The answer is - to the kulaks. (That's why Stalin exterminated the kulaks)

At that time, the Soviet government began to realize that such a situation in Soviet agriculture not only hindered the development of agriculture, but also affected socialist industry. And with the development of Soviet industry and the acceleration of urbanization, Soviet agriculture had to be modernized.

Later, there was a Holodomor in the Soviet Union, and many people blamed the root cause of the famine on the collectivization of agriculture, but was this really the case?

The real situation about the 1932 food shortage was that a two-year drought in many parts of the Soviet Union led to grain harvests in Ukraine and other places, and in such a situation, the local kulaks claimed that the collectivization of agriculture would "confiscate all their livestock and property" and instigated other peasants to slaughter their livestock, otherwise the animals would not be their own.

This, coupled with the fact that the collectivization movement developed much faster than Stalin had planned, was that there were not enough machines for the farms to use, and there were not enough accountants and managers, and the efficiency of grain production in the USSR did not grow enough (but growth and help were always there). In the end, the Soviet Union had to implement a strict national rationing system, which allowed the country to tide over the difficulties.

In 1935, after the Soviet people survived the Holodomor, a new model of collectivized agriculture was consolidated.

In the years that followed, the production of agricultural products in the USSR increased every year. By 1937, 71 percent of the country's cultivated land, 54.3 percent of the country's sowing, 43 percent of the harvest, and 94 percent of the threshing had been mechanized, and the efficiency of grain production had been greatly improved.

Since then, agricultural production in the Soviet Union has been able to fully meet the needs of urbanization and industrialization, providing enough food for the growing urban population to support the industrial development of the Soviet Union.

It is undeniable that there were many deviations in the implementation of agricultural collectivization in the Soviet Union, but the great contribution of collective farms to the agricultural progress of the Soviet Union cannot be buried. The collective farms have indeed changed the backward and ignorant state of the Russian countryside, and are no longer a stumbling block to the development of industry, culture and education, but have provided a powerful impetus for the development of socialist industry in the Soviet Union!