The most important thing is that Hitler likes to hold on to military power tightly and does not let go, so he misses some generals who are very capable of commanding the overall situation, such as Marshal Guderian, the inventor of the blitzkrieg, is one of them, because Hitler is unwilling to give up control of the country's armed forces, Guderian has never been able to sit in the position of commander-in-chief of the German Wehrmacht, not even the position of chief of the general staff, and finally was arranged to serve in the reserves, what a sad opinion thing. Germany was eventually sent to hell because of Hitler's power**.

Facts speak louder than words -

After Guderian was appointed commander-in-chief of Army Group Don, Guderian came under Hitler's command for the first time, as he was concurrently serving as commander-in-chief of the three armies and commander-in-chief of the army. It was only now that Guderian had the opportunity to see for himself how he tried to carry out the task of supreme commander in a war in addition to his position as head of state, and in the past Guderian had always felt that his influence on military decisions was at best indirect and distant. This is because all incidents related to warfare are subject to strict secrecy. So it is difficult for Guderian himself to make any definite judgments.

During the Polish campaign, Guderian did not feel Hitler's interference with the leadership of the army. On two occasions when he inspected the headquarters of Field Marshal Lundest's Army Group, he listened sympathetically to Guderian's explanations of the situation, and agreed with Guderian's intentions without any intention of interfering.

As for the occupation of Norway, outsiders have always been inscrutable about this plan, and Hitler's attitude towards the offensive on the Western Front has been discussed at length before. It is certainly shocking and dissatisfying that he had completely crossed the Army Headquarters in this case, but his basic notion that the solution must be offensive was not at all good from a military point of view, even though the timing he had set for it was not appropriate. Admittedly, the outline of the plan he drew up could not produce a complete solution, for reasons that Guderian had already analysed. At that stage, he probably didn't expect to achieve such great results. But when the plans of Army Group A gave him such an opportunity, he immediately grasped the idea and adapted himself to it, albeit with some restrictions for fear of risk.

He made a fatal mistake by halting the advance of the armoured troops outside Dunkirk, but at the time it was difficult for outsiders to recognize this, for the amount of equipment left on the beachhead was enough for anyone to recognise the great success of the British in transporting their troops across the sea.

However, the lack of a "war plan" and the lack of proper preparation for the invasion of Britain and the failure to time it were sufficient to show the failure of the German leadership, in other words, that is, Hitler himself was responsible. On the contrary, it is difficult to judge whether the decision to turn the head against Russia is truly unavoidable for political reasons for any recognition that is not actually present. The deployment of Russian troops on the borders of Germany, Hungary and Romania is indeed very shocking.

Standing in the position of army commander and commander of an army group, Guderian had little understanding of Hitler's operational guidance of the original attack plan and the first phase of the campaign, as well as the influential role of the summer offensive plan of 1942. In any case, Hitler's command of the Crimean campaign did not interfere. When Guderian visited him in the spring of 1942, he did not hesitate to agree with Guderian's intentions, and there is no doubt that he had made Guderian as successful as possible in Sevastopol. However, Guderian considered the transfer of the 11th Army after the fall of the fortress to be unreasonable.

For the first time, Guderian was directly under Hitler's command as commander-in-chief of an army group, which gave Guderian his first real experience of the execution of his supreme command.

When analyzing Hitler's position as a military leader, one must not belittle him and say that he was just a "small squad leader" in the First World War.

There is no doubt that he was very sensitive to combat, as exemplified by his plan to take Army Group A on the Western Front. In fact, this kind of genius is common among many amateur military strategists, otherwise there would not be so many princes in history who became commanders. In addition, Hitler had an astonishing memory and imagination, which enabled him to quickly understand all technical events and armament problems. He is very familiar with the performance of the enemy's latest weapons, and can recite the wartime production figures of the enemy and Guderian in a complete set. In fact, whenever he talks about something he doesn't want to hear, he asks for this set of magic weapons to use as a tool to resist the other party. There is no doubt that many of his achievements in armaments are due to his vision and extraordinary energy. But he was overconfident in his genius in this area, which often led to unfortunate consequences. His interference hindered the smooth development of the air, as did the development of rocket propulsion and atomic weapons.

Moreover, Hitler's interest in all technical issues led to an overestimation of the importance of technical resources. In situations where a large number of troops were necessary to have any hope of success, he believed that a handful of assault guns or new Tiger tanks would suffice.

In a nutshell, what he lacks is experience-based military capabilities, which his "intuition" cannot replace.

Hitler, of course, was sensitive to a tactical opportunity and was able to seize it quickly, but he lacked the ability to determine the prerequisites and practical possibilities of a certain battle plan. He could not understand the objectives and limits of an operation, which had to be proportional to time and troops, not to mention the possibility of replenishment. Nor would he recognize that any long-range offensive operation would require a gradual increase in force far beyond what was needed for the original assault. These weaknesses were evident in the planning and execution of the summer offensive of 1942. Another example of this is what he said to Guderian in the autumn of 1942 that he wanted to use a motorized army group from the Caucasus all the way into the Near East and India.

Politically, as in the military sphere, Hitler lacked a complete sense of what was achievable and what was not. In the autumn of 1939, although he despised the French resistance, he was the first to recognize that a properly planned German offensive would be sufficient to have the potential for decisive success. But when he actually succeeded, because the conditions changed, he missed a better opportunity. In each case, what he lacked was real training in the field of strategy and big tactics.

Therefore, his active mind was interested in all the objects that aroused his fantasies, and in this way pursued several at once, often at great distances on the battlefield, thus exhausting the strength of the German army. He was completely unaware of the basic law that the forces of the key points should never be too strong, and that in order to obtain a decisive goal, they should even sacrifice less important aspects, or accept considerable risks. So in the offensive of 1942 and 1943, he could not give it all in order to succeed. At the same time, when the situation reverses, there is also a reluctance to take any urgent remedial measures.