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As for Hitler's strategic goals (at least in terms of the conflict with Russia), most of them were influenced by political considerations and the economic needs of the German war. Political and economic questions were undoubtedly very important in deciding on strategic objectives, but Hitler's mistake was to place too much emphasis on such achievements, and more importantly to consider the preservation of geographical objectives more important than the defeat of the enemy's military forces. In fact, from the struggle against Russia, it is clear that it is questionable to obtain economically valuable geographical objectives when the military victory or defeat is undecided, and it is even more impossible to maintain them in the long term. At that time, it was not possible to destroy the enemy's production centers and transport systems with aircraft or missiles.

Strategy should undoubtedly be a tool in the hands of a political leader, but he must not lose sight of a fundamental fact. In any war, the strategic goal is to crush the enemy's military defenses. Political and economic goals can be achieved only after victory is ensured.

This brings us to another factor, and that is Hitler's willpower, which was one of the most important determinants of his leadership character, and which he overestimated. He believed that this willpower could be carried out in the heart of every soldier, and that would be enough to make his decisions and orders successful.

It is clear that the strong will of the Supreme Commander is a necessary prerequisite for victory. In the nick of time, leaders suddenly lose their willpower, and the result is often failure. However, this will to win is different from Hitler's will, which is rooted in his confidence that he has a "destiny" mission. Such a belief inevitably leads a man to lose his mind and think that his own will is sufficient to overcome reality, regardless of the superiority of the enemy's forces, regardless of the conditions of time and space, and whether the enemy's leader is equally strong-willed.

Generally speaking, Hitler, in his calculations, seldom took into account the possible intentions of the enemy, for he was convinced that his will would be able to achieve final victory. Any report, no matter how reliable, will be reluctant to take it when it comes to the superiority of the enemy, even if the latter is several times stronger than him. Hitler would casually refute these reports without any reason, or deliberately exaggerate the enemy's weaknesses and quote German production figures so that no one could speak to him.

In the face of his will, any military commander on which to base his decisions would be rendered meaningless in practice. This is how Hitler disregarded reality.

Hitler, though he overestimated his willpower and neglected the resources and possible intentions of the enemy, was strangely not matched by the boldness of his decisions. Until 1938, Hitler had been victorious in politics, but the man had become a political gambler, and he did not dare to take risks in the military sphere. Perhaps the only bold military decision Hitler himself made was the occupation of Norway. Even its original plan was proposed by Marshal Raeder. Especially when the situation in Narvik was unfavorable, Hitler almost ordered the withdrawal of the city, which was tantamount to sacrificing the basic objective of the whole operation - to open the routes for transporting iron ore.

Hitler did not dare to take military adventures, and in the final analysis, the decision to attack Russia was also an inevitable result of not daring to cross the sea to attack Britain. Hitler thought that the invasion of Britain was too dangerous, so he did not dare to try it.

Hitler's fear of taking risks in the campaign against Russia can also be seen in two ways. The first is that he refused to adopt a flexible mode of warfare after 1943. At that time, the crisis could only be dealt with by automatically giving up the conquered lands temporarily. The second is that he does not dare to abandon the secondary battlefield and to draw as many troops as possible to cope with the main decisive battle, although failure to do so may cause great danger.

The reasons why Hitler did not dare to take risks in the military field may be divided into three points: First, he may have been secretly aware of his own lack of military capabilities to deal with these crises. Because of this, he even less believed that his generals had this ability. Second, like all dictators, he fears that any setback will be enough to shake his prestige. In fact, such an attitude is enough to cause a military mistake and, even more, to lose its prestige. 3. Hitler had a greed for power, and he was unwilling to give up anything he had.

During Guderian's tenure as commander-in-chief of Army Group Don, Guderian and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Zler, had spent unlimited energy correcting Hitler's erroneous thinking, but the result was in vain.

When he was faced with a decision that he was unwilling to face and could not avoid, Hitler would delay as long as he could. Guderians often encountered this difficulty when they felt the urgency to immediately mobilize their forces to prevent the enemy's success in battle, or to halt its expansion. The General Staff had to fight Hitler for several days before it was able to draw a small amount of troops from the less threatening areas to the rescue of the emergency sites. In most cases, it was only when it was too late that he was willing to give too few troops - the end result was that he spent several times more troops than originally planned to achieve the original goal. Arguments often go up for weeks to give up an undefended position, such as the Donets region in 1943 and the Dnieper Bay in 1944. Sometimes, when an unimportant prominence is given up in order to draw a little force, the result is the same, and a dispute is inevitable.

Hitler may have hoped that things would eventually turn out to be his ideals, so that he could avoid making decisions he was unwilling to make. Because he did not want his decision to adapt to the actions of the enemy. He had great confidence in his own willpower, so he was reluctant to accept any adventure in mobile warfare, such as a roundabout offensive, the success of which could not be guaranteed in advance. He is also not willing to give up anything automatically. Over time, these factors became increasingly influential in Hitler's military leadership. The stubborn defense of every inch of land gradually became a formula, and this military leadership was finally cut off. So, when the Germans had already won such excellent success in the early stages of the war by virtue of their operational mobility, Hitler's response to the first crisis on the Moscow front was Stalin's concept of holding any position. In 1941, this policy nearly brought Russia to its knees, so when the Germans launched their 1942 offensive, they finally abandoned this notion as well.

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