But what is worse is the following development. Hitler's designation of Norway as a battlefield for the High Command was beyond the authority of the Army Headquarters, and that was only the first step in disrupting land operations. Since then, almost all other battlefields have gradually become the private property of the Supreme High Command, and in the end only the Eastern Front still belongs to the Army Headquarters, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Army has been concurrently appointed by Hitler. Therefore, the influence of the Chief of the Army General Staff on other things on the battlefield is simply pitiful.

Similarly, the commanders-in-chief of the other two services have no influence on the issue of grand strategy. The Chief of the Army's General Staff has no say in the overall distribution of the Army's forces, and often does not know which troops and supplies will be sent to other battlefields. In such an environment, clashes between the Operations Division of the Supreme High Command and the Army General Staff are inevitable. Hitler seems to have deliberately created this conflict so that at all times he alone could have the right to decide. Naturally, this bad organization was doomed to the collapse of the entire senior military leadership. Hitler's overestimation of his own willpower and military prowess had the added consequence of his direct command of the subordinate troops by means of individual edicts, which became increasingly awkward.

A characteristic of the moral leadership system is often emphasized, that is, it is hoped that commanders at all levels can give full play to the spirit of initiative and dare to take responsibility. All measures are aimed at giving full play to this characteristic. Therefore, in principle, the "instructions" of the higher command headquarters and the orders of the middle and lower command headquarters are limited to the "assigned" tasks of their subordinate units. As for how to carry out the assigned tasks, that is the matter of the subordinate commanders themselves, and the superiors should not interfere. This system of dealing with orders was a major reason why the Germans were often able to outmaneuver the enemy, because the orders of the adversaries were often so detailed that they restricted the actions of all subordinate commanders. Unless it was a last resort, the German side always tried not to encroach on the authority of subordinate units.

Hitler, however, thought that he himself had a better understanding of the situation in his office than a commander at the front. He ignored the situation marked on his map of the situation that was too detailed, and in fact could not keep up with the development of the situation. And from such a distance, it is impossible for him to judge what is appropriate and necessary for action on the front line.

He had gradually developed a habit of interfering with the actions of army groups, army groups, and subordinate units by warrants, which was completely irrelevant to his area of concern. Although Guderian had never been interfered with in the past under his own command, when Guderian was on his way from Feterbusk to Rostov-on-Don, he met with Marshal Kruger at a railway station, and he gave Guderian a forewarning. He said that on the part of Army Group Center, any operation with more than one battalion of troops would have to be consulted with Hitler beforehand. Although Guderian was not subjected to such intolerable interference in the future, Hitler's meddling had caused enough conflicts between Guderian and the High Command.

Such personal orders from Hitler usually only hindered command and operations, and on the contrary, Hitler was extremely reluctant to issue long-term combat instructions. The more he made the principle of "adherence to it at all costs" a key point of his policy, the more reluctant he was to issue long-term instructions. Because he no longer trusted his subordinates, he feared that this long-term instruction would give them the freedom to move and do what he did not want. The result, however, is the loss of all leadership. After a long time, even an army group could not move without an order from the command. Guderians often recalled the situation when Guderians were in the Crimea, when Guderians had full freedom of movement.

There are many records that Hitler was very rude, sometimes foaming at the mouth and sometimes biting the carpet. It is true that he sometimes loses his self-control, but when Guderian is present, he has only seen him lose his temper once, and that is in an argument with Halder. It is clear that Hitler was sent by people. In Guderian's personal experience, he has always been able to maintain the proper courtesy. Even when Guderian had conflicting opinions, he never blushed.

Hitler was a psychologist, and he had a way of convincing anyone who came to see him, and getting them to accept his views. Moreover, he was of course aware of the motives of anyone who came to see him, and had already prepared a theory of defence. He has a special ability to convince others to accept his own ideas, whether they are true or false. In particular, some officers who had just returned from the front line knew nothing about him and were more susceptible to his deception. In this case, when this man set out, he mentally only wanted to tell Hitler the truth of the facts on the front line, but when he returned, he was completely convinced by Hitler, and he was full of confidence.

When Guderian was commander-in-chief of Army Group, he often debated with Hitler over the question of warfare, and what impressed Guderian most was his incredible resilience in defending his own views. Almost for hours of argument, sometimes his guests would achieve his goal, but most of them would go back empty-handed, and the best consolation would be nothing more than empty promises. No one known to Guderian has the same staying power in such a discussion. An argument with a front-line commander lasted no more than a few hours at best, but the chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Chaizler, often argued for days in order to demand the necessary action from Hitler. While this debate was going on, Guderian was always accustomed to asking Chazreel how many "rounds" they had reached.

Moreover, the arguments used by Hitler to justify his views (by which Guderian is referring here, including purely military ones) are often not easily refuted. In any discussion of combat intentions in particular, the consequences of the events in question can hardly be predicted with absolute accuracy. Nothing can be determined in war, neither what is said nor done.

When Hitler himself felt that his strategic views did not make any good impression, he immediately looked for reasons in the political or economic spheres. Because his knowledge of political and economic conditions is unmatched by any front-line commander, his debates are often all the more justified at this time. As a last resort, Guderian insisted that if he did not agree with Guderian's proposal or the demands made to him, there would be bad military consequences. As a result, the political and economic aspects will also be badly affected.

On the contrary, although he is reluctant to accept requests, he often shows that he is a good listener and that he is sometimes able to make objective discussions.

Such a fatalistic dictator, who thinks only about his political ambitions, and lives in his belief in the "Mandate of Heaven", naturally has no intimate relationship with his military generals. It is clear that Hitler was least interested in the personal factor. In his view, all human beings are merely tools for their political ambitions. He himself had no emotional connection with the German soldiers.

[Ask the brothers to collect, about the famous figures in World War II, the fallen leaves will not make up nonsense, they will definitely take history as the criterion, based on facts, and the historical figures who have to be explained in this book will also be explained in the free chapter. 】