Because the heroic resistance of Guderian's forces in the winter of 1941 finally repelled the Russian counteroffensive, Hitler was convinced that his ban on any voluntary retreat had saved the Germans from the same fate that befell Napoleon's Grand Army in 1812. His praise was sufficient for his praise from his favourites and some of his commanders. So when the German offensive in the autumn of 1942 had come to a halt in Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and a new crisis was emerging, Hitler immediately thought of his old method, believing that success would be guaranteed if he held on to what he had already obtained at all costs. From then on, there was no way to get him to give up this idea.

It seems to be accepted by now that defense is the stronger form of the two forms of combat. However, this is conditional, and it only makes sense if the defense is relatively effective enough to cause the attacker to bleed too much and suffer a fatal blow when attacking the position. On the Eastern Front, however, this theory is inappropriate. The Germans were simply not enough to organize such a strong defense. The enemy's forces were several times stronger than those of Guderian, and on such a wide front, it was possible to concentrate his forces at any selected point to achieve a breakthrough. As a result, a large number of German troops could not avoid the fate of being encircled. Only in mobile operations could the superiority of German staff officers and combat units come into play, perhaps counteracting the numerical superiority of the Russian army.

Hitler's inclination to hold on to the ground at all costs is growing day by day, and the reason for his persistence may have to be discovered in the depths of his nature. His view of the battle noted only the extreme savage aspect. His mind could only understand that standing still and letting the enemy run into Guderian's lines and bleed to death, but he could not understand that a skilled boxer would often take a step back in order to launch a decisive assault. He did not know the art of war, but only brute force, and believed that willpower was sufficient to ensure his success.

Because Hitler valued brute force more than his mind, he reveled in the production figures of German industry, and even ignored the fact that the enemy's production figures were even higher. He had forgotten that training and skill were necessary to make a new weapon work to its fullest potential, and that he was content as soon as the new weapon reached the front line. He paid no attention to whether the troops had learned how to use it, and whether such weapons had passed the test under combat conditions.

Similarly, Hitler often ordered the formation of new divisions. Although the increase in the number of Guderians' troops was ideal, the lack of reinforcements in the already formed troops was not worth the loss. These old troops have almost shed their last drop of blood. The casualties of those newly formed units, because of their lack of combat experience, were particularly significant, as evidenced by the Air Force Field Divisions, SS Divisions, and the so-called People's Infantry Divisions.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that, although Hitler was heroic in his appearance and joyful in his pursuit of the experience gained as a front-line soldier, in fact he lacked the character of a soldier, and his thoughts and emotions were not in keeping with Prussian tradition.

Hitler, from the reports of army groups and army groups, undoubtedly had a clear understanding of the situation on the front line. In addition, he often summoned officers who had just returned from the front line. So he was not only aware of the achievements of Guderian's troops, but also known that since the beginning of the Russian campaign, Guderian's troops had been suffering excessively. Perhaps this was the main reason why Guderian was never able to persuade Hitler to get closer to the front. It was difficult enough to invite him to inspect the headquarters of Guderian's army group, and it was impossible for him to take another step forward, probably fearing that what he saw and heard at the front would shatter his golden dreams.

Although Hitler tried to emphasize his former status as a front-line soldier, Guderian never felt that his heart belonged to the fighting army. The loss of troops for him was nothing more than a reduction in numbers. He never treated them as human beings. (Note: Some people think that Hitler was weak at heart, that he was too dominated by emotions, so he himself was afraid that this weakness would affect his determination, so he did not dare to go to the front line to take a look.) But Hitler was a very strange person, and it was difficult to understand. If he is weak at heart, then why is his rule so barbaric and cruel? )

However, there is one thing that Hitler's concept is completely like that of a soldier, and that is the award of merit for military merit. His main goal was to make the Warriors get honor.

The above points are sufficient to prove that Hitler was not fit to be a military leader. But if he had fully trusted an experienced and responsible Chief of the General Staff, these shortcomings would have been somewhat compensated. In any case, he also had several specialties that were indispensable for a supreme commander: a strong will, nerves capable of resisting the most serious crises, an extremely sharp mind, a certain genius in the field of warfare, and the ability to recognize technical possibilities. Had he known how to use the skills of his Chief of General Staff to compensate for his lack of training and experience in the military field, especially in the areas of strategy and grand tactics, he would have been able to establish an effective military leadership despite all of these weaknesses. But this was exactly what Hitler was unwilling to accept.

Let's use it in Chinese terms! Perhaps everyone understands that if Hitler had the ability to use talents like Liu Bang, Germany would not necessarily fail to challenge the imperialism with its own evil intentions with the strength of one country. Liu Bang is just a scoundrel, but he can use people, a leader, he can not fight, but he must arrange the right people in the right position, but unfortunately Hitler did not, he wanted to hold the power in his hands and die, and as a result, he improperly buried Germany and sent himself to hell.

Precisely because he believed that his strength of will was invincible, his political successes and military victories in the early stages of the war, which he considered to be his personal achievements, were sufficient to cause him to lose all sense of proportionality in estimating his own abilities. According to his thinking, if he accepted the opinion of a chief of general staff with real power, it would not be a supplement to his own will, but as if he were submitting to the will of others. In addition, due to the influence of tradition and background, he has a fundamental distrust of military leaders, whose rules of life and way of thinking are different from his. So he is not ready to have a really responsible military adviser on his side. He wanted to be another Napoleon, and could only allow his minions to be under him, tamely carrying out his personal will. Unfortunately, he lacked the military experience and genius of Napoleon.

Guderian once said that none of the Supreme Command organized by Hitler had the right to advise him on the question of grand strategy or draw up a war plan. The "Operations Division" of the Supreme High Command is theoretically supposed to be responsible for this task, but in practice it is only a military secretariat. Its only job was to rewrite Hitler's ideas and directives into formal orders in military terms.

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