Had he known how to use the skills of his Chief of General Staff to compensate for his lack of training and experience in the military field, especially in the areas of strategy and grand tactics, he would have been able to establish an effective military leadership despite all of these weaknesses. But this was exactly what Hitler was unwilling to accept www.biquge.info

Let's use it in Chinese terms! Perhaps everyone understands that if Hitler had the ability to use talents like Liu Bang, Germany would not necessarily fail to challenge the imperialism with its own evil intentions with the strength of one country.

Liu Bang is just a scoundrel, but he can use people, a leader, he can not fight, but he must arrange the right people in the right position, but unfortunately Hitler did not, he wanted to hold the power in his hands and die, and as a result, he improperly buried Germany and sent himself to hell.

Precisely because he believed that his strength of will was invincible, his political successes and military victories in the early stages of the war, which he considered to be his personal achievements, were sufficient to cause him to lose all sense of proportionality in estimating his own abilities.

According to his thinking, if he accepted the opinion of a chief of general staff with real power, it would not be a supplement to his own will, but as if he were submitting to the will of others

。 In addition, due to the influence of tradition and background, he has a fundamental distrust of military leaders, whose rules of life and way of thinking are different from his.

So he is not ready to have a really responsible military adviser on his side. He wanted to be another Napoleon, and could only allow his minions to be under him, tamely carrying out his personal will. Unfortunately, he lacked the military experience and genius of Napoleon.

Guderian once said that none of the Supreme Command organized by Hitler had the right to advise him on the question of grand strategy or draw up a war plan.

The "Operations Division" of the Supreme High Command is theoretically supposed to be responsible for this task, but in practice it is only a military secretariat. Its only job was to rewrite Hitler's ideas and directives into formal orders in military terms.

But what is worse is the following development. Hitler's designation of Norway as a battlefield for the High Command was beyond the authority of the Army Headquarters, and that was only the first step in disrupting land operations.

Since then, almost all other battlefields have gradually become the private property of the Supreme High Command, and in the end only the Eastern Front still belongs to the Army Headquarters, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Army has been concurrently appointed by Hitler. Therefore, the influence of the Chief of the Army General Staff on other things on the battlefield is simply pitiful.

Similarly, the commanders-in-chief of the other two services have no influence on the issue of grand strategy.

The Chief of the Army's General Staff has no say in the overall distribution of the Army's forces, and often does not know which troops and supplies will be sent to other battlefields. In such an environment, clashes between the Operations Division of the Supreme High Command and the Army General Staff are inevitable.

Hitler seems to have deliberately created this conflict so that at all times he alone could have the right to decide. Naturally, this bad organization was doomed to the collapse of the entire senior military leadership.

Hitler's overestimation of his own willpower and military prowess had the added consequence of his direct command of the subordinate troops by means of individual edicts, which became increasingly awkward.

A characteristic of the German military leadership system is often emphasized, namely, the desire for initiative and responsibility from commanders at all levels. All measures are aimed at giving full play to this characteristic.

Therefore, in principle, the "instructions" of the higher command headquarters and the orders of the middle and lower command headquarters are limited to the "assigned" tasks of their subordinate units.

As for how to carry out the assigned tasks, that is the matter of the subordinate commanders themselves, and the superiors should not interfere. This system of dealing with orders was a major reason why the Germans were often able to outmaneuver the enemy, because the orders of the adversaries were often so detailed that they restricted the actions of all subordinate commanders. Unless it was a last resort, the German side always tried not to encroach on the authority of subordinate units.

Hitler, however, thought that he himself had a better understanding of the situation in his office than a commander at the front. He ignored the situation marked on his map of the situation that was too detailed, and in fact could not keep up with the development of the situation.

And from such a distance, it is impossible for him to judge what is appropriate and necessary for action on the front line.

He had gradually developed a habit of interfering with the actions of army groups, army groups, and subordinate units by warrants, which was completely irrelevant to his area of concern. Although in the past, it was within Guderian's own command and had never been interfered with.

But when Guderian was on his way to Rostov from Feterbsk, he met with Marshal Kruger at a railway station on the way, and he gave Guderian a forewarning. He said that on the part of Army Group Center, any operation with more than one battalion of troops would have to be consulted with Hitler beforehand.

Although Guderian was not subjected to such intolerable interference in the future, Hitler's meddling had caused enough conflicts between Guderian and the High Command.

Such personal orders from Hitler usually only hindered command and operations, and on the contrary, Hitler was extremely reluctant to issue long-term combat instructions.

The more he made the principle of "adherence to it at all costs" a key point of his policy, the more reluctant he was to issue long-term instructions. Because he no longer trusted his subordinates, he feared that this long-term instruction would give them the freedom to move and do what he did not want.

The result, however, is the loss of all leadership. After a long time, even an army group could not move without an order from the command. Guderians often recalled the situation when Guderians were in the Crimea, when Guderians had full freedom of movement.

There are many records that Hitler was very rude, sometimes foaming at the mouth and sometimes biting the carpet.

It is true that he sometimes loses his self-control, but when Guderian is present, he has only seen him lose his temper once, and that is in an argument with Halder. It is clear that Hitler was sent by people.

In Guderian's personal experience, he has always been able to maintain the proper courtesy. Even when Guderian had conflicting opinions, he never blushed. (To be continued.) )