Hitler was a psychologist, and he had a way of convincing anyone who came to see him, and getting them to accept his views. Pen, fun, pavilion www. biquge。 In addition, he was of course aware of the motives of anyone who came to see him, and had already prepared a theory of defense.

He has a special ability to convince others to accept his own ideas, whether they are true or false. In particular, some officers who had just returned from the front line knew nothing about him and were more susceptible to his deception.

In this case, when this man set out, he mentally only wanted to tell Hitler the truth of the facts on the front line, but when he returned, he was completely convinced by Hitler, and he was full of confidence.

When Guderian was commander-in-chief of Army Group, he often debated with Hitler over the question of warfare, and what impressed Guderian most was his incredible resilience in defending his own views.

Almost for hours of argument, sometimes his guests would achieve his goal, but most of them would go back empty-handed, and the best consolation would be nothing more than empty promises.

No one known to Guderian has the same staying power in such a discussion.

An argument with a front-line commander lasted no more than a few hours at best, but the chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Chaizler, often argued for days in order to demand the necessary action from Hitler. While this debate was going on, Guderian was always accustomed to asking Chazreel how many "rounds" they had reached.

Moreover, the arguments used by Hitler to justify his views (by which Guderian is referring here, including purely military ones) are often not easily refuted.

In any discussion of combat intentions in particular, the consequences of the events in question can hardly be predicted with absolute accuracy. Nothing can be determined in war, neither what is said nor done.

When Hitler himself felt that his strategic views did not make any good impression, he immediately looked for reasons in the political or economic spheres.

Because his knowledge of political and economic conditions is unmatched by any front-line commander, his debates are often all the more justified at this time.

As a last resort, Guderian insisted that if he did not agree with Guderian's proposal or the demands made to him, there would be bad military consequences. As a result, the political and economic aspects will also be badly affected.

On the contrary, although he is reluctant to accept requests, he often shows that he is a good listener and that he is sometimes able to make objective discussions.

Such a fatalistic dictator, who thinks only about his political ambitions, and lives in his belief in the "Mandate of Heaven", naturally has no intimate relationship with his military generals.

It is clear that Hitler was least interested in the personal factor. In his view, all human beings are merely tools for their political ambitions. He himself had no emotional connection with the German soldiers.

The main thing is that Hitler liked to cling to military power and not let go, so he missed out on some generals who were extremely capable of commanding the whole situation.

For example, Field Marshal Guderian, the inventor of the blitzkrieg, was one of them, because Hitler was unwilling to give up control of the country's armed forces, and Guderian never sat in the position of commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht.

What a sad opinion that he did not even hold the position of chief of the General Staff, and was finally placed in the reserves. Germany was eventually sent to hell because of Hitler's lust for power.

Facts speak louder than words, and Guderian's personal experience speaks for itself.

After Guderian was appointed commander-in-chief of Army Group Don, Guderian came under Hitler's command for the first time, as he was concurrently serving as commander-in-chief of the three armies and commander-in-chief of the army.

It was only now that Guderian had the opportunity to see for himself how he tried to carry out the task of supreme commander in a war in addition to his position as head of state, and in the past Guderian had always felt that his influence on military decisions was at best indirect and distant.

This is because all incidents related to warfare are subject to strict secrecy. So it is difficult for Guderian himself to make any definite judgments.

During the Polish campaign, Guderian did not feel Hitler's interference with the leadership of the army.

On two occasions when he inspected the headquarters of Field Marshal Lundest's Army Group, he listened sympathetically to Guderian's explanations of the situation, and agreed with Guderian's intentions without any intention of interfering.

As for the occupation of Norway, outsiders have always been inscrutable about this plan, and Hitler's attitude towards the offensive on the Western Front has been discussed at length before.

It is certainly shocking and dissatisfying that he had completely crossed the Army Headquarters in this case, but his basic notion that the solution must be offensive was not at all good from a military point of view, even though the timing he had set for it was not appropriate.

Admittedly, the outline of the plan he drew up could not produce a complete solution, for reasons that Guderian had already analysed. At that stage, he probably didn't expect to achieve such great results.

But when the plans of Army Group A gave him such an opportunity, he immediately grasped the idea and adapted himself to it, albeit with some restrictions for fear of risk.

He made a fatal mistake by halting the advance of the armoured troops outside Dunkirk, but at the time it was difficult for outsiders to recognize this, for the amount of equipment left on the beachhead was enough for anyone to recognise the great success of the British in transporting their troops across the sea.

However, the lack of a "war plan" and the lack of proper preparation for the invasion of Britain and the failure to time it were sufficient to show the failure of the German leadership, in other words, that is, Hitler himself was responsible.

On the contrary, it is difficult to judge whether the decision to turn the head against Russia is truly unavoidable for political reasons for any recognition that is not actually present. The deployment of Russian troops on the borders of Germany, Hungary and Romania is indeed very shocking.

Standing in the position of army commander and commander of an army group, Guderian had little understanding of Hitler's operational guidance of the original attack plan and the first phase of the campaign, as well as the influential role of the summer offensive plan of 1942.

…… (To be continued.) )