In any case, Hitler's command of the Crimean campaign did not interfere. When Guderian visited him in the spring of 1942 www.biquge.info he did not hesitate to agree with Guderian's intentions, and there is no doubt that he had made Guderian as successful as possible in Sevastopol.

However, Guderian considered the transfer of the 11th Army after the fall of the fortress to be unreasonable.

For the first time, Guderian was directly under Hitler's command as commander-in-chief of an army group, which gave Guderian his first real experience of the execution of his supreme command.

When analyzing Hitler's position as a military leader, one must not belittle him and say that he was just a "small squad leader" in the First World War.

There is no doubt that he was very sensitive to combat, as exemplified by his plan to take Army Group A on the Western Front. In fact, this kind of genius is common among many amateur military strategists, otherwise there would not be so many princes in history who became commanders.

In addition, Hitler had an astonishing memory and imagination, which enabled him to quickly understand all technical events and armament problems. He is very familiar with the performance of the enemy's latest weapons, and can recite the wartime production figures of the enemy and Guderian in a complete set.

In fact, whenever he talks about something he doesn't want to hear, he asks for this set of magic weapons to use as a tool to resist the other party.

There is no doubt that many of his achievements in armaments are due to his vision and extraordinary energy. But he was overconfident in his genius in this area, which often led to unfortunate consequences. His interference hindered the smooth development of the air, as did the development of rocket propulsion and atomic weapons.

Moreover, Hitler's interest in all technical issues led to an overestimation of the importance of technical resources. In situations where a large number of troops were necessary to have any hope of success, he believed that a handful of assault guns or new Tiger tanks would suffice.

In a nutshell, what he lacks is experience-based military capabilities, which his "intuition" cannot replace.

Hitler, of course, was sensitive to a tactical opportunity and was able to seize it quickly, but he lacked the ability to determine the prerequisites and practical possibilities of a certain battle plan.

He could not understand the objectives and limits of an operation, which had to be proportional to time and troops, not to mention the possibility of replenishment. Nor would he recognize that any long-range offensive operation would require a gradual increase in force far beyond what was needed for the original assault.

These weaknesses were evident in the planning and execution of the summer offensive of 1942. Another example of this is what he said to Guderian in the autumn of 1942 that he wanted to use a motorized army group from the Caucasus all the way into the Near East and India.

Politically, as in the military sphere, Hitler lacked a complete sense of what was achievable and what was not. In the autumn of 1939, although he despised the French resistance, he was the first to recognize that a properly planned German offensive would be sufficient to have the potential for decisive success.

But when he actually succeeded, because the conditions changed, he missed a better opportunity. In each case, what he lacked was real training in the field of strategy and big tactics.

Therefore, his active mind was interested in all the objects that aroused his fantasies, and in this way pursued several at once, often at great distances on the battlefield, thus exhausting the strength of the German army.

He was completely unaware of the basic law that the forces of the key points should never be too strong, and that in order to obtain a decisive goal, they should even sacrifice less important aspects, or accept considerable risks.

So in the offensive of 1942 and 1943, he could not give it all in order to succeed. At the same time, when the situation reverses, there is also a reluctance to take any urgent remedial measures.

As for Hitler's strategic goals (at least in terms of the conflict with Russia), most of them were influenced by political considerations and the economic needs of the German war.

Political and economic questions were undoubtedly very important in deciding on strategic objectives, but Hitler's mistake was to place too much emphasis on such achievements, and more importantly to consider the preservation of geographical objectives more important than the defeat of the enemy's military forces.

In fact, from the struggle against Russia, it is clear that it is questionable to obtain economically valuable geographical objectives when the military victory or defeat is undecided, and it is even more impossible to maintain them in the long term. At that time, it was not possible to destroy the enemy's production centers and transport systems with aircraft or missiles.

Strategy should undoubtedly be a tool in the hands of a political leader, but he must not lose sight of a fundamental fact. In any war, the strategic goal is to crush the enemy's military defenses. Political and economic goals can be achieved only after victory is ensured.

This brings us to another factor, and that is Hitler's willpower, which was one of the most important determinants of his leadership character, and which he overestimated. He believed that this willpower could be carried out in the heart of every soldier, and that would be enough to make his decisions and orders successful.

It is clear that the strong will of the Supreme Commander is a necessary prerequisite for victory. In the nick of time, leaders suddenly lose their willpower, and the result is often failure.

However, this will to win is different from Hitler's will, which is rooted in his confidence that he has a "destiny" mission.

Such a belief inevitably leads a man to lose his mind and think that his own will is sufficient to overcome reality, regardless of the superiority of the enemy's forces, regardless of the conditions of time and space, and whether the enemy's leader is equally strong-willed.

Generally speaking, Hitler, in his calculations, seldom took into account the possible intentions of the enemy, for he was convinced that his will would be able to achieve final victory.

Any report, no matter how reliable, will be reluctant to take it when it comes to the superiority of the enemy, even if the latter is several times stronger than him. Hitler would casually refute these reports without any reason, or deliberately exaggerate the enemy's weaknesses and quote German production figures so that no one could speak to him.

In the face of his will, any military commander on which to base his decisions would be rendered meaningless in practice. This is how Hitler disregarded reality.

Hitler, though he overestimated his willpower and neglected the resources and possible intentions of the enemy, was strangely not matched by the boldness of his decisions.

……

[If the brothers don't like to read these chapters, just skip it, there is a sea battle behind it, and it will be over after writing the book.] (To be continued.) )