At first glance, the Great Rus' has world influence and is one of the few countries that has a war periodical, but Russia's strategic defense system is congenitally insufficient. 【Reading.com】

It is undeniable that Russia has a glorious history of astronautics, the first to launch artificial satellites, the first to send astronauts into space, the first to build an orbital space station, and so on.

Although at the beginning of the century, relying on the legacy of the former Soviet Union with low shooting costs. For example, the construction of the International Space Station led by the United States and Europe is mostly undertaken by Russia. However, at the end of the decade, as the Republic took the lead in realizing the commercial application of controlled fusion nuclear power plants, the cost of space launch was rapidly reduced, Russia no longer had a cost advantage, and its position in the international space field plummeted, coupled with the Great Depression that lasted for more than ten years. By the end of the era, Russia no longer had any advantages in the international space field.

If it weren't for state support, so to speak. and has the world's largest treasure trove of resources. Russia is not even a space power. For example, as early as the beginning of the blade era, the Republic and the United States eliminated the traditional chemical fuel rocket motive, and comprehensively promoted the hydrogen and oxygen rocket motive, which reduced the cost of space launch by an order of magnitude, and the European Space Corporation also launched the "Ariane 7" high-thrust launch vehicle using a new type of hydrogen and oxygen rocket motive in the second half of the fear era, and joined the "low-cost space club" Russia did not launch a new type of hydrogen and oxygen rocket motive with a low earth orbit carrying capacity of less than 2 tons until the beginning of the decade. It was only in the year of drowning that the first large launch vehicle with a low earth orbit carrying capacity was launched, and it officially joined the "low-cost space club".

There is only one reason why Russia is struggling in the field of space, and that is the backwardness of power technology.

As we all know, the key to the new ammonia oxygen rocket is not the rocket motor, but the cheap access to liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, that is, how to reduce the cost of electricity. There is only one credible solution, which is to universalize controlled fusion nuclear power plants and replace other power plants. It can be said that the era of low-cost aerospace can come in the era of the closure of the century, because the controllable fusion nuclear power plant began to be popularized in the era of the last century, so that the power supply is infinite, and the price of electricity is infinitely close to zero. As a result, the production cost of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen is reduced to near zero point.

Admittedly, the more resources the better.

Because it has the most abundant natural resources in the world, Russia has had the most difficult years.

In order to ensure national security, the Russian authorities have been encouraging independent innovation in the form of government subsidies and providing orders for space enterprises by promoting the construction of the national strategic defense system. The problem is that government support cannot improve production efficiency, and therefore reduce the cost of injection. Faced with high shooting costs. At the time of the construction of the national strategic defense system. Russia is naturally not as rich as it seems. Prioritize everything to keep system costs as low as possible. Because the main reason for the high cost is space launching, the first thing that the Russian authorities think of is to reduce the number of shots, to be precise, to reduce the quality of the system, and use the minimum amount of shots to form a strategic defense

Command.

It's not impossible, it's just that the actual meaning is certainly up for debate.

As we all know, the strategic defense system itself is a "money-burning machine" for major powers. According to the official data released by the Republic, the national strategic defense system is divided into three major stages and eight stages, with a total investment of trillions of yuan. Even after deducting inflation, it is calculated in the currency value of 2 field years. It is also as high as a trillion yuan. It is equivalent to the GDP of the Republic of China in that year. Although the US authorities have not given exact statistics, the total input of its NMD system will not be much lower, and in terms of the annual value of the regiment, it will be between one trillion yuan and one trillion dollars, which is about twice the gross national product of the United States in that year.

The problem is that the huge investment is a problem, and the republic's and the United States' investment is another problem.

As a matter of fact, as early as when the national strategic defense system and the national missile defense system were being planned and designed, relevant experts from the Republic and the United States put forward the proposal. If the system design is too complex, it will inevitably lead to high construction costs, and if the integration of the system can be appropriately improved, the cost can be greatly reduced without significantly reducing the interception ability of the system. This is because these two of the world's most powerful strategic defense systems are designed with appropriate redundancy as the situation changes. For example, the design of the strategic defense system requires that it can intercept one target at a time, and intercept it in batches to deal with tens of thousands of targets, and when it is completed. Even if the United States, Russia, France, Britain, Israel, Palestinians and other nuclear powers attack the Republic at the same time, as long as they fail to launch all strategic missiles within minutes, to be precise. It is that all strategic delivery vehicles carrying nuclear warheads cannot enter the range of striking the mainland of the republic within minutes, and the national strategic defense system can intercept them all. And the overall interception success rate is not less than that, which is equivalent to the fact that in the case of a concave nuclear warhead attack, only the colt warhead misses the net.

Because behind the national strategic defense system, there is also a theater guidance defense system, a knife and missile interception system. The interception efficiency of these two systems against incoming targets is more than ever. Therefore, at most, only one of the auxiliary warheads that slipped through the net could fall and explode over important targets in the republic. By the standards of a world war, even if it was a megacity attacked, it would not have much impact on the war potential of the republic.

Similarly, the US National Missile Defense (NMD) system, as well as the theater missile defense system and the battlefield missile defense system at the campaign and tactical level, also have similar interception capabilities, which can basically guarantee that in the event of a full-scale nuclear attack, the losses will be reduced to a bearable range.

Because the nuclear powers all pursue a policy of bundling. That is, when a strategic strike is carried out, it will definitely not be aimed only at the enemy country. Instead, it will carry out devastating strikes on other nuclear powers, nuclear states, and even countries capable of building nuclear weapons, so as to ensure that no country can immediately build nuclear weapons after a nuclear war and thus become a world hegemon. Therefore, in a full-scale nuclear war, neither the Republic nor the United States can be attacked by other nuclear powers and nuclear powers. In other words, if a nuclear war were to break out, a nuclear warhead exploding on the territory of the republic would certainly not be touched.

It can be seen that improving system integration and appropriately reducing interception capabilities will not have a substantial impact on national security.

The problem is that neither the Republic nor the United States has done so.

The reason is simple: reducing interception capabilities is only one of the problems that arise from increased system integration, and it is only a secondary effect. From the perspective of military systems, the greatest impact of increasing integration on the strategic defense system should be to reduce the reliability of the system, that is, the survivability of the system.

As everyone knows, the strategic defense system is the cornerstone of the security of a major power, and it is also the guarantee for the survival of a major power in an all-out war.

Such an important military system is definitely the target of attack. In fact, this is exactly the case, and while building a strategic defense system, both the Republic and the United States regard the destruction of each other's strategic defense system as a top priority, otherwise they will not open up the offensive capability of the strategic defense system. In this way, the two sides will be able to develop their strategic defense systems in the direction of both offense and defense. We have to work to improve the survivability of the system itself. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that neither the Republic nor the United States have abandoned the air-based and ground-based sea-based interception systems, given that the space-based interception system has the best combat effectiveness and can complete the defense task at the lowest cost without being attacked. You know, the space-based interception system is the least survivable of all subsystems, and it is also the one that is most vulnerable to attack. If all hope is pinned on a single subsystem, it cannot be called a strategic defense system.

The problem is that space-based interception systems really have the highest combat efficiency.

Affected by this, the Republic and the United States have not only not given up the space-based interception system, but are also trying by all means to improve the survivability of the space-based interception system. The main way to do this is to increase system redundancy. And it is dispersed, and even in the case of the destruction of some facilities, it still has a considerable interception capability.

It can be said that this is also the fundamental reason for the high cost of building the space army.

In the case of the space-based interception system of the Republic's National Strategic Defense System, the interception part alone consists of additional satellites in orbit. Plus detection systems, communication systems, calibration systems, deception systems, and so on. The entire number of satellites in orbit of today's base interception system has passed the young. Among these satellites, most of them require orbital maneuverability and more than the old years of in-orbit working time, so the average mass of the satellites is above the old tun, the largest of which is more than 3 stews, and the most is also a ton. On average, the total mass of the satellites is above. Even with the aerospace power of the republic. It is necessary to put the old stewed satellite into orbit around the earth. It's also a lot of money. What's more, the average service life of these satellites is around the old years, that is, every time, the pie has to be renewed. Even without taking into account the enhancement of the performance of the system, the total mass is shot every year. The stewed satellite is equivalent to launching 2o times with a large launch vehicle with a carrying capacity of field tons. Because not all satellites work in low-earth orbit, the actual number of launches is much higher.

Even if calculated on a case-by-case basis, the annual cost of satellite launch is as high as tens of billions of yuan, and the average annual maintenance cost of the space-based interception system is as high as hundreds of billions of yuan, equivalent to 1 percent of the gross national product of the Republic of China. If it's just a one-time investment, it's not a big deal. What's worse is that this is a continuous investment, that is, every year Ni of the gross national product will be taken out to maintain the space-based interception system for decades, not to mention Russia. Even the republic could not afford it.

It can be seen from this that for Russia, the only way out for building a strategic defense system is to shrink.

Because space-based interception systems account for the majority of the strategic defense system, controlling the scale of space-based interception systems, that is, improving the degree of system integration, has become the only choice for the Russian authorities. To put it mildly, with Russia's strength, even if the Russian authorities know that doing so is tantamount to destroying the Great Wall. Otherwise, we can only give up the space-based interception system, which is equivalent to giving up the national strategic defense capability.

On the premise of ensuring the interception capability of the system as much as possible. Improving integration must start with the reduction of assistance systems. Minister. It is to integrate the auxiliary system that does not need to exist separately into the Silent Hunger Doctor. In this way, the amount of space shot and the maintenance cost in the future will be reduced. To take a relatively simple example, Russia's space-based interception system does not have separate calibration satellites, but relies on the global positioning satellite system and the setting of ground positioning stations to locate interception satellites. As another example, Russia's space-based interception system does not have a separate communication system, but through the setting of special commands for the military communications satellite network. Priority is given to ensuring the communication channels of the interception system to ensure the ability to exchange information between the systems. In fact, the detection system and the deception system also rely on the original military satellites, or are directly integrated into the interception satellites, and do not form a separate system. In other words, Russia's space-based interception system is, in fact, a single defense system with only an interception system. The mother is undoubted. The survivability of such an interception system, similar to that of the commander of the light pole, is certainly not very good.

It is precisely for this reason that as early as two years ago, some Russian generals claimed that the Russian authorities were joking about national security by repeatedly reducing their investment in the national strategic defense system.

Until the calendar year, the issue of the strategic defense system did not attract the attention of the Russian leadership.

It was only after the events in Kazakhstan last year that the Russian authorities realized that a reliable strategic defense system is the key to ensuring Russia's national security. In this context. The Russian army organized a targeted exercise, and it was concluded that in a full-scale war, Russia's strategic defense system has no chance of survival. Although the results of this exercise immediately attracted the attention of the Russian authorities, they were not announced because they were related to Russia's national security. Moreover, in just over a few years, it is difficult to substantially increase the survivability of the strategic defense system. Before the outbreak of the war, all the problems were still hidden under the water.

When the war began, all the questions came to the fore. Because the military communications satellite system was attacked. It is in a state of complete paralysis, so the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces is simply not able to give the command to attack the lower part of the interceptor satellite system. In other words, in just a few minutes, the main component of Russia's strategic defense system became an ornament. More importantly, after the communication link went wrong, the Russian Aerospace Forces Command not only could not understand the situation of other military satellite systems, but also did not dare to rashly launch a strategic counterattack. Although it only takes a few minutes to contact the Kridemon Palace, in those few minutes, the Russian military satellite system has been devastated. Among them. Naturally, this includes interceptor satellites in space-based interception systems.

Around midnight Moscow time, Cheryakov received a call from Dukov, commander of the Celestial Army. Although the second reaction of the Russian president was a sudden strike on the most important strategic system, and according to the national strategic counterattack procedure, it should be immediately counterattacked, that is, a retaliatory strategic strike on the republic, but before opening the mouth; Cheryakov calmed down, because he knew. If it is not a system failure, but a strategic strike by the republic, then Russia's strategic retaliation will be the justification for a full-scale strategic strike by the republic. Fight for strategic strike strength. Russia is far inferior to the republic, and in terms of strategic defense strength, Russia is even less comparable to the republic. It's really going to be in full swing. I am afraid that all strategic ballistic missiles aimed at the republic will explode over the Russian mainland, and all strategic ballistic missiles aimed at Russia will also blossom on Russian soil.

In other words, strategic retaliation is, in fact, self-destruction.

After calming down, Cheryakov gave the first order, that is, to thoroughly check the cold state of the military satellite and determine the damage.

At the time of this order, Cheryakov was already rushing to the subway of the strategic command center.

In the name of the old point, Cheryakov contacted Chodnovich, who was urgently taken to another strategic command center, and other important personnel who were being taken care of, and urgently consulted with everyone about the current situation.

Due to the extremely tense situation, the discussion was a few minutes later. Cheryakov issued a supreme strategic mobilization order, bringing the strategic forces of the Russian army, navy, air force, and space forces into the highest state of combat readiness, that is, ready to attack, capable of firing missiles as soon as they receive the order.

Undoubtedly, this is not a simple command.

Russia still possesses hundreds of strategic ballistic missiles, several strategic submarines and dozens of strategic bombers, as well as thousands of nuclear warheads carried by these delivery vehicles. If you count the storage. With nuclear warheads that have not yet been destroyed, as well as tactical nuclear warheads, Russia's nuclear power cannot be reckoned with.

The question is, in the face of such a terrifying force capable of destroying the entire human civilization, will the Republic take it lightly?

From the standpoint of the republic, after the war starts, destroying Russia's strategic strike capability will definitely be the top priority, and striking Russia's military satellite system is only the first step, and to achieve the goal, it is necessary to make persistent efforts, such as the complete destruction of Russia's strategic weapons system.

To destroy Russia's strategic weapons systems. It is necessary to determine the exact location of Russian strategic weapons systems.

The most effective way to find those missile vehicles in tens of millions of square kilometers of Russian territory and a few strategic submarines in millions of square kilometers of sea is to lure the snake out of the hole. Of course, in practical terms, it should be called a scareless. If you want to know what will happen next, please log in to the chapter of the Horn for more, support the author, and support genuine reading! Yi Xunshu is a fine concave and said that Xunshan is a different body clam