In a certain sense, the reason why the Russian authorities dare to act on the issue of the mid-day issue is to provoke the authority of the Republic because their strategic nuclear submarines are outside the strike range of the Republic's tactical forces, thus ensuring that the Republic always has a minimum strategic deterrent capability. Looking back, how similar this is to Japan's provocation of the hegemonic position of the Republic in spite of the serious consequences of extinction and extinction a few years ago.

It must be admitted that Russia is not Japan, and it is much stronger than Japan.

In the past year, under the pretext of fulfilling its obligations under the second phase of the "London Treaty," Russia decided to concentrate on the deployment of strategic ballistic missile submarines, that is, to transfer all the strategic submarines originally deployed in the Pacific Fleet to the Northern Fleet, and to retain only the strategic submarine force in the Northern Fleet.

The greatest purpose of this move is precisely to target the strategic threat to the republic.

Although the base of the submarine forces of the Russian Pacific Fleet is not in Vladivostok, but in Lopavlovsk, which is located on the Kamchatka semi-U, it is located thousands of kilometers from the republic and directly faces the North Pacific Ocean, with unrestricted access to the sea. What's more. The strategic submarines deployed there do not need to enter the North Pacific Ocean, and can completely cross an area of 10,000 square kilometers and have an average water depth of more than 10,000 meters. Activities in the Okhotsk Sea between the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Island and the Russian Far East, thus being covered by the shore-based anti-submarine forces of the Russian army. However, the Sea of Okhotsk is not completely closed, so it does not belong entirely to Russia, and part of it is international. Other words. The spy ships of the Republic can swagger into the Sea of Huikhotsk. The attack submarines of the republic were no exception. Even if the Russian military's shore-based anti-submarine forces pose a huge threat to any country's submarines, no one can guarantee that the Republic's attack submarines will be able to be found and sunk before their strategic submarines are sunk. That is, the Russian strategic submarines deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk are not absolutely safe. Of course, the same is true of the Russian strategic submarines that went out of the North Pacific.

In fact, as early as after the Year of Medicine, the Republic Navy increased the intensity of its activities in the Sea of Okhotsk, and the intelligence services of the Republic even dispatched spy ships to map the seabed topography of the Sea of Okhotsk in just a few years. Collected current information. These. All in preparation for the deployment of attack submarines.

According to information released by the Russian authorities, around the time of the year, that is, shortly after the end of the large-scale military operation in the Middle East war, the republic's attack submarines entered the Sea of Okhotsk and were tracking the Russian strategic submarines. There has been contact with the anti-submarine forces of the Russian army.

The most serious accident occurred in the old month of Daohong, when an attack submarine of the Republic Navy was tracking the Russian strategic submarine because it was too close and had a provocative move. The Russian submarine was slightly annoyed and embarrassed, and as a result, the two submarines collided about a meter below the surface of the sea. Fortunately, both submarines are double-hulled. Otherwise, the consequences of this underwater crash are unimaginable. Yue was the accident that made the Russian authorities make a decision to deploy all strategic submarines to the Northern Fleet.

Of course, being far away from the republic is not necessarily all good.

From the point of view of active attack, the closer the distance, the better, and the strategic strike force is no exception. Take strategic ballistic missiles as an example, in the case of a range of kilometers and a range of kilometers and kilometers. The flight time of the former is only one-third that of the latter. That is to say, the interception time left for the opponent is only one in the latter: one, and in the same situation, the probability of penetration is 3 times higher than that of the latter. In order to shorten the flight time of the missile, before and after the signing of the London Treaty, the new generation of strategic ballistic missiles of the Republic, the United States, Russia, and other countries adopted a lower flight trajectory by increasing the motor thrust and ensuring the range.

The problem is that the main value of the presence of strategic submarines is not an active offensive.

Although it cannot be denied that strategic submarines have the ability to take the initiative to attack, if they can be deployed in the sea area several hundred kilometers away from the enemy's coastal center, they will be able to complete a devastating strike within minutes, making the enemy's strategic defense system useless, and will not even give the enemy country sufficient time to counterattack. But the deployment of strategic submarines to the enemy's doorstep is a very difficult, almost impossible task in itself. Arguably. Among all the nuclear powers, the main task of strategic submarines is to carry out devastating retaliation against the enemy's mainland in the event of a nuclear attack on the homeland and the effectiveness of other strategic counterattack forces. Peacetime. Strategic submarines are the most powerful deterrent. For example, a strategic submarine carrying a ballistic missile, each missile carrying, an Otter warhead. If you shoot all the missiles at once, and the warheads hit all of them, you can destroy all the large and medium-sized cities in any country, or all the big cities in the world. Even if some of the warheads will be intercepted. It is also possible to use the method of cluster attack, that is, to use some warheads to detonate in advance in front of the enemy, destroy the enemy's defense system, and let the rest of the warheads break through smoothly, which can also deal a major blow to the enemy country, thus forcing the enemy to have some concerns when starting a war.

It is precisely with such an important deterrent capability that it is in the context of the total destruction of nuclear weapons. The first two have already been completed. In the case of the phased reduction, several nuclear powers have not given up on strategic submarines, but have tried by all means to enhance the penetration capability of SLBMs, such as equipping them with more decoy warheads.

Russia is no exception, with its only strategic submarines, "the threat of 6o SLBMs should not be underestimated..."

Of course, the deployment of strategic submarines to the Northern Fleet. The biggest advantage is that you don't have to worry about being "harassed" by the republic's attacking submarines.

It is well known that the republic does not have a military base in the North Atlantic, let alone a naval base for the deployment of attack submarines.

The closest to the Russian Northern Fleet. It is also a number of military bases located in the South Atlantic, leased by Argentina to the republic. Leaving aside the difficulties and dangers encountered in going north from the South Atlantic, the long voyage alone is enough to discourage any attack submarine. From the mouth of the Río de la Plata to the Barents Sea, the distance in a straight line is about a thousand kilometres, and the actual voyage is in. More than one kilometer. Under normal circumstances, the underwater cruising degree of attack submarines is below the mouth section, so one-way navigation requires mountain days, and round-trip navigation takes days, while the usual activity period of attack submarines is about Gotian, that is, it can only be active in the Barents Sea for 8 days. If it is based on the continuous tracking of 2 Russian submarines, and the Navy of the Republic of China has a high duty rate at sea. It is also necessary to deploy chemical attack submarines in Argentina.

Obviously, this is a very unrealistic thing, because the Republic Navy has only a few attack submarines in total. This is still purely theoretical, considering that the North Atlantic has always been the territory of the US Navy. There's a lot more trouble with the actual deployment.

Not deploying submarines does not mean not doing anything else.

Since the beginning of Liwan, the Navy of the Republic, in cooperation with the Military Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies, has intensified its comprehensive reconnaissance of the sea areas where the Russian Northern Fleet is often active, especially in the Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas, which are under the control of the Russian Navy. On many occasions, attack submarines with advanced performance and special detection instruments have been dispatched to the Arctic Ocean to carry out missions across the Arctic ice sheet in the context of scientific investigations. The purpose of doing these things is to grasp the hydrological situation of the Arctic Ocean, as well as the topography of the seabed, to determine the activity of the Arctic Ocean ice sheet, to determine the possible areas of activity of Russian strategic submarines, and to determine the ideal missile launch points at different times.

Although in the eyes of many, as long as it is impossible to continuously deploy attack submarines in the Arctic Ocean, even if the rules of activity of Russian strategic submarines are mastered, they cannot prevent them from launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles. So there's not much point in doing these things. But if you look at it from another angle, you can see the great significance.

Failure to prevent the Russian strategic submarine from launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles does not mean that it is powerless against it.

Under the premise of having a powerful strategic defense system, even if a ballistic missile is launched into the air. It can also stop the warhead from falling.

The best time for strategic defense is the missile ascent stage, because advanced strategic missiles all use combustion engines, and the ascent phase is very short, so whether or not the missiles that are rising can be spotted in time has become the key to the key. To do this, it is first necessary to determine the approximate area of the missile. Only then can reconnaissance satellites focus on observing these areas, so that an alarm can be raised immediately after the missile is launched, and intercepting satellites can intercept them immediately. In this way, it is natural to gather relevant information in peacetime and determine as much as possible the range of activity of enemy submarines and the main missile ranges.

In abundance, strategic submarines will not move at will, and it is even more impossible to launch missiles in any sea area.

In general, strategic submarines have a fixed patrol route, which, of course, is not only absolutely secret, but also adjusted every time. There are many advantages to using a fixed route, such as the ability to deploy attack submarines on the route in advance for cover missions, and the ability to accurately determine the location of submarines, reducing the hassle of firing missiles. It is precisely for this reason that strategic submarines generally have several fixed missile ranges, and when carrying out combat readiness patrol tasks, strategic submarines will generally tour between several missile ranges, and will not stay too long at each range so as not to expose their whereabouts. In this way, when the firing order is received, the missile can be fired quickly. If it is in other sea areas, it is necessary to surface to locate the submarine and reload the launch information for the missile, which prolongs the preparation time for firing and reduces the survival probability of the submarine.

There is no doubt that in the Arctic Ocean, there will not be too many suitable missile ranges, especially in winter. While Russia's strategic submarines have ice-breaking capabilities and, if necessary, are able to use the heat released by the reactors to dissolve thicker layers of ice. Therefore, it has a very strong mobility capacity. However, it will definitely take time to break the ice, and melting the ice with high-temperature hot water will expose the whereabouts of the ice, so under normal circumstances, the Russian strategic submarines will operate in the sea area without ice, and choose to standby at the shooting range without ice.

At the end of the month, it is the harsh winter of the Northern Hemisphere.

Because this year's climate is particularly cold, and the Arctic ice sheet is moving southward ahead of schedule, the area suitable for strategic submarine activities in the Barents Sea is not vast.

At a time when the reconnaissance satellite system has measured the accurate position of most of the Russian missile vehicles and the long-range strategic alert radar has also detected the Russian strategic bombers, the Republic Celestial Army is adjusting the military satellites over the Barents Sea and activating several spare interception satellites. Preparations were made for the interception of SLBMs.

In fact, it didn't take much time. It's only been more than ten minutes.

Beijing time flies a little bit of old minutes, after everything is ready. The central computer of the national strategic defense system sends an attack signal to a kinetic interception satellite located in low-earth orbit.

In less than a second, interceptor satellites equipped with kinetic warheads completed the attack.

As with the previous attacks, this one was still silent at the beginning. It's just that at the end of the day, it's sure to shake the mountains.

The so-called kinetic interception satellites are military satellites that use kinetic weapons to fight.

Of course, the so-called kinetic weapon is actually a high-density heat-resistant alloy rod propelled by a small rocket and equipped with an attitude control rocket motive. According to the difference in the target of the strike. The mass of this metal rod ranges from hundreds of grams to tens of kilograms. Of course, its power is determined by its quality. For example, when intercepting a space target, a metal rod of several hundred grams can completely destroy a nuclear warhead or a launch vehicle. If you need to deal with an intra-atmospheric target, such as an airplane in the air, you need to use a metal rod of several kilograms. When dealing with ground targets. You'll have to use the largest metal bar. Although it is not loaded with high-energy explosives, its destructive power cannot be underestimated with thousands of kilometers per second. For example, a metal rod that drops kilograms per second. When the degree of rice falls to the ground, the kinetic energy is as high as that of the farmer. Megajoules, which is equivalent to the energy released when explosives explode. Other words. Such a metal rod fell to the ground. Enough to destroy all man-made facilities within a radius of 100 meters.

It is precisely because of this that many people believe that kinetic interception weapons are offensive weapons, not defensive weapons.

In fact. At a time when energy weapons were in vogue, the Republic and the United States did not abandon kinetic weapons, but spent huge sums of money to develop new kinetic weapons and deploy kinetic interception satellites in low-earth orbit, in order to make this more suitable weapon action for attack useful. It is naturally more suitable to use kinetic weapons against the missile vehicles of the Russian army.

For kinetic weapons that fly thousands of kilometers per second. From low-earth orbit hundreds of kilometers high to the ground, it only takes a hundred seconds.

The advantages of kinetic weapons over other weapons are very obvious.

Not to mention anything else, kinetic weapons are very difficult to intercept, and even more difficult to intercept by energy weapons. Even if it is intercepted, there is a certain threat to ground targets.

What's more, the blow of kinetic weapons came very suddenly.

For the Russian officers and soldiers on the missile launch vehicle. By the time they felt the anomaly, the kinetic weapon had already fallen to the ground and exploded violently. Even if some Russian officers and soldiers look up at the starry sky while the vehicle is moving, at most they can only see some light left by a meteor piercing the night sky, and then there is an explosion like a shaking mountain, as well as the shock wave and sound generated by the explosion.

If you look down from a satellite hundreds of kilometers high. Or look down from the orbital space station; I could only see that in the dark Russian land, dazzling fireballs suddenly appeared. In any case, it is equivalent to a violent explosion of more than 2 tons, and it will definitely not be too calm.

Because kinetic weapons are difficult to detect, the top of the Russian army did not know until they lost contact with the troops and received reports from neighboring units. Its strategic striking force was dealt a devastating blow.

At this point, it is unlikely that you can recover your losses.

It can even be said that it is impossible to reduce losses.

The blow came very suddenly, and it was very violent. For Russia's top brass, or for Russian President Cheryakov, there are only two options, one is to silently bear the blow, and the other is to use the remaining forces to carry out a strategic counterattack.

Whatever one may say, Cheryakov is Russian, and if he chooses to condemn, he is not Russian.

At the end of Moscow time, less than a few minutes after the blow, Cheryakov gave the order for a strategic counterattack.

At this time, the usually cautious Russian president ignored a very critical issue.

That is, why was the strategic communication system of the Russian army not hit?

Although both long-wave and very long-wave radio stations are built on the national power grid, that is, the power grid is used as a transmitting antenna, and there is no separate antenna, and it is impossible for any country to completely destroy Russia's national power grid at once, and it is impossible for the world to blow up the antenna of the strategic radio station, but the strategic communication system also has a control system, so as long as the control system is destroyed, the strategic communication system can be paralyzed.

That is, if the republic really strikes a strategic blow to Russia. In order to avoid retaliation, it is necessary to find a way to paralyze the strategic communication system of the Russian army, so that the Russian president cannot give the order to counterattack the submarine lurking in the sea. Make it impossible for Russia to carry out a strategic counterattack.

If Cheryakov had calmed down, he would have been able to see the problem.

To put it simply, the republic is taking this opportunity to bring Russian strategic submarines to the surface. Knock out the last strategic forces of the Russian army.

In fact, after the order for a strategic counterattack was given, Cheryakov realized this.

The problem is that the order has already been given, and it is too late to stop it. You must know that the strategic counterattack order is the highest level of order that the president can give, and the value of its existence is to die with the enemy, so the strategic counterattack order has the highest priority and cannot be changed.

At this point, in the face of desperate Russia, the Celestial Army of the Republic must also go all out! If you want to know what will happen next, please log in to the heart. More chapters, support the author, support genuine reading!