Chapter 484: Blocking on the Eastern Front of the War of Resistance

Li Wentian was not at all unprepared for the possibility of an offensive by the Soviet army along the Shilka River valley, and a brigade of the 48th Army was stationed at the end of the valley.

The vanguard of the Soviet army on the eastern route was an infantry division equipped with a large number of trucks, and the Soviet army was also fully aware of the important strategic significance of the exit of the Shilka Valley.

According to the early air force reconnaissance report, there were thousands of [***] squadrons guarding the end of the river valley.

Thus, although the industrial production capacity of the USSR is now at the stage of development and recovery, the production of trucks is not large, and the Soviet Special Army in the Far East is not equipped with many trucks. However, they still concentrated almost all the trucks of the eastern route troops, and carried this vanguard division along the flat river valley to the exit of the valley quickly, with the aim of taking advantage of the fact that the reinforcements of the [***] squadron could not arrive in time to capture this important exit in one fell swoop.

After Zhou Yaoming received the order, he immediately set off with his troops.

Although Zhou Yaoming had never fought with the Soviet army and did not have a sense of understanding of the Soviet army, Li Wentian repeatedly briefed them on the situation of the Soviet army at the operational meeting, with the aim of making them, the senior generals, have a clear understanding of the Soviet army and avoid the emergence of the idea of underestimating the enemy.

According to Zhou Yaoming's understanding, he knew that this brigade alone would not be able to stop the Soviet army for long. Since the Soviets disregarded the rear and took the risk of taking the road of the Shilka Valley, the exit of the valley was a strategic point that they had to obtain. Judging by military common sense, the Soviet army will definitely send powerful troops to storm the exit with the most ferocious firepower, trying to open the passage for a large Soviet army in the shortest possible time.

Therefore, whether his reinforcements can arrive in time is an important condition to determine whether the exit of the valley can continue to be controlled in his hands.

The stretch from Öndörkhan to the exit of the Shilka valley is high and steep, and it belongs to the eastern side of the Kent Range, and there are no roads at all, only mountain paths. This 150-kilometer distance, if it is really a plain or if the road is good, the Fourth Route Army, which usually attaches great importance to long-distance cross-country training, can arrive in two days at most. However, walking on such a rugged mountain path, the marching speed was much fuller, and it was absolutely impossible for Zhou Yaoming's 48th Army to rush to the exit of the river valley in a short time.

However, Zhou Yaoming did not prepare to pull the whole army to the exit of the Shilka River Valley, but left two divisions in dangerous areas along the way to establish several lines of defense. He was prepared that reinforcements would not arrive on time and that the exit of the valley would be lost ahead of schedule. Zhou Yaoming himself personally led two brigades to the valley to export support.

Zhou Yaoming's prudence played a decisive role in delaying the pace of the Soviet offensive and ensuring that the 46th Army of Ma Fa 5 returned to defend Wendur Khan in time.

Sure enough, after the Soviet vanguard arrived at the exit of the river valley, it immediately launched the most fierce attack on the defenders' positions.

Although the Soviet vanguard division did not carry large-caliber heavy artillery in order to speed up the march, the number of 75mm mountain artillery still far exceeded that of Zhou Yaoming's brigade. Moreover, the attacking Soviet troops were not only supported by heavy artillery fire, but also supported by more than 200 planes belonging to the Soviet troops on the East Road, which for a time bombed the position of Zhou Yaoming's brigade and filled the position with gunsmoke, mountains and rocks flying indiscriminately, and flames soaring into the sky.

Although Zhou Yaoming's brigade occupied a favorable position and had built defensive positions in advance, the casualties were still very large, with more than 1,000 casualties on the first day alone, nearly one-seventh of the entire brigade.

It was mainly Soviet aircraft that inflicted heavy casualties on this brigade. The more than 200 planes of the Soviet army did not fly in a swarm to bomb and strafe, but adhered to the consistent tradition of the Soviet air force, bombing positions in multiple waves without interruption, which made the defenders who lacked anti-aircraft machine guns unable to cope. The defenders had planes circling and strafing almost all the time, and the soldiers had to deal with the fierce attacks of the Soviet infantry like waves on the one hand, and at the same time endure the frenzied bombing and strafing of the Soviet planes, and the casualties were inevitable.

Three days later, after losing more than 2,000 people, the brigade finally failed to withstand the frantic attack of the Soviet army, and was broken through the main peak position by the Soviet army.

Because the brigade headquarters communications company was bombed by the Soviet army and the radio station was destroyed, the brigade commander retreated with the remnants of more than 4,000 people, most of whom were wounded, without consulting Zhou Yaoming.

After receiving this brigade, Zhou Yaoming's reinforcements were still more than 40 kilometers away from the exit of the river valley, and by the time the reinforcements arrived at the exit, the Soviet army had already gained a firm foothold, and it was impossible to recapture the exit of the river valley.

Zhou Yaoming had no choice but to order the two brigades to defend on the spot, and ordered the two brigades to take turns to block and retreat, alternately cover, and must withstand for one to two days each time before allowing the retreat.

Zhou Yaoming himself took the troops directly under the army and the almost crippled brigade, and then withdrew to the preset blocking position.

Li Wentian, who received a report from Chu Xichun, commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, was both surprised and angry at the reality that he had a preset position, losing more than 2,000 people in just three days of blocking the Soviet army and being broken through the position.

To his surprise, this time the Soviet army was obviously prepared, and the ferocity of firepower was by no means comparable to the battle of Manchuria, and he would face an unprecedented fierce battle; What made him angry was that this brigade commander ignored the strict orders of the headquarters and dared to lead the troops to retreat without receiving the order to retreat. At the beginning of the war, such a bad precedent must not be set, otherwise it would be very unfavorable to the future battle against the Soviet army, and it might even be fatal.

This brigade commander must be severely punished in order to set an example.

This brigade commander was originally a subordinate of Zhao Fengwu's Northwest Army, and although Li Wentian also knew that his radio station had been bombed, he still ruthlessly telegraphed to Chu Xichun and Zhou Yaoming, and at the same time reported this brigade commander to Song Zhewu and asked the whole army to be informed.

The Soviet troops, who occupied the exit of the Shilka Valley, did not immediately pursue the retreating troops of the 48th Army, but consolidated the occupied positions at the exit of the valley to prevent the 48th Army from counterattacking. After waiting for two days and the arrival of the Soviet follow-up troops, the Soviets attacked the blocking forces of the 48th Army again.

The fact that the brigade commander who withdrew his position without authorization was brought to justice caused quite a stir in the whole army, and although the Fourth Route Army had strict military discipline, it was the first time in the military history of the Fourth Route Army that a senior officer at the brigade level was shot.

Although some officers were a little dissatisfied with the current enforcement of military discipline and thought that Li Wentian was using this head to deter the whole army, this also made the officers at all levels really cheer up their spirits, strictly supervise the battle step by step, and make them all ready to live and die together with the position.

The two brigades of the 48th Army, which were responsible for delaying the Soviet army, took advantage of the two days that the Soviet army was waiting for the follow-up troops to seize the time and work hard to build a position. In view of the heavy shelling and bombardment of the Soviet troops, a large number of anti-artillery holes were dug. Therefore, although the Soviet artillery and bombardment were more intense, and the casualties of the troops were also heavy, they gritted their teeth and held on for two days before moving to the next blocking position.

(To be continued)