After only two kilometers of advance, one of the latest Soviet T-18 tanks ran over an anti-tank mine.

Compared with the two MC-1s that were blown up last time, the T-18 that was blown up this time was much more miserable, and the fuel tank was directly blown up. Soviet tanks all used gasoline engines, and with the explosion of the fuel tank, this T-18 quickly burned to a pile of scrap metal.

The MC-1 was the first mass-produced tank of the Soviet Army, but it was not designed by the Soviets themselves, but imitated the French Renault-17. The T-18 is different, it was completely designed and manufactured by the Soviets themselves, and the first tank was mass-produced.

Due to the T-18's poor obstacle crossing ability, the Soviets had to install a bracket on the front of the vehicle to improve the obstacle crossing ability when the tail pry was already available. Thus, the T-18 also received the nicknames "Rhinoceros" and "Cart".

Despite its poor appearance, its speed was much higher than the 10 km/h of the MC-1 and reached 20 km/h, and it was better than the Renault in all other indicators.

Due to the limitations of production capacity and the fact that the Soviet military top brass was not very satisfied with the T-18 in terms of speed, the Soviet army now has only 600 vehicles. This time, 300 T-18s were handed over to the Far Eastern Special Army at one time, and the purpose was to test its surname on the battlefield.

The tank company assigned to the vanguard battalion had only one platoon of T-18, and the other two platoons were MC-1s.

But Niyazov was no longer in the mood to consider the feelings of the tank company commander, and the only thing he was thinking about now was how to quickly pass through the Chinese minefield.

It's just that the Chinese' new mines gave Niyazov a headache, and the engineer company was killed and injured more than a dozen engineers, but the mines were still not completely eliminated. It is said that it is clearing mines, but in fact it is more like using people to clear mines.

This caused great fear among the sappers, so much so that every time they assigned an engineer to clear mines, the commander of the engineer company had to personally assign them.

That night, Niyazov, who was called to the division headquarters, gave the grumpy division commander a severe reprimand. Fortunately, Bai Yin, the commander of the puppet Mongolian regiment who followed the actions of the Soviet army, suggested that cattle, sheep and horses should be used to wade the mines in front.

The local Mongols have long since retreated to the south of Kulen, and it is no longer possible to find cattle and sheep in the area. And with a war horse, not to mention that Niyazov was a little reluctant, the division commander from the cavalry resolutely refused.

As a result, the Soviet army sent trucks overnight to transport a large number of cattle and sheep from the logistics depot that was still in the Soviet Union. From the next day, when they encountered a minefield, they drove hundreds of cattle and sheep to the mines. Although the Soviet troops were trampled by cattle and sheep, and occasionally undetonated mines injured the Soviet troops, the speed of advance was greatly accelerated.

The Soviets are now paying great attention to searching and guarding the mountains and woods on both sides of the road as they advance, but there are still vigilant troops who are often attacked by the [***] squadron ambushed in the woods, and the casualties are dozens of people every day. In particular, the squadron often fired mortar shells at the advancing Soviet vanguard on the highway on the mountainous terrain one or two kilometers away from the road, and ran away with a few rounds before the Soviet troops could launch a fire counterattack.

In addition to the cattle and sheep killed and wounded, there were many people who were frightened and ran into the mountains and forests during the shelling, and every time they were shelled, the Soviet army had to send a large number of people to go around to catch cattle and sheep. On average, for every kilometer advanced, dozens of cattle and sheep were lost, so much so that the Soviet army had to constantly replenish cattle and sheep from the rear.

The tactics adopted by the Central [***] team against the Soviet troops in the center were to harass and delay, but they were resolute in blocking the Soviet troops on the eastern route.

In Song Zhewu's original battle plan, it was assumed that the Soviet army on the eastern route would move directly south after crossing the border, first occupying Krulun, the political and economic center of eastern Northern Mongolia, and then controlling the northeastern part of Northern Mongolia. Then, with Kruren as the rear support and logistics support base, it moved westward along the Kruren River Valley.

For this reason, Zhuo Ren, chairman of the Northern Mongolian Front, and Chu Feng, vice chairman of the Northern Mongolian Front, with the cooperation of Li Wentian, the commander of the Northern Mongolian front, have moved all the military and political organs and residents of Krulun to the south, and there is now not a single civilian except for the 46th Army of Ma Fa 5.

It should be said that this is a relatively safe plan for the Soviet army. In this way, it will not only ensure the logistical supply of the troops advancing west to Kulen, but also gradually control the entire eastern part of Northern Mongolia with Krulun as a base. However, because the Soviet generals, including Blyukher, somewhat contemptuous of the [***] team, even the Manchurian fiasco, did not completely change this view of the Soviet generals.

Therefore, the Soviet army did not move south to seize Khulun, but after crossing the border, it moved westward along the narrow valley of the Shilka River close to the border area, intending to move south into Öndörkhan in the north of Öndörkhan, enter the Khuren Valley, and then go west into Kulen.

The Soviet army completely ignored the threat that Kruren's squadron might go north to cut off the logistical supply line of the Soviet army in the Shilka River Valley, and also ignored the danger that if the Shilka River Valley was blocked, the Soviet army of more than 100,000 people would not be able to deploy at all, and could only be passively beaten.

Regarding the arrogance of the Soviet army, Mengxi even suggested that the 46th Army of Ma Fa 5 should go north to cut off the Shilka River Valley, and then concentrate his forces to gather and annihilate the Soviet army on the East Road in the Shilka River Valley.

Song Zhewu was also a little angered by the contempt of the Soviet army, but after a careful sand table deduction with Tao Rong, he still gave up this plan.

The reason was that the Soviet army was under heavy firepower and the Shilka Valley was too close to the border, and the Soviet army would receive strong support from the air force, and it would be impossible to grasp the Soviet army of more than 100,000 men in three armies at a time with the current strength of the Fourth Route Army. If the Soviet army on the Eastern Route is forcibly annihilated, even if the goal of the campaign is achieved, its own casualties will be very huge, and it may even be a war of attrition, which will be very unfavorable to the overall situation of the entire campaign to defend Northern Mongolia.

Therefore, Song Zhewu had no choice but to change the original battle plan, and urgently transferred Zhou Yaoming's 48th Army in Wendur Khan to the north to block the Soviet army at the exit of the Shilka River Valley, more than 150 kilometers northeast of Wendur Khan; At the same time, the Mafa 546th Army was ordered to abandon Kruren and withdraw west to Öndörkhan to take over the defense of the 48th Army.

Krulun is more than 250 kilometers away from Öndörkhan, and although there are flat valleys along the way, most of Song Zhewu's trucks go to the northeast, and Mafa Wu has to return to Öndörkhan on foot. It would take at least six days to reach Öndörkhan at such a long distance. Including the rest and recuperation and taking over the defense after that, it will take 10 days at the earliest. Therefore, Song Zhewu instructed Li Wentian to require Zhou Yaoming to block the Soviet army on the eastern route for more than 10 days in the mountainous area of the exit from the Shilka Valley to Wendur Khan.

(To be continued)