Author: Painstaking Fang Congzhe

Book friends who discussed together: A scholar on Jinghu South Road, IP brother, Gao Aocao and other book friends.

The battle of Shandong, all in all, was a tragic victory for Xiao Deng, but for Yu Chahan, it could not be said that it was completely defeated.

Why? Because the starting point is different, the purpose is different. Xiao Deng's starting point was to deal with the thunderous blow of Chahan's 80,000 male divisions with a scattered weak brigade, and if he held on, he won.

The starting point of Chahan was to attack more than 100,000 Shandong Red Army with 80,000 men (and later 20,000 or 30,000 Haidong reinforcements). Judging from the results, Tian Feng was defeated by him, and most of the sieges of the Red Army on the three routes came to naught within two or three years, and even the starting positions of Baoding, Zhending and other places were recaptured by Chahan. Although it did not completely eliminate Xiao Deng Kefu Shandong, it also eliminated a large number of its vital forces, and even seized the important place of Jinan, blocking the possibility of it going west out of Henan.

The loss of Chahan is mainly in two ways:

1. Underestimating the opponent's combat power and dividing troops into multiple routes, resulting in a long-term invincibility.

2. Jinan failed to encircle and annihilate the enemy's heavy army group.

3. The siege of Tai'an failed.

(A scholar on Jinghu South Road: I agree very much with the first point, it is better to concentrate troops to capture Yidu and start the war early.)

The second point is that Wang Baobao's performance as a cattle man in the late Yuan and early Ming Dynasty is very disappointing. With an absolutely superior force, first blocked in Jinan and then blocked in Huashan, if it were not for the rebellion in Jinan, it is difficult to say whether Jinan could be successfully taken.

Again, back to the topic of division operations. If Chahan only used partial divisions to contain Jinan and Tai'an, and concentrated all his forces to destroy Yidu, what kind of outcome would it be. ）

Deng She's loss is mainly in:

1. Insist on fortifying the city, leading to their own battles. People and land have been lost in several places.

2. Due to the trapping of Yidu, the control over the overall situation has declined, and the guerrilla operations in several places are unfavorable, so it is better to make the best use of the Chahan people.

(A scholar from Jinghu South Road: I agree with the second point.

It stands to reason that Xiao Deng is a landlord and should grasp the geographical advantages, and he never wanted to encounter ambushes in several places, and was pulled out of his pocket and drilled in. Fortunately, several marshals who led the troops were quite handsome, and none of them were beaten badly. If there had been a little careful deployment beforehand, and the headquarters had withdrawn to the rear as soon as possible to take overall command, I am afraid that this battle would have been much easier to fight.

For the third point, Jinan was lost prematurely and fell within the uncontrollable range. However, Xiao Deng did not take precautions in advance, and did not have a clear follow-up, so he should be responsible for leadership.

I agree with the first point. When we are weak and we are strong, we should not care about the gains and losses of one city or one pond, but should give full play to the mobility of our troops and cut off the enemy's food routes. Concentrate superior forces, destroy the enemy's vital forces, and make preparations for a protracted war.

Once again, I sighed how good Taizu's guerrilla warfare tactics were.

Painstaking efforts Fang Congzhe: Originally, it was necessary to be willing to sacrifice to concentrate superior forces to fight a war of annihilation, but now Deng She's conditions are still not available. There is also no good mass base cooperation - for example, if Deng She really gives up Yidu, there is no doubt that the whole of Shandong will fall to Chahan.

*History is not always open-minded - for example*During the command of the mountains, Huai'an was very unable to let go, and lost the battle to defend Lianghuai. There are also those that cannot be let go of - such as defending Siping, if Siping is easily abandoned, I am afraid that Dongye will be driven out of China.

But it's not as light as those national fans in the book review area say. Especially someone who is only staring at the Northeast Battlefield - please, if there is no real millet plus rifle from the Kannai Battlefield, * can rest for so long before the summer offensive? Don't talk about it, even if there is no millet plus rifle in southern Liaoning, * you can also go to the USSR to repair it. The battles of Shanxi, Hebei, Luyu, Northwest, and even Lüliang are even more invisible.

A scholar from Jinghu South Road: Well, I strongly suggest that Xiao Deng do more to improve the relationship between the army and the masses in the future, and promote the spirit of the people's soldiers. The mass foundation is the grain road and the logistical support.

Another suggestion is that Xiao Deng should have a broader vision and mind, after all, in the 21st century, he has no awareness of modern warfare, so it doesn't matter if he doesn't wear it.

Painstaking efforts to make a sense of modern warfare even difficult.

If you are not a soldier yourself, you are an ordinary college student, what kind of military literacy can you have. Rather than selling half-understood knowledge, it is better to be honest than Zhao Kuo.

Poor Pan Xian'er, he has made countless suggestions, but he can't adopt them, or if he does, he will become defeated. In other words, I will go to Chahan. ）

3. Jinan was lost prematurely.

As a senator of the State Guest House, it is natural to offer a few more strategies for future actions after summarizing:

1. In this operation, our army suffered very serious losses. Yang Wanhu's department, known as the Five Ya, had only two or three thousand people left, and lost its combat effectiveness. Gao Yonsei and Li Zifanbu, there were only 500 people left, and they lost their combat effectiveness. There are still more than 10,000 people left in the Li Monk and Bi Qianniu Division, and only the ability to defend the city remains. More than 10,000 people of Liu Si's army were wiped out, but on the contrary, they added thousands of combat strength to the enemy. The combat effectiveness of the 2,000-odd people in Tong's health and maintenance department has recovered slightly. Wen X Guo and Guo are new to Longbu, and they still have combat effectiveness. Xu Jizu, Hu Zhong, Deng Chengzhi, Zhang Ji'er, etc., totaling about 10,000 people, were also exhausted or unable to fight again.

Our army has a total of 890,000 troops participating in the battle, and nearly half of the losses in this battle have lost their combat strength in a short period of time. Liaodong also had no mobile troops to help. The Tuntian army originally numbered tens of thousands, and almost all of them were scattered except for those who were killed and captured. The Navy's Liu Yang Division also lost thousands.

The Chahan army lost only 20,000 or 30,000 men, and was replenished by several thousand on the spot.

Although there are reasons such as our army's poor preparation and too many new troops, it has also fully exposed the huge gap between our army and the Chahan army in terms of tactical quality and cadre ability. In particular, the local troops of our army in Shandong are almost incapable of fighting except for Chen Tantou, and the local army that is rarely pulled from Henan is similar to its main force. Even the local troops of our army in the Korean province, except for Zhang Zhen'er in Guanbei, cannot be compared with Chahan. Therefore, the training of local troops needs to be strengthened.

2. The good coordination between the civilian and military forces of our army deserves praise, and we should sum up our experience and compile regulations at some time to straighten out the relationship between generals, local officials, and staff and civilian officers.

3. After this battle, our army lost the ability to attack, and it is advisable to rest and recuperate. On the one hand, the troops were reorganized, and on the other hand, Tuntian Donglai.

However, Jinan and Jining are the throats of our army, and it is necessary to make preparations as soon as possible to recover the two places and extend their influence to Dongping and Dongchang. At the very least, we should make early plans for the recovery of Jinan.

4. Tian Feng used to shield Hebei for our army. Although it was extremely unreliable in this battle, at the end of the battle, he took Hejian Province, and still formed a situation of covering Hebei for our army.

Since our army is currently unable to make a northern expedition to the capital, it is better to have a buffer than no buffer. It is very easy to get a field of abundance, but I am afraid that it will be difficult to get another field of abundance!

(A scholar on Jinghu South Road: I don't agree with the fourth point.) Instead of relying on Tian Feng's wall grass as a buffer, it is better to replace it and advance the front. Choosing a good general to defend, with the same troops, or Tian Feng's effect is much better.

Painstaking Fang Congzhe: It is impossible to hold the Hejian Road under the enemy's full attack, so it is better to let it go to Tian Feng than to waste troops and the result is the same as that of Zichuan Wang Thirteen.

If you don't take Tian Feng, there is still united front value. If you always do too much, who will believe you in the future?

You killed Wang Shicheng and took his wife, although you promoted Gao Yanshi and treated Chen Tantou well, but it was just to make the generals of other forces not worry about their way out after they were annexed. The lords of the other forces are afraid that they will ...... ）

5. Draw lessons from this operation and establish a system of front and rear commands.

Taking this operation as an example, our side's insistence on benefiting is of great political and strategic significance, and it cannot be controlled unless Deng She. Therefore, it makes sense that Dunshe did not retreat. However, Deng She did not stipulate an overall commander second only to himself (later Wen Pingzhang), resulting in everyone having to rely on a person who was trapped in Yidu and often could not be contacted to command behind closed doors, and the result was not good.

In order to learn this lesson, a system of front and rear command posts should be established in the future to ensure that such incidents do not happen again.

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Brother IP: Pan Xianer's plan, the minister also thought it was a good strategy. It's a pity that it hasn't been reused. Li Zifan, it seems that he is too cautious.

Gao Aocao: After this battle, most of the generals of the Yidu faction were killed and wounded, and the troops of Gao and Chen were greatly damaged, and at most 30% of the troops were retained, which objectively said that it also strengthened the control of the Haidong regime in Shandong.