Volume 5 The Qilin Offering the Seal Chapter 7 to Attack the Qing Dynasty (I)

"TMD, Hong Chengchou, this little white face, I think I should have dragged him out and killed him back then, it's so stupid!"

Bingzhong slapped the spy report on the case table while shouting loudly. A cabinet meeting was held in the royal court to discuss how to deal with the imminent external disturbances.

A group of civil and military generals stood under the court, seeing that Bingzhong's complexion was not very good, and the big guys didn't dare to squeak. After standing like this for nearly half an hour, I saw Wang Zhaolin step forward and take a step forward, and said stubbornly: My king is angry, there are indeed a lot of losses in this battle report today, but it is also a foreign invasion, and people of insight in my Chinese land will be as prepared as we are, especially the inspirational Xu Tu to go north to Dashun Chuang Wang ......!

Before Prime Minister Wang finished speaking, Bingzhong heard that Zao'er was moving to the north, and there was a burst of irritability in his heart. waved his hand and said: The four princes, the commanders of the battalions and Wang Zhaolin, spare their lives, Gong Wanjing and others stay, and the rest retreat.

After the alienated and detached ministers gradually withdrew from the royal court, Bingzhong said: I told you these things, not to let you comfort my heart. We all know the general trend, the key is how to deal with it now? Everyone was relieved to see Bingzhong say this. Gong Wanjing saw that the king was a little calm, so he took the first step forward and said: "My lord, I think that the current matter should focus on studying the battle situation of the two sides, find out their respective reasons and weaknesses, and deal with them one by one.

As soon as Bingzhong heard Gong Wanjing's words, he was overjoyed, thinking that you, a kid, knew how to observe words and feelings. He glanced at Gong Wanjing, then stroked his beard again, nodded and said: "Wanjing, what you said is very true!" and instructed the cultural personnel in the big bird camp to send the analysis of the spy battle situation between the two sides that had been prepared long ago to everyone.

Everyone takes a closer look and can get together to discuss, discuss, and then give their opinions.

Someone, push the sand table up!

After all these things were put together, everyone gathered around the sand table and deduced their own thoughts and ideas according to the spy situation of the two sides. After about half a day's effort, the Minister of the Interior gave a lecture on the analysis of the war situation of the day.

The fundamental reason for the failure of the Battle of Songjin was that the decisive battle time chosen by Emperor Chongzhen was completely contrary to normal thinking and decision. The logistical organization and deployment of troops in the Ming Dynasty were also unsustainable. Under the extremely unfavorable internal and external situation of the country, Emperor Chongzhen rashly launched this decisive battle, which was a serious strategic mistake, and the Manchu Emperor Taiji would lead the main force of the Qing army to come to the decisive battle with the strength of the country, and he was not prepared for effective strategic filing and prevention; so the defeat was all normal, but the number of people was too large and abnormal, and it was an unexpected result.

From the perspective of Zhu Youzhen, the Chongzhen Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, if it is said that in the thirteenth year of Chongzhen, Emperor Chongzhen asked Hong Chengchou to supervise the 130,000 troops out of the customs and confront the Qing army in Jinzhou, it can be regarded as a reasonable judgment based on the domestic situation. Then in the later fourteen years of Chongzhen, the peasant rebels from all walks of life in the Guannai rose one after another, and the situation in the provinces in the Guannai was already in chaos, and Emperor Chongzhen actually planned to use his only remaining strategic mobile corps to fight with the Qing army in the Liaoxi Corridor, which is simply unreasonable. What's more, the continuous natural disasters at that time, harsh taxes, and additional levies made the peasants bankrupt one after another, reduced to displaced people, and joined the camp of the rebel peasant army, which made the collateral manpower gradually grow, and successively conquered the two strategic towns of Xiangyang and Luoyang. The peasant army was active in Henan and Huguang, two important places in the world, and it was extremely difficult for the southern provinces to raise food and pay to send them to Beijing. And if the Ming Dynasty continued to increase the looting of grain and grass in Shanxi, Beizhili, Shandong and other northern provinces, with the momentum of sparks in these areas, the people's morale would be lost and quickly lost.

Previously, Hong Chengchou supervised the army out of the pass, and originally had two operational goals, one was to rescue the besieged Guan Ning army led by Zu Dashou, and the other was to keep Jinzhou, a strategic stronghold in the western Liaoning corridor. In order to achieve these two goals at the same time, when Huang Taiji had already made up his mind to encircle Jinzhou at all costs, it was indeed beyond the organizational and combat capabilities of the Ming army at that time.

In addition, Emperor Taiji of the Manchu Chongde Emperor was originally raised on the battlefield and was the emperor immediately. It is indeed different from Zhu Youzhen, who grew up in the Ouchi Deep Palace. During the two-year confrontation, the Ming army's repeated attempts have long proved that if the Ming army wants to protect Jinzhou and successfully repel the Qing army to relieve the siege, if it does not press all the main forces, the troops will be completely insufficient. According to Hong Chengchou's original idea, it was absolutely impossible to maintain an army of more than 100,000 troops in Songshan for a long time, fight with the Manchu regime for a long time, and in a situation where the provinces of Guannai had already been thrown into disarray by the peasant army. As for crushing the main force of the Qing army in the field, crossing 500 miles to fight back to Liaoyang and Shenyang, and recovering the territory of eastern Liaodong, it is even more "wishful thinking".

The Ming Dynasty's Liaodong Jingluo Hong Chengchou originally went as a reinforcement, but he never expected that the war would develop to the end of the situation where he would go to a showdown with the Qing army. For the person himself, there is a weakness of psychological unpreparedness. What's more, it is a large army of more than 100,000 people, and without a single psychological preparation to fight to the death, how can it be possible to fight this battle well.

If the Ming army only wants to rescue Zu Dashou and his Guanning army, and give an explanation to Liaodong Jiangmen, it is completely possible, and the two siege relief actions of the Ming army have actually touched the edge of Jinzhou City, if at this time, Emperor Chongzhen took the opportunity to ask Zu Dashou to give up Jinzhou and join the main force, then it is entirely possible that before the main force of the Manchu Qing led by Huang Taiji arrived, the whole division retreated, leaving only an empty city for the Manchu Dynasty. Under the circumstance that the Manchu Qing Dynasty had already defeated Lin Dan Khan and controlled the Mongolian steppe, Jinzhou, which was at the mouth of the bottle of the Western Liaoning Corridor, was actually of little strategic significance. In this way, if the Zu Dashou Department retreats to Shanhaiguan, and Hong Chengchou and the 130,000 elites led by him are transferred back to the battlefield in Guannei and begin to suppress the peasant army, then Emperor Chongzhen's internal and external tactics and strategies are still quite scrutinized. But the ruthless historical fact is that because of the tragic defeat on the battlefield in Guannei, Emperor Chongzhen was even more naked and slapped in the face because of the defeat and death of Yang Sichang, who was reused by all the people, so that he urgently needed an unprecedented victory on the battlefield outside Guan, so as to boost his prestige and save the lost face.

It just so happened that Hong Chengchou's results in the early stage of the Songjin Campaign were not bad, so when the logistics, organization and strategic situation were not supported, Emperor Chongzhen decided to gamble a big one, and almost took out all his bargaining chips, hoping to rely on the victory of a strategic decisive battle against the Manchu regime to reverse the strategically domestic and foreign difficulties. What is used is a bad decision that can be safe from the outside.

Of course, we all know the result now, the Ming army, which has been proven to be unable to fight hard battles many times, was forced to fight a quick decisive battle, and the result is that except for a few elite generals such as Cao Bianjiao, who fought bloodily and once killed the main account of the Huang Taiji Chinese army, most of the rest of the Ming army, as soon as they heard that the back road was cut off, they rushed to break and flee, collapsed in self-suspicion and chaos, and became pigs and sheep slaughtered by the Manchu Eight Banners. More than half of the more than 100,000 elites have been lost, countless material losses have been lost, Hong Chengchou has such a capable handsome talent to surrender to the enemy, and all kinds of piles and piles have marked that the Ming Dynasty has indeed run out of gas and is on the verge of extinction.

A hundred years later, the great-great-grandson of Huang Taiji, Emperor Qianlong of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, when visiting the ancient battlefield of Songshan, sincerely sighed that "Taizu fought a battle and Wang Jikai, Taizong fought and the emperor succeeded", and the battle of Huang Taiji defeated Hong Chengchou and the battle of Salhu of Nurhachi were listed as the two most critical battles in which the Manchus replaced the Ming Dynasty and opened the country in a hundred battles.

1. The imperial court blindly urged the war. As early as the Battle of Salhu, the Ming army was finally defeated because of the continuous urging of the imperial court, and as a result, the Battle of Songjin still did not learn a lesson. After the victory in the first battle, if the Ming army followed Hong Chengchou's suggestion and steadily advanced step by step, then even if it could not defeat the Qing army, it would not lead to the final defeat, at least there was still the strength of a battle. As a result, Emperor Chongzhen, Chen Xinjia, the secretary of the military department, and others believed in the words of Zhang Ruolin, the superintendent of Liaodong, who underestimated the enemy's rash advance, and blindly urged a quick victory, which eventually led to Hong Chengchou's tribe falling into a trap.

2. The prison army interfered indiscriminately. At that time, Hong Chengchou, the governor of Jiliao, and Zu Dashou, the general of Jinzhou, actually agreed with the strategy of steady advancement, but they were resolutely opposed by Zhang Ruolin, the superintendent, and even "raised their arms and worked hard, supported the troops, collected the power of the governors, and indulged in command", and directly intervened in the command of the army, so the Ming army "knew that there was Zhang Bingbu, but did not know that there was a Hongdu governor, and the governor had nothing to do". The final defeat of the Ming army, Zhang Ruolin, the supervising army, could not escape the blame.

3. Strategic command mistakes. Although Hong Chengchou was familiar with military affairs, he was ultimately defeated by power, and with the intervention of Zhang Ruolin and Chen Xinjia and others, he finally chose to give in. Zhang Ruolin proposed that he should retreat to Ningyuan and fight again after reorganization, so he led his army to break through to the south. It can be said that except for the first battle, Hong Chengchou has handed over the command power.

4. Generals are afraid of death and cowardice. At the time of the decisive battle with the Qing army in Songshan, the Ming army was actually not weaker than the Qing army, and it was not without a chance to win. As a result, some Ming generals were afraid of death and cowardice, refused to obey the general's orders, and broke through the siege indiscriminately, such as the general soldier Wang Pu for his own life, regardless of the safety of the whole army, and fled first in breach of contract, resulting in the defeat of the Ming army in Songshan. For example, in order to rescue Hong Chengchou, the Ming court ordered Yang Shenwu, the governor of Shuntian, and Fan Zhiwan, the squire of the military department, to lead the army to Songshan to relieve the siege, but they "did not dare to come out".

It can be said that the defeat of Songjin, the "crime of non-war", the entire operation system of the Ming Dynasty has already had problems. The Battle of Songjin was so similar to the Battle of Sarhu, if the Ming court could learn the lessons of the Battle of Sarhu and not indiscriminately interfere with the command of the front-line generals, then defeat was not inevitable.