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Although Zhang Jiashi himself was not a person who had come into contact with military affairs, he had traveled to the Great Qin Empire for nearly ten years, and more than three years could be regarded as commanding the army to fight abroad. Pen ~ Fun ~ Pavilion www.biquge.info please search and see the most complete!

Therefore, in some respects, even if Zhang Jiashi himself has not experienced systematic military study, but on the premise of being exposed to it, his understanding of military affairs is not inferior to that of some people.

And more importantly, Zhang Jiashi's body also resides in a Bai Qi, who is known as the king of murder through the ages and a famous general of the real Warring States, if Zhang Jiashi makes some big mistakes in the battle, Bai Qi can also make up for it, so as not to make a big mistake.

In a sense, the key to winning or losing a war is that one side makes fewer mistakes.

In terms of logistics, Zhang Jiashi did not have a detailed understanding, and he did not know that some of the concepts of logistics in later generations were quite mature.

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Logistics is a distinct branch of the science of warfare that encompasses a large number of activities that should be coordinated with tactical or strategic activities, not confused with tactics or strategy.

Later generations believed that it was important to understand the army and navy as a unified combat machine.

When people build a new machine, they always envision what it will be used for. If you don't think about the purpose in advance, you won't start building a new machine. The first thing to figure out is the need for the machine, and the generation of the machine is the answer to the need. Isn't the combat machine any different in this regard?

If there is any need for the war machine, it is to rely on it to enforce the policies of the state. A country cannot uphold its sovereignty if it cannot enforce its policies. But we often see opposition to the policies of some major powers. Diplomatic negotiations are rife with overt, silent or covert threats. Opposition to national policies may succeed unless it is backed up by strength. A machine is an organic composition of various forces that are used for a specific purpose. The war machine is an organization that deals with opposition to the policies of a certain country. If we assume that this country is determined to preserve its sovereignty, then its need for a war machine is self-evident.

Once the problem of the need for machines is solved, the next question we face is: what kind of machines are needed, because there are all kinds of machines.

Some machines are designed to have a positive function and do some kind of positive work, such as a lawn mower that can be used to mow grass or remove weeds. Other machines are designed to prevent or alter the action of a certain force, such as a dam to hold back a flood.

However, dikes can be used to do two things: to protect nearby property by blocking the flow of flood water in one direction, and to install turbines on spillways to generate electricity, some of which are primarily designed to protect nearby property from flooding, and power generation plays a secondary role. Others are mainly used to generate electricity, with property protection taking a secondary role.

Combat machines can be used as protective facilities, like dikes. According to this concept, it is an organization that resists force. That is, it can be fitted with an active set of machinery (turbines on the spillway) like a. In addition to its stationary function, it can also do some active work. This is a combat machine that is mainly defensive. But it can also be conceived as a machine that works actively like a lawn mower, for example, to remove "hostile" weeds from a field. This is an offensive-focused combat machine.

Of these two types of combat machines, we must choose the one that solves a specific problem. If national policy is threatened by floods, and floods can be dealt with by levees, then levees are the machines that people want. If the threat takes the form of a rapid expansion of the enemy's army, spreading like weeds on the enemy's land, we can eradicate it before it spreads viciously to our land. For that, we had to take out our lawn mowers.

Sometimes, a person with fertile land is threatened by flooding on one side and the spread of weeds in his neighbor's field on the other. Then, he had to use both the levee and the lawn mower. Therefore, for a nation to defend its country, it is sometimes necessary to clear its southern border of weeds in the fields of its neighbours and to build dikes on its northern border.

Merely determining the nature of the machine is not the same as determining the design of the construction of the machine itself.

To design a levee, engineers must gather information about meteorological conditions, topographical conditions, concrete strength, and so on. His may have to deal with only the smallest amount of rainfall, but his calculations had to be based on the maximum amount of rainfall, taking into account past experience and known conditions, plus an appropriate safety factor.

Modern farmers no longer use their sickles to do heavy tasks such as weeding or harvesting crops. If he does, he loses the competition.

Combat machines, whether offensive or defensive (or both), must be powerful enough to do the job that has been calculated beforehand. If a can be compared to a war machine, we can say that every part of a is worthless if it is not strong, and that the war machine used for defensive strategy, if not every point is strong, is bound to make a big mistake. For this reason, the risk of a defensive strategy is great, and if it does not work at all, a devastating flood will go straight in, and if it only goes wrong at one point, there is hope for a remedy.

The key to logistics is that the combat machine must be a continuum (in terms of the type and power of the machine) capable of fulfilling the various tasks it may undertake. Logistics workers are very concerned about the design of the whole machine, because most of the work of manufacturing the machine falls within the scope of logistics. Quantitative and qualitative analyses of logistical tasks must be based on the nature and workload of the entire war machine. The strategy adopted by a country, whether it is defensive or offensive, and the logistical tasks that come with it, are also different.

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Although Zhang Jiashi is not very clear about this situation, some logistics concepts have been used in the Great Qin Empire, but in many details, they are not as good as the later generations to have a better experience summary and improve them.

In later generations, military personnel did not need to make a detailed analysis of the tasks of each department of the logistics department, but could put forward the following general requirements: That is, every logistics officer, in order to enable his department to produce the most products and achieve the goal of maximum development, should study the tasks of the department from beginning to end, and pay attention to the general aspects without neglecting all the details.

If a certain sector is engaged in the manufacture of products, it must not only meet the needs of consumption in peacetime, but also be able to expand production to the maximum to meet the needs of war. All kinds of machines and tools needed for wartime production should be ready for production in peacetime. All private factories that anticipate the manufacture of munitions in wartime should be arranged in advance to take into account their needs, such as equipping them with all the necessary machinery and equipment, or rapidly supplying them with the necessary specifications and materials to facilitate the production of special products or to expand the production of their original products. These factories should be equipped with special design drawings, a full set of technical specifications and instruments to test the products to ensure that they meet the needs of wartime. The above-mentioned specific matters must be implemented one by one in peacetime, and once war breaks out, it is only necessary to give an order and start the action. The decree on the mobilization of raw materials should also be drawn up in peacetime, and in the event of a declaration of war, it will be known what must be done in this regard. A committee should be established to empower producers to meet their demand for raw materials and to be responsible for setting their prices. In this European war, work on this was done in Germany by the "Raw Materials Bureau" of the War Office.

Any department responsible for the production of war materiel has another function, and that is that it must obtain intelligence about the latest advances and inventions in order for its products to be the best for their intended use. In order to do this, the officials in charge of production must be familiar with the performance of the product and be aware of the areas where improvements can be made.

In modern warfare, the competition between the belligerents in terms of resource mobilization is unprecedentedly fierce, and it seems that only the party that can use its resources most economically, that is, who can get the most out of the consumption of its resources, who is the best at choosing the most economical weapons (i.e., weapons produced at a certain cost, which can destroy the enemy's war resources to the maximum), and so on, can win the war. As far as today's European war is concerned, some people believe that which side still has considerable reserve manpower and financial resources in the end will be able to win the war.

If the armies of the two belligerents are well organised and the two sides are inseparable, then the vital question is who can be economical in the various branches of the war machine.

At this point, we may point out that, in terms of the cost of a single soldier, the expenditure of certain armies is already twelve to sixteen times that of the German army, seventeen to twenty times that of Japan, and eighteen to twenty-three times that of Switzerland. The main reason for such a large difference, (in which the difference in soldiers' salaries plays only a small role), is the economic management of the armies, that is, the elimination of waste. It can also be said that high efficiency will not only bring economic results, but will also produce good results in other aspects.

All logistics departments should act on the basis of the principle of economy and strengthen management.

By sitting together and discussing, the various departments can compare the needs of each department and rationally arrange the division of tasks to meet the various needs and avoid duplication of work. For example, a certain sector needs to build a certain machine. If another department also needs to use one or all of the same type of machine, then joint action can be greatly saved, for example, when the medical and health department needs to transport ambulances, and the transport department can fully meet its requirements.

Therefore, the logistics department must always adhere to the principle of cooperation and waste in all its work.

At the same time, one point of view also assists in this regard:

Efficiency can be said to be the ability to accomplish a certain scheduled job. We can also say that efficiency refers to a certain level of knowledge that should be possessed to perform a certain task, or it can be said to be the ratio of the effect produced to the energy expended to produce that effect. A striking point here is that ability and knowledge are subjective things, while tasks are objective things, and subjective conditions must be adapted to objective needs. That is to say, the competence and knowledge that each member of the "war machine" should possess must be qualitatively and quantitatively necessary to meet the needs of the mission. In fact, this is what it means to anticipate the task and determine the measure of efficiency.

The small tasks assigned to the individual staff members of the "combat machine" are very different, but the big tasks are the same for all. Therefore, the condition for completing small tasks is that specialization is required, and the basic conditions for completing large tasks are what everyone should have. For example, a commander's profession is to command and control the troops under his jurisdiction, a gunner's profession is to operate artillery, and neither the commander nor the gunner is required to be proficient in other professions. And the big task of both is to defeat the enemy. One might think that it would be difficult to adequately describe the conditions required by formulating the task in such general language, but this is not the case.

For, really, if not everyone in a fighting army has a strong desire to win, and if only one person neglects his duties, a battle may be lost, and if every unit has a strong desire to defeat the enemy, it is tantamount to winning the battle. The personal qualities that make people develop the impulse to win are: will, determination, hard work, concentration, perseverance, clear goals and objectives, physical strength, and courage. With these qualities, there are essentially the power elements of efficiency, which can arouse people's impulses, and the guidance of action depends on the knowledge element of efficiency. The condition of knowledge is divided into two categories: first, the specialized knowledge already discussed above, and second, the basic knowledge, that is, the knowledge of the laws of nature (which must be possessed by all members of the army).

We cannot say that the efficiency of the lowest level of subordinates is as important as the efficiency of the commander, since the latter has even greater negative consequences if it lacks efficiency. Of course, in individual cases, the ignorance of the lowest level of personnel can also lead to the defeat of a war that is related to the fate of the country.

It is said that Frederick the Great's infantry were driven into battle out of fear of the coops who walked behind and carried sticks. With the enemy in front and the "nine-tailed whip" in the rear, the soldiers had no other way but to march forward bravely. But it was an era when armies were small and densely formed, and warfare was not as astonishingly fierce as it is today, and had become a major scientific event. Forty-five years ago, the analytical Germans had recognized:

"With the intensification of modern gun fire (by the time of 1870), the battle and tactical formations became correspondingly loose. With such a loose procession, how can we control the scattered crowds, keep them closely coordinated, and guide them to drive them to charge?"

This means that as modern combat formations are disjointed, individual infantry must be able to adapt to the situation, move correctly and coordinate with the soldiers on its flanks.

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In a sense, many things themselves are also correspondingly related, and although Zhang Jiashi and the current Great Qin Empire, although they cannot achieve a strict and orderly logistics method similar to that of later generations, but in terms of war preparations for dealing with the Huns, Zhang Jiashi asked himself, he can basically do it, or that he can think of places, and improve them as much as possible. (To be continued.) )

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