readx;

In terms of military theory, Zhang Jiashi himself relied on the corresponding ancient military classics recorded in the Qingyu Lingshu. Pen × fun × Pavilion www. ｂｉｑｕｇｅ。 ｉｎｆｏ

The fact that these classics have been handed down is largely a sign that they still have enough inheritance significance.

Just like the thirteen chapters of Sun Tzu, although strictly speaking it is far from the real experience of actual combat, there is no doubt that as a leader in the ancient art of war in military theory, Sun Tzu's Art of War has far-reaching significance.

It is a pity that Bai Qi is a pity that although he was able to learn some military theories that were very novel to him with the help of Zhang Jiashi himself, he had a deep interest in some famous military works in the West.

These well-known military works include "On War."

...................................................... Dividing Line................................................

"On War", as the name suggests, refers to the theory of war, but in contrast to Sun Tzu's Art of War, its author Clausewitz was already a soldier who had experienced a hundred battles and had considerable combat experience when he compiled "On War".

This is fundamentally different from the fact that Sun Wu, the author of the Art of War, did not seem to have participated in war when he compiled The Art of War.

This can be seen from the content of "On War":

Here, we do not intend to give a lengthy political definition of war at the outset, but only to talk about the element of war - struggle. War is nothing more than an expanded struggle. If we want to think of the myriad fights that make up a war as a unity, then it is better to imagine a situation in which two people fight. Each side seeks to force the other to submit to his will by physical strength, and his immediate aim is to break the other so that the other can no longer put up any resistance.

War, therefore, is an act of violence that forces the enemy to submit to our will.

Violence equips itself with the fruits of technology and science to deal with it. The limits to violence are negligible and coexist with violence, but do not diminish the force of violence. Violence, that is, material violence (since there is no more mental violence than the concepts of the state and law) is the means; Imposing one's will on the enemy is the goal. In order to achieve this with certainty, it is necessary to render the enemy powerless to resist, and therefore conceptually speaking, the real goal of the conduct of war is to render the enemy powerless. This objective replaces the aforementioned purpose and excludes it to some extent as something that does not belong to the war itself.

At the same time, in some of the detailed descriptions of "On War", Clausewitz's views as a veteran soldier can be expressed:

Before people experience the danger of war, they usually imagine it not to be terrible, but to be attractive. Rushing upon the enemy, motivated by enthusiasm, - who cares about its bullets and the dead - closing its eyes in an instant, rushing towards the grim reaper, - not knowing whether it is us or someone else who can escape its clutches, and is it not difficult to do this when the laurels of victory are at hand, and the fruits of honor are within reach?

But this moment is not like a pulse beat, as one might think, but like a pill, it must be diluted and melted for a while, and, we say, there are very few such moments.

Let us accompany those who have not been to the battlefield to the battlefield. As we approached the battlefield, the rumbling of artillery grew louder and louder, followed by the whistling of shells, which attracted the attention of newcomers. Shells began to fall not far behind us, and we hurried to the high ground where the commander and many of his retinue were. Here shells fell nearby, grenades exploded continuously, and in this way, the serious reality shattered the naïve illusions of the newcomers. Suddenly, an acquaintance fell—a grenade fell in the middle of the crowd, causing a commotion,—and people began to feel less calm and composure, and even the bravest of men were at least somewhat distracted. We marched further on, to a nearby division commander, and the fierce battle unfolded almost like a theatrical scene. Here the shells fell one after another, and the roar of our artillery made people even more unsettled. We then came to the brigade commander from the place of the division commander, who was considered to be of great courage, and carefully concealed himself behind a hill, a house, or a tree—a sign of the growing danger.

Grenades fell on the rooftops and in the fields, and shells whizzed all around, flying over and around us, while the screams of bullets rang out incessantly. We walked further forward and came to the infantry units, which had been engaged in fire for hours with indescribable tenacity. There was the whizzing of bullets everywhere, and this short, high-pitched sound indicated that the bullets were close at hand, passing in our ears, on our heads, and in our chests. In addition, the compassion that arises from seeing people injured and fallen makes our beating hearts even more grieved.

When the newcomer is confronted with the different degrees of danger mentioned above, he does not fail to feel that the light of reflection here is different from that of imagination, where it moves through different common substances and produces different refractions. When a person is exposed to these initial impressions, if he can not lose the ability to make decisions on the spot, he must be an extraordinary person. Of course, habits can quickly dilute these impressions, and after half an hour, we begin to be relatively indifferent to everything around us (some people feel more indifferent, some people feel less). However, an ordinary person cannot always be completely calm in this situation.

It follows from this that it is not enough for a person to have ordinary mental powers here, and the greater the responsibility that needs to be borne by him, the more this is the case. In such a difficult environment, in order for all activities to have what appears to be average indoors, one must possess a great, indomitable, innate courage, a strong sense of honour or a habit of enduring danger.

The danger of war is a resistance in war, and a correct view of it is necessary to bring the knowledge into accord with the truth, which is why we have mentioned it here.

A description such as this passage is simply not something that a person who has not experienced war can describe. Because probably only those who are there can deeply feel the reality of this situation.

The following description is also based on Clausewitz's own military experience:

If a man were to judge the events of war at a time when his limbs were numbed from the cold, or when he was thirsty, hot, hungry, and tired, he would be able to get even less objectively correct judgments. However, these judgments are at least subjectively correct, that is, they reflect exactly the relation of the judge to the thing being judged. We understand this when we see that the eyewitnesses of an unfortunate event, especially when he is still there, often make negative and pessimistic judgments about the outcome of the event, even exaggerated. In our view, it is clear from this how much impact exertion can have and how much attention should be taken when judging exertion.

In war, there are many things that cannot be strictly defined for their use, especially physical strength. If physical strength is not abused, then it is a factor of all strength, and no one can say exactly how much exertion the human body can endure. It is worth noting that just as only the strong arm of an archer can pull the bowstring tighter, in war, only a strong commander can exert the power of his army greaterly.

It is one thing, for example, for an army to be in danger after a great defeat, to be on the verge of crumbling like a collapsing wall, and to get out of it only by enduring great exertion, and quite another for a victorious army, inspired by pride, to be commanded by the commander-in-chief as he pleases. The same enduring exertion arouses sympathy at most in the former case, and necessarily makes us admire in the latter, since it is more difficult to do so.

In this way, the inexperienced can also see that exertion is one of the many factors that secretly restrain intellectual activity and drain the strength of feelings.

Although what is being discussed here is only the question of the commander-in-chief asking the army and the commander to ask his subordinates to endure hardships and stand hard work, that is, whether they dare to demand and are good at demanding hardships and hard work from the army and their subordinates, the question of their own fatigue should not be ignored. Now that we have carefully analysed this point of war, we must also pay attention to the importance of the remaining important issue.

We are talking here about fatigue in particular, because it is one of the most important causes of resistance, like danger, and at the same time it does not have a certain measure, it is very much like an elastic object, which, as you know, is very difficult to calculate.

In order to avoid misusing the above arguments and to avoid overemphasizing the various difficult conditions of war, we have an innate sense of guiding judgment. Just as it is not good for a man to mention his own weaknesses when he is slandered and insulted, but it is good to mention his weaknesses when he has successfully refuted or countered them, no commander in chief and any army can remove the impression of shameful defeat by depicting danger, difficulty, and fatigue, but in victory they increase their brilliance indefinitely. It follows that our feelings prevent us from drawing superficially unbiased conclusions that our judgments are prone to draw, because our feelings are a higher judgment.

......

And there is one thing that military experts in both the East and the West coincidentally admire, that is, the importance of war intelligence.

In "The Art of War", there is a famous sentence for the ages: "Know yourself and know your opponent, and you will not be defeated in a hundred battles", and the most intuitive description of this sentence is the effectiveness of intelligence control.

There is also a corresponding description in "On War", but based on the corresponding circumstances, Clausewitz's description of intelligence is undoubtedly more detailed and clear:

Intelligence refers to all that we know about the enemy and the enemy state, and is the basis of all our thoughts and actions. One only considers the nature of this foundation, its unreliability and its variability, and we immediately feel how dangerous the building of war is, how easily it can collapse to bury us under its rubble. Although all the books say that reliable information should be trusted, and that one must not be suspicious, this is nothing more than a pitiful excuse for masturbation when the author of the book cannot think of a better one.

Much of the information obtained during the war was contradictory, more false, and most of it quite inaccurate. This requires officers to have a certain ability to discriminate, which can only be obtained through the knowledge and judgment of things and people. Here he must follow the law of generality. When we draw up the initial plans indoors before we arrive at the real battlefield, the difficulty of discerning intelligence is already not small, and in the chaotic and chaotic situation of war, intelligence comes one after another, and this difficulty is even more infinite.

If this information contradicts each other, distinguishes between right and wrong, and needs to be analyzed and discerned, then it is considered lucky. Worse for the inexperienced commander is that the situation is not as stated above, but one piece of information supports, confirms or supplements another, the picture is constantly adding new colors, and in the end, he has to make a hasty decision, only to soon find out that the decision is stupid, and all this information is false, exaggerated, wrong, etc. To put it simply, much of the intelligence is fake, and people's timidity makes it even more false and untrue.

Often, people tend to believe the bad, not the good, and the bad exaggerated. The dangerous news that comes in this way, although it disappears like a wave, often reappears like a wave without any apparent reason. Commanders must stand up to their convictions and stand up to the waves like rocks in the middle of the sea, which is not easy. Whoever is not optimistic by nature, or who has not been trained in war and whose judgment is not strong, it is better for him to follow this rule: force himself, that is to say, go against his inner thoughts to get rid of fear and turn to hope. Only then will he be able to maintain his true composure. If one could correctly understand the difficulties that form one of the greatest obstacles to war, then things will be completely different from what one might think.

The impression of feeling is stronger than the idea of deliberate thought, and this intensity is so great that the commander has to overcome some new doubts at the outset in the accomplishment of any more important operation. The average person is easily influenced by the opinions of others, and most of them are unable to make decisions on the spot. They always think that the reality is not what they originally imagined, especially when they are afraid to listen to other people's opinions.

Even those who draft their own plans can easily doubt their original opinions when they see the actual situation with their own eyes. At this time, only firm self-confidence can enable him to resist the onslaught of temporary illusions. Only when the prospect of various dangerous images that fate has pushed onto the stage of war is dismantled, and the eyes suddenly become clear, can his original belief finally be confirmed. This is one of the biggest differences between making a plan and implementing a plan. (To be continued.) )

This book is from //.html