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"On War" is often referred to in military works together with "The Art of War". Pen, fun, pavilion www. biquge。 info

However, in a certain sense, "On War" is more in line with the teaching of modern warfare, while "The Art of War" should be regarded as a guide in terms of theoretical guidance.

This is very closely related to the fact that The Art of War itself is more theoretical.

When the "Thirteen Chapters of Sun Wu" was presented in front of King Wu Lu, Sun Wu did not participate in the record of the war, and even in later generations, there was an opinion that Sun Wu existed.

Zhang Jiashi himself was noncommittal about this point of view, but he also knew in his description to Bai Qi that Sun Wu might exist, but even in the Warring States Period, there was no more detailed description of Sun Wu.

As for Sun Wu's origin, he was often a small nobleman of Qi during the Warring States Period.

On the other hand, from the middle and late Spring and Autumn Period to the middle of the Warring States Period, Sun Bin wrote "Sun Bin Art of War", and it can even be said that "Sima Law" is more familiar than "Sun Tzu's Art of War".

However, during the Warring States Period, many people recognized the existence of Sun Wu, because Sun Bin's honorific title was "Qi Sun Tzu", not "Sun Tzu". This point shows that Sun Wu and Sun Bin are not the same person, and Sun Wu has become the founder of a certain school of doctrine in the military family.

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In contrast to Sun Wu, who seemed to have no actual combat experience before writing "The Art of War", Clausewitz can be said to have very profound military experience and actual combat experience before writing the Theory of War:

After graduating from the Berlin Military Academy in 1803, Clausewitz became Prince August's aide-de-camp. When he participated in the Battle of Auerstedt with the prince, he was captured by the French and released at the end of the following year. At the beginning of 1809, he was transferred to the General Staff of the Prussian Army and served as Chief of the General Staff and Chairman of the Military Reform Committee.

In the autumn of 1810 he became an instructor at the military academy and taught military lessons to the crown prince.

In the spring of 1812, he advocated a coalition with Russia against France, but resigned because he was dissatisfied with the Prussian king's alliance with Napoleon I, and transferred to the Russian army, serving in the cavalry corps and infantry corps command. In 1814 he returned to the Prussian army. The following year, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Third Army of the G.L. Blucher Regiment and participated in the Battle of Linny.

In May 1818 he was appointed director of the Berlin Military Academy, and in September he was promoted to major general. He served as the principal for 12 years, devoting himself to the study of war history and engaging in military theory writings. In 1830, he was appointed inspector of the Second Supervision Department of Artillery. In May 1831 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army on the Polish border. He died in Breslau in November of the same year.

After Clausewitz's death, his wife compiled and published "The Posthumous Works of General Carl von Clausewitz", a total of 10 volumes, 1~3 volumes of "On War", and the rest of the works on war history. The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the national liberation movements of European peoples in the early 19th century had a decisive impact on the formation of Clausewitz's world outlook and military outlook. Although Clausewitz was opposed to the French Revolution, he also clearly saw the fundamental changes in military affairs caused by this revolution and sharply attacked feudal military theory.

Clausewitz studied more than 130 wars and conquests that took place during the year, and wrote many military histories on the Dutch War of Independence, the Wars of Gustav II Adolf, the Wars of Louis 14, the Wars of Frederick II, the Napoleonic Wars, the Great Patriotic War of 1812, and the War of German Liberation of 1813. Clausewitz's main work is On War.

The conclusion of "On War" is: "War is a tool of politics, and war inevitably has a political character,...... War is, in its main respect, politics itself, and politics is represented here by the sword, but this does not mean that it no longer thinks according to its own laws. Lenin spoke highly of Clausewitz's argument. Lenin called him "a very famous writer of the philosophy and history of war." However, Clausewitz, as an idealist, regarded the politics of his country as a representative of the interests of society as a whole, and did not understand that the driving force of politics itself was the class struggle. He regarded war as nothing more than a continuation of foreign policy, but failed to recognize the connection between war and domestic policy, and separated politics from economics, politics from social systems, and politics from class struggle. Since he does not reveal the social and class nature of war, he is unable to articulate the aggressive or just nature of war when he discusses specific wars.

Clausewitz believed that "every age should have its own specific wars" and that changes in military scholarship were caused by "new social conditions and social relations."

These judgments are correct. But he did not understand what exactly determined the development of military scholarship, so his interpretation of this point is rather contradictory.

Clausewitz did a great deal of work in the study of military academic theory and its components - strategy and tactics. He objected to the "eternal principle" in military scholarship, arguing that the phenomenon of war was constantly evolving. At the same time, he denied the existence of regularity in military development, and asserted that "war is a field full of contingencies and uncertainties."

Clausewitz was the first in Western military science to explicitly put forward some principles for the implementation of engagements, war situations, and even entire wars: the maximum use of all forces, the concentration of forces as much as possible in the direction of the main attack, the suddenness, rapidity, and resoluteness of military action, and the effective use of the vested results.

Clausewitz revealed the winning role of the mental factor, which was also his major contribution to military theory. According to Clausewitz, the main spiritual forces are: the talent of the commander, the martial virtue of the army, and its national spirit. However, because Clausewitz did not understand the social nature of the war and the decisive role of the people in the course of the war and in the outcome of the war, he exaggerated the role of the commander-in-chief, so he could not recognize the true source of the spiritual factor.

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Later generations held that Clausewitz's view was still a bourgeois middle-of-the-road: a progressive view mixed with reactionary ideas, Prussian nationalism and militarism. The theoretical basis of Clausewitz's views is the idealistic philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel in Germany. Using this idealist philosophical thought as a guideline, he analyzed for the first time in bourgeois military science the interconnection and development of a series of phenomena such as war and military scholarship.

At the same time, later generations have integrated Clausewitz's view of war into six points:

1. War is the continuation of politics.

According to Clausewitz, war is like a chameleon, and each war has its own characteristics, which are ever-changing and different. However, the violentness of war, the probability, and the contingency of war are one of its fundamental attributes. From the perspective of the relationship between war and politics, politics is the mother of war. Under no circumstances should war be seen as something independent, but as an instrument of politics, in the service of politics.

Military views must be subordinated to political views. Any attempt to subordinate political views to military perspectives is wrong. After the outbreak of the war, it was not separated from politics, but it was still the continuation of political exchanges, the realization of political exchanges through another means, the politics of war, and the politics of writing with the sword.

2. The purpose of war is to destroy the enemy.

Clausewitz believed that the political purpose of war is to destroy the enemy, and the destruction of the enemy must be achieved through a decisive battle by force, and it can only be achieved through battle, and it is a superior and more effective means than all other means. The destruction of the enemy involves both material and spiritual forces. Of course, destroying the enemy does not mean being brutal. If you have courage and no strategy, you will not only not be able to destroy the enemy's army, but will make your own army be wiped out by the enemy.

3. The strategy includes five major elements: spiritual, material, mathematical, geographical and statistical.

Spiritual elements refer to spiritual forces and their role in military operations. Material elements refer to the number of troops, their composition, and the proportion of each branch of the army. Mathematical elements refer to the angles of the formation of the battle line, centripetal motion, and centrifugal motion. Geographical elements refer to the influence of terrain such as commanding heights, mountains, rivers, forests, roads, etc. Statistical elements refer to all means of supply, etc. Clausewitz argues that "most of these elements are intricate and tightly intertwined in military operations." "Among them, the spiritual element occupies the first place, influencing all aspects of the war and running through the war. "Material causes and effects are but the hilt of the sword, and spiritual causes and effects are precious metals, the truly sharp blades. ”

Fourth, the basic principles of strategy and tactics.

According to Clausewitz, numerical superiority is the most common winning factor in both strategy and tactics. Although it is usually not possible to create an advantage everywhere in actual combat, it is necessary to create a comparative advantage through the skillful deployment of troops at the point of decision. All military operations must be based on more or less surprise in order to gain superiority, to plunge the enemy into confusion and discouragement, and thus to multiply the impact of victory. The most important and simplest criterion in strategy is to concentrate superior forces. The available forces for a strategic purpose should be used simultaneously, and the more they should be concentrated in one operation and at one time, the better. Battles are the real focus of war, and large-scale battles formed by several battles can effectively destroy the enemy's army and achieve the greatest results, so senior generals should attach importance to this kind of war between the main forces of the two sides and regard it as an important means to defeat the enemy's will to fight.

5. Offense and defense in war.

Clausewitz believed that offense and defense were the two basic forms of warfare in warfare. The two are interrelated and mutually transformative. The whole is defensive, and the part may be offensive. There is a defensive element in the offense, and there is an offensive element in the defense. Offense can be turned into defense, and defense can be turned into offense. Generally speaking, the defense has the advantage of being close to its own troops and supplies and relying on its own people, but its purpose is to passively defend it. The offensive has the active purpose of "occupying" and increasing its own means of warfare by occupying.

Sixth, it is necessary to actively learn from the history of war.

Clausewitz believed that the theory of war is the fruit that grows in the soil of war experience. War history is the best, most authoritative, and most convincing teacher. The formulation of war theories and principles should be carried out on the basis of studying the history of war. Of course, the theory of war must also change with the changes of the times and the armed forces, and must be adapted to the needs of a specific country and have the characteristics of the times.

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In addition to these six points, later generations made a corresponding overall evaluation of Clausewitz:

Clausewitz likened war to a "chameleon" and believed that each period of war was different from previous wars. Its basic color includes three aspects, namely, the violent, probability, and accidental activities of the elements of war, and the subordination of war as a political tool.

These three aspects of war are the starting point for Clausewitz's discussion of the question of war, and they are the basis for him to put forward the forms of "absolute war" and "actual war". The violentness of the elements of war is derived from placing war in the realm of purely conceptual abstractions. He saw war as an expansion of the struggle between two people, and thus war was an act of violence pursued to bring down the other. This is the so-called "absolute war" format. However, in reality, wars are of all kinds, and one of the reasons that hinders the realization of absolute forms of warfare is that the probabilities and contingencies of war are at work. Wars are fought by specific nations, commanders, and people.

There are strong people, there are weak people, there are consistent people, and there are incomplete people. In addition, there are difficulties such as the uncertainty of the situation during the war. Clausewitz called this difficulty of human incompleteness and uncertainty in war "resistance." In the face of resistance, there is ample room for action in terms of certainty and contingency. In a real war, one side of the war can infer the actions of the other side according to the characteristics and conditions of the other side, so as to determine the forces that it needs to use, and it is not necessary to pursue extremes.

Serendipity makes war full of opportunities, luck and misfortune, so war is very much akin to gambling. Another reason why the absolute form of war cannot be realized is that the subordinate nature of war as a political tool is at work. Any war has a political purpose, and if the political purpose pursued is not great, the opponent's resistance will not be too strong, and then the force you need to use will not be too great, and vice versa. Therefore, the political purpose of war is both a measure of the amount of force used and a measure of the intensity of the war. War is violent, and therefore it is necessary to be prepared to shed blood and sacrifice in war, and any benevolent and cowardly view is harmful;

Clausewitz pointed out that war is subordinate to politics and is a tool of politics, so the commander-in-chief should have a political mind, correctly understand the war he is engaged in, and use this tool correctly. Politics is the mother of war. Because of the different motives for waging wars and the different conditions under which they arise, wars are bound to be different. In any case, war should not be seen as a stand-alone thing, but as a political tool.

In using such a tool, it is necessary to understand its characteristics so that the course of the war is in line with the political intent and the political requirements are in line with the means of war. Politics cannot make demands on war that war cannot fulfill. He has repeatedly stressed that war is in the service of politics, that the military point of view must be subordinated to the political point of view, and that any attempt to subordinate the political point of view to the military point of view is absurd. After the outbreak of the war, it was not separated from politics. Political exchanges between governments were not suspended by war, but continued by another means. That is, "war is nothing more than the continuation of politics by another means".

War is, in its main aspect, politics, not the politics of writing diplomatic documents, of course, but the politics of war, the politics of writing with the sword.

Clausewitz believed that in war, it was the fighting that ultimately solved the problem, the bloodshed. The objectives pursued in a war can be varied: to defeat the enemy, to destroy the enemy's army, to occupy the enemy's territory, to invade the enemy's territory, to wait for the enemy's attack, etc. There is only one way to achieve these goals, and that is to fight. The so-called battle is the destruction of the enemy's army. The destruction of the enemy's army refers not only to the destruction of the enemy's material forces, but also to the destruction of the enemy's spiritual forces. Material and spiritual forces influence and complement each other.

The destruction of the enemy's army comes at a great cost and at great risk, but it is worth it because it is of great value. The destruction of the enemy's army and the preservation of oneself are two indispensable aspects of the same purpose. The commander-in-chief can use various methods to exploit the enemy's weaknesses to achieve the goal of making peace and avoid major conflicts and bloodshed, but he must have a sufficient basis and a good grasp of success, and be prepared for battle for this.

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If Zhang Jiashi looked at Clausewitz's theory from the perspective of a controller of the Great Qin Empire, he would have the idea that Clausewitz himself said: "War is a continuation of politics." Such a point of view.

But there is no doubt that Clausewitz's understanding of politics was relatively narrow.

This is likely to have something to do with Clausewitz's position.

After all, it's like a not-so-nice but really reasonable saying, that is, "the ass decides the head", and the same can be applied to Clausewitz.

After all, in terms of experience, although Clausewitz once served as the principal of a military academy, he did not really have any real contact with the handling of state affairs, which is also a fundamental factor limiting Clausewitz's vision. (To be continued.) )

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