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Although "On War" is not in the big picture because of Clausewitz's own experience. Pen %Fun %Pavilion www.biquge.info please search and see the most complete!

But there is no doubt that "On War" itself can be regarded as a summary of Clausewitz's life's experience.

On the other hand, if "On War" can be regarded as a work on tactics, then Mahan's "Theory of Sea Power" is a guide book on strategy.

Of course, on the one hand, "The Theory of Sea Power" is also insufficient, just like its title, "The Theory of Sea Power" rarely systematically describes the strategic system of land and more of a description of the strategic impact of sea power.

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"The main factors influencing the maritime power of a State may be enumerated as follows: geographical location, morphological composition, which includes the natural productivity and climate associated with it, territorial extent, population size, popular characteristics, and governmental characteristics, including state institutions. - Mahan"

This sentence can be said to be one of the essences of "The Theory of Sea Power".

In detail, Mahan explained his own understanding:

From a political and social point of view, the first and most obvious feature of the ocean itself is that it is like a large road, and in better cases, a wide commons, where people can walk in either direction, but on the ground, some of the obvious paths they have traveled indicate that they are compelled to choose certain routes over others. These journeys are called trade routes, and the reasons for determining them are to be found in the history of the world.

Despite the dangers of the ocean, both known and unknown, it is always easier and cheaper to travel and trade by water than by land. The commercial success of the Netherlands depended not only on its maritime navigation, but also on the numerous waterways that made it cheap and easy to access its own hinterland with Germany. The advantages of transport by water over land were even more pronounced during periods of road scarcity and dire conditions, frequent wars, and social unrest, as they had been two hundred years earlier.

Although sea traffic was at risk of bandits, it was still safer and faster than land transportation.

A Dutch writer of that period, in estimating his country's chances of a war with England, noted, among other things, that the British waterways had failed to penetrate the depth of the country, and that, therefore, because of the dilapidated condition of the land routes, goods had to be transported from one part of the kingdom to another, and that they were vulnerable to interception on the way. In the case of purely domestic trade, this danger is now usually gone. In most civilized countries, today, coastal trade is lost or disappeared simply because of inconvenience, although water transport is still cheaper. Nevertheless, as late as the war between the French Republic and the First Reich, those who are familiar with the history of that period and the frivolous naval documents that surround it know how often there are convoys of convoys that smuggle from one point to another along the French coast, despite the fact that the sea is full of British patrol ships and has good inland roads.

However, under contemporary conditions, domestic trade is only one part of the commercial activity of the littoral states. Imports of necessities or luxuries must be brought into their ports, either by their own ships or by foreign ships. When you return, you can load up with the goods you have exchanged with the country, whether they are a gift from the land or the fruit of human hands. The commercial use of national vessels is the desire of every country, so ships in transit must have ports to return safely and must also be protected by the host country for the entire voyage as far as possible.

In times of war, this protection must also be extended through armed shipping. The necessity of a navy, in the narrow sense of the word, derives from the existence of a fleet of peaceful transports, and disappears with it. This, of course, excludes cases in which a country harbors aggressive tendencies---- maintains a navy only as a branch of the military establishment. Since the United States has no aggressive intentions at the moment, and its commercial services no longer exist, the shrinking armed fleet and the general lack of interest in it are a logical corollary.

When, for some reason, maritime trade is once again deemed to have a cost, a shipping interest that has swelled enough to swell up will be revived, prompting a resurgence of the war fleet. When the rivers that cross the Mesoamerican landscape seem to become a reality, it is entirely possible that the impulse of desire will be strong enough to produce the same result. However, it is questionable that since a peaceful, business-loving country is not so far-sighted, and this vision must have sufficient military deployment, especially in such times, how can it be successful?

When a country with unarmed and unarmed ships allows its ships to leave their homeland and sail far away, it soon becomes apparent that the idea that ships depend on peaceful trade, refuge, and supplies is necessary.

Today, strange but friendly ports can be found all over the world, and as long as world peace continues, they will be protected sufficiently.

However, this is not always the case, and peace will not last long, and the United States has benefited greatly from the enduring continuation of peace. In the early days, seafarers sought trade in new and unexplored territories, profited at the risk of loss of life and liberty from doubtful or hostile nations, and were slow to collect profitable cargo.

Thus, intuitively, they often seek one or more stops on the other side of their trade lanes, either by force or by boon. There they can keep themselves or their agents in a state of reasonable security, there their fleets can fall unscathed, and there local profitable products can be collected on a continuous basis, anticipating the arrival of their own fleets and being able to carry them to their home countries. Because of the great profits and risks, in the early voyages, such establishments naturally proliferated and evolved into colonies, and their eventual development and success depended on the policies and talents of the country in which they emerged, and thus formed a large part of the history of the world, and especially of the world's maritime history.

Not all colonies have the simple and natural process of emergence and development described above, and many colonies are more formal and purely political in terms of their conception, formation, and the behavior of the rulers of the people rather than of individual individuals. However, the trade port and its subsequent expansion were initially merely the work of adventurers in search of profit, and in their justification and essence were indistinguishable from deliberately organized and established colonies. In both cases, the native has gained a foothold in foreign soil, finding a new outlet for its exports, a new sphere of its shipping, able to bring more employment to its people, and to its own comfort and wealth.

However, business needs are not met by obtaining security at the other end of the road. The voyage was long and dangerous, and the seas were often filled with enemy trails. At the height of colonization, lawlessness was pervasive across the oceans, and memory of this is now almost gone.

Between the nations of the sea, there are few days of stability and peace.

This sparked a demand for stops along the way, which, like the Cape of Good Hope, St Helen and Mauritius, were originally formed not for trade reasons, but for defense and war. The need to occupy fortresses such as Gibraltar, Malta, Louisbourg ---- ---- located at the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the value of which is primarily strategic, though not entirely. Colonies and colonial fortifications were by their very nature, sometimes commercial and sometimes military, and like New York, the same status was equally important from both points of view, with the exception.

In these three things---- production, which had the necessity of exchanging products, shipping, by which exchange took place, colonies, which facilitated and expanded shipping operations, and protected them through the proliferation of security zones---- were identified as the key to much of history and policy, and of the littoral states, which changed according to the spirit of the times and the character and insight of the rulers. However, the history of littoral countries is not so much due to the ingenuity and foresight of their governments. Rather, it is determined by the status, scope, composition, number, and nature of its people---- whichever appelled, in a word, is determined by the state of nature.

It must be recognized, however, that the actions of individuals, wise or unwise, have had a tremendous deterministic impact on the growth of maritime hegemony in the broad sense of the word, in certain historical periods. This includes not only military power on the seas---- which dominates the seas or parts of them by force---- but also peaceful trade and shipping. Only in this way can a naval fleet be born naturally and healthily, and can it be as stable as Mount Tai.

......

From this part of Mahan's description, it is clear that Mahan is quite respectful of maritime supremacy.

Because Mahan clearly understands that the establishment of maritime hegemony will largely make a country truly powerful. Because the establishment of sea power is, in a certain sense, also a formal determination of a strategic environment with considerable advantages. In this regard, Mahan cites the situation of Britain after it was established to control its sea power:

If a nation is in such a position that it is neither compelled to defend itself on land nor induced to expand its territory by land, then, by virtue of its singularity of purpose facing the sea, it has an advantage over a people whose borders are all continents. In this regard, as a maritime power, Britain has a huge advantage over France and the Netherlands. The latter's forces were initially exhausted by the necessity of maintaining a large army and the costly wars waged to preserve its independence, and France's policies were always inconsistent, sometimes sensible and sometimes stupid, both in terms of its maritime and continental plans. These military campaigns cost the people fat and anointment, but their geographical location can increase wealth if used wisely and consistently.

For its part, geography may reach the point of elevating or dispersing military power at sea. In this respect, the British Isles once again had the advantage over France, whose location, in addition to its proximity to the Atlantic, also extended to the Mediterranean. Despite its strengths, however, in general, it is the crux of the weakness of military forces at sea. It was only after crossing the Strait of Gibraltar that the eastern and western fleets of France could converge, and to do so they had to take frequent risks and often suffer losses. The United States of America's proximity to the two oceans is either a source of great disadvantage or a cause of its excessive spending, if it has a large maritime commercial interest on both sides.

Because of its vast colonial empire, Britain had ceded most of the advantages of amassing a navy on its perimeter coasts, but the sacrifice was a wise one, and the benefits still outweighed the disadvantages. As the state of affairs confirmed, as its colonial system expanded, so did its naval fleet, and its commercial shipping and wealth grew even faster. Also in the American Revolutionary War, and in the war between the French Republic and the Empire, a French writer put it astonishly: "In spite of the rapid rise of the British fleet and the mountains of wealth around it, it nevertheless felt as always the embarrassment of poverty." "Britain was strong enough to sustain its entire population, while the Spanish colonial empire, which was equally vast, suffered humiliation and injury because of its naval inferiority.

A country's geographical location not only helps to concentrate its military forces, but also provides further strategic advantages such as a central location and good bases for conducting hostile military operations against its potential adversaries. The situation in the UK is always in line with this. On the one hand, it faced the Netherlands and the northern powers, and on the other hand, it faced France and the Atlantic. When threatened by the cleverness of France and the maritime powers of the North and Baltic Seas, as it has always done, its fleets cruising in the Strait of Dover and the English Channel, and even not far from Brest, occupy bases in depth, and are thus able to quickly deploy their combined forces against any enemy who is waiting to cross the English Channel, thus affecting its alliance with the allies.

Likewise, on either side of the two sides, the heavens gave it a better harbor and a more suitable shore for safe approach, which had previously been a very serious factor in the passage of the English Channel, but later the improvement of steam and its harbor alleviated this disadvantage which France had once suffered. In the heyday of galleons, the British fleet attacked Brest and established its bases in Torbay and Plymouth. In short, the plan was this: in the event of a strong easterly wind or milder weather conditions, the fleet carrying out the blockade mission would have little difficulty holding its positions. But in the westerly winds, when the conditions were very bad, they turned back to the English port, knowing that it was impossible for the French fleet to come out until the wind turned in its direction, and that they would be able to return themselves to their fortresses by the gale.

The advantage of geographical proximity to the enemy or the target of attack is nowhere more pronounced than in the shape of warfare. It was only recently that this was branded as a business-undermining operation, which the French called "guerrilla operations". This war operation, since it was entirely aimed at peaceful merchant ships, which were usually undefended, required only lightly armed ships. These vessels do not have much strength to defend themselves, so they rely on shelters or support points that are close in front of them. This can be found either in a certain section of the sea under the control of the country's combat vessels, or in friendly ports.

The latter were able to give the most powerful support, since they were always in the same position, and their proximity was more familiar to the attacked merchant fleet than to the attacking enemy. France's proximity to England made it possible to greatly facilitate its guerrilla operations directly against the latter. With ports in the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Atlantic, its cruisers were able to set off from places close to British trading hubs. The proximity of these ports to each other is not so advantageous for a regular combined military operation, but it has an advantage for such unconventional, auxiliary operations, because its essence is to concentrate forces, whereas for the business of sabotage, the dispersion of forces is the law.

The fact that commercial sabotage ships were dispersed and that they were able to discover and capture more prey is illustrated in the history of the fierce French pirates. Their bases and operations are largely in the English Channel and the North Sea, or in distant colonies, where islands such as Guadeloupe and Martinique in the French West Indies provide the same proximity to shelter. The need to replenish coal makes today's cruisers even more dependent on their ports than warships of the old type. In the United States, public opinion has always had a great deal of confidence in trade against adversaries, but it must be remembered that the republic did not have a port very close to the great centers of overseas commerce. As such, its geographical location is particularly unfavorable for a successful commercial raid unless it can find a suitable port with an ally.

In addition to being conducive to attack, if the heavens set up a country in such a way that it could easily enter the high seas themselves, and at the same time control a choke point of world shipping, then it is obvious that the strategic value of its geographical position is very high. Again, and to a large extent, Britain was in the position, and the trade of the Dutch, Swedish, Russian, and Danish trades, as well as those that had been made up the river to the heart of Germany, had to cross the English Channel close to their doorstep, because galleons were always moving close to the English coast. Further, this type of northern trade had a unique effect on maritime supremacy, since, as they are often called, naval storage came largely from the Baltic states. (To be continued.) )

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