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Zhang Jiashi focused on the development of surface troops, and its foundation was mainly based on the shipbuilding industry system of the Great Qin Empire itself. Pen & Fun & Pavilion www.biquge.info please search and see the most complete! update the fastest novel

However, limited by the development level of shipbuilding industry technology of the Great Qin Empire itself, Zhang Jiashi's current naval division troops basically lack the ability to sail.

In addition to the fleet dominated by the Liaodong Naval Division system, which can go to Qin Kaicheng for corresponding material transportation and personnel transfer, the other fleets under Zhang Jiashi are basically "small fleets" with inland river transportation operations as the main body.

And this kind of fleet system, compared with the navy of later generations, is not even in the category of "green water navy".

Of course, in the current naval warfare method of naval warfare, which is more often only a few hundred meters away, and even has to rely on hand-to-hand combat to seize control of the enemy's ships, even if Zhang Jiashi develops an alternative "blue water navy", it is not of much significance.

......

Before the category of the green-water navy, there was also a standard for a "brown-water navy".

The brown water navy refers to the navy that has a certain degree of mid-sea and offshore combat capabilities.

The ability to project troops from long distances is poor, although it can fight hundreds of nautical miles away from land. However, in many cases, it still depends on the cooperation of land-based aircraft and the cover of coastal defense forces. The peculiarity of this kind of fleet is that the farther it is from home, the weaker its combat effectiveness becomes.

In the sea area closest to the land of about 200 nautical miles, the sea water is yellow-brown because of the mud mixed with it, and it is commonly known as "yellow water" or "brown water" by the international maritime community. The "brown water navy" refers to a naval force that mainly operates in the waters of the continental shelf near the coast and relies on the support of mainland bases, and its main task is to defend the security of its own coastline, so it is also called "coastal defense navy" and "coastal defense navy". The "brown water navy" is mainly equipped with land-based weapons and medium and light ships.

The meaning of the green water navy refers to the navy that has a certain ability to fight in the medium and far seas, and at the same time, it also has a certain ability to project troops at a long distance, and can intercept enemy aircraft and fleets at sea.

The characteristics of this kind of fleet are that the farther away from the homeland, the weaker the combat effectiveness is, but within the support range of land-based aviation, the combat effectiveness of the green water navy is much stronger than that of the brown water navy.

The "Brown Water Navy" and the "Green Water Navy" are located within about 200 nautical miles of the closest land, and are yellow-brown due to the mud mixed in the seawater, and are commonly known as "yellow water" or "brown water" by the international maritime community. Stretching from the end of the brown water area to an area of more than several hundred nautical miles, the water is purer than "brown water" and is defined as "green water". The "brown water navy" and the "green water navy" refer to the naval forces that mainly operate in the "brown water" and "green water" and other continental shelf waters close to the coast and rely on the support of mainland bases, and their main task is to defend the security of their own coastlines, so they are also called "coastal defensive navy" and "coastal defensive navy", and the "brown water navy" and "green water navy" are mainly equipped with land-based weapons and light ships.

The deep-sea area outside the green water area, including the exclusive economic zone and the contiguous zone stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the sea water is relatively pure compared to "brown water" and "green water", less affected by land impurities, and the sea water is basically blue or blue-black, so it is called "blue water".

The standard for dividing the combat scope of the navy in the next step is the blue-water navy being the best.

The Blue Navy, also known as the Blue Water Navy, refers to a type of navy that can extend maritime power to the open ocean and deep sea areas and has the ability to conduct expeditionary operations, which first sprouted from the "maritime expeditionary capability" of the British Royal Navy.

The so-called blue water refers to the blue water of the open ocean. The blue-water navy must have the ability to carry out missions in the open ocean for a long time and protect the territorial interests and security of the country and overseas in the wide ocean.

There is a view that the blue-water navy should have the ability to defend against submarine-to-air-to-surface threats, the ability to provide logistics and supply for long distances, and still have combat capabilities in special environments (such as Arctic icebergs). Only a few countries have a substantial blue-water navy, and most are in the stage of converting their green-water navy to a blue-water navy, which affects the coastal SEZs to some extent.

......

Whether it is the division of the operational scope of the blue water navy or the green water navy, in a certain sense, part of the content of the "Theory of Sea Power" is relatively vaguely described:

As far as the formation of maritime supremacy is concerned, it does not refer to the total number of square miles possessed by a country, but to the length of the coast and the characteristics of its ports that must be taken into account.

In this regard, it is said that, in the case of geographical and natural conditions, depending on the size of the population, the length of the coast becomes the crux of the problem of strength or weakness. In this respect, the state is like a castle, and the garrison must be stationed on top of the city.

The most recent examples of similarities can be found in the American Civil War. If the South had been as numerous as its belligerence, with a navy capable of being a maritime power and commensurate with other resources, the sheer size of its coasts and the number of harbors would have been essential factors in making it a great power. The people of the United States and the government at that time should have congratulated themselves on the effectiveness of the blockade of the entire southern coast. It's a remarkable feat, a very remarkable feat. However, if the population of the South were much larger and the whole population was seafarers, this would have been almost impossible.

What is to be shown here, as said, is not how such a blockade can be maintained, but only in the presence of a population that is not only unaccustomed to water, but is also very few. Those who can recall how the blockade was maintained, and who participated in the blockade ship class for most of the war, knew that this plan would work in the specific circumstances of the time, but it would not be possible to carry it out in the face of a real navy.

The ships of the United States, sparsely scattered along the coast and unable to support each other, held their positions alone or in small groups, facing a vast network of inland waterways of communication, a network that greatly facilitated the secret build-up of enemy forces. Behind the first line of water communication are long harbors, dotted with impregnable fortresses on which enemy ships can always retreat to escape pursuit or seek protection. Had a Southern navy been able to take full advantage of these advantages, or the disadvantage of the scattered ships of the United States, the latter would have been unlikely to be as they had been at the time, and would probably have been assembled to support each other, thus opening up many small but beneficial avenues for Southern commerce.

However, in the light of its scope and port, just as the southern coast could have been a source of strength, these features have been the source of many injuries due to strategy and military composition.

The great story of the opening of the Mississippi River is the most powerful illustration of the ongoing action that is taking place throughout the South. At every breach in the sea, warships are marching in, and the rivers that once laden the wealth that supported the trade of the rebel nation are now turning back and watching their enemies approach its heartland. According to more optimistic estimates, in areas where a country could have survived the most exhausting wars, there is a rife of disappointment, insecurity and powerlessness. Maritime power has never played a larger or more decisive role than in such a competition.

This rivalry determines the landscape that the course of world history will take on on the North American continent as one great nation, and not several hostile countries to each other. While there may be a right sense of pride in the glory of the past, and the splendor of the outcome of the overwhelming superiority at sea, Americans who know the truth should be reminded of the overconfidence of their countrymen that not only does the South have no maritime nations, not only is it not a maritime community, but its people are not properly stationed in the coastal areas that should be guarded against.

Judging from the above, Mahan basically saw Britain at that time as a naval power with a blue-water naval combat capability.

It is a pity that the division of these naval combat capabilities did not have a corresponding basis during the Mahan period.

...................................................... Dividing Line................................................

There is an interesting passage in "The Theory of Sea Power", that is, although Mahan did not know much about the situation in East Asia at that time, he believed that this place happened to be a prominent area of the dispute between sea power and land power:

Land and maritime powers target their policies to regions where their political and social prospects are uncertain, and those prospects are determined by the influence they exert on their peoples. These regions include the Chinese Empire in the east, especially the Han region, and the Asian part of Turkey and Persia in the west. The latter two are adjacent to each other, and are divided by a tall but indestructive chain of mountains that stretch southeast from the mountains of Armenia to the Persian Gulf.

Due to the absence of railways, the strip is relatively backward from a modern point of view. Its area ----excluding the Arab region---- is about one million square miles, bordered by the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf to the south, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea to the north, and about 500 miles wide from north to south, equivalent to half the distance between New York and Chicago. The region has great potential for the construction of a railway connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the apex of the Persian Gulf, and another railway passing through Persia to the Indian border. If such a trunk line is put into operation, it will naturally be subsequently expanded.

In these regions, as well as in China, the government and people are equally content with the status quo, not knowing and not expecting development and progress. Therefore, it is very difficult to deal with the problems of these countries, and it is better to wait until the civilized and progressive countries outside really need to deal with them. Now, however, for China, given the realistic awareness of the urgency of the problem and the efforts to gain a territory from China to exert control or influence, it has become very important for its own future.

Whatever influence countries want to achieve, one thing remains the same: they demand some kind of advantage, a real possession of some power and territory. That's the only reason why some native Asians think a powerful country wants some kind of concession. If this motive is strong from both the north and the south, it will clearly influence the behaviour of States. Of course, there is absolutely no need to deprive local people of their rights, which is neither practical nor necessary, and the only reasonable intention should be to induce them to accept a situation that will promote their progress and their interests as well as those of the world at large. Whether this will be achieved is a matter of uncertainty as to whether to gradually take over local rule---- as in India or, as in Egypt, to spur on the government that maintains nominal rule. The answer to it is not so much predetermined as it depends on actual evolution.

Historically, these changes have generally been preceded by private commercial enterprises, and the incompetence of local governments has led to a high number of illegal acts. The latter requires foreign governments to intervene to protect the rights of their citizens, not only in the form of demands on local governments to correct past wrongs and promise never to do them again, but also in the form of guarantees for this, such as being given a degree of local dominion, which will be strengthened by the vigor of the suzerain. This is like if a seed is sown, its germination and growth are determined more by its own conditions than by the soil conditions, and once it takes root, it is not easy to be plucked. It is not local resistance that determines whether a country can dominate a piece of land, but the countervailing effect of countries of its kind.

This is true in India's past history---- when the confrontation between Britain and France, represented by Clevau and Dubre, arose and was in a state of tension, and it is also very much manifested in the present era. In Egypt, the process of countervailing the influence of different countries has just ended, contrary to what was initially estimated. The result is a situation of dominance by one country, as in the case of India. In China, this process has begun and is continuing. However, with a few countries in the race, it remains to be seen whether this situation will be fundamentally reversed by some unexpected events, as was the case in India and Egypt. As for Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia, it should not be assumed that they will always be outside of this process. We do not know why, but it is clear that this process will inevitably begin with the associated consequences, although it is not yet possible to predict when it will begin and what it will be.

Regardless of the specific outcome of such a process. The prevailing situation has amply demonstrated that it is an objective reality. To that end, the present should be studied to give the future more certainty than the past. This study begins with two basic facts that have already been stated: first, that the present struggle is being waged on both flanks of the Asian heartland and will continue as a result of Russian expansion; However, the recognition of the presence of these two main competitors does not mean that the situation is overlooked, namely, that sea and land power are not separate things, but complement each other. That is to say, the land power also needs to advance to the sea to use the sea for its own service, and the sea power must rely on the land and control its inhabitants. However, with regard to the second basic case, there is a notable exception. France, a maritime power in its fundamental interests, became a supporter of Russia in the East, thanks to its formal alliance with Russia. In addition to this, it is a natural interest that determines the inclination of the state, which is a reasonable and long-standing situation. So Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States have the same interests, and this is by no means a temporary situation, because some situations seem to be here to stay.

......

Judging from the above, although Mahan is not very clear about some essential situations, his inferences are not too wrong in fact.

Mahan's understanding of the internal situation in China at that time, that is, the Qing Dynasty, may have been understood only from some relatively outdated sources. And if Mahan knew that the Qing Dynasty at that time was even a country that was difficult to maintain a land power system, I am afraid that the relevant description of the Qing Dynasty would have changed to a great extent. (To be continued.) )

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