How the Four Discussion Heroes Were Smeared, Back to the **** Boss's Summary of Yuan Chonghuan [Blog Post]

In the case that I pointed out through several articles that the **** boss tampered with historical materials and created perjury, the **** boss who loves to "quote scriptures" is very smart to change his combat style. Putting on a hat and not presenting evidence is indeed a good way to deal with perjury when it has been repeatedly exposed. So, since he began to spread rumors out of thin air without presenting evidence, I will use real evidence to debunk his lies. It should be noted that most of the "mistakes" of Yuan Chonghuan summarized by the **** boss here are based on the perjury that has been debunked by me. While repeatedly avoiding my "30 questions" and "13 questions", he went around selling these wrong conclusions based on perjury, which shows that after the **** boss lost the magic weapon of selling perjury, he could only use countless repeated lies to create visual fatigue. It's just that even if a lie is repeated a thousand times, will it become the truth?

His main negative effect was to change the favorable situation outside the customs in 1628, before the Yuan people went out of the customs, Houjin had no food to eat due to famine, so he was so embarrassed that he asked for food from Korea, and begged Wang Zhichen and Mao Wenlong to negotiate were refused, unable to break through the Guanning defense line, and because of Mao Shuai's containment, he could not make a detour to Mongolia, which was very difficult.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. After the Battle of Ding Mao, the materials imported by North Korea into Houjin were "mainly cloth, paper, and leather goods, followed by Korean native products, medicinal materials, and sundries" (excerpted from "A Preliminary Study on Houjin and Korean Trade under the "Brotherly Alliance"", Journal of Shandong University, No. 3, 2003), and the conclusion here is based on the statistics of the "Joseon Injo Record" and the "Seongjeongwon Diary" during the period from 1627 to 1639 in the first year of Tiancong. In the historical records of Joseon, except for the 2,000 stone of grain paid at the Battle of Dingmao, until 1639, all the tribute lists and transaction lists did not include grain.

2. It is certain that the first five letters of "Mao Wenlong's Letter" in "Manchu Old Files" must have been written before Yuan Chonghuan left the customs for the second time, that is, before Yuan Chonghuan left the customs for the second time, Mao Wenlong and Houjin privately negotiated peace.

3. In September of the first year of Chongzhen, the Houjin and Karaqin coalition forces defeated Chahar in the area of Xing'an Mountains, and Mao Wenlong did not contain it at all. At this time, Yuan Chonghuan had just arrived in any month, and the Ningyuan mutiny had just subsided. Mao Wenlong, who should be responsible for containment, did not move, but Zu Dashou won a small victory in Huangniwa. This battle was also the beginning of the Karaqin tribe gradually surrendering to the Later Jin Dynasty from the "flesh side wall" of the Ming Dynasty.

4. The **** boss here uses very clever words, in May 1628, Wang Zhichen abandoned the Jinzhou defense line, so the **** boss said here that Houjin "can't break through the Guanning defense line". But in fact, Houjin did not attack Shanhaiguan Ningyuan, so why can't it be attacked?

But after Lord Yuan left the customs, he not only killed Mao Shuai and destroyed the Dongjiang River, but also privately negotiated peace and sold grain, so that Houjin made a detour to Mongolia safely, so that the "Guanning Defense Line" was scrapped, and there was no peace in the customs from then on.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. Only one person killed Mao Wenlong, not the rest of the Dongjiang River, and the successor of the Dongjiang River designated by Yuan Chonghuan was Chen Jisheng, Mao Wenlong's father-in-law and think tank. Dongjiang Town resisted Jin until seven years after Yuan Chonghuan's death, and only six or seven people escaped, how could it destroy Dongjiang?

2, Yuan Chonghuan in the first year of Chongzhen in July platform play, he said, "Keeping is right, harmony is the side, and the battle is strange", Chongzhen's answer was: "Jiaqi is loyal and long-working, and the battle and defense should be listened to and acted cheaply, and the floating rumors have their own identification, do not look at them" ("Chongzhen Long Edition") "I think about peace is just a technique of bondage, quality is not a long-term strategy, if you need to be strict with the army, otherwise you will fight with him." ("Historical Materials of the Ming and Qing Dynasties", ed. How can we negotiate peace in private?

3. Selling grain is sold to the Mongolian Karaqin Department instead of Houjin, Karaqin is Duoyan Sanwei, also known as Duoyan Thirty-six Families, which means that there are thirty-six tribes, which is not a tribe mentioned by the **** boss at all. In the early years of Chongzhen, Karaqin's position was actually at both ends of the Ming and Qing dynasties. In fact, during the Apocalypse, Karaqin was still a relatively loyal ally of the Ming Dynasty, and after the Ningyuan War, it was these tribes who took the initiative to pursue Nurhachi's defeated army. However, in the autumn and winter of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, the Chahar, the largest tribe in Monan Mongolia (basically present-day Inner Mongolia), fought against the Karaqin and other tribes, and the result was a crushing defeat for the Karaqin. For this situation, the Ming Dynasty, which was too busy to take care of itself, was powerless and unwilling to help, and Karaqin could only turn to the Later Jin for help. From February of the first year of Chongzhen's reign, Karaqin wrote a letter to Huang Taiji asking for help, until September, when the two sides jointly defeated the Chahar tribe entrenched in the old land of Karaqin, Karaqin and Houjin finally began to have common interests. Also in September, Karaqin accepted the reward of the Ming Dynasty, and these Mongolian tribes in the gap between the Ming and Qing dynasties began to live a two-sided life. In the first month of the second year of Chongzhen, Huang Taiji ordered the Mongolian ministries such as Horqin, Ao Han, Naiman, Khalkha and Karaqin to "obey the system of our dynasty" and set the flag, which is also a proof that the **** boss said that "after the surrender of Karaqin, Jin is almost known to passers-by". But in fact, this was a unilateral order of Huang Taiji, and the Mongolian tribes such as Karaqin were actually still in disobedience to the yang and yin, swaying between the Ming and Qing dynasties, and each tribe did its own thing. It is recognized in the historical circles that Karaqin really descended to the Qing Dynasty, which was actually a matter of the eighth year of Chongzhen, and it was not until this year that Karaqin accepted the banner of Houjinding, which was divided into the left wing of Karaqin and the right wing of Karaqin. The first banner lord of the left wing of Karaqin was the chief of Yuan Chonghuan's protagonist in the question of the enemy's capital. That is, in the first month of the second year of Chongzhen, some tribes in Karaqin robbed the border towns of the Ming Dynasty because of famine. In March, Karaqin asked Yuan Chonghuan to sell rice to them to survive the famine, and Chongzhen heard rumors that Karaqin was actually buying rice for Houjin, so he ordered Yuan Chonghuan to stop opening the market. Yuan Chonghuan explained the reason, and Chongzhen replied that he was only allowed to sell grain. The only evidence that can "prove" Yuan Chonghuan's existence of selling rice is the incident of Chen Renxi's envoy to Liaodong recorded in the "Guoyu" and the "Supplement to the Ming History Chronicle". The original text of the matter is:

"Hanlin Academy edited Chen Renxi to Liaodong, did not go out of the capital, reported that 150,000 soldiers from Jianzhou attacked Ningyuan, and arrived at the pass without a horse, asked, said to go to North Korea. When he arrived at Nantaibao, he knew that he would not buy women for the Han Dynasty and build a valley for Jianzhou. Ning Yuan, Wu Jinshi, Wang Zhenyuan, Chen Guowei, and Renxi. Said: The people who don't live outside the customs, the yang enemy inserts the Han, in fact, it is nicknamed, and the state is also married. There were six or seven thousand people stationed outside Ningyuan Pass, and two thousand people were open here. Jianzhou outpost counted more than 400 people in the department of Shu Bu, did not use the bow and arrow, inserted the Han far away in the desert, rushed to help, beheaded and bed, and the enemy atmosphere could be rested. Missing this opportunity, the four khans arrived first in April, and the princes of autumn and winter all entered, and they would give up Liao and attack thistle and Xuanyi. ”

First of all, let's look at the first sentence "Hanlin Academy edited Chen Renxi to make Liaodong, before leaving the capital, reported that 150,000 soldiers from Jianzhou attacked Ningyuan, and arrived at the pass without a horse, and asked, said to go to North Korea." "Judging from this alone, it seems that Yuan Chonghuan lied about the enemy situation in Ningjin, but looking at the historical records during this time, there is no such astonishing news at all. What's more, since the war between the Ming and Qing dynasties, among all the reports in the Ming Dynasty, the most is only 100,000 reported by Li Song during the Battle of Ding Mao. In Yuan Chonghuan's enemy report, there are no more than 60,000. How could a 150,000 come out of nowhere? Therefore, the military intelligence of this 150,000 attack on Ningyuan is most likely due to folk rumors.

Then let's look at the latter sentence, "When I arrived at Nantaibao, I knew that I couldn't buy women for the Han Dynasty, and I built a valley for Jianzhou." The Han is the Chahar, the largest tribe in Southern Mongolia mentioned earlier. Since the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Karaqin and Chahar have been at odds with each other, so how can it be possible to "buy women for the Han Dynasty"? Where did Chen Renxi's information come from? The following explains, "Wang Zhenyuan, a martial artist from Ningyuan, and Chen Guowei have joined Renxi. Said: The people who don't live outside the customs, the yang enemy inserts the Han, in fact, it is nicknamed, and the state is also married. It is really ridiculous to be able to say that the information of "Yang Hatred is inserted into the Han, in fact, it is nicknamed". Later, the rapprochement between Jin and the Mongol tribes was a means for him to win over the tribes, and it did not fully represent a firm alliance between the two tribes. I won't repeat the whole sentence in the following sentence, but the "Jianzhou outpost counts more than 400 people in the ministry of Shu Bu" in this sentence is often intercepted by some people with ulterior motives, so that the Houjin people went directly to Yuan Chonghuan's market to buy rice. In fact, the record here only says that "there are 6,000 or 7,000 people stationed outside Ningyuan Pass, and 2,000 people are stationed at the opening of the market here", while the 400 "Jianzhou outposts" only say that they are in the ministry of Shu Bu, not in the crowd that opened the market.

The later "Insertion Han is far away in the desert, and it is too late to help" is still based on the absurd premise that Shu Bu and Chahar are "actually nicknamed". And the last sentence "Lose this opportunity, the four khans will come first in April, and the princes of autumn and winter will enter, and they will give up Liao and attack thistle and Xuanyi" There is still a lie, and the "four khans" is Huang Taiji, where did Huang Taiji attack Ningyuan in April of the second year of Chongzhen?

Looking at the reports of these two warriors, there are many staggered ones, and the most critical mistake is that they can't even understand the relationship with Chahar. In fact, if you carefully analyze this account, it is not difficult to see that these two confused warriors regarded all the alien races as a group. On the one hand, there is the arbitrariness of "if it is not my race, its heart will be different", and on the other hand, it is the greed to ask "if you are not prepared, you will kill it by covering it at night......

Why did Yuan Chonghuan insist on selling rice? A careful reading of Yuan Chonghuan's recitals shows that the reasons are very clear. If you don't sell rice, Karaqin will definitely completely fall to the back gold, and if you sell rice, you can be a little more enveloped. When the Ming Dynasty was still struggling to deal with a post-Jin capital, did it still have to resolutely push Karaqin to the enemy? "At this time, I have no soldiers and horses, so I can only wrap up the network, and I will repair the Zhou Zhou, and use it by expelling it, if it is not used by me, there is another way to deal with it."

Shu Bu's ministry formed an alliance with the Houjin in August. This result does indicate that Yuan Chonghuan's appeasement policy failed, but it does not mean that Yuan Chonghuan's opening in March was wrong. Because one of them is that this is an effort that should be made to reduce the enemy. Second, Chongzhen had already instructed that there was basically no possibility of a capital enemy in the case of selling grain by ration, unless he would rather starve himself than leave the grain to Houjin, but judging from historical records, it was determined that cooperation with Houjin was a matter of August, and could the rice bought in March still be eaten until August? In fact, at the end of the Ming Dynasty, the annual harvest time in Liaodong was June, and Yuan Chonghuan could only supply the "less than 10,000" population who could not eat the rations in June. The reason why Huang Taiji "discussed the Ming Dynasty" in June and ordered the Mongolian ministries to "pre-harvest wood and build ships for the transfer of wages" was precisely because Houjin had already received the new year's harvest and could have military rations to prepare for military operations.

4. Did Houjin make a safe detour to Mongolia? The fact of the change is that Huang Taiji did not dare to come out of the nest. According to the record of Taizong of the Qing Dynasty, "when the troops were sent out, each Niu recorded 20 or 15 soldiers, destroyed the strong side walls of the Ming Kingdom, and drove straight in." The number of armor soldiers per Niu Lu in Houjin is sixty, so the number of troops with Huang Taiji and the entrance is only less than one-third of the total strength. Why did the Later Jin elite go deep into the operation alone, leaving two-thirds of the troops to watch the family? Of course, it was to defend the Ming army in Liaodong.

On the contrary, when the Manchu Qing Dynasty proved that he already had the strength to tease the entire Ming Dynasty, only the Ningjin Defense Line made him dare not go deep into the Central Plains for too long and too long, because there was always an iron horse that he could not gnaw on threatened his base camp. And when in the seventeenth year of Chongzhen, the last pass of the Ningjin defense line was occupied by the Manchus, there was nothing to stop them from sweeping the entire Central Plains.

Many of his mistakes are irreparable, such as Dongjiang Town, a group of traitors appointed by him who have been traitors for more than 20 years, and after the people who surrendered to Cheng for less than a year held important positions in Dongjiang, these people surrendered to Houjin again, and finally mutiny seized real power, and later there was a rebellion, and actively rebelled, so Dongjiang was paralyzed, not to mention, even Shandong also rebelled, three of the four kings with different surnames in the Manchu Qing Dynasty came from here, and one was Wu Sangui, a subordinate of Lord Yuan.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. After I pointed out countless times that the **** boss deliberately confused the difference between loyalty and traitor of the Liu brothers, he always wanted to beat the Liu brothers as traitors as always. Without it, tampering with this history in order to discredit Yuan Chonghuan.

Liu Xingqi has seven brothers, and he was indeed engaged in Houjin at the beginning, and Liu Xingqi was accepted as a son-in-law by Nurhachi. But in the Chongzhen period, Liu Xingqi fled to the Ming Dynasty, and the rest of the brothers also returned to the Ming Dynasty from Houjin and became Dongjiang generals. It is undeniable that the Liu brothers have been traitors, although the time is not more than 20 years of **** bosses, but about 10 years, but this is also an unchangeable fact. However, what did the Liu brothers do after they returned to the Ming Dynasty? Among the seven brothers, the most famous deeds are Liu Xingqi, Liu Xingji, and Liu Xingzhi, who are ranked second, third, and fifth respectively. After Yuan Chonghuan killed Mao Wenlong on Phi Dao, he reorganized the Dongjiang Army into the Four Associations and appointed Liu Xingqi as the commander of one of them. Soon after, the four associations were changed to the second associations, and Liu Xingqi still served as the leader of one of the associations. It should be pointed out that in the two reorganizations, another Chen Jisheng has always been the co-leader. And until Yuan Chonghuan was imprisoned, the supreme person in charge of Dongjiang was Chen Jisheng, and Liu Xingqi needed to obey his command. And Chen Jisheng's identity is Mao Wenlong's father-in-law and think tank - Yuan Chonghuan was so appointed, obviously for the stability of the Dongjiang army. After Yuan Chonghuan was imprisoned, Sun Chengzong took over the Liao affairs and transferred Liu Xingzhu to Ningyuan, and Liu Xingzhu's position as the assistant leader of Phi Dao was taken over by Liu Xingzhi. After that, Liu Xingqi used his expertise in knowing the command banner in the Later Jin Army to achieve a victory in a small-scale war, which was rewarded by the imperial court. But in the next battle, Liu Xingqi, who took the lead, was hit by mistake and died on the front line of the anti-Qing Dynasty. At this time, Liu Xingzhi in Phi Dao also achieved a winning record. However, at Liu Xingzheng's memorial ceremony, Liu Xingzhi launched a mutiny on the grounds of unfair treatment of Liu Xingqi after his death, and killed Chen Jisheng, the commander-in-chief of Phi Dao, and a group of his subordinate officers. After the mutiny, Sun Chengzong sent Zhou Wenyu, the deputy commander-in-chief, to Phi Dao to negotiate. The result of the negotiations was a compromise with the imperial court, and Liu Xingzhi led the military affairs on Phi Dao. After that, Liu Xingzhi defeated the Qing army in a small battle. But a few months later, Liu Xingzhi rebelled again, this time the purpose was to reduce the Qing, in this rebellion, Liu Xingji, who had just been transferred back to Phi Dao, resolutely opposed it, and was tied up and beaten by Liu Xingzhi. As a result of Liu Xingzhi's second Phi Dao rebellion, the Ming army sent by Lushun was pacified.

Through the above brief description of history, it can be known that although the Liu brothers used to be traitors, after returning to the Ming Dynasty, at least Liu Xingqi and Liu Xingji were always loyal to the Ming family. And Liu Xingzhi did not have the idea of defecting to the enemy before the second rebellion. Before Yuan Chonghuan's death, it was Liu Xingqi and Liu Xingji who were reused, the former was the co-leader of Phi Dao, and the latter was taken by Yuan Chonghuan to accompany the army in Ningyuan. The rest of the Liu brothers, including Liu Xingzhi, were not given any "important positions" at all when Yuan Chonghuan was in charge of Liao. However, the **** boss recklessly told the truth, called the seven Liu brothers traitors, and framed the rebellion of Liu Xingzhi during Sun Chengzong's tenure on Yuan Chonghuan's head, in essence, he still used ordinary people to not know this deed, and wantonly tampered with history to smear Yuan Chonghuan.

2. Let's talk about the "three" of the four kings with different surnames in the Manchu Dynasty. After the Ming army quelled Liu Xingzhi's second rebellion, the imperial court appointed Huang Long, the former commander of Lushun, as the new commander-in-chief of the Dongjiang River. When Huang Long was cleaning up the remnants of the rebellion, he involved Geng Jingzhong (because his brother was involved in the rebellion), so Geng Jingzhong and Kong Youde fled to Denglai Sun Yuanhua. Originally, this matter had passed, but after the outbreak of the Battle of Dalinghe in the fourth year of Chongzhen, Kong Youde was sent to reinforce Ning Jin, but on the way, he mutinied due to lack of pay and robbing the rich. As a result, Kong Youde fought all the way back to Denglai, and Geng Jingzhong also rebelled and merged. Kong Geng's rebellion was defeated by the Liaodong Army transferred by Ning Jin, and the two took the remnants to Houjin by water, but they were brutally robbed and killed by Huanglong and Shang Kexi on the sea route. Two years later, Kong Geng, who had already surrendered, persuaded Shang Kexi to surrender again, and the "Shandong Three Mine Disciples" became traitors. This period of history is clearer than that of the Liu brothers, the rebellion of these three people was completely due to their own reasons, and they had nothing to do with Mao Wenlong, nor did the Ming Dynasty treat them badly. If I have to say it, at most, I can only say that the impact surface of Huanglong may be too big when he cleans up the rebellion. However, it was Sun Yuanhua who recommended Huanglong as the commander-in-chief of the Dongjiang River, and the Jiliao Governor at this time was already Sun Chengzong. In a word, it has nothing to do with Yuan Chonghuan.

3, Wu Sangui, when Yuan Chonghuan died, he was not in the army at all.

The silver he spent smashed into the huge pit of Jinzhou and it was difficult to recover, and it was difficult to give up when Jinzhou was repaired into chicken ribs, and finally the last family of the Ming Dynasty, "eight total soldiers and 130,000 people", was "surrounded and rescued", and these could not be recovered.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. Does Yuan Chonghuan spend a lot of money?

"Chongzhen Long Edition" volume 15: "55,345 soldiers inside the Guan, 78,340 soldiers outside the Guan...... This month and March, the silver is sixty-nine hundred thousand six hundred and sixty-three. This is the calculation of Shanhaiguan Town and Liaodong Town in August of the first year of Chongzhen, in which the soldiers in the Guannei are the Shanhaiguan garrison, and the soldiers outside the Guanhai are the Ningjin garrison. Judging from this record, there were 133,685 soldiers in the two towns, and the salary for three months was 693,600 taels, and the average annual salary per person was 20.75 taels, or 207,500 taels per 10,000 people. At the end of the Ming Dynasty, the amount of military recruitment stipulated was one tael and five cents of silver per month, that is, 18 taels a year. Why is the figure of Guan Ningjun slightly higher? Mao Wenlong's "Five Things of the Unequal" is played, which mentions that Ning Yuan "has a monthly salary of one tael and five cents, Neiding two taels and four cents, and eats five buckets of rice", and "Chongzhen Long Edition" Volume 2. Neiding is a family ding, which is also a kind of military system in the late Ming Dynasty, and the treatment of the pro-soldiers who are about to receive is slightly higher than the average of ordinary soldiers to all soldiers, and the total salary standard naturally reaches 20.75 taels per person. However, at the end of the Ming Dynasty, the country's financial resources were exhausted, and the army was generally in arrears, so the military department gave priority to ensuring Guanning's salaries. Even so, in July of the first year of Chongzhen, Ning Yuan still owed money in April, which led to a mutiny, and in August Yuan Chonghuan took office, quelling the rebellion with his personal prestige.

"The Biography of Yuan Chonghuan in the History of the Ming Dynasty" "Chonghuan was in Liao, and led the teaching, Dashou, and Kegang to set the military system, and gradually reached Denglai, Tianjin, and Dingdongjiang military system, and the four towns had 153,000 soldiers, 81,000 horses, more than 4.8 million years of expenses, and more than 1.2 million old ones. Emperor Awards. "The four million ,800,000 here is the total, including the true color (grain) and the folded color (silver). In Mao Wenlong's Dongjiang Tang Newspaper, it was also mentioned many times that Dongjiang's annual salary was 400,000 yuan, which included 200,000 yuan and 20 folds. As mentioned earlier, the average annual salary of each soldier is about 20 taels, so the annual salary of 153,000 soldiers is about 3 million, and the remaining 1.8 million should be the true color. The 1.8 million stone grain (or 1.8 million true colors) that is often said on the Internet is likely to come from this. This number is actually included in the total of 4.8 million, but it is often pulled out and counted again.

However, the figure of 1.8 million is actually wrong, because this figure is only a hasty calculation of the total of 4.8 million minus 3 million. According to Mao Wenlong's standard for the Guanning Army, the annual salary of 153,000 troops should be 918,000, and if the total annual salary of 153,000 troops with an annual salary of 20.75 taels per capita is accurately calculated, it should be 3.175 million taels. In this way, the total of 4.8 million, in addition to the 4.1 million rated by the 153,000 army, and the figure of 700,000 seems to be multiple.

What kind of money is this 700,000 yuan? In addition to the normal military salaries at the end of the Ming Dynasty, first of all, there was also the reward silver after winning the battle; for example, when Yuan Chonghuan first arrived in Liaodong to take office, Zu Dashou of Jinzhou led the army to fight a small victory in the yellow mud valley, and this is what should be paid to reward merit; secondly, there were special funds for the purchase of military horses and equipment for supervision; in addition, there was also a temporary increase in the internal funds to stimulate morale (the emperor's private money **** was naturally beneficial to morale), as well as the salaries of generals and officials. In Mao Wenlong's Tang Newspaper, you can see that the list of payments received by Dongjiang in the fifth year of the Apocalypse is " In the fifth year of the Apocalypse, Cao Weixin, the preface of Honglu Temple, sent 50,000 taels of silver to the treasury of the household department; the commissioner Wen Tuming and Sun Anguo of 100 households went to the Beijing Treasury to find 10,000 taels of silver, and pulled out 13,3829 coins of silver, and Liao Guanyue went to the Beijing Treasury 8,000 taels of silver; consulted Dengfu to save 8,000 taels of silver; Hao Guoru, a thousand households of Jinwuwei, received 93,977 taels of silver, and first received 6,000 taels of silver from Xu Wuyuan, the capital secretary, who bought silk and cloth and other things in Beijing, and Li Mo, the preface of Honglu Temple, received 50,000 taels of silver from the horses of the Taifu Temple; and the eunuch of the ceremonial eunuchYu Ming, the official of the Jindeng Committee, and others delivered 147,378 stones and four buckets of miscellaneous grain, and 17,894 horses of cloth...... of which "8,000 taels of silver were consulted and decomposed; Hao Guoru, a thousand households of Jinwuwei, received 93,977 taels of silver, and first received 6,022 taels of silver for silk and satin cloth and other goods purchased by Xu Wuyuan, the chief priest of Honglu Temple, and Li Mojie, who borrowed the price of horses from Taifu Temple, and 40,000 taels of silver; These payments are all additional issuances in addition to regular salaries. Dongjiang Town's annual salary is 400,000 yuan, and the additional money received in the five years of the Apocalypse alone is nearly 200,000 yuan, which shows that Yuan Chonghuan's four towns with an annual salary of 4.1 million yuan receive an additional 700,000 yuan a year It is also common sense.

In addition, it should also be noted that in August of the first year of Chongzhen, there were more than 133,000 soldiers in the two towns of Shanhaiguan and Liaodong alone, and after Yuan Chonghuan killed Mao Wenlong in June of the following year, the Dongjiang army was 28,000. If these two figures alone are added up, they already exceed the total of 153,000, could it be that the soldiers stationed in Tianjin and Denglai are negative? In fact, this is because after Yuan Chonghuan took office, in accordance with Chongzhen's will, he carried out the adjustment of the military system in the areas under his jurisdiction. Taking this factor into account, in the first few months of Yuan Chonghuan's tenure, the total number of soldiers who needed to be paid was more than 153,000, so the total amount of food and salary that the four towns were rated to be distributed in this year should also be greater than 4.1 million, that is, the additional amount received was less than 700,000, and this number was even smaller. And in this smaller number, let's count it as 500,000, including various expenses such as buying horses, building cities, supervising equipment, rewarding merits, and salaries of officials and generals. Comparing the 1 million budget required for Wang Zaijin's plan to build a heavy city in Shanhaiguan in the second year of the Apocalypse, it is obvious that Yuan Chonghuan's annual expenses are not too much, so the "History of the Ming Dynasty" records that "more than 1.2 million yuan of old ones have been reduced." Emperor Awards. ”

By the way, to make a slight comparison with another record, in November of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Su Mao, the governor of the Kuraba Household Department, said: "The Beijing army has put more than 300,000 stones, and now the rice in Beijing and Tongercang is 1,269,573 stones. There are 753 craftsmen in the Wensi Academy, which is now supplemented, and there are 3,288 people, and more than 30,000 stones. (Chongzhen Record)

This record states that the Beijing camp pays more than 300,000 stone military salaries every year. Since the unit of "stone" is used here, it is obviously just food, that is, the true color. Perhaps due to the shortage of silver in the household department, the Beijing camp used grain instead of silver to pay military salaries, and Mao Wenlong also said in the Tang Daily that he paid Lushun's military salaries in this way. But in any case, Jingying's annual salary is at least 3 million or more, which seems to be able to be used as circumstantial evidence.

Regarding Yuan Chonghuan's military salary, there is another well-known figure of 1.2 million yuan. After the Ningyuan mutiny on July 25 of the first year of Chongzhen, although Yuan Chonghuan pacified it by himself, Jinzhou also mutinied on the first day of October. Yuan Chonghuan asked the imperial court - owed 740,000 + horse price silver, 40,000 reward silver, plus a total of 1.2 million in August and September, Yuan Chonghuan did invite and asked for "internal money" very abruptly in the eyes of ordinary officials, but the key is that Yuan Chonghuan got 300,000 yuan—— out of the account of Chongzhen's ugly in October of the first year of Chongzhen in volume 14 of "Chongzhen's Long Edition" and volume 89 of "Guoyi", and Chongzhen still said cruel words in volume 1 of "Martial Emperor's Little Knowledge"!

However, there are many people with ulterior motives who confuse "asking for salary" with "getting paid", saying that Yuan Chonghuan received 1.2 million domestic funds in addition to the 4.8 million military salaries - and the real 300,000 domestic funds should be counted in the total of 4.8 million.

2. How was the Battle of Songjin defeated, and what was the reason for the fiasco of Hong Chengchou's 130,000 army?

What are the necessary conditions for encirclement and reinforcement? It is not a geographical requirement but an advantage in combat strength! At the very least, it has a local combat strength advantage over both the encircled "points" and the "reinforcements" to be attacked. Otherwise, we will not be able to enclose the "point" and will not be able to eat the "aid". Of course, in terms of overall combat strength, it is also allowed to be slightly inferior to the strength of "points" and "aids" combined, although this is a bit risky, but it is possible to play the time difference through flexible changes in tactics to achieve local short-term advantages. However, if you want to encircle the side and send reinforcements, if your own strength is weaker than either the "point" or the "reinforcement", this tactic has basically no chance of success - except for the only exception: the use of surprise soldiers.

In the first stage of the Songjin War, Zu Dashou's garrison in Jinzhou was about 30,000, and Dolgon Tuntian Yizhou gradually increased his troops, and finally the total strength increased to 40,000, and Zu Dashou was gradually trapped in Jinzhou. In the second stage, Hong Chengchou rushed to Songshan with an army of 130,000 and dealt with Dolgon with Zu Dashou inside and outside, and the Ming army had an absolute advantage. In more than a month, Hong Chengchou did not completely defeat Dolgon and open the road to Jinzhou, which is really a strange thing. In the third stage, Huang Taiji led an army of 80,000 to the rescue, and the total number of Ming troops was slightly more than that of the Qing army. However, because the Ming army was divided into two parts, for Hong Chengchou's 130,000 troops stationed in Xingshan, it was only comparable to the overall strength of Huang Taiji. Considering that the Ming army was unfavorable in the field, Hong Chengchou defended more cautiously, so that the Qing army Shi Shiran dug three big ditches from Jinzhou to the seaside, cutting off all the Ming army and the rear in Xingshan, Jinzhou. At this time, Huang Taiji made a surprise move: he used Azig to lead a partial division to seize the grain and grass that the Ming army had hoarded in Bijia Mountain. Finally, the Ming army was in turmoil, and Hong Chengchou decided to withdraw the whole army to Ningyuan. However, after the retreat began, the various units of the Ming army did their own thing, and the Ming army, which abandoned the unified command, could only be wantonly slaughtered by the Qing soldiers. The defeat of the Songjin War was decided. From the arrival of Huang Taiji's reinforcements to the defeat of Hong Chengchou, it was only twelve days in total.

From the above analysis, it can be seen that in the first half of the Songjin War, Hong Chengchou had the absolute strength to defeat Dolgon. From the military report of Dolgon at that time recorded in the "Manchu Old Files", we can see how embarrassed Dolgon's resistance was with 40,000 against 160,000. However, the overly conservative Ming army delayed the war until Huang Taiji came to the aid of the whole army. Under the condition that the strength of the two sides is equal, Huang Taiji highlighted the surprise soldiers, completely destroyed the military spirit of the Ming army, and completed the classic example of encirclement and reinforcement. This fiasco has nothing to do with terrain factors. On the contrary, for the Ming army's Cheying and the Manchu cavalry, the mountainous terrain near Jinzhou was actually extremely unfavorable for the cavalry to play and conducive to the defense of the Cheying firearms, which is why Sun Chengzong and Yuan Chonghuan chose to build a city in Jinzhou.

He did not deal with North Korea and the Dongjiang River, not only caused the Dongjiang River to be damaged, North Korea and the Later Jin Dynasty formed an alliance, but also made the Mongolian tribes turn to the Later Jin Dynasty, so that the Ming Dynasty did not have a blockade circle in Liaodong, and after Mao Shuai's death, Jin did not care about detouring through Mongolia to enter the fortress.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. During the Battle of Ding Mao, was Yuan Chonghuan capable of dealing with Korea and the Dongjiang River, and if so, was it possible to change the outcome of the war?

In the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Emperor Taiji sent Amin to lead an army of 30,000 to conquer the court, and by the way, invaded Mao Wenlong. (The figure of 30,000 can be found in the "Records of the Joseon Yi Dynasty.") In the Ming Dynasty, because Mao Wenlong on the front line falsely reported the enemy's situation, there were five or sixty thousand, eighty thousand, and one hundred thousand three theories, but Mao Wenlong's false report of the enemy's situation and lying about his military exploits was commonplace. North Korea, as a personal participant in the war, was beaten by Amin very miserably, of course, there is no need to reduce the number of enemies encountered. Therefore, Amin's conquest of the DPRK may only be less than 30,000, and it can never be more. Since there is no record of the number of troops sent by Ding Mao in the Manchu Qing Dynasty, the number of 30,000 is currently based on the historical circles. At this time, the total strength of Houjin was about 70,000 or 80,000, and the number of troops sent by Ningyuan in the previous year's battle against Nurhachi was 50,000 or 60,000, so Huang Taiji's troops left behind in Shenyang were at least 40,000 or 50,000. Of course, compared with the garrison of the whole clan, Shenyang's defense at this time was of course slightly weaker. However, Yuan Chonghuan was the governor of Liaodong at this time, and he only had 70,000 soldiers in Ningjin under his jurisdiction, and even if he poured out of Shenyang to take Shenyang, he had no chance of winning. What's more, the war in North Korea basically ended after Amin conquered Pyongyang on the 26th of the first month, and Amin's troops stayed in North Korea after that only to intimidate North Korea so that they could gain more benefits when forming an alliance. It was already March when Yuan Chonghuan received the order from North Korea to send troops, and at this time sending troops was no longer helpful to the Korean war, and there was a danger of being flanked by Amin's troops before and after returning to the division at any time. In fact, if the imperial court really made up its mind to mobilize a large army from Jizhen and Shanhaiguan to Jinzhou, and cooperate with the Mongolian Chahar Department to send troops to Shenyang, there would still be a certain threat to Houjin, where nearly half of the army was outside. However, Mao Wenlong's false report made the imperial court misjudge the enemy's situation, thinking that Ning Jin's troops alone were enough to plow the court - in order to shirk his responsibility, Mao Wenlong lied that there were 80,000 troops in the Korean army, and in order to reduce his own crisis as soon as possible, he lied that the remaining troops in Shenyang were less than 10,000 (and in April, he lied that Huang Taiji would send some reinforcements to North Korea). Therefore, what really made this possible opportunity go to waste was the heroic and invincible General Mao in the mouth of the **** boss.

Therefore, first, due to Mao Wenlong's false report, the Ming Dynasty did not equip Yuan Chonghuan with military strength capable of threatening the Later Jin. Second, even if Yuan Chonghuan had attacked Shenyang immediately after receiving the imperial decree in March, Korea and Dongjiang had already been defeated a month earlier, and the only possible result was that Yuan Chonghuan's army had been unable to attack Shenyang for a long time due to Mao Wenlong's false report, so that it was flanked by Amin who had returned to his division, and the whole army was annihilated.

2. Did the Korean fiasco in the Battle of Ding Mao cause the Mongol tribes to turn to Houjin in a chill?

How can there be such a simple matter in state-to-state politics, and if there is no vital interest, how can a major reversal of stance occur? The Karaqin Ministry's gradual turnaround began with the disastrous defeat in the battle with the Chahar Ministry, in the autumn and winter of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, as mentioned in the previous "grain selling" incident.

3. It can also be known from the "Mao Wenlong's Coming Book" included in the "Manchu Old Files" that after the Battle of Ding Mao, Mao Wenlong privately played the peace card, and at both ends of the first rat between the Ming and Qing dynasties, he had no courage and plan to fight against the Houjin. Even when Mao Wenlong occasionally had the courage to fight a war, the Dongjiang was not seen in all the Liaodong wars, such as the Guangning War, the Ningyuan War, and the Ningjin War, so could it be that if Mao Wenlong did not die, he would have been able to perform miraculous feats in the Battle of Jisi? Yuan Chonghuan's killing of Mao Wenlong did not reach the rest of the Dongjiang generals and soldiers, and the strength of the Dongjiang River was not damaged in the slightest. If it is said that Mao Wenlong threatened Houjin during his lifetime, even after his death, this force still exists. Could it be that the Dongjiang force is in the hands of Yuan Chonghuan, and it is better to be in the hands of Mao Wenlong, who is at both ends of the first rat, and the threat is greater? The lone army of the Later Jin elite went deep into the operation, and two-thirds of the troops had to be left to watch the house, of course, to defend the Ming army in Liaodong.

Regarding why Chongzhen killed him, here is also a brief introduction:

Chongzhen convicted Lord Yuan of many crimes, but there was no "collaborator" and "rebellion", Chongzhen kept him for a few months, and killed him because the people were indignant and the national law did not tolerate it. The people's anger was mainly in the Gyeonggi area, because Lord Yuan himself promised to block the Houjin army in Jixi, and he said: "The enemy will not be allowed to cross Jixi", but he commanded blindly, and he didn't know that the Houjin army had passed, and he rushed to Beijing the next day.

Jimen is very dangerous, known as the "key to the east of the country", Lord Yuan does not concentrate his forces here to block, but scatters the gathered forces to various places, and even the detection and defense can not be realized, it is really incompetent......

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. Chongzhen's charge for Yuan Chonghuan did not include collaborating with the enemy or plotting treason, but the punishment used was a standard punishment only for traitors - Ling Chi's punishment, which was only used for disobedience and rebellion?

2. The direct reason for Chongzhen's killing of Yuan Chonghuan was Wen Tiren's insistence, which is clearly recorded in history, Wen Tiren alone represents the people's anger and national law?

3. The phrase "will not let the enemy cross Jixi" was said by Yuan Chonghuan in his recital to Chongzhen after rushing to Jizhou. At this time, Yuan Chonghuan had been temporarily appointed by Chongzhen as the commander-in-chief of the Qinwang army, and asked him to resist the army at the entrance of Huang Taiji so that it could not threaten the Jingshi. How did Huang Taiji get in? The Great Wall defense line laid out by the Ming Dynasty for hundreds of years could not stop the Houjin army, and Yuan Chonghuan, with 50,000 troops (30,000 of which were still weak brigades in Jizhen), was able to temporarily arrange a defense line on the North China Plain that could not be penetrated? But with the national disaster at hand, since Chongzhen has appointed Yuan Chonghuan as the commander-in-chief of the Qinwang army, no matter how impossible the task is, he can only do it with iron heart. Yuan Chonghuan's words "will not let the enemy go beyond Jixi" is this kind of promise that a big husband must do something.

4. After Huang Taiji learned that it was Yuan Chonghuan who was facing him, he changed for the first time the military style of attacking the city and pulling out the fortress all the way since the entrance, and only dared to quietly bypass Yuan Chonghuan's defense line, which is enough to show that Yuan Chonghuan is the only person that Huang Taiji is afraid of. After Yuan Chonghuan learned that the Houjin army was marching by detour, he galloped day and night, arriving first, and set off one day later but arrived in Beijing one day earlier than Houjin.

5. No matter how dangerous Jimen is, it is only equivalent to the rest of the North China Plain, and a natural dangerous place blocked by unfortified fortifications can be more dangerous than the Great Wall at the entrance of Huang Taiji? As soon as the Houjin army entered the Great Wall, it was like a dragon entering the sea in the North China Plain, and even if the Ming army blocked the short area around Jizhou, there was still a broader plain area for the Eight Banners Iron Cavalry to choose the direction of aggression. Could it be that Huang Taiji was not a military beginner who knew how to adapt to the situation, and did not know how to change his march route accordingly according to the deployment of the Ming army? It was simply impossible for the 50,000 Ming troops to successfully intercept the Manchu and Mongolian coalition forces on the North China Plain. After Yuan Chonghuan's death, the Later Jin Dynasty also entered the Central Plains four times, and the Ming army still had no way to take the Qing soldiers who were moving around, which shows that it is completely difficult for a strong man to blame Yuan Chonghuan for dereliction of duty.

6. Accusing Yuan Chonghuan of "scattering the gathered forces to various places" and accusing Yuan Chonghuan of not intercepting the Manchu and Mongolian coalition forces are two fundamental contradictions. The more the defensive line is stretched, the more areas are defended, and of course the greater the possibility of interception. This is the simplest common sense. Chongzhen's accusation of Yuan Chonghuan's "four episodes of reinforcements and dismissal" is not at all an accusation that this kind of action led to the failure of interception - Chongzhen is also much stronger than the **** boss for the military, so he will not say such nonsense - the meaning of Chongzhen's accusation is very simple: Yuan Chonghuan's arrangement reduced the number of troops in Beijing at the first time, so Chongzhen, who was afraid of his own insecurity, was angry with Yuan Chonghuan. But in fact, Beijing was guarded by more than 100,000 Beijing battalions, and there were even more fortified artillery that the Manchu and Mongolian coalition forces could not gnaw at all, while other areas did not have such a strong defense. Therefore, the various Qinwang troops were scattered in various key points of Jizhen, which could not only protect the people in various places, but also intercept the enemy in a wider area.

Yuan Chonghuan's charge of being Ling Chi was recorded in detail in the "Chongzhen Long Edition": "The edict is that Yuan Chonghuan's entrustment is ineffective, he is deceitful and hidden, he steals money with city rice, and beheads the commander with money, and the enemy is driven for a long time, the troops are not fighting, the reinforcements are four episodes, and they are dismissed, and the soldiers are thin under the city, and they sneak into the city with lamas, and insist on entering the city, all kinds of crimes." The official of the Ministry of Punishment and Punishment announced that according to the law, the family members of the family should be beheaded for more than 16 years, and the family members under the age of 15 would be enslaved. Now his wife and concubines, children and brothers of the same birth are 2,000 miles away, and the rest are relieved. ("Chongzhen Long Edition" Volume 37, Chongzhen 3rd Year August Guihai, Wang Jiben)

Among them, everything that was Hou Jin Zhang Luo after Lord Yuan was released from the customs was included, but there were no words such as "collaborating with the enemy" and "plotting rebellion".

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. The entrustment is ineffective, and the deception is hidden. From Yuan Chonghuan's appointment to his imprisonment, Chongzhen's real incident to him was only 16 months, and it was the most ridiculous crime to blame Yuan Chonghuan for failing to achieve his goal in five years of Pingliao. In the change of Jisi, Huang Taiji entered the jurisdiction of Liu Ce, the governor of Jiliao, who passed through the Guannei, and just a month ago, Yuan Chonghuan anticipated the possibility of such a move by the Later Jin, "With the Qing troops wanting to go west, first ask to garrison Ningyuan, and increase the garrison gates. ("Chongzhen Record"). In Yuan Chonghuan's own jurisdiction, he achieved the early warning measures of "please garrison Ningyuan and increase the gates", but in Liu Ce's jurisdiction, "sending the general Xie Shangzheng and others to prepare" was rejected by the friendly Wang Yuanya. A month later, Hou Jin drove straight into the Zunhua section of the Great Wall that Wang Yuanya was in charge of.

2. Theft with city rice. See the previous analysis of Yuan Chonghuan's "selling rice" incident, and after Chongzhen ordered that only the amount of rice and grain should be allowed to be counted, there is no record that Yuan Chonghuan sold more grain to Mongolia against this will.

3. If you seek money, you will be killed. The more than ten letters exchanged between Huang Taiji and Yuan Chonghuan during the negotiation and reconciliation were all included in the "Manchu Old Files", which did not mention the word "beheading" at all. The charge of "beheading the commander by seeking money" is a typical trumped-up. The only "evidence" that the Ming court ever had was that seven people had been arrested in Jinyiwei, and the eunuchs called them the liaison between Yuan Chonghuan and Huang Taiji to negotiate peace privately. However, what is very funny in the world is that these seven people all disappeared the day after they were arrested and put in the Jinyiwei prison, so Qian Jiaxiu said in "White Injustice": "Whew! Where is the brocade? Who is the spy? Who is the spy? Why did the seven people go away? Or did the seven people have wings and could fly up? They always wanted to kill Chonghuan, so they did not hesitate to trap each other. ”

4. The enemy drives for a long time, and the troops do not fight. The entrance to Huang Taiji was invaded from Liu Ce's jurisdiction, and then entered the Manchu and Mongolian coalition forces in the North China Plain, which was difficult to intercept with Yuan Chonghuan's strength at hand, and the Qing soldiers who entered the Central Plains after repeated proof of this. As for the soldiers not fighting, whether it was a three-day defense battle of Jizhou or a more than ten days of defense of Beijing, Yuan Chonghuan with the military strength in his hands, the only correct way was to rely on the city and rely on artillery to hold on. Chongzhen held more than 100,000 Beijing battalions but left them all in Beijing to protect himself, and at the same time asked the Qinwang army of less than 20,000 outside the city to take the initiative to drive away the enemy, which was actually forcing the Qinwang army to a dead end, and the result of the battle of Yongdingmen made the best note for Chongzhen's stupidity.

5. Under the city, he sneaked into the city and insisted on entering the city. The big guy has always used the rules set by Yu Qian when he defended Beijing to conclude that Chongzhen's refusal to let the Liaodong Army enter the city was "in line with the ancestral system". But this ancestral system is a double standard - Mangui's Datong reinforcements were invited into the city by Chongzhen to repair it well. In fact, this article just shows that when Yuan Chonghuan first arrived in Beijing, Chongzhen had already heard rumors and thought that Yuan Chonghuan had a heart of disobedience. The lama is the envoy of Yuan Chonghuan and Huang Taiji who negotiated peace over the years. When most of the Qin Wang's army failed to arrive, it was of course the safest way to delay time by means of peace talks.

In addition, Chongzhen's exhaustive efforts to raise the liao salary and the last main force have been lost, in fact, the "Zhongxing strategy" has lost its last support.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

1. Liao salary is an additional tax that began to increase in the Wanli Dynasty. Originally, it was levied in the name of the Liaodong War, but after the money was actually collected into the national treasury, it was not used entirely for the Liaodong War. Until ten years before Chongzhen, the cost of suppressing peasant uprisings throughout the country came from here. When Yuan Chonghuan took office as the governor of Jiliao, the consumption of Yunnan's Anxuan Rebellion was a large amount, and the rebellion in this southwest region began at the end of Wanli and was not quelled until August of the second year of Chongzhen. In addition, the civil unrest in the northwest has also begun to take shape, and all this money comes from Liao's salary. The difference between Liaodong and Liaodong military is a common sense in the history of the late Ming Dynasty, and I have repeatedly pointed out this to the **** boss. But like other tricks to tamper with history, such a confusing statement, the **** boss will never give up even if he knows his mistakes. And the nature of knowingly and maliciously smearing heroes is ten times worse than unintentional misunderstanding.

2. The last main force of the Ming Dynasty was the thirteenth army killed by Hong Chengchou in the Battle of Songjin in the fourteenth year of Chongzhen, and Yuan Chonghuan had been dead for eleven years at this time.

Moreover, the Ming Dynasty fell in a natural disaster, that is, the Xiaoice period, since 1580 for more than 70 years, this is a global disaster, because sunspots suddenly disappeared for more than 70 years, the entire northern climate is cold, is the coldest in 10,000 years of human beings, it caused a long-term drought in the north, disasters continued, nomads, The fishing and hunting tribes entered the army frequently, and the income of the military towns increased the burden on the imperial court, while the taxes of the Ming Dynasty were concentrated in agriculture, which decreased relatively largely, and due to the border troubles and the consumption of the nine military towns in the north, they finally died of plague and financial bankruptcy.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

The same natural disaster was a disaster for the Ming Dynasty and an opportunity for the Manchu Qing Dynasty. In fact, for the Ming Dynasty, which had a vast territory and abundant fish and rice in the south of the Yangtze River, the so-called Xiaoice River period would certainly have done less damage to him than his opponent. The demise of the Ming Dynasty should not be complained about, but only by the people. It should not be Yuan Chonghuan, the lone pillar of blame, but the accumulation of difficulties in the ruling system at the end of the Ming Dynasty and the mistakes of the three emperors in the last days.

In addition, the excessive resources consumed by Lord Yuan on the "Ningjin Defense Line" not only led to the inability of Jizhen to be strengthened and was broken through by the Houjin, but also led to the inability to distribute the military salaries and food salaries of several other northern military towns, and the victims could not receive timely relief, which led to a combination of homeless people and routs like Li Zicheng, which eventually led to the easy capture of Beijing by the Liukou after suffering from the plague.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

By the end of the Ming Dynasty, the finances had collapsed. The expenses of the Liaodong soldiers are just the salaries they deserve. The additional expenses of the Ningjin defense line are also far less than reasonable. Therefore, Yuan Chonghuan supervised Ji Liao for a year, "reducing the old by more than 1.2 million." Emperor Awards. "If you want to strengthen Jizhen, just repairing the Great Wall for more than 1,000 miles will cost the Chongzhen Dynasty a hundred years of financial revenue. And paying all the soldiers in the country on time and in full is also a huge amount that the emperor and hundreds of officials cannot satisfy without eating or drinking. In such a situation where the total investment is limited, where should resources be allocated first? Of course, the most dangerous place in the country: Liaodong, and of course, the army with the strongest combat effectiveness in the country: the Liao army. After the death of Yuan Chonghuan, the Chongzhen Dynasty survived for more than ten years, and it was this Guanning iron cavalry that blocked the pace of the Manchu invasion and successfully suppressed the peasant uprisings in various places. If the Ming court had not prioritized resources to ensure this army (in fact, it was just basically paying salaries on time and in full), the fall of the Ming Dynasty would have been ten years earlier.

As far as the fall of the Ming Dynasty is concerned, Lord Yuan did not come lightly these times, and it was not a good time, the Xiaoice River period lasted for more than 70 years since 1580, and the Ming Dynasty held out until 1644 with that pitiful finance, and it was almost over, and the disaster gradually disappeared after 1650, so there was the so-called "Kangqian prosperous era" , In fact, it is just the recovery brought about by the gradual decline of the disaster, which is still far from the normal level of the Ming Dynasty, if there is no Yuan Daren's toss, the Ming Dynasty will survive for a few more years, and the national strength will be restored to a considerable level, which is not something that an opponent like Houjin can deal with.

In the years of famine, the population is actually a burden, but in the period when the wind and rain are smooth and the products are abundant, the population is the resource, and the Ming Dynasty just did not survive this node, which is a pity.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

During the so-called Xiaoice period, the Manchu Qing, which was colder than the Ming Dynasty and had less grain income, became stronger in the Vietnam War; the Ming Dynasty, which owned half of the southern granary of the country, was faster and more hopelessly erosive. Is the harsh climate really the root cause of the fall of the Ming Dynasty as the **** boss said?

Before Yuan Chonghuan, successive Liaodong commanders were defeated and retreated, from Fushun, Kaiyuan, Tieling, Liaoyang, Shenyang, Guangning, until Jinzhou, the territory of Liaodong Town was basically lost, and the Ming Dynasty did not have the slightest ability to resist in the face of the Manchu attack. It was Yuan Chonghuan's "cannon with a fortified city" that resisted the Manchu offensive on the frontal battlefield for the first time, and bought precious time for the Ming Dynasty to recuperate and restore its strength. And Yuan Chonghuan has always adhered to the "harmony as the side", which is a necessary supplementary means for this kind of strategic repair. The hero of the continuation of the Ming Dynasty is Yuan Chonghuan!

In years when famine is not war, population is indeed a burden, but in times of famine and war, it is a resource. Moreover, if the theory of the Xiaoice period is true, the extent of the disaster in the Manchu Qing is naturally worse than that of the Ming Dynasty. Natural disasters can never be an excuse for the Ming Dynasty to die in the Qing Dynasty.

Click on the image link: