On January 12, the day after returning to Yan'an, he sent a telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, instructing: It is a serious strategic task for us to hinder and delay the northward advance of the recalcitrant army.

Our Taihang and Hebei-Shandong-Henan districts can gather more than 60,000 main forces, which will be commanded by Liu Jiao personally to deal with the recalcitrant army advancing north on the Pinghan Road, and annihilate one to most of them within the period.

After this telegram came out, ** still felt that the matter was very important, so on January 17, he again called the Jin, Hebei, Luyu and Henan Central Bureau, which was recorded in Jiao Xiaoping, and emphasized: All forces under your leadership, in addition to the all-out operation of Taiyue to fight against Pulu to strive for the victory it deserves, must gather all the efforts of Taihang and Jiluyu to win the victory of the Pinghan Campaign, and the upcoming new Pinghan Campaign is to oppose the offensive of the main forces of the Kuomintang and strive for the realization of a peaceful situation. The outcome of this battle has an extremely important bearing on the overall situation. "......, I hope to use the experience of the Shangdang campaign to mobilize Taihang,

The main forces of the Hebei, Shandong, and Henan regions were commanded by Liu Bocheng and Jiao Xiaoping, and the various battles were precisely organized.

Won the second battle of Shangdang.

According to the first telegram, Liu Jiao gathered 3 main columns and 3 armies, a total of 60,000 people, and mobilized 10,000 militia to cooperate with the battle. Liu Jiao was determined to annihilate the Kuomintang army in the Ziyang Hetao area south of Handan and north of the Zhanghe River, and never let Chiang's army occupy Handan, let alone let them do anything on the land of North China.

Handan is an important town on Pinghan Road. Now it is the government of the Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan Liberated Areas.

Chiang Kai-shek wanted to open up the Pinghan Road, divide the liberated areas, and pick this one in North China, and the "peach" Handan Zheng ben became the first offensive target of the Kuomintang army.

Liu Bocheng adopted the tactic of waiting for work with deep enemies. He first commanded the troops of the first column and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, and with the cooperation of the militia, the enemy entered the preset battlefield south of Handan.

When the three armies of the Kuomintang army entered between Matou Town and Cixian south of Handan, "Liu Bocheng immediately ordered the 2nd and 3rd columns ambushed in the area and southern Hebei. The troops of the Taihang Military Region, together with the first column and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Army and their troops, surrounded its three regiments.

Chiang Kai-shek, who was in command of Chongqing, saw that the situation was not good, and immediately ordered the 16th Army stationed in Shijiazhuang and the 32nd Army stationed in Anyang to advance north and south to reinforce the three encircled armies.

In order to deal with Chiang's reinforcements, Liu Bocheng immediately transferred the troops of the Taihang Military Region to cooperate with the Jin-Cha-Ji troops to block the reinforcements in Gaoyi, and at the same time strengthened the defense of the blocking position on the Barrier River, and attacked and harassed Chiang's army south of Anyang to stop the movement of the enemy's 32nd Army.

On the 28th, the general offensive began. In order to resolve the battle as soon as possible, Liu Jiao stepped up his efforts to win the uprising of Gao Shuxun, commander of the Kuomintang 11th Theater and commander of the New 8th Army. At the same time, the chief of staff, Li Da, was also sent to the New 8th Army to urge an uprising. Gao Shuxun and the New 8th Army originally belonged to the Northwest Army, not Chiang Kai-shek's descendants. There were very sharp contradictions with the Chiang Kai-shek clique, and Wang Dingnan and others were sent to work in the high department. Because Chiang Kai-shek has never changed the policy of discriminating against the sidelines, and forced him to go to the front line of the civil war to serve as cannon fodder in the civil war, Gao was very dissatisfied with this, and before he was ordered to march north, Gao Shuxun sent Wang Dingnan to get in touch with the ** side. Liu Jiao then decided to mobilize the ministry to stage a battlefield uprising. In order to dispel Gao Shuxun's concerns, the central government also sent a telegram to Zhang Aiping, commander of the 4th Division of the New Fourth Army, to Xuzhou to successfully pick up Gao Shuxun's wife and the families of other rebel officers.

On January 3o, "Gao Shuxun led the New 8th Army and 10,000 people of the Hebei People's Army to officially announce the battlefield uprising. This played an extremely important role in the victory of the entire Pinghan Campaign, which made Chiang's army shake. The 5th and 3rd Armies of the 4O Army, which had been resisting stubbornly, completely lost the confidence to hold on, that is, to break through and flee south.

However, how did Liu Bocheng know that Ma Fawu and other actions had long been expected by him, and he had already arranged a net composed of the 1st and 2nd columns of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region to wait for Ma Fa 5 and other troops to break through again.

After two days and two nights of fighting, more than 20,000 people of the Kuomintang Ao and 3O armies who fled south, except for a few who escaped, were all annihilated in Linzhang. Magnetic county between the area. Ma Fawu himself was also captured alive" and thus the Battle of Handan ended. In this battle, Chiang Kai-shek lost more than 30,000 troops and a large number of American-style equipment.

When the news reached Chongqing, "the Kuomintang camp caused a great shock, and its internal dissatisfaction with Chiang's civil war policy was even more dissatisfied, and they strongly demanded that Chiang Kai-shek earnestly negotiate an armistice, while some Kuomintang diehards complained about the heavens and people, and it was difficult to swallow this breath, and they were helpless. In short, it was a loss of soldiers, and I did it again, "Huangliang dream".

After the Pinghan Campaign, Chiang Kai-shek did not learn any lessons, and it was impossible to change the course of the civil war. He accelerated the deployment of troops, continued to seize strategic points, and tried in vain to regain the gains from the people.

On 8 July, Chiang Kai-shek summoned commanders, deputy commanders, commanders-in-chief and other senior generals of all theaters of the country to Chongqing to hold a secret military meeting after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan. At this meeting, Chiang Kai-shek determined the guiding principle of "suppressing the Communists first" and put forward a military plan of "defeating the main forces of the Communist Army within a few months, and then dividing the military plan to "eliminate them." This plan stipulates: the first step is to control northern Jiangsu and northern Anhui, clear Shandong, and open up the Jinpu line: the second step is to gather heavy troops in Pingjin, "Shudang," North China: the third step, to open up the Pingsui line and occupy Chasui. An attempt to solve the country's main post-war problems by force.

The sabotage war on the railway communication line is one of the most effective tactics to resist the Chiang army's victory in the War of Resistance. And created conditions for the fight for the Northeast and Recha. As early as September 22, 1945, the Kuomintang troops marched north along the Tongpu, Pinghan, and Jinpu railways, and eastward along the Pingsui railway, pointing to Zhangjiakou, Pingjin, and Jinan, respectively, in an attempt to control Recha and the northeast. In order to delay the offensive of the Kuomintang army from the 6th Route to the northeast, ** drafted a letter to Liu Bocheng for the Central Military Commission. Suburb Xiaoping. The telegram of instructions from Nie Rongzhen and others proposed to do everything possible to delay the Kuomintang troops for more than two months in order to win victories in Northeast China and Recha.

The telegram said: It is proposed to adopt the following tactics: the main forces of Shandong and the New Fourth Army should deal with the stubborn ones heading north along the Jinpu Road, the main forces of Hebei, Luzhou, and Henan and the first part of Daxing should be used to deal with the Beilianzhong who was heading north along the Pinghan Road, and the main forces of Taihang and Taiyue and the six divisions of Zhao Er should be used to deal with Hu Zongnan, who was advancing north along the Tongpu and Zhengtai roads, and that the main forces of each road should have 30,000 to 50,000 men each, and that effective field command and political organs should be organized (preferably Bocheng commanded Tongpu Road, and Li Da commanded Pinghan Road), and that the local armed forces and militia "should use the tactics of entanglement and scuffle, in front of and behind the recalcitrant army, I fought with the recalcitrant army until Pingjin, and finally cooperated with the troops under my control in eastern Hebei to fight a decisive battle in Yidong to ensure my safety in the northeast and Recha provinces. In order to realize the above-mentioned tactics, it is necessary to use our small units and militia to regularly harass the main forces of the recalcitrant army and completely destroy the railways and highways, plant a large number of mines and bombs, organize the masses to clear the walls, and exhaust the recalcitrant army for a long time, while our main force peeps into the weak points of the recalcitrant army, and violently attack at its weak points, destroy its vital forces, or let us control a section of the railway, and completely prevent its northward advance or continue to entangle and scuffle with it. With the above-mentioned tactics, if the Japanese army does not cooperate with the recalcitrant army to attack us on a large scale, it will not be easy for us to fall into passivity, and the recalcitrant army will be in a passive position for a long time. My fatigue consumption is easy to recover and replenish, while the recalcitrant army is cut off by the back road, and the fatigue consumption is not easy to compensate: if the recalcitrant army is forced out and fights me, it will also be beneficial to me. In this kind of operation, our field army can also be formed and tempered, and military and political training can also be strengthened in combat.

On January 2, when the Shangdang Campaign, which smashed the offensive of the Yanxi Mountain Department in Shanxi, was about to end, the main force of Liu Jiao in the Shanxi, Hebei, Shanxi, and Henan base areas was about to end in the next operational direction, he further pointed out: "At present, the war in the liberated areas has basically become a major transportation route, and there are not many strongholds in the deep liberated areas, and the stubborn enemy must open up the railway. Therefore, I should assemble all my troops in the liberated areas to the main communication routes in a planned manner to carry out a traffic sabotage war, and thus form my troops. ”

The above arrangements of the central government effectively delayed the deployment of the Kuomintang army to the north. river

On the 1st of the month, the central government sent a telegram to the Chongqing delegation, saying, "All major railways have been cut off, and all units of Chiang's army are not allowed to enter. Pingsui Road, my Nie He's army has occupied most of it, and it is surrounded by Guisui: the southern section of Tongpu was cut off by my Chen Liao. "The southern aid of the Li army in Shijiazhuang is in a dilemma, and it cannot go to Beiping for a while: the southern, and northern sections of the Jinpu Road have all been cut off by me, and Huo Shouyi, Chen Daqing and other troops are not allowed to enter, so those who go to the northeast have no other way but sea and air transportation." This has bought valuable time for the development of opportunities in the Northeast.

The Tianjin-Pudong Railway was the only way for the Kuomintang army to advance to the liberated areas and quickly control the strategic points and communication lines in North China, so as to quickly open the passage into the northeast and seize the northeast. In this regard, Chiang Kai-shek moved faster than **. After its 12th Army and 2nd Cavalry Army arrived in Xuzhou from the Henan-Anhui border in January of the same year, they took the main force of our Eighth Route Army's Shandong Military Region to the northeast and the New Fourth Army's Lu troops had not yet arrived, and marched north along the Jinpu Road and occupied Jinan on the day of Sichuan in November. In addition, the 97th Army of the Kuomintang Army advanced to Lincheng: the 51st, 59th, and 7th, armies and the new 6th Route adapted from the puppet army Hao Pengju's department, from Xuzhou to occupy the line from Hanzhuang to Taierzhuang. The 7th and 48th armies entered from Anhui to occupy Bengbu and Chuxian. Pukou, control the Pubang section of the Jinpu Road, Diao Chiang Kai-shek's Third Front Army, Tang Enbo, and Gu Zhutong's troops of the 3rd Theater also attempted to first control Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and the southern section of the Jinpu Road, and then use Xuzhou as the forward base to continue to expand the Jinpu Line in order to advance to Tianjin, Beiping, and the northeast.

**『〗The central army was to break Chiang Kai-shek's plan to open up the quiet road to Tianjin.

On 12 January, he sent a telegram to Chen Yi, commander of the New Fourth Army, and Luo Ronghuan, commander and political commissar of the Shandong Military Region, pointing out: At present, the task of Shandong and China, in addition to sending troops to the northeast, is to cut off the Jinpu Road, prevent the recalcitrant army from going north, and strive to eliminate one or most of the recalcitrant army going north. To this end, it was necessary to immediately organize a powerful assault force, which should be placed in a suitable position north of Xuzhou and south of Jinan, to control a section of the railway, and to create a battlefield for striking at the recalcitrant army heading north.

In addition, the Central Military Commission also demanded that the main forces of the New Fourth Army move north to Shandong and some of the main forces of the former Shandong Military Region should be quickly formed into a field army on the Jinpu front line and organize a campaign between Xuzhou and Jinan to control the Jinpu Railway and prevent the Kuomintang army from attacking north.

In the meantime, the central government decided that the military headquarters of the China Bureau and the New Fourth Army would move north to Shandong. The China Bureau and the Shandong Branch were merged into the East China Bureau, which led the overall work of China and Shandong. Chen Yi, commander of the New Fourth Army, concurrently serves as commander of the Shandong Military Region, and Rao Shushi serves as political commissar of the New Fourth Army and Shandong Military Region. After the Hua Bureau and the military headquarters of the New Fourth Army were moved north, Hua organized another Hua sub-bureau and came under the leadership of the East China Bureau: At the same time, the Hua Military Region was established, which was subordinate to the New Fourth Army system, with Zhang Dingcheng as commander, Jiao Zihui as political commissar Su Yu, Zhang Aiping as commander of Du, Tan Zhenlin as political commissar and director of the Political Department of Lei, and Liu Xiansheng as chief of staff, under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union and Huainan Military Region, two independent brigades, and eight military subdivisions.

On the 1O day of Sichuan, the Huaye Army was formed, with Su Yu as commander, Tan Zhenlin as political commissar, Liu Xiansheng as chief of staff, and Zhong Qiguang as director of the Political Department, with a total of more than 40,000 people in the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 1st columns.

At the same time, the Jinpu Frontline Field Army Headquarters was formed in Zengnan, with Chen Yi and Li Yu, the political commissar of the Shandong Military Region, in charge of unified command of part of the main forces left behind by the former Shandong Military Region and the Lu troops of the New Fourth Army. The 3rd and 4th Garrison Brigades of the Shandong Military Region attacked and annihilated the enemy in Tai'an and Gunzhou: the 8th Division of the Shandong Military Region and the 8th Brigade of the Lunan Garrison attacked and annihilated the enemy in Buxian and Lincheng, and cut off the railway: The 9th Brigade of the Lunan Garrison and the local armed forces of the Lunan Military Region were used to attack and destroy the enemy in Xuzhou and Lincheng. In the Zaozhuang area, the Kuomintang army was clamped down on the northward advance. In order to join forces with the troops of the Shandong Military Region to meet and annihilate the enemy who continued to invade north from Xuzhou and to smash the attempt of the Jiang army to open up the Jinpu Road, the 4th and 3rd Brigades of the 2nd Division of the New Fourth Army and the 9th Brigade of the 4th Division were also organized into the 2nd Column of the New Fourth Army.

The campaign began on January 18, and by the beginning of the month of Sichuan, the troops of the New Fourth Army and the Shandong Military Region successively captured Buxian and Dahankou, annihilated the three divisions of the 1st Army of the Wuhua Division, which had been reorganized by the puppet army, by ambush means at Jiehe, controlled a section of the railway between Gunzhou and Tengxian, and cut off the passage for the Kuomintang army to advance north. In late January, the main force of the field army on the Jinpu front moved south to Hanzhuang and Knee County to expand the offensive and annihilate the Japanese puppet army 4oo. More than one person. From December 12 to 15, more than 9ooo people of the 19th Group Army of Chiang's army were annihilated. On January 7, 1946, the Jinpu Front Field Army was renamed the Shandong Field Army, and with the cooperation of the First Division of the Chinese Field Army, the Kuomintang troops advancing north on the Taierzhuang, Zaozhuang, Lincheng Line and Jinpu Road section launched an attack and political struggle, causing Hao Pengju to raise more than 10,000 people to revolt and reorganize it into the Chinese People's Main Coalition Army.

In the battle, the troops of the New Fourth Army and the Shandong Military Region suffered 6oo casualties

o At the cost of people, more than 28,000 Kuomintang military revolutionaries were annihilated, and the Jinpu Tieluo Line was controlled for 2oo

more than one kilometer.

According to the telegram, Zhou and Wang later discussed with the Kuomintang and instructed the work of the Southern Bureau to shift the focus of their work to expose Chiang Kai-shek's fake peace and real civil war, and successively invited Huang Yanpei and Zhang Lan, the leaders of the main party of the People's Republic of China. Shen Junru, Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji and others had a discussion and sued the Kuomintang for the civil war plot.

On the 15th, representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party held meetings one after another. The focus of the two talks was on the Northeast issue. It was also at the time of the talks between the two sides that the Kuomintang, after the "diplomatic reception" in the northeast was frustrated, decided to carry it out, and the civil war in the northeast of the "armed reception" broke out. At the talks, the Kuomintang representatives insisted that Chiang's army enter the northeast and forcibly receive it. **It is hoped that the Northeast can become the main experimental area of the People's Republic of China through peaceful consultations. However. The views of the two parties are very different, and on the issue of the northeast, as on other major issues, the two sides cannot talk about each other at all. During the talks, the Kuomintang representatives asked US Ambassador to China Hurley to mediate the conflict between the two sides. But ** had long been disappointed in Hurley, thinking that "this man is too unfair". And Hurley himself lost the trust of the U.S. government in him, and at the end of the month, he was finally fired by the White House.

On the 25th of Sichuan, Zhou Enlai returned to Yan'an by plane and reported to the central government.

With the return of the negotiator Zhou Enlai, another round of negotiations came to an end after the signing of the "80 Double 10 Agreement".

On the surface, the reason why no progress has been made in the more than a month of negotiations seems to be due to the fact that both sides are trying to create conditions for gaining superiority on the battlefield, but in essence, the fundamental reason is the refusal of the Kuomintang side to unconditional armistice. Because all the issues in dispute were caused by the Kuomintang army's attack on the liberated areas of North China. It was precisely because of the KMT's insistence on marching in an attempt to monopolize the right to surrender that it ultimately led to the failure of the negotiations at this stage. As the central government revealed in a telegram to Zhou Enlai at that time1ù: "In the negotiations before tears, the other side was all a delaying tactic, and there was no sincerity to solve the problem, and all the arrangements of the other side were to eliminate our party."

"Since the Kuomintang side lacks sincerity, it is reasonable that the two sides of the negotiations will eventually break up unhappily.

One thing must be clear. Although the negotiations failed at this stage and the crisis of the civil war became more serious, Zhou Enlai's analysis of the situation at that time was calm and objective."

Its belief in opposing civil war and seeking peace remains firm. After returning to Yan'an, he wrote a written report entitled "On the Negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party" for the central leaders to circulate, saying that since the departure of the Kuomintang from Chongqing, the Kuomintang has gone from peace to war, and the negotiations have reached a stalemate, but there have been ups and downs. On the whole, Chiang Kai-shek was vacillating, and now it is impossible for him to abandon the idea of ** and the attempt to destroy the first and automatically achieve close cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party: but at present he has to make up his mind to crusade, and would rather engage in a long-term civil war than hesitate, which is also impossible" because peace is, "the trend of the times, the will of the people" Although Chiang Kai-shek is shaken, he cannot completely go against it. Therefore, ""Fighting and talking at the same time will become a characteristic of the KMT-CPC relations for a considerable period of time. "The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are in harmony for a while, and war is brewing in peace, and peace is brewing in war, and the struggle will be serious and complicated. To this end, we should follow the basic principle of opposing civil war, fighting for the sovereignty of the people, and seeking peace, practice the principle of political offensive and military self-defense, and set the minutes of the Double 10 Talks as the basic price for our side's proposals. "Peace is a spear, and resistance is a shield. The war and the encounter of resistance, so that they will retreat in the face of difficulties" and "strive for the arrival of the peace phase". Practice has proved that Zhou Enlai's estimation and the negotiation policy he put forward are completely correct.

"To whom should the fruits of the victory of the War of Resistance belong?" This is very clear. For example, if a peach tree bears peaches, the peach is the fruit of victory. Who should pick the peaches? It is necessary to ask who planted the peaches and who carried the water to water them. ”

This passage was made at the Yan'an cadre meeting on the fourth day after the surrender of Japan. This passage of his "vividly reveals the basic reasons for the birth of the civil war in the early days of the victory of the Anti-Japanese War."

At this time, from the battle on the Taihang Mountain to the firefight on the Pinghan Road, as well as the battle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in Suiyuan and Chahar, and even the struggle in the whole of China and North China, its origin came from this.

In this way, less than three months after the signing of the Double Tenth Agreement, the civil war was in fact going on, and the fact of the civil war already objectively existed. However, the difference is that the civil war at this time has not yet become a national affair, and it is still limited to a certain range, and it is closely centered on peace talks. Neither the KMT nor the CCP has stopped the peace talks. Chiang Kai-shek believed that he had no intention of abandoning a political settlement: he also said that he would continue to fight the Kuomintang at the negotiating table and force Chiang Kai-shek to finally stop the war. In short, in the final analysis, in everything during this period, "war" is for the sake of the son, and "talking" is to increase the bargaining chips for the negotiation.

**After returning to Yan'an from Chongqing. Zhou Enlai, the chief negotiator of the country, remained in Chongqing to preside over the peace talks.

Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei, who accompanied ** back to Yan'an and then returned to Chongqing, were tasked with continuing to negotiate with the Kuomintang representatives to resolve the problems that were not resolved in the "Double Tenth Agreement."

On January 2o, the second round of negotiations in Chongqing officially began, and the location was No. 1O3, De'anli, Silu Silu, one of Soong Meiling's residences in the city. The representatives who participated in the talks, the first side was Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei: only Zhang Qun was left on the Kuomintang side. Wang Shijie, Shao Lizi 3

Person. Zhang Zhi did not participate and went to deal with the "Yining incident" in Xinjiang in September.

Article 2 of the Double Tenth Agreement stipulates: "On the question of the road to political 'democratization', it is unanimously agreed that the political discipline should be quickly concluded, the constitutional government should be implemented, and the necessary steps should be taken first, and the National Government should convene a political consultative conference to invite representatives of various political parties and social elites to consult with the state to discuss the plan for peaceful nation-building and the convening of the National Assembly." At present, the two sides are discussing with all parties on the terms of the number of members of the CPPCC, its organization, and its functions and powers, and the two sides have agreed that the CPPCC conference should be convened as soon as the talks are completed. Therefore, on the issue of the CPPCC, the basic principles have been determined, and the number of people attending the CPPCC session has been agreed upon, tentatively at 37. What needs to be further discussed now is mainly the allocation of quotas, organization and powers. As a result of the consultations, agreement was reached on most of the issues. The two sides unanimously agreed that the number of CPPCC deputies will be 36 and will be composed of four parties. Namely: 9 people from the Kuomintang side, 9 people from the ** side: 9 people from the Democratic League: 9 people from non-party social elites.

However, on the eve of the opening of the CPPCC, Chiang Kai-shek went back on his word and set off quite a storm on the issue of the number of deputies.

It turned out that on the eve of the opening of the CPPCC, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly thought of a problem, the relationship between the Democratic League and ** is particularly good, and it may completely fall to the side of ** at the CPPCC meeting. In addition, the non-partisan social elites, although Chiang Kai-shek could pull over some deputies, could not completely control them.

In this way, "it is impossible to be isolated, and the Kuomintang may be isolated."

As a result, Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers decided to make up their minds about the number of delegates to the NLD.

The "Democratic League" is the main league of the people of the country, and its predecessor was the Comrades Association for the Founding of the People's Republic of China. 1941 3

In the month, the various parties that resisted the oppression of the Kuomintang and sought common existence were secretly established on the basis of the Unified Founding Comrades Association, which was then named the "Nationalist and People's Political League". There are three main parties and three factions participating in the alliance, namely, the Youth Party, the National Socialist Party, the Third Party, the National Salvation Association, the Vocational Education Party, and the Rural Construction Party.

However, since the three parties and three factions did not collectively join the League in the name of their parties, and their leaders and members all voluntarily fulfilled the formalities of the People's League in their personal names before becoming members, the original parties and factions were still independent, and the resolutions and actions of the League were not legally or practically binding on the parties. In addition, when the People's Political League was established, Huang Yanpei, Zhang Junli, Liang Shuyan, Zhang Bojun, and Zuo Shunsheng were elected as members of the Standing Committee of the League, Huang Yanpei was the director of the Standing Committee, and Zuo Shunsheng was the secretary general. From the very beginning, the NLD was a patriotic "democratic" party representing the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and their intellectuals. Although many leading members of the Democratic League advocate taking the road of interstitialism and developing capitalism, and have differences with their political views, the Democratic League's insistence on resisting Japan, demanding the "people" and opposing the one-party dictatorship is completely consistent with the "Democratic League". Therefore, the NLD has established a good relationship with **.

Chiang Kai-shek was concerned about this situation. Therefore, in order to find ways to split the NLD, it is necessary to make a chapter on the quota of CPPCC deputies to the NLD.

One day in December 1945, Zhang Qun and Wu Tiecheng invited some members of the Standing Committee of the Democratic League to hold a forum, and Zuo Shunsheng, the leader of the Youth Party who was instigated by the Kuomintang, arrogantly proposed to occupy five seats for the CPPCC, causing the forum to break up unhappily.

Chiang Kai-shek was determined to bring the Al-Shabaab into the CPPCC as an independent unit" and occupied five seats.

** At first, he supported the NLD and opposed Chiang Kai-shek's recognition of Al-Shabaab as an independent unit in the CPPCC.

Later, with the consent of the Central Committee, Zhou Enlai adopted a flexible policy and proposed that the Democratic League should continue to maintain a quota and that the Youth Party could be formed into another unit and retain 5 quotas. The total number of delegates increased from 36 to 38. The above problem is solved. The birth and settlement of this storm shows that the Kuomintang has sinister intentions, while ** takes the overall situation into account. On the surface, it seems that the KMT won five seats for Al-Shabaab, but their ruse to divide relations with the NLD and eventually isolate them has been shattered. However, it should be noted that this wind was born later.

At the talks on January 2o, the issue of the CPPCC went relatively smoothly. On the 21st, the two sides continued negotiations. In addition to continuing to discuss the issue of the CPPCC, the two sides also talked about the cessation of the army's advance, the resumption of communications, the convening of a national convention, and the recognition of the liberated areas. For these thorny issues, the two sides will speak on your behalf and I will talk about mine. As a result, at the end of the day, no problems were solved. Negotiations could once again stall.

Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei immediately telegraphed the situation to Yan'an. On January 22, **『〗 Yang and ** called back. ** Instructions say: In negotiations, the puppet army must be resolved first,

There are three major issues: the redrawing of surrendered areas and the recognition of liberated areas. Otherwise, no other problems can be solved.

If we want to talk about the downsizing of the armed forces, we must first talk about how the Kuomintang armies should be downsized, or at least the armies of both parties should be downsized at the same time.

This telegram shows that the Yan'an side has been consistent with the beginning of the negotiations, and there is a basic principle: "The "asking price" is not high, but it can no longer be "bargained." However, the three major issues raised by the central government were all difficult for Chiang Kai-shek to accept, or accepted on the surface, but in fact he was absolutely unwilling to fulfill. Chiang Kai-shek's concerns are, to put it bluntly, two things, one is the so-called restoration of communications, and the other is the downsizing of the army led by **. The realization of the first article is conducive to the transportation of troops by Chiang's army and the seizure of strategic points and the division of the liberated areas: the realization of the second article is conducive to weakening and even eliminating the first article without a fight. It can be seen from this that the KMT and the CPC have their own considerations. The two sides talked about the possibility of going together xìng there, but not clipping.

And there is a reason why Yan'an's attitude is tough at this time. Because the situation in the whole country was deteriorating, although the "Double Tenth Agreement" had been signed, Chiang Kai-shek did not have the sincerity to fulfill the agreement, but relied on force to play such a set of tricks as talking and fighting, talking and talking, and fighting and fighting. Therefore, in addition to resolutely defending itself and repelling the offensive of Chiang's army, the first side must also expose and fight at the negotiating table, and must not allow Chiang Kai-shek to deceive the people of the whole country and international public opinion.

Zhou Enlai, the number one negotiator, and Wang Ruofei, who was extremely eloquent and talented, skillfully waged a-for-tat struggle against the Kuomintang representatives in accordance with the instructions and principles of the Central Committee.

On January 22, 23 and 26, "the representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party held three more talks, and the contents of the talks were as follows. First of all, it is about stopping the military offensive, transporting troops and resuming communications.

Zhou Enlai pointed out that the armies of the two sides should immediately stop their offensives and stay where they are, and then talk about the settlement of other military issues. Wang Ruofei fiercely criticized the actions of the Kuomintang and the Americans. He pointed out that "the most dissatisfied with our side are: (1) The US troops continue to board the coast, and the United States has helped Chiang Kai-shek to transport troops, and the number of troops in the liberated areas has reached more than 70,000; (2) The enemy and puppet troops are used as the vanguard to occupy towns and communication lines, so that the central army can advance forward.

The representatives of the Kuomintang still adhered to Chiang Kai-shek's fallacious reasoning, saying that as long as all the troops withdrew from the lines of communication, the communications were restored, and the government "did not attack the troops, the conflict would stop." What this actually means is that as long as the Jiang army is allowed to put itself to death, the Jiang army will stop attacking. In this regard, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofeili "immediately refuted that the areas where the Kuomintang army is advancing now belong to our liberated areas and recovered areas" The lines of communication passed through were also under the control of our army. Therefore, today's conflict is purely caused by the attack of the Central Army on our army. It is absolutely impossible to ask our side to stop defending itself, withdraw from the lines of communication in North China, and cede to you the important cities and lines of communication in these areas, so that you can control our territory instead of the Japanese invaders, and then negotiate with us.

Chiang Kai-shek did not give up. During the negotiations on the 26th, Zhang Qun and others repeated the old tune of demanding that the army withdraw from the line of communication, and said that "traffic must be restored" This is the demand of Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng. As for the areas that are currently occupied, the status quo can be maintained for the time being.

** The side is well aware that Chiang Kai-shek's "temporary maintenance of the status quo" is false, and the rush to open up the communication line is true. Zhou Enlai insisted on not giving in, he proposed: "The Japanese army is in the territory of the country today, and it still has to keep its weapons and be ordered to maintain the transportation, and the ** army is going to withdraw from the communication line. Wang Ruofei also proposed: "Under the present circumstances, the issue of the liberated areas has not been resolved, and the surrendered areas have not been redrawn1, in our opinion, the advance of the Central Army is an offensive, and the destruction of communications by our side to stop the advance of the Central Army is a matter of course. So the problem is simple: transport should be restored, but only in peace. If the armed forces occupy the lines of communication and drive us out of them, it will be war.

Zhou Enlai added: "The purpose of restoring transportation is to avoid civil war, and the only way to avoid civil war is to stop the march." ”

Under these circumstances, the Kuomintang delegates had no choice but to agree to stop the occupation, but not to stop the march. They also asked Zhou and Wang to put forward a written proposal on the issue of resuming traffic and avoiding conflict.

Zhou Enlai promised that the matter would have to be replied to after the well showed Yan'an.

The second issue in the negotiations was about the rezoning of the surrendered areas.

After the surrender of Japan, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the whole country to be divided into a surrender area, but not to give more than one million troops to the ** anti-Japanese armed forces, which is too unfair, of course the country ** will not agree. Therefore, the central government has been strongly demanding the redivision of the surrendered area. Only a just and equitable redrawing of the surrendered areas can eliminate the civil war. **During the Chongqing negotiations, this request was also made many times, but Chiang Kai-shek just did not agree. Article 12 of the Double Tenth Agreement is also vague on this issue. The agreement recorded: On the issue of surrender, the first responsibility proposed: redraw the surrendered area and participate in the surrender work: The government said that after accepting the order of the central government, it can be considered.

Such wording, in fact, does not solve any problems. The Kuomintang also did not give ** the right to participate in the surrender work at all. Therefore, in the negotiations after the "Double Tenth Agreement", Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei could not help but make demands again. The Kuomintang was not willing to talk about this at all except for refusing it again. As a result, there has been no progress in the negotiations on the issue of participation in the surrender.

The third issue is the recognition of the liberated territories. The problem is more difficult than before, and there is little hope for solving it.

During the period of the first and other talks in Chongqing, the question of whether to recognize the liberated areas or the local governments in the liberated areas was one of the focal points of dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. In the end, the discussion was written into the Double Tenth Agreement, but the issue was not resolved. Article 1O of the Double Tenth Agreement reads: "On the issue of local governments in the liberated areas, the government proposes that the government should recognize the legitimate status of the democratically elected governments at all levels in the liberated areas. ”

Next, there is a large section of account, describing the plan of the ** side on this issue and Jiang Fang's reply. ** Four solutions were proposed, but the Kuomintang replied with only one sentence: these plans hindered the unification of the central government's decrees, so they could not be agreed.

The only point of agreement reached by the two sides was their agreement to continue the talks.

At the talks on 22 January, ** repeatedly and strongly demanded that the Kuomintang government recognize the "democratic" power in the liberated areas. Wang Ruofei said: On the issue of the liberated areas, I advocate that the personnel of the government agencies at all levels in the villages, townships, and counties in the liberated areas should be elected by the people, and that the central government and local governments should recognize the additional committees. The governments of the border regions (including the four provinces of Hebei, Re, Chacha, and Shandong) will maintain the status quo and will be re-elected in accordance with the law after the constitution is implemented.

Compared with the previous plan, ** has made a big concession, temporarily abandoning the demand for recognition of the border district and provincial-level governments, and proposing to first solve the problem of the additional committees of the democratically elected governments below the county level. In this regard, the Kuomintang side of the former Chongqing highest-level negotiation had said that it could be considered, but during this negotiation, even this point was withdrawn and the first responsibility was rejected, thus blocking the door to continued negotiations on the issue of the liberated areas, which was a conspiracy of Chiang Kai-shek. In this regard, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei tried their best to fight on the basis of reason, but the Kuomintang did not let go. Later, Zhou Enlai reviewed the negotiations in Yan'an, and he pointed out: "After Comrade ** came back, Comrade Ruofei and I also talked with the Kuomintang for a month. We tried all kinds of methods to get them to admit it, but they still didn't admit it, because the heart was that they didn't want the people of the country to get a base for the people. In a country as big as a country, it is impossible to advance in a balanced way, and the life of a country comes out in this way, with ups and downs, one position and one position after another. Therefore, for the people of the country, everything is important in the base area. Arming is important, but after all, armed forces are a tool for maintaining base areas, and armed forces cannot survive without base areas. "Jiang saw this clearly, and he also knew the importance of this issue, so he didn't admit it anyway." As for the issue of the liberated areas, it has actually become one of the most important issues in the negotiations between the KMT and the CPC. This was not only the main problem that led to the abortive of the two Chongqing negotiations, but also the basic factor that led to the eventual breakdown of the KMT and the CPC.

In order to break the impasse in the negotiations, on 26 January, the ** representative drafted a written proposal. The proposal stated: (1) In order to resolutely avoid civil war and to restore communications quickly, the march of troops should be stopped. Offensive and occupation: stop using the enemy and puppetry: neither side will station troops on the eight railway lines (Pingsui, Tongpu, Zhengtai, Pinghan North Section, Bohai East Section, Jinpu, Jiaoji, and Beining Line Sections): If the government wants to transport troops to Pingjin and Qingdao, it must go through mutual consultations.

(2) The military group shall have no right to settle the matter only after the principle of the above-mentioned question has been decided.

(3) In the unlikely event that an agreement cannot be reached on the issue, the first side shall not object to the convening of the Political Consultative Conference, but when the meeting is held, the issue of avoiding civil war and resuming transportation must be resolved first.

After that, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei reported the above written proposal to Yan'an! a。