In the **** boss's "Refutation of Fanqianyulei's Essay on Defending Yuan Chonghuan", I pointed out 13 places where he tampered with historical facts and asked him to answer. The big guy's reply once again staged a wonderful performance of answering non-questions and tampering with history. I am trying to write this article to restore the real history.

The first question, Jinzhou's choice was determined after the "Ningjin War".

What are you doing hiding the final ruling of the Emperor of the Apocalypse? The remarks of some officials who are greedy for life and afraid of death who have been vetoed by the emperor have become a final conclusion in your mouth?

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Regarding this question, the **** boss used the trick of answering the question, and pasted a lot of "historical materials" that he had screened and compiled, but he never dared to come up with the ruling of the apocalypse. "The closed door leans on Ningyuan, and Ningyuan leans on Tashan and Jinzhou, all of which are protected by layers, and more fences are set up to strengthen the golden soup." In addition, Du Wenhuan was ordered to be stationed in Ningyuan, Hou Shilu to be stationed in Tashan, and You Shilu to be stationed in Jinzhou, "all of them must keep their promises, build cities, train soldiers, cook solidly, and defend with war and urgency, and do not divide each other in vain." "Xizong Records" July of the seventh year of the Apocalypse.

The big guy picked up the remarks of some officials and generals abandoning Jinzhou in the course of the controversy and pretended to be a "final conclusion", but he hid the final ruling of the Apocalypse, and his style of study and character were really unbearable.

In addition, the **** bigwig also took the Ming army's abandonment of Jinzhou in the second year as a "evidence", can a border policy debate last for a year? This is also too demeaning to the efficiency of the Ming Dynasty, and it is simply to treat the holy decree of the Emperor of the Apocalypse as air. In May of the first year of Chongzhen, Wang Zhichen abandoned Jinzhou without permission, was it allowed by the imperial court? If so, Wang Zhichen would not have been urged to be dismissed by Chongzhen in July (the plan to replace Wang Zhichen with Yuan Chonghuan was put forward in April, but the eunuchs in the court still kept delaying, but when Wang Zhichen made this big mistake, the eunuchs could no longer drag on). This incident also involved Man Gui and was transferred to the general army of Datong.

The second question, although Huo Weihua, the squire of the military department, thinks that Jincheng cannot be easily given up, according to the objections of the generals, he cannot but summarize as: "If the thief arrives, the wall will be cleared and waited." ”

- Playing the game of taking quotes out of context again? The context is taken out for everyone to see.

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Regarding this issue, the **** boss still insists on not taking out Huo Weihua's original words, only insisting on the original misinterpretation.

What are Huo Weihua's original words? The whole recital is very long, and there are two pages in the "Records of Xizong." I'll copy two sentences first, "Jinzhou must not be observed." How can we object to the fact that the whole territory of Liao is about to be restored? In addition, we can still frustrate the thieves on the day when the construction is not completed, and now that we have won this battle, why is it difficult to consolidate ourselves!" Jinzhou is bound to be defended, and the only one who is in contact with Ningjin is Tashan. ”

Huo Weihua completely held the opposite position to Yan Mingtai and others, and the **** boss was able to intercept Huo Weihua's words of hundreds of words in nine words and said that "according to the objections of the generals, he can't help but summarize", pointing out that the skill of the deer as a horse has far exceeded his ancestor Zhao Gao.

This text of the big guy is copied from capo1234's "The Change of Chongzhen's Second Year". The original text of capo1234 is "After Huo Weihua, the squire of the military department, compares the gains and losses, he still feels that 'Jincheng has been effectively defended, and it should never be abandoned.'" But he couldn't come up with any good solution, and only said, 'If the thief comes, the wall will be cleared.' Although capo1234 was also a member of the Yuan faction, and he also played the trick of hiding the ruling of the Emperor of the Apocalypse, he still didn't dare to confuse Huo Weihua's position. But the back waves of the Yangtze River pushing the front waves are really reasonable, and the **** boss's face is much thicker than his predecessors.

Huo Weihua's "strong walls and clear the wilderness" is actually the correct solution, and Yuan Chonghuan's Ningyuan War and Ningjin War did this. Huo Weihua's summed up methods are not limited to this one, roughly as follows: "One is that Jinzhou must not be defended", "one is that Tashan must be defended", "one is that firearms must be practiced", "one is that the car battalion must be prepared", "all battalions are mainly based on vehicles, filled with foot soldiers, in order to exhaust the length of firearms, and the Chinese and Tibetan horsemen can have a wonderful plan, advance by attacking, and stop from relying on solidification" and so on.

The third question, the chief soldier stationed in the place, You Shilu, said that Jinzhou "the city collapsed by the rain and was unlivable"

- Can't read the ancient text? Is this the reason why Jinzhou can't be defended?

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Regarding this question, **** insisted that this was the "opinion of the front-line generals", but avoided whether this opinion was worthy of the reason why Jinzhou could not be defended.

You Shilu's words are actually enough to be called good and bad. None of the Houjin's iron cavalry destroyed Jinzhou, and a rainstorm could damage the city to the point where it could not be garrisoned? At most, the barracks in the city were temporarily uninhabitable. However, the Ming Dynasty did not let you come to Jinzhou for vacation and recuperation, but for you to guard the front line of national defense. Shangganling cat ear piercing can be held, not to mention Jinzhou, a fortified city built with huge manpower and material resources. You Shilu himself was not embarrassed to propose to withdraw from Jinzhou for this reason, his original words were "Jinzhou City was collapsed by rain, and it is impossible to live, and now it is temporarily stationed in Xingshan." Xingshan is also a part of the Jinzhou defense line. But the latter sentence **** boss deliberately omitted the twist and turn of You Shilu's request to be temporarily stationed in Xingshan, which he took out of context as the entire Jinzhou defense line could not be stationed, and even went further, interpreting You Shilu's temporary request in the rainy season as You Shilu thought that the geographical situation of Jinzhou could not be defended.

The fourth question, the general stationed in Tower Hill thinks that Tower Hill is not a place to defend and wants to "move to another place"

- Context, context! Are you tired of playing this kind of trick all the time?

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Like the third question above, this content is also recorded in the "Three Dynasties Liao Facts" volume 17. The original text is "Hou Shilu said, Tashan is low and concave, approaching the high mountain, and it is not a place to defend, and its city is not finished in construction, and it is intended to transplant other places." "Hou Shilu has two reasons, one is the poor geography, and the other is that the construction of the city is not completed. But when it comes to the **** boss, the second reason is to block it. Tashan is not Jinzhou, but is almost the middle of Jinzhou and Ningyuan in terms of geographical location. The big guy likes to use the example of the Liaoshen War, and the "Tashan Resistance Battle" took place here. If Tashan cannot be defended, how can Siye stop it? Hou Shilu also has an extremely famous deed that happened in the second year of Chongzhen. In the defense of Beijing, Yuan Chonghuan led the Liaodong army to guard the Guangqu Gate, and Hou Shilu took his Xuanfu soldiers to cooperate with the Datong soldiers of Mangui to defend the Desheng Gate. After the battle, Hou Shilu fled first, and the whole army of Xuanfu followed and dispersed, resulting in a lone battle in Mangui, coupled with the accidental injury of the artillery of the Jingying camp in the city, which eventually led to the defeat of Deshengmen. For such a person who is greedy for life and afraid of death, how much credibility is there for the reason why Tashan cannot be defended from his mouth?

You Shilu and Hou Shilu did not play their own opinions. They actually submitted their opinions to the ministers of the Jiliao Governor Wang. Wang Zhichen was the decision-maker who withdrew from Jinzhou a year later. But in July of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, after he reported the request of these two people, he immediately said his disposal plan later, "The ministers and their commanders have already decided, and they should advance and retreat, so how can they be transferred." If the geographical advantage is lost, the people's hearts are not fixed. Rongchen is temporary, and his grain reserves are appropriate, and they should be widely preempted, and they should not be delayed. Obviously, Wang Zhichen was also resolutely guarding Jinzhou at this time. But these contents, the **** boss is all selectively eliminated.

Question 5: Among the many opinions proposing to abandon Jinzhou, Yan Mingtai of the Governor Jiliao was the strongest and the most severe

- What kind of birdman is this guy, can you tell everyone? How did he get into trouble to confiscate the army, well? What is so strange about opposing Sun Chengzong's strategy based on this guy's position and his old life?

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The big man's answer was, "His point of view is correct, and he also foresaw that in the future, everyone who made an article in Jinzhou would make a big mistake, this is Yuan Chonghuan and Hong Chengchou, his opposition is very reasonable, but unfortunately in the end Lord Yuan still went to the wrong line." However, he always avoided what Yan Mingtai was.

First of all, let's talk about the ridiculousness of the **** boss's answer this time. Yan Mingtai's book this time was after the Ningjin War, for Yuan Chonghuan, how could it be that "he foresaw that in the future, all those who write articles in Jinzhou will make a big mistake"? I don't know if the **** boss really can't figure out the order of historical events, or deliberately reverses the cause and effect. In the Jinzhou guard, Hong Chengchou suffered a defeat, is it true, Yuan Chonghuan's Ningjin victory is also called "planting a big heel"? **** The big guy has repeatedly used Yuan Chonghuan's performance a year ago to tamper with the time to fight for Mao Wenlong, is it also necessary to stuff the matter of "planting a big heel" to Mao Shuai, whom you sincerely admire?

Yan Mingtai is a standard eunuch, and after Chongzhen cleaned up Wei Zhongxian, he sent him to the army, and the crime was that this person had built more than a dozen ancestral halls in his Jiliao jurisdiction. Chongzhen's attack on the eunuchs was very incomplete, and the scope of the impact was very small, but Yan Mingtai was among them, which shows his status in the eunuchs. Sun Chengzong is the core figure of the Donglin Party, and Yuan Chonghuan's idea of promoting the recovery of Liao is inherited from Sun Chengzong. In order to oppose the Donglin Party, the eunuch party has always been in opposition to Sun Chengzong in the Liao affair - as long as Sun Chengzong's Liao affairs plan is proved to be wrong, all the achievements of the Donglin Party in the Liao affairs can be overthrown. Therefore, the two hardcore eunuchs, Gao Di and Yan Mingtai, are the most resolutely opposed. This is the real reason why "among the many opinions proposing to abandon Jinzhou, Yan Mingtai of the Governor Ji Liao was the strongest and the most severe".

The sixth question, Jinzhou is located between the Xiaoling River and the Daling River, from Ningyuan to Jinzhou must pass through Tashan, Songshan, Xingshan to reach Xiaoling River

- Let's take a look at the map of the Northeast first, and then come here to fool around.

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The big guy still doesn't admit his mistakes here.

This question is the same as the 21st question in another "30 questions" - because the **** boss often copies duplicate things everywhere, so I will have the same questions for different articles. at

In "How Heroes Are Smeared, and Back to the **** Boss "Answer 30 Articles", I have replied to this question, and the original text is copied as follows:

It seems that I was wrong to ask you to look at the map of Liaoning - probably you are looking at the map of modern Liaoning. However, on the map of Liaodong at the end of the Ming Dynasty, Xiaolinghe City is between Jinzhou and Dalinghe City. Don't tell me, when you say the Xiaoling River, you mean the river, not the fortress - don't you have a moon formation, the river is a terrain that is very favorable for the Ming army, hehe.

The seventh question, Yuan Chonghuan was unable to effectively reinforce Zhao Shujiao during the "Ningjin War", and Hong Chengchou could not rescue Zu Dashou during the "Songjin War" because of this geographical defect.

-- Can the famous Ningjin War and the Nuclear Songjin War still break blindly? Go back and make up for history. Yuan Chonghuan is tired of the Jin army, and he sent Mangui to see the number of 10,000 people who knew that it was contained; Hong Chengchou had already been able to rescue Zu Dashou, and the one that Dolgon beat was miserable, and he went to see how "Manchu Old Files" was written, and finally missed the opportunity to wait for Huang Taiji to come to help, which was completely overly conservative. Don't compare these two wars, one is 10,000, which is clearly contained, and the other is 130,000, first conservative and then blind, and all of them were stripped by you and the battle went to the geography, you are really a theoretical expert who complains about constipation and blames the toilet.

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The big guy's reply was: "Lord Yuan was criticized for not rescuing Jinzhou, and his resignation was because he was restrained? Why is Hong Chengchou unlucky, is it not because of the terrain of Jinzhou, if it is a plain instead of this kind of narrow corridor, can Huang Taiji cut off the rear of the Ming army so easily?"

Here, the **** boss began to play the trick of buttoning his hat again, "Lord Yuan was criticized for not resigning because he was restrained because he was restrained", and he was able to pull "criticized resignation" from my text above, which is really rich in association. Actually, my first statement is clear enough, since the **** boss is still talking about crooked reasoning, then I will explain this problem in more detail.

The reason why the Ningjin Battle was victorious and the reason why the Songjin War failed was that the Huang Taiji changed his tactics, from attacking the city to encircling the point to send reinforcements. What are the necessary conditions for encirclement and reinforcement? It is not a geographical requirement but an advantage in combat strength! At the very least, it has a local combat strength advantage over both the encircled "points" and the "reinforcements" to be attacked. Otherwise, we will not be able to enclose the "point" and will not be able to eat the "aid". Of course, in terms of overall combat strength, it is also allowed to be slightly inferior to the strength of "points" and "aids" combined, although this is a bit risky, but it is possible to play the time difference through flexible changes in tactics to achieve local short-term advantages. However, if you want to encircle the side and send reinforcements, if your own strength is weaker than either the "point" or the "reinforcement", this tactic has basically no chance of success - except for the only exception: the use of surprise soldiers.

Now let's take a look at the Battle of Ningjin first. Yuan Chonghuan mainly had two cities in Ningjin, 30,000 soldiers in Jinzhou, 35,000 troops in Ningyuan, and about 10,000 troops stationed in small cities such as Qiantun in the rear of Ningyuan. After the battle began, Man Gui of Shanhaiguan also led 10,000 soldiers to Ningyuan to obey Yuan Chonghuan's assignment, which was all the troops in Yuan Chonghuan's hands. And then Jin here, Huang Taiji's forward troops were 20,000, and the main army was 40,000, which basically arrived at the beginning of the campaign. In the later part of the campaign, Huang Taiji also transferred a team of reinforcements from the rear, and the history books did not record the specific number of troops. Then, when Jinzhou led by Zhao was besieged, Yuan Chonghuan could allocate at most 40,000 troops to rescue Jinzhou (at least 5,000 troops should be left to defend Ningyuan). For the Later Jin army, whether it was the 30,000 troops of Jinzhou who were besieged, or the 40,000 troops that could be reinforced, they were absolutely inferior in terms of local numbers. Coupled with the fragility of the Ming army's field combat ability to Houjin, if Yuan Chonghuan went all out to rescue Jinzhou, then the inevitable outcome would be: to be surrounded and sent to help. Therefore, Yuan Chonghuan's decision was to send only 10,000 troops from Mangui to feint and retreat as soon as there was contact (the casualties of the "Battle of Claw Fence Mountain" were only 60), and to attract the tired division that had been besieging Jinzhou for a long time to the city of Ningyuan, relying on the advantages of the city's artillery, and finally achieved a big victory.

Then let's take a look at the Songjin War. In the first stage, Zu Dashou's defenders in Jinzhou were about 30,000 people, and Dolgon Tuntian Yizhou gradually increased his troops, and finally the total strength increased to 40,000, and Zu Dashou was gradually trapped in Jinzhou. In the second stage, Hong Chengchou rushed to Songshan with an army of 130,000 and dealt with Dolgon with Zu Dashou inside and outside, and the Ming army had an absolute advantage. In more than a month, Hong Chengchou did not completely defeat Dolgon and open the road to Jinzhou, which is really a strange thing. In the third stage, Huang Taiji led an army of 80,000 to the rescue, and the total number of Ming troops was slightly more than that of the Qing army. However, because the Ming army was divided into two parts, for Hong Chengchou's 130,000 troops stationed in Xingshan, it was only comparable to the overall strength of Huang Taiji. Considering that the Ming army was unfavorable in the field, Hong Chengchou defended more cautiously, so that the Qing army Shi Shiran dug three big ditches from Jinzhou to the seaside, cutting off all the Ming army and the rear in Xingshan, Jinzhou. At this time, Huang Taiji made a surprise move: he used Azig to lead a partial division to seize the grain and grass that the Ming army had hoarded in Bijia Mountain. Finally, the Ming army was in turmoil, and Hong Chengchou decided to withdraw the whole army to Ningyuan. However, after the retreat began, the various units of the Ming army did their own thing, and the Ming army, which abandoned the unified command, could only be wantonly slaughtered by the Qing soldiers. The defeat of the Songjin War was decided. From the arrival of Huang Taiji's reinforcements to the defeat of Hong Chengchou, it was only twelve days in total.

From the above analysis, it can be seen that during the Ningjin War, the reason why Yuan Chonghuan was unable to effectively reinforce Zhao Shujiao was not poor geography, but poor strength. In the first half of the Songjin War, Hong Chengchou had the absolute strength to defeat Dolgon. From the military report of Dolgon at that time recorded in the "Manchu Old Files", we can see how embarrassed Dolgon's resistance was with 40,000 against 160,000. However, the overly conservative Ming army delayed the war until Huang Taiji came to the aid of the whole army. Under the condition that the strength of the two sides is equal, Huang Taiji highlighted the surprise soldiers, completely destroyed the military spirit of the Ming army, and completed the classic example of encirclement and reinforcement.

The 8th question, if it weren't for Mao Shuai's attack on Liaoyang, the capital town of Houjin, during the "Ningjin War".

——Go to the "Three Dynasties Liao Facts" yourself, you can fool the matter of the sixth year of the Apocalypse to the seventh year of the Apocalypse, and you will be shameless to the extreme.

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The answer to this **** boss is:

Wang Zaijin said in volume 14: "Mao Wenlong attacked Liaoyang, so the troops were connected, the siege of Ning Jin was solved, and Wenlong was powerful!"

This is in response to the content of Lord Yuan's recital: "I know that Mao Wenlong attacked Liaoyang and rotated his troops accordingly, so that non-Mao Shuai made trouble, and Jinning suffered from the enemy! Although Mao Shuai was broken by the army, he had been restrained for several years, and this was the most fierce!"

If this piece was written in 1626, could it be that in 1626 the Later Jin Dynasty had another "Battle of Ningjin" that surrounded Ningyuan and Jinzhou?

is a ridiculous and unreasonable answer, when is it recorded in the "Three Dynasties Liao Facts", it is something that only needs to be verified, and the **** boss has to use subjective inference to question it, which can only be said to be a strong word. In the "Records of the Three Dynasties and Liao", Volume 14 records the events of "the first month to August of the year of Yichou", that is, from the first month to August of the fifth year of the Apocalypse, and the Battle of Ningjin took place in May and June of the seventh year of the Apocalypse. Yuan Chonghuan's recital is recorded in Volume 16, which records the events of "Bingyin's February to December", that is, from February to December of the sixth year of the Apocalypse. Yuan Chonghuan's front of this recital is "August Governor Shangshu Wang's Ministers Inscription ......", and the first one is "In July, the Ministry of Officials will push the military department Shangshu Feng Jiahui Wang Zaijin, and the hand-picked will push". Feng Jiahui was removed from the position of Shangshu of the Ministry of War before the Battle of Ningjin in April of the seventh year of the Apocalypse!

Since Sun Chengzong began to defend Liao in the second year of the Apocalypse, the Ming army gradually expanded its sphere of influence, and Sun Chengzong began to build Jinzhou City in May of the fifth year of the Apocalypse, and as early as a year ago, in September of the fourth year, Yuan Chonghuan and Ma Shilong patrolled Guangning until the return of the Sancha River, which is enough to prove that Jinzhou has long been within the sphere of influence of the Ming army. Was the battle in the Ningjin area the only one in which the Ningjin War took place? In fact, there were constant battles of all sizes, and if you look at the Ming Shilu, you will know that there are records of battles every three or four months on average. In the fifth year of the Apocalypse, there was a relatively large-scale defeat of Liuhe, which was also the direct reason for Sun Chengzong's deposition. Wang Zaijin's "siege of Ningjin" in the fifth year of the Apocalypse cannot, of course, be understood literally as Ningyuan Jinzhou was surrounded, but in fact it was just that the Ningjin area was being attacked.

The big guy insisted that Yuan Chonghuan's letter was written in August of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, and forcibly changed the period clearly recorded in the history books to a year later, but he took a fancy to the word "Jinning" in it and could use it to make a fuss - but this is still a big joke, Yuan Chonghuan was excluded and resigned in July of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, what else did he do in August?

9. There is no Jinzhou Shanhaiguan to defend, from 1622 to 1628, of which Jin was garrisoned for several years, and after 1628, Jin also occupied Jinzhou, but it also felt boring, so it automatically retreated, because Jinzhou is an easy place to be surrounded, who guards who is unlucky.

- Well, so Huang Taiji was Alzheimer's before he died, and it took more than three years to use the country's military and financial resources to lay down such an unlucky place.

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The big guy changed the topic again and shifted the focus to "encircling the point to help".

The Songjin War began in the twelfth year of Chongzhen, and the prologue battle was that Huang Taiji "poured all the people into Liao, carried many artillery fires, attacked Songshan, and wanted to do his best to break the defeat in a vain attempt to shake the eight cities", the war lasted for two months, and finally ended with Huang Taiji abandoning the attack and collecting troops. After that, the Qing soldiers mentioned above, Tuntian Yizhou began to gradually besiege Jinzhou, until the Battle of Songshan and Hong Chengchou were defeated. Then the Qing army besieged the city in July, the three cities of Jin, Song, and Xing surrendered, Huang Taiji occupied the Jinzhou area, and Dolgon began to fight against Wu Sanguila in Ningyuan. From the end of the Battle of Songjin in March of the fifteenth year of Chongzhen to the fact that Wu Sangui was allowed to evacuate Ningyuan in March of the seventeenth year of Chongzhen, this battle between Ningjin and Jin lasted for almost two years - why were the Qing soldiers unlucky when they occupied Jinzhou?

10. 750/(19*4.8+26*10+35*10)*12=128,000 taels of silver/10,000 people/year

-- It seems that the DPRK did not provide money and grain for the DPRK in the war? Or does the money and grain provided by the DPRK not count as military expenses? In the last years of the Ming Dynasty, the standard for recruiting troops was one or two or a half yuan per month, and the salary paid when helping the DPRK fight the war was lower than this?

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To this question, the **** boss's answer is "The military town of the Ming Dynasty is a tuntian system, and the grain does not need to be spent by the imperial court, but it is different at the end of the Ming Dynasty, all the military towns in the north have suffered from drought, and the grain harvest has to be replenished by the imperial court, so of course the financial constraints, at this time, it is necessary to repair the fortress and consume the national strength, which is of course a great crime." This is a ridiculous answer that is extremely contrary to the common sense of Ming history. Because, the military system of the Ming Dynasty changed from the tuntian system to the military recruitment system from Qi Jiguang, when Wanli conquered Korea, this reform had already been completed, and those sent to North Korea were recruited. Moreover, the **** boss explained the reason why the Tuntian system was changed to the military recruitment system, which is really disgusting. The main purpose of the reform of the military system was to discover in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression that the training and fighting spirit of the Tuntian Army were insufficient. The trial implementation of the military recruitment system is Qi Jiguang's anti-Japanese Zhejiang, how could Zhejiang have to change Tuntian to recruit troops because of the poor grain harvest? In addition, the more you analyze, the more you find that the **** bigwigs are making big jokes. According to the **** boss, the difference between the military recruitment system and the tuntian system is whether the grain is supplied by the imperial court -- spraying wildly! The military recruitment system is more expensive than the tuntian system, and the tuntian army does not need to pay so much money at all, but the army recruitment is in addition to the salary, but also the military rations.

11. 71,000 (Guan, Ning, Jin), 800/7.1 = 1,126,000 taels of silver/10,000 people/year

- I don't know how you fooled the figure of Wanli's aid to the dynasty, this can't escape my eyes. The source of your 7.1 is 71,000 "outside the Guan", and more than 40,000 "inside the Guan" refers to Shanhaiguan, but you are not ashamed to get one (Guan, Ning, Jin). Obviously, it is only the strength of the two cities of Ningjin, but you have counted the strength of the Shanhaiguan including the Shanhaiguan, and the Mongolian people have the skill.

There is also this 800, which is even more funny, it is calculated by the Liaoyu salary of 680 in the first year of Chongzhen and the total deficit of the imperial court in the seventh year of the Apocalypse of 120. Ten years ago in Chongzhen, the money for suppressing the peasant uprising in the whole country came out of Liaoyu, do you know? Chongzhen's first year of the southwest rebellion was a large expense, and the 6.8 million people from the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan were at least eaten, how did you eat it? The deficit in the Liaozhen year and the apocalypse year together is a joke in itself, not to mention that you count the deficit of the entire Ming Dynasty as being spent by Liaodong.

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In this problem, I have actually found out the wrong calculation method of the **** boss. The basis for this calculation was given by him himself in Tianya, and I have already corrected it in Tianya. However, he is still using this erroneous data to slander Yuan Chonghuan, which can only show that he is unscrupulous and has a poor character.

Now, the **** boss has begun to come up with a new method of fooling, "4.8 million Liaoyu, 1.8 million folded color, 1.2 million inner library, as well as armor, artillery, etc., how much is it together? More than people have fought for seven years, how can these be distributed to Yunnan-Guichuan? Shanhaiguan has '40,000 people', which is really powerful, then I will ask Zhao Shu, the general of Shanhaiguan, to teach him that he lacks heart, he has 40,000 people who don't need it, and only brought 4,000 people to reinforce Zunhua, but the whole army was wiped out because of the small number ......of soldiers."

Since this person still wants to be untrustworthy, then take off his panties again and let him run naked. "Chongzhen Long Edition" volume 15: "55,345 soldiers inside the Guan, 78,340 soldiers outside the Guan...... This month and March, the silver is sixty-nine hundred thousand six hundred and sixty-three. This is the calculation of Shanhaiguan Town and Liaodong Town in August of the first year of Chongzhen, in which the soldiers in the Guannei are the Shanhaiguan garrison, and the soldiers outside the Guanhai are the Ningjin garrison. Judging from this record, there were 133,685 soldiers in the two towns, and the salary for three months was 693,600 taels, and the average annual salary per person was 20.75 taels, or 207,500 taels per 10,000 people. At the end of the Ming Dynasty, the amount of military recruitment stipulated was one tael and five cents of silver per month, that is, 18 taels a year. Why is the figure of Guan Ningjun slightly higher? Mao Wenlong's "Five Things of the Unequal" is played, which mentions that Ning Yuan "has a monthly salary of one tael and five cents, Neiding two taels and four cents, and eats five buckets of rice", and "Chongzhen Long Edition" Volume 2. Neiding is a family ding, which is also a kind of military system in the late Ming Dynasty, and the treatment of the pro-soldiers who are about to receive is slightly higher than the average of ordinary soldiers to all soldiers, and the total salary standard naturally reaches 20.75 taels per person. However, at the end of the Ming Dynasty, the country's financial resources were exhausted, and the army was generally in arrears, so the military department gave priority to ensuring Guanning's salaries. Even so, in July of the first year of Chongzhen, Ning Yuan still owed money in April, which led to a mutiny, and in August Yuan Chonghuan took office, quelling the rebellion with his personal prestige.

"The Biography of Yuan Chonghuan in the History of the Ming Dynasty" "Chonghuan was in Liao, and led the teaching, Dashou, and Kegang to set the military system, and gradually reached Denglai, Tianjin, and Dingdongjiang military system, and the four towns had 153,000 soldiers, 81,000 horses, more than 4.8 million years of expenses, and more than 1.2 million old ones. Emperor Awards. "The four million ,800,000 here is the total, including the true color (grain) and the folded color (silver). In Mao Wenlong's Dongjiang Tang Newspaper, it was also mentioned many times that Dongjiang's annual salary was 400,000 yuan, which included 200,000 yuan and 20 folds. As mentioned earlier, the average annual salary of each soldier is about 20 taels, so the annual salary of 153,000 soldiers is about 3 million, and the remaining 1.8 million should be the true color. The "1.8 million folds" that the big guy said should actually be 1.8 million true colors, but this number is actually included in the total of 4.8 million, but the **** big guy pulled it out and counted it again.

However, the figure of 1.8 million is actually wrong, because this figure is only a hasty calculation of the total of 4.8 million minus 3 million. According to Mao Wenlong's standard for the Guanning Army, the annual salary of 153,000 troops should be 918,000, and if the total annual salary of 153,000 troops with an annual salary of 20.75 taels per capita is accurately calculated, it should be 3.175 million taels. In this way, the total of 4.8 million, in addition to the 4.1 million rated by the 153,000 army, and the figure of 700,000 seems to be multiple.

What kind of money is this 700,000 yuan? In addition to the normal military salaries at the end of the Ming Dynasty, first of all, there was also the reward silver after winning the battle; for example, when Yuan Chonghuan first arrived in Liaodong to take office, Zu Dashou of Jinzhou led the army to fight a small victory in the yellow mud valley, and this is what should be paid to reward merit; secondly, there were special funds for the purchase of military horses and equipment for supervision; in addition, there was also a temporary increase in the internal funds to stimulate morale (the emperor's private money **** was naturally beneficial to morale), as well as the salaries of generals and officials. In Mao Wenlong's Tang Newspaper, you can see that the list of payments received by Dongjiang in the fifth year of the Apocalypse is " In the fifth year of the Apocalypse, Cao Weixin, the preface of Honglu Temple, sent 50,000 taels of silver to the treasury of the household department; the commissioner Wen Tuming and Sun Anguo of 100 households went to the Beijing Treasury to find 10,000 taels of silver, and pulled out 13,3829 coins of silver, and Liao Guanyue went to the Beijing Treasury 8,000 taels of silver; consulted Dengfu to save 8,000 taels of silver; Hao Guoru, a thousand households of Jinwuwei, received 93,977 taels of silver, and first received 6,000 taels of silver from Xu Wuyuan, the capital secretary, who bought silk and cloth and other things in Beijing, and Li Mo, the preface of Honglu Temple, received 50,000 taels of silver from the horses of the Taifu Temple; and the eunuch of the ceremonial eunuchYu Ming, the official of the Jindeng Committee, and others delivered 147,378 stones and four buckets of miscellaneous grain, and 17,894 horses of cloth...... of which "8,000 taels of silver were consulted and decomposed; Hao Guoru, a thousand households of Jinwuwei, received 93,977 taels of silver, and first received 6,022 taels of silver for silk and satin cloth and other goods purchased by Xu Wuyuan, the chief priest of Honglu Temple, and Li Mojie, who borrowed the price of horses from Taifu Temple, and 40,000 taels of silver; These payments are all additional issuances in addition to regular salaries. Dongjiang Town's annual salary is 400,000 yuan, and the additional money received in the five years of the Apocalypse alone is nearly 200,000 yuan, which shows that Yuan Chonghuan's four towns with an annual salary of 4.1 million yuan receive an additional 700,000 yuan a year It is also common sense.

In addition, it should also be noted that in August of the first year of Chongzhen, there were more than 133,000 soldiers in the two towns of Shanhaiguan and Liaodong alone, and after Yuan Chonghuan killed Mao Wenlong in June of the following year, the Dongjiang army was 28,000. If these two figures alone are added up, they already exceed the total of 153,000, could it be that the soldiers stationed in Tianjin and Denglai are negative? In fact, this is because after Yuan Chonghuan took office, in accordance with Chongzhen's will, he carried out the adjustment of the military system in the areas under his jurisdiction. Taking this factor into account, in the first few months of Yuan Chonghuan's tenure, the total number of soldiers who needed to be paid was more than 153,000, so the total amount of food and salary that the four towns were rated to be distributed in this year should also be greater than 4.1 million, that is, the additional amount received was less than 700,000, and this number was even smaller. And in this smaller number, let's count it as 500,000, including various expenses such as buying horses, building cities, supervising equipment, rewarding merits, and salaries of officials and generals. Comparing the 1 million budget required for Wang Zaijin's plan to build a heavy city in Shanhaiguan in the second year of the Apocalypse, it is obvious that Yuan Chonghuan's annual expenses are not too much, so the "History of the Ming Dynasty" records that "more than 1.2 million yuan of old ones have been reduced." Emperor Awards. ”

By the way, to make a slight comparison with another record, in November of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Su Mao, the secretary of the Governor-General Cangchang Household Department, said: "The Beijing army has released more than 3 million stones, and now Beijing and Tong 2 warehouses have 1.269573 stones. There are 753 craftsmen in the Wensi Academy, and now there are 3,288 people, and more than 30,000 stones. (Chongzhen Record)

This record states that the Beijing camp pays more than 300,000 stone military salaries every year. Since the unit of "stone" is used here, it is obviously just food, that is, the true color. Perhaps due to the shortage of silver in the household department, the Beijing camp used grain instead of silver to pay military salaries, and Mao Wenlong also said in the Tang Daily that he paid Lushun's military salaries in this way. But in any case, Jingying's annual salary is at least 3 million or more, which seems to be able to be used as circumstantial evidence.

As for what the **** boss said, "4.8 million liao salary, 1.8 million folded color, 1.2 million inner library, as well as armor, artillery, etc.", please also take out the original text of the history books, how much Yuan Chonghuan is in the four towns, it's not that you just talk about it. In these numbers, 480 Liao salary must be wrong, Liaodong military salary is Liaodong military salary, Liao salary is Liaodong salary, the difference between these two concepts I have reiterated many times, **** bigwigs still mix them together, can only think that it is intentional, and wants to count all the Liao salaries used in suppressing the peasant uprisings in the interior as Liaodong's expenses. 1.8 million folded color must also be a low-level mistake, if the true color is so-so can be said to be a miscalculation, the folded color must be nonsense. I don't know where the 120 internal money came from, I remember that Yuan Chonghuan's internal money allocated by Chongzhen this year was 200,000 yuan, but I forgot which book it was recorded in for a while, so I suspect that you are like an unscrupulous trader who casually added a hundred figures in front. As for armor and artillery, please also give specific figures. There are a lot of numbers on the armor network, 200,000, 280,000, 400,000, 480,000, 600,000, 680,000, and so on.

In addition, Zhao led the education to rescue Jizhen is an emergency reinforcement, and he only had time to bring the fine horse. If you want to say that Zhao Shujiao is stupid, then is it equally stupid to bring 5,000 soldiers to King Qin's Datong General Man Gui? Because Man Gui and Yuan Chonghuan are at odds, this has always been your favorite, and Zhao Shujiao is the number one general under Yuan Chonghuan, so you do not hesitate to look for all kinds of opportunities to belittle him. In fact, you should know very well how many soldiers there are in Shanhaiguan, and when you quote Sun Chengzong and Wang Zaijin's argument over whether or not to set up a major pass, don't you see the number of garrisons in Shanhaiguan that they discussed and involved? You are just looking for all kinds of opportunities to discredit Yuan Chonghuan, so you are inconsistent and you can't take care of slapping yourself.

12. In fact, as long as the model of the Anti-Japanese War is established, an army of the Qi Jiguang style can be used to sweep away the Houjin cavalry

——The Qi family army has long been completely defeated by Nurhachi, and the battle of the Hunhe River in the Liaoshen War was completely annihilated as the authentic Qi family army. Nurhachi had mixed with the Ming Dynasty, and was much smarter about the advantages and disadvantages of the Ming army's tactics than the little Japanese and the Mongols. Do you think that Nurhachi, like the Mongols, only knows how to use cavalry to foolishly charge and be beaten by artillery? Do you know that this thing is cheap and good, and the old cheap thing makes the muskets and artillery that the Ming army has spent a lot of money equipped with into decorations.

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To this question, the **** boss's answer was, "You only said that thousands of seven armies died on the battlefield, why don't you say that Houjin used people to exhaust the ammunition of the Qi family army before breaking the battle formation of the Qi family army on the plain?

At this point, the **** boss finally answered a little to the point for the first time in history.

The total strength of the Ming army in the Battle of the Hunhe River was 10,000, and of course the Qi army was several thousand, but what kind of troops were there a few thousand? Sichuan Shizhu soldiers, Qin Liangyu's elite soldiers. In the Battle of the Hunhe River, the Che Battalion of the Qi family army was broken by the Houjin several times, and it was the stone pillar soldiers who struggled to repel the enemy troops who broke through the formation - if there was no white pole of the stone pillar soldiers, the Qi family army would have been defeated earlier, and it would not have been able to hold on to the fire at all.

The crux of this question is: How much fire can the Ming army bring in the field battle? Was the Qi army in the Battle of Hunhe a hasty attack? Not at all, it was a reinforcement of Liaoyang that was prepared for battle. Therefore, the crux of Qi Jiguang's army has always been unavoidable is the problem of the carrying capacity of Huoyao, Liu Ting in Salhu is lost in the Huoyao, Qi Jin Qin Bangping of Hunhe is lost in the Huoyao, and Luo of Xipingbao is still lost in the Huoyao. Nurhachi, who had served as the general of the Ming Dynasty, knew the weakness of the Ming army, and a cheap and high-quality cart greatly weakened the power of the Ming army's firearms, and the Ming army, which could not cause fatal damage to the Houjin army before the fire was used up, was always inevitably the fate of the entire army.

13. The "Songjin War" fought for a few years, and it is strange that there is no problem with the grain, and the Houjin let North Korea transport grain from the sea to the Daling River during the "Songjin War", and the grain of the Ming Dynasty could not be transported into Jinzhou at all, which is a good place for Yuan Da to choose

——The Songjin War started in the twelfth year of Chongzhen, and the first two years were Zu Dashou alone in front. Dolgon also slowly surrounded Jinzhou before Zu Dashou's grain and grass began to have problems. After Hong Chengchou Chongzhen sent troops from Ningyuan in June of the 14th year, as soon as he arrived in Jinzhou, he and Zu Dashouli should cooperate with the outside world to beat Dolgon, which was extremely miserable. During this period, the grain of the Ming army was sent to Jinzhou. One of the people who protected the grain delivery was the famous Wu Sangui. On August 12, Huang Taiji increased his troops to Jinzhou to support Dolgon, and on the 24th, Hong Chengchou was beaten beyond recognition. Then there was a seven-month siege of the city, and at this time there was no way to send food -- what happened to the terrain when the city was besieged and couldn't send food? The most wasteful thing about Hong Chengchou was that Ning Jin directly cut off his retreat to Ningyuan, which naturally meant that Hong Chengchou also cut off Huang Taiji's retreat back to Shenyang. When the brave meet on a narrow road, the brave wins, but Hong Chengchou decided first, "Let's run away", the whole army did not listen to the command, and the whole line was defeated in a chaotic manner -- he was served dumplings and blamed the terrain for the situation?

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To this question, the **** boss's answer was, "Why did Huang Taiji come with him as soon as Hong Chengchou sent troops? That's called encircling the point to send reinforcements, you don't even understand this, what else is there to talk about? Huang Taiji has Kong Youde and others at this time, there are sailors, and even Phi Dao can attack, you still expect to cut off the back road of others, do you have any brains?"

What is the encirclement point reinforcement, the encirclement reinforcement in the Huang Taiji Songjin War can only be said to be at the tactical level, not at the strategic level at all. If it was strategic, Jinzhou should have been surrounded with a large army at the beginning, rather than having Dolgon bring 40,000 troops to face the Ming Dynasty's 160,000 troops. As soon as Hong Chengchou sent troops, did Huang Taiji follow? There was a gap of two months between the two! In two months, Hong Chengchou did not defeat Dolgon, and could only be attributed to conservatism. Huang Taiji's encirclement and reinforcement is a temporary change at the tactical level. In the Ming and Qing wars, it was always determined from the strategic level to be the encirclement point to send reinforcements, which was the Battle of the Daling River. And the second half is even more of a joke, if there is a sailor, it will not be cut off, then the Ming army has no sailors? If, as you did before, due to the unfavorable terrain of Jinzhou, the Ming army cut off the back road to lead to a fiasco, then it is equivalent to saying that the sailors are powerless, so why does the sailors of the Qing army work? Or do you mean that the strength of the Qing army's sailors has surpassed the Ming army at this time? So what about your big and small fortune ships? Don't tell me that you have been boasting about the **** of the Ming army's navy Big guy, now I'm going to start praising the stinky feet of the Qing army, hehe.

For other questions about the Battle of Songjin, see question 7.

The only thing that needs to be added is the one that is most directly related to the question in this article: Is the terrain of Jinzhou unable to transport grain? If the Daling River can transport it, the Xiaoling River cannot transport it? Jinzhou is a city that is half-surrounded by the Xiaoling River! During the Battle of Songjin, the Ming army was unable to transport grain into Jinzhou for a long time for only one reason -- it was surrounded by the Qing army! A city surrounded by the enemy, no matter how many rivers there were, like Venice, could only be trapped in a lonely city. Excuse me, is there any city that is absolutely impossible to be surrounded by terrain? To blame the unfavorable terrain chosen by the city for not being able to deliver food after being surrounded by enemy troops is like taking off your pants and farting!

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