16) If Lord Yuan knows that he does not have many soldiers and is not strong enough, then he should not disperse his troops, if he really does not have many troops and is not strong, then he should never say something like "five years of Pingliao", what nonsense: "Enter Jizhou to rest for a while, carefully investigate the situation, strictly prepare for the sentinel, and strive to intercept it, and will not let the enemy cross Jixi." ("Ming Shilu" November Bingshen)

In military affairs, whether it is a person who fails because of imbecility, or a person who says unrealistic big things, he deserves to be scraped.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

This paragraph is just a few words, but the low-level mistakes that make people spray rice are endless.

1. "If Lord Yuan knows that he does not have many soldiers and is not strong enough, then he should not disperse his troops" - when Yuan Chonghuan arranged the Jixi defense line, he sent reinforcements from all walks of life to disperse and deploy the defense, the purpose was to guard the defense line long enough as much as possible to resist Huang Taiji's troops east of Jizhou. Although Yuan Chonghuan scattered his strength to deploy defenses everywhere, Huang Taiji had a slight engagement at Mashenqiao and Shiyimen and learned that it was Yuan Chonghuan who was defending on the opposite side, so he changed his style of attacking the city all the way since the entrance of Jimen, and quietly bypassed the Jixi defense line. This detail is enough to show that although Yuan Chonghuan only has 20,000 elite soldiers in Liaodong and 30,000 rice bucket soldiers in Jizhen, it is enough to frighten Huang Taiji not to face the enemy head-on.

On the one hand, the big man admitted that Yuan Chonghuan "did not have many soldiers and was not strong enough", thinking that Yuan Chonghuan should not disperse his troops, and on the other hand, he continued to accuse Yuan Chonghuan of not holding all the areas east of the Beijing Division, so that Huang Taiji bypassed the defense line and attacked the city of Beijing. Whether Yuan Chonghuan should concentrate his forces to defend Jizhou City, or should he further disperse his troops and deploy them in a linear manner, it seems that the **** boss actually has no definite plan in his heart. The only thing he diligently pursued was to accuse Yuan Chonghuan from various angles and positions, so that he couldn't care about self-contradiction.

2. "If he really has few troops and is not strong, then he should never say big things like 'five years of Pingliao'" - the accusation of "five years of Pingliao" is a classic of the Yuan faction. Because Yuan Chonghuan has only supervised Ji Liao for a total of 16 months, no matter whether or not the five years of Pingliao can be realized, it is untenable to use this sentence as a crime of bullying the king. It's just that the **** boss is the same as his like-minded peers, and he likes to repeat these deceptive things a thousand times, even if they are debunked nine hundred and ninety-nine times, they will always be poured the thousandth time as always. I used to think they were stupid enough to think that a lie repeated a thousand times would turn into truth. Now I really understand their purpose, just like what Ma Ji said in his cross talk "Pink Eye", "Eight cents for a stamp, at least make your kid sick for half a year". What if I'm just insulting, before you didn't expose me again, at least you could make people who don't know the truth look disgusting Yuan Chonghuan for half a year!

By the way, the absurdity of this sentence will be slightly exposed. What is discussed here is the history of Yuan Chonghuan's entry into the guard in his own year. Huang Taiji raided the customs, Yuan Chonghuan rushed to the rescue of Jizhen, at this time only with 20,000 Liao soldiers around him, and there were only 30,000 soldiers in Jizhen, of course, the number of troops was less. However, "five years of Pingliao" refers to the strategic concept of Liaodong, which is under the jurisdiction of Yuan Chonghuan

150,000 elite soldiers in four towns. But the **** boss is once again knowingly confused here.

3. "What is the:" Enter Jizhou to rest for a while, carefully investigate the situation, strictly prepare for the sentry, and strive to intercept it, and will not let the enemy cross Jixi'. ("Ming Shilu" November Bingshen)" - here is another **** boss quoting historical materials. Slightly better than elsewhere, this passage does exist, but as with his other quotes, it is a random quote here. "Enter Jizhou to rest the horses, carefully investigate the situation, strictly prepare for the sentry, and strive to intercept it, and will not let the enemy take a step beyond Jixi", this sentence is recorded in the "Chongzhen Long Edition", not "Ming Shilu". Obviously, the **** boss is copying here and there, and he hasn't read the original history books at all.

Yuan Chonghuan's words were said in a recital to Chongzhen after he arrived in Jizhou. At this time, Yuan Chonghuan had been temporarily appointed by Chongzhen as the commander-in-chief of the Qinwang army, and asked him to resist the army at the entrance of Huang Taiji so that it could not threaten the Jingshi. How did Huang Taiji get in? The Great Wall defense line laid out by the Ming Dynasty for hundreds of years could not stop the Houjin army, and Yuan Chonghuan, with 50,000 troops (30,000 of which were still weak brigades in Jizhen), was able to temporarily arrange a defense line on the North China Plain that could not be penetrated? But with the national disaster at hand, since Chongzhen has appointed Yuan Chonghuan as the commander-in-chief of the Qinwang army, no matter how impossible the task is, he can only do it with iron heart. Yuan Chonghuan's words "will not let the enemy go beyond Jixi" is this kind of promise that a big husband must do something.

4. "In military affairs, whether it is a person who fails because of imbecility, or a person who says unrealistic big things, he deserves to be scraped." "-- "Imbecile and failure"? **** When the big guy commented on Xiong Tingbi and Gao Di's abandonment of the 400 miles of land outside Shanhaiguan, why didn't they have such strict requirements? "Said unrealistic big things"? Mao Wenlong, who claimed to have returned to Liao in two years, should be guilty of it? Note that this was said by Mao Wenlong in the third year of the Apocalypse. Moreover, what kind of crime is the punishment used for? Disobedience and rebellion. Is "imbecile and failure" and "saying unrealistic big things" considered disobedience or rebellion?

The atmosphere of big talk in the officialdom of the Ming Dynasty was very prevalent. Yuan Chonghuan's courage to take on a heavy responsibility and promise an impossible task at the time of national crisis is not comparable to the rhetoric of peacetime ministers.

17) Lord Yuan spent a lot of money on the construction of the Ningjin defense line in Jinzhou for the second time, and the movement was also very large, and he himself was stationed on the Ningjin defense line, but why was Huang Taiji at this time announcing the "whole expedition to the west" only seven days after he killed Mao Shuai?

Lord Yuan is tossing and turning on the Ningjin defense line with all his strength, but why doesn't Houjin care about him at all?

On the contrary, when he was happiest in his cultivation, he "marched westward"? Is this how your so-called "Ningjin Defense Line" threatens Houjin?

The threat that Hou Jin is really afraid of is Mao Shuai, when Hou Jin attacked Guangning, he hit Mao Shuai first, and when Hou Jin attacked Ning Jin, he also hit Mao Shuai first.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Mistake 1, Yuan Chonghuan built Jinzhou for the first time in the fifth year of the Apocalypse, Yuan Chonghuan built Jinzhou for the second time in the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Yuan Chonghuan built Jinzhou for the third time in the first year of Chongzhen, and Yuan Chonghuan killed Mao Wenlong in the second year of Chongzhen. When did you mean by "At this time, Huang Taiji will announce the 'whole journey to the west' only seven days after he killed Mao Shuai?" When did you mean that people who were not even clear about the process of Yuan Chonghuan's three construction of Jinzhou should go back to make up for the lessons?

Mistake 2, "Qing Historical Manuscript Taizong Benji" "June Yi Chou, Discussion of Ming". "Discussion of Fa Ming" was secretly replaced by "the whole brigade to the west" for the **** boss here. In fact, Huang Taiji's "whole trip to the west" was a matter of the second day of October. Yuan Chonghuan's killing of Mao on the fifth day of the sixth month and the "discussion of the Ming Dynasty" of the Emperor Taiji on the twelfth day of June are two independent events, which strip away all the historical background and prerequisites of the "discussion of the Ming Dynasty" of the Emperor Taiji, and only pick out the two incidents separately and make false guesses at the proximity of time at a glance, which is a rather deceptive way of reasoning. In fact, the prerequisites for Huang Taiji's "discussion of Ming" were: 1) obtaining a covenant from some Mongolian tribes to make it possible to pass through Mongolia, and 2. The Ningjin defense line was unbreakable and had to gamble heavily from the Jizhen defense line. An examination of Mao Wenlong's combat records against Houjin shows that since the Battle of Ding Mao in the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Mao Wenlong has basically not taken any threatening actions against Houjin. In fact, it can also be known from the "Book of Mao Wenlong" included in the "Manchu Old Files" that after the Battle of Ding Mao, Mao Wenlong privately played peace cards, and at both ends of the Ming and Qing dynasties, he had no courage and plan to fight against the Houjin. Even when Mao Wenlong occasionally had the courage to fight a war, the Dongjiang was not seen in all the Liaodong wars, such as the Guangning War, the Ningyuan War, and the Ningjin War, so could it be that if Mao Wenlong did not die, he would have been able to perform miraculous feats in the Battle of Jisi? Yuan Chonghuan's killing of Mao Wenlong did not reach the rest of the Dongjiang generals and soldiers, and the strength of the Dongjiang River was not damaged in the slightest. If it is said that Mao Wenlong threatened Houjin during his lifetime, even after his death, this force still exists. Could it be that the Dongjiang force is in the hands of Yuan Chonghuan, and it is better to be in the hands of Mao Wenlong, who is at both ends of the first rat, and the threat is greater? According to the record of Taizong of the Qing Dynasty, "when the troops were sent out, each Niu recorded 20 or 15 soldiers, destroyed the strong side walls of the Ming Kingdom, and drove straight in." The number of armor soldiers per Niu Lu in Houjin is sixty, so the number of troops with Huang Taiji and the entrance is only less than one-third of the total strength. Why did the Later Jin elite go deep into the operation alone, leaving two-thirds of the troops to watch the family? Of course, it was to defend the Ming army in Liaodong.

Mistake 3: Before the Battle of Quang Ninh, Mao Wenlong was beaten two months before the Great War, and before the Battle of Ningjin, Mao Wenlong was beaten four months before the Great War. Mao Wenlong's duty is to contain. In the two battles before and after, Mao Wenlong's strength was not damaged, but he was frightened, and he forgot his duty when the battle in the western Liaoning battlefield was in full swing. In this way, the **** boss still does not hesitate to smear and whitewash it, and what he does is just to belittle Yuan by praising Mao.

18) After 1627, when Jin attacked Korea, the "Shenyang emptiness" was just that once, and during the "Battle of the Daling River", did you hear that Huang Taiji arranged an empty camp in Shenyang as a suspicious soldier, and he was about to sing an empty city plan?

Besides, where is the Daling River? Ning is 600 miles away from Shenyang, Jinzhou is 400 miles away from Shenyang, and the Daling River is between Shenyang and Jinzhou, and it is one step closer.

It can be seen that it is very rare for Lord Yuan to waste that opportunity......

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

When the big guy couldn't tell the difference, he began to play the trick of diverting the topic again.

The 18th question is aimed at the **** bigwigs who boasted that Sun Chengzong "affirmed" the establishment of an amphibious combat force, which can be used to combine the moon array with waterways and is invincible. The purpose of creating such a force and such a tactic, which had never existed in the history of the late Ming Dynasty, was only to deduce that Yuan Chonghuan had "wasted" Sun Chengzong's brilliant ideas.

In this regard, I doubt that if such a unit and "invincible" tactics existed, why did it not be used in the rescue battle of the Daling River personally commanded by Sun Chengzong in August of the fourth year of Chongzhen? At the end of the Ming Dynasty, the climate in eastern Liaodong was unusually cold, and it was impossible to sail for half of the year. It is rare that the battle of the Daling River took place in August, there is no inconvenience of freezing, and the battle happened on the bank of the Daling River, why didn't Sun Chengzong use the "trick" that the **** boss "definitely exists"?

As a result, the **** bigwigs, who are obviously ignorant of the history of the Ming and Qing dynasties, actually talked nonsense about the "Battle of Daling River" to the Battle of Ding Mao in the seventh year of the Apocalypse (1627), which is simply ridiculous. Then he Ningyuan, Jinzhou, Shenyang, Dalinghe, Huangzhou and other place names, I don't know what to say. And the distance between these places is also messy: "Ning is 600 miles away from Shenyang, Jinzhou is 400 miles away from Shenyang, and the Daling River is between Shenyang and Jinzhou, which is one step closer." The real geography is that Ningyuan is at least 800 miles from Shenyang, Jinzhou is at least 600 miles from Shenyang, and Dalinghe City is close to Jinzhou, and the distance from Shenyang is at least 600 miles.

Huang Taiji's empty city plan was originally irrelevant to this issue. But since it was bullstrapped by the **** boss, let's talk about it by the way.

In the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Emperor Taiji sent Amin to lead an army of 30,000 to conquer the court, and by the way, invaded Mao Wenlong. (The figure of 30,000 can be found in the "Records of the Joseon Yi Dynasty.") In the Ming Dynasty, because Mao Wenlong on the front line falsely reported the enemy's situation, there were five or sixty thousand, eighty thousand, and one hundred thousand three theories, but Mao Wenlong's false report of the enemy's situation and lying about his military exploits was commonplace. North Korea, as a personal participant in the war, was beaten by Amin very miserably, of course, there is no need to reduce the number of enemies encountered. Therefore, Amin's conquest of the DPRK may only be less than 30,000, and it can never be more. Since there is no record of the number of troops sent by Ding Mao in the Manchu Qing Dynasty, the number of 30,000 is currently based on the historical circles. At this time, the total strength of Houjin was about 70,000 or 80,000, and the number of troops sent by Ningyuan in the previous year's battle against Nurhachi was 50,000 or 60,000, so Huang Taiji's troops left behind in Shenyang were at least 40,000 or 50,000. Of course, compared with the garrison of the whole clan, Shenyang's defense at this time was of course slightly weaker. However, Yuan Chonghuan was the governor of Liaodong at this time, and he only had 70,000 soldiers in Ningjin under his jurisdiction, and even if he poured out of Shenyang to take Shenyang, he had no chance of winning. What's more, the war in North Korea basically ended after Amin conquered Pyongyang on the 26th of the first month, and Amin's troops stayed in North Korea after that only to intimidate North Korea so that they could gain more benefits when forming an alliance. It was already March when Yuan Chonghuan received the order from North Korea to send troops, and at this time sending troops was no longer helpful to the Korean war, and there was a danger of being flanked by Amin's troops before and after returning to the division at any time. In fact, if the imperial court really made up its mind to mobilize a large army from Jizhen and Shanhaiguan to Jinzhou, and cooperate with the Mongolian Chahar Department to send troops to Shenyang, there would still be a certain threat to Houjin, where nearly half of the army was outside. However, Mao Wenlong's false report made the imperial court misjudge the enemy's situation, thinking that Ning Jin's troops alone were enough to plow the court - in order to shirk his responsibility, Mao Wenlong lied that there were 80,000 troops in the Korean army, and in order to reduce his own crisis as soon as possible, he lied that the remaining troops in Shenyang were less than 10,000 (and in April, he lied that Huang Taiji would send some reinforcements to North Korea). Therefore, what really made this possible opportunity go to waste was the heroic and invincible General Mao in the mouth of the **** boss.

The above is the historical background before and after the occurrence of the Huang Taiji Empty City Plan, and the specific time of this event is the eighth day of the first month of March. At this time, the overall situation of Amin's expedition to the DPRK had been decided, and negotiations with the DPRK had been going on for more than a month, but rumors began to spread in the country after Jinjin. Because the common people did not know the specific distribution of military forces, and only saw Amin's army outside, they were worried that the emptiness in the country could not prevent a possible attack by the Ming Dynasty and the Mongols. On the second day of the third month, the magistrate of the Later Jin Dynasty killed a student surnamed Yue, on the grounds that this person was in danger outside the army, and suggested that he negotiate peace with the Ming Dynasty and return the captured Liao people. For this kind of domestic situation, Huang Taiji will of course be alert, it is not a good thing for the people to be flustered, and once this kind of news is detected by Yuan Chonghuan and sent troops accordingly, it is not a comfortable thing for Houjin to only fight with half of the troops. Therefore, at the beginning of March, the Eighth Emperor Taiji swaggered along the Liao River with a vote of ministers, patrolling all the way from Shenyang to the Sancha River (that is, the cordon between the Ming army in Jinzhou), and many of the "patrolling" barracks were actually empty. This is the origin of Huang Taiji's "empty city plan" touted in the Manchu history books, which means that he learned the strategy of Kong Ming in the Three Kingdoms. What Huang Taiji didn't know was that due to Mao Wenlong's false report, the decision-making body in Beijing of the Ming Dynasty had far underestimated Shenyang's true strength, so only 70,000 troops allocated to Yuan Chonghuan and Ning Jin urged him to send troops, which could not pose a mortal threat to Shenyang at all. However, the first purpose of the "empty city plan" is not to confuse the enemy, but to reassure the people, and in this sense, Huang Taiji's feints are still successful.

19) The Houjin cavalry can kill Juehua Island, which means that the sea has been frozen, and there is no advantage of using the water division, which is not to blame the water army, because they have no way to be a water army anymore, and this consequence is completely caused by Lord Yuan not retreating before the freeze, so this consequence proves the correctness of Gao Di's order to retreat, and at the same time does not negate Sun Chengzong's strategy and tactics, on the contrary, it proves that it is wrong to defend Ning Yuan under such conditions, because it is impossible to verify the strategy and tactics designed by Sun Chengzong for Ning Yuan.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Is there a clause in Sun Chengzong's strategy and tactics that when the weather is cold and frozen, do you give up Ning Yuan Juehua? Sun Chengzong only talked about "rejecting the enemy in the court, and rejecting the outside of the court, there is a difference between the situation." I urged the enemy 200 miles away, and the enemy urged me 200 miles, and the momentum was discerning. Gai Guangning, I am far away and the enemy is near; Ningyuan, I am near and the enemy is far away. If I don't advance and force the enemy, the enemy will push me. Today, we can't restore Liaozuo, and Ningyuan and Juehua can't be abandoned." Yuan Chonghuan followed Sun Chengzong's strategic vision. In the first month of the sixth year of the Apocalypse, the rapid freezing of the sea near Juehua Island was difficult for anyone to predict in advance. And if Yuan Chonghuan followed Gao Di's order to abandon Guanwai and not stick to Ningyuan, then it would be tantamount to allowing Nurhachi to easily demolish the Ningyuan defense line that Sun Chengzong had spent three years building, and completely abandon Sun Chengzong's achievements in Liaodong for three years. In October of the fifth year of the Apocalypse, Sun Chengzong had just left office because of the eunuch party, and Gao Di, who took over, took the initiative to abandon the cities of Jinzhou, which Sun Chengzong had built with great effort. In order to completely deny Yuan Chonghuan, the big guy had to put all the tactical ideas of Yuan Chonghuan's predecessors into a basket far-fetched, and the result could only be laughing and generous.

20) Xiaobai, a sea boat can carry sports materials, not the person who drives the boat can carry it, in the case of the Haihe River is not frozen, it is very convenient to drive the boat and leave, the gate Haihe River is frozen, how to use the boat to transport?

It would be easy not to retreat the materials and ships, and only let the army and the people withdraw, but Lord Yuan would not let it, and it would be only a dozen miles away from Juehua, which is not far

In addition, you should think about whether Lord Yuan has a split personality, obviously because he did not give orders and did not retreat caused the tragedy, but he actually had the cheekiness to write eulogies for the soldiers and civilians of "Juehua Island......

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Your original text was "It will be difficult to retreat to the rear when the sea freezes in the first month of the following year (1626)", but now you have secretly changed to retreating by boat. If the weather is cold and freezing, do you still use boats to retreat? If you really want to retreat, can't people resist the horses? Mao Wenlong's Tang Bao in the sixth year of the Apocalypse said that by March of that year, due to the cold and freezing weather, there had been no food and salary delivery in the Dongjiang River for eight months. Obviously, when Gao Di ordered the retreat in October, the sea route had frozen, and Juehua Island was also unable to retreat by boat.

In addition, according to your judgment logic of Yuan Chonghuan's split personality, Mao Jiang, who led the anti-Japanese resistance, is not qualified to mourn the martyrs and the victims.

21) You never look at a map, and you can't read a map, so it's a shame to talk to you about the hard work of someone who makes a map.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

What is said here is that "Jinzhou is located between the Xiaoling River and the Daling River, and when you go from Ningyuan to Jinzhou, you must pass through Tashan, Songshan, and Xingshan to reach Xiaoling River", and it seems wrong for me to ask you to look at the map of Liaoning - probably you are looking at the map of modern Liaoning. However, on the map of Liaodong at the end of the Ming Dynasty, Xiaolinghe City is between Jinzhou and Dalinghe City. Don't tell me, when you say the Xiaoling River, you mean the river, not the fortress - don't you have a moon formation, the river is a terrain that is very favorable for the Ming army, hehe.

22) This "five battles and five victories" was quoted in the article "Later Jin (Qing) Two Expeditions to Korea", and I also quoted here, you said that you did not ask him to go to court.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

If you quote the source "Later Jin (Qing) Expeditions to Korea Twice", then you should mark the source as "Later Jin (Qing) Expeditions to Korea Twice"; but what you are marking now is "Supplement to the Ming History Chronicle", then there is no such sentence in the original book at all, and of course the lawsuit will be brought to you.

Arbitrarily quoting other people's articles without verifying them is not a rigorous attitude toward history; quoting other people's articles without explaining that they are secondary citations is still more an academic fraud; and not admitting their mistakes after being found out by others is shameless and scoundrel.

In addition, according to your arguments, I searched for the article "Later Jin (Qing) Two Expeditions to Korea", but only found a version without a reference appendix - whether it was a mistake in quotation by someone else or a mistake in your own quotation, or it is unknown.

23) "Dongjiang Shujietang Newspaper Excerpt Copy" reads: "Gather all the generals, teach the strategy face-to-face, measure the distance and near the danger, send troops to set up ambushes, surprise attack, and go to Yizhou and Yalu River on the 13th, and openly intercept and kill by land and water"

In addition, with the disparity in military strength at that time, Mao Shuai could only really threaten Houjin by land and water, and he didn't go to the Yalu River to intercept and kill, could it be that he performed the mythical story of Lord Yuan's "9,000 and 100,000" on the plain?

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

What I asked was the basis for what you said, "Later, the main force of Amin who returned to Shenyang by land and water was intercepted and killed on the Yalu River, and achieved some victories", and as a result, you took out Mao Wenlong's Tang report dated April 20, the seventh year of the Apocalypse.

According to the Manchu Old Files, Amin's army returned to Shenyang from Korea and crossed the Yalu River on the 10th day of April. The time of the battle reported by Mao Wenlong was April 13. Three days have passed since Amin's army, and where did Mao Wenlong look for "Amin's main force returning to Shenyang" on the Yalu River? Back to the Tang newspaper of 20 April, the full text of this passage taken out of context by the **** bigwig is: "According to Mao Chenglu, the general of Neiding, more than 10,000 horsemen were found to be stationed in Zhenjiang, more than 10,000 horsemen were camped in Qianjiazhuang, and 4,500 horsemen were stationed in Yizhou. I heard that he led the Goryeo to build more than 200 warships and wanted to cross the island of Terracotta. I also saw thieves coming out of Goryeo, and there was an endless stream. I heard that my soldiers and horses have repeatedly killed his head, and he will take revenge and wait for love. According to this position, because the four princes of the former slave chieftains sent troops and horses to attack Yuncong, Kashima and other places, knowing that it was necessary to capture their posts, on the fifth day of the first month of April, they gathered all the generals, taught the strategy face-to-face, and sent troops to set up ambushes, and attacked by surprise, all of them went to Yizhou and Yalu River on the 13th, and combined the water and land to intercept and kill, and still ordered to attack together, and did not allow the head of the greedy department, but only allowed to capture the thief and the giant leader alive, and cut the head. "The enemy that Mao Wenlong reported here was not Amin's army returning to Shenyang, but Huang Taiji (the fourth prince) sending reinforcements from Korea. However, checking the "Records of the Li Dynasty", "Manchu Old Files" and "Records of Taizong of the Qing Dynasty", Mao Wenlong's report is completely a false report made out of nothing. Huang Taiji did not send any reinforcements to North Korea at all. On the 13th day of April in the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Huang Taiji was already making all-out preparations for the Battle of Ningjin! As for the number of troops left by the Later Jin in Korea and Zhenjiang, it is rare for the "Manchu Old Files" to have a clear record of the number this time, leaving 1,000 Manchurian soldiers and 2,000 Mongolian soldiers in Yizhou, and 300 Manchurian soldiers and 1,000 Mongolian soldiers in Zhenjiang, totaling 4,300 troops. But in Mao Wenlong's mouth, this number was exaggerated to 25,000. By the way, it should be noted that Mao Wenlong's report on April 20 was not a battle against these remaining troops, but a fictitious "four princes sending troops and horses".

In short, a battle with a non-existent enemy reported by Mao Wenlong in the Tang Daily was pinched off by the **** boss and tampered with as "The main force of Amin who returned to Shenyang by land and water achieved some victories". As everyone knows, Amin's main force has already left this "battlefield" for three days at this time!

24) You say 30,000 is 30,000, take out the evidence :)

The records of the Ming and Qing dynasties are as follows: the "Secret Records of the Manchu Old Files" and the "Eight Banners of the King James Dynasty" respectively recorded that "Shangfang ordered the two Belezirharang, Azig, Dudu, Yuetuo, and Shuotuo to lead 80,000 elite soldiers to conquer Korea", the "Renzu Record" and the "Dongjiang Shujietang Newspaper Excerpt Copy" both said that "there were more than 80,000 slave soldiers", and the "Two Dynasties Congxinlu" and "Three Dynasties Liao Facts" both recorded that the governor of Denglai at that time also reported to the court that "more than 80,000 slave soldiers committed robbery in Tieshan Yizhou".

Besides, you mention the number "30,000" to slap Lord Yuan, I really want to see which of you can knock down whom, haha~!!

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Here, the **** boss once again uses the falsified historical materials to shamelessly deceive. The number of soldiers in the Battle of Ding Mao, the Manchu Qing Dynasty has no definite numerical record, which is recognized by the historiography. Although I don't have it in the "Eight Banners of the King James Order", the "Manchu Old Files" does, and the record on page 805 is that "on the eighth day of the first month of the first year of Tiancong, he ordered Bel Amin, Jilharangtaiji, Azigtaiji, Dudu Taiji, Yuetuotaiji and Shuotuotaiji to lead a large army to conquer Mao Wenlong, the Ming general stationed in Korea. "The Old Manchu Files" is the first-hand information of the Manchu Qing Dynasty about this period of history, and the record of the "Eight Banners of the King James Dynasty" is also based on it. Therefore, although I do not have the original book of "The Eight Banners of the King James Dynasty", I can also be sure that the words "80,000 elite soldiers" will never appear, otherwise it would have subverted the accepted recognition of the historiography long ago. And the sentence quoted by the **** boss is extremely wrong in terms of the content of the narrative itself: Amin the coach of the Battle of Ding Mao actually disappeared from the list of players, and Zilharang was actually given the title of the last Erbeiler, if you compare Zilharang's resume, it can definitely make people laugh.

After that, North Korea's "Injo Record", the **** boss began to talk nonsense again, recording "more than 80,000 slave soldiers", in fact, the real record of North Korea is "On the 13th of this month, more than 30,000 slaves and thieves attacked Yizhou", this number is also the basis for the number of Jin troops sent after the Battle of Ding Mao recognized by the historians - will the beaten North Korea, with a blue nose and swollen face, underreport the number of enemies?

Later, the "Dongjiang Shujietang Newspaper Excerpt Copy", "The Two Dynasties Congxin Record" and "The Three Dynasties Liao Facts Record" actually recorded the same intelligence source - Mao Wenlong's report. The Dongjiang River was subordinate to Dengzhou, and the report of the governor of Dengzhou came from the Dongjiang River on the front line of the battle. Compared with the records of North Korea, the figures reported by Mao Wenlong are obviously mixed with a lot of water, but this is also commonplace for Mao Shuai.

By the time the war was almost over in April, as mentioned in question 23, Mao Wenlong fabricated a great victory on the Yalu River, saying that he had defeated the reinforcements issued by Huang Taiji. Therefore, the number reported by the governor of Denglai became "100,000" - the 80,000 plus reinforcements at the beginning. In the face of the increasingly mysterious enemy situation on the battlefield on the Eastern Front, could Yuan Chonghuan on the Western Front deny the military reports of his "first-line" colleagues? However, when the imperial court asked him to "take advantage of the situation and make trouble" according to the reports on the Eastern Front, Yuan Chonghuan clearly knew that the Western Front was indeed defended by a large number of Houjin troops. Under such pressure, Yuan Chonghuan could only answer that the western front of the imperial court was not as empty as the friendly intelligence said, while ideally admitting that the friendly forces on the eastern front had lied. This is the origin of Yuan Chonghuan's compromises that "100,000 plundering fresh and 100,000 dwelling nests". The initiator of the exaggerated numbers is Mao Wenlong, and I don't know what the **** boss is proud of?

25) It's hard to say in other places, but this Hunhe River goes straight into Shenyang, in 1627, Huang Taiji set up an empty camp outside Shenyang to be a suspicious soldier, just when he was about to sing the empty city plan in Shenyang, do you say it's fun?

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

This reply from the big guy is in response to my questioning of his fictitious invincible army "Moon Array".

At the end of the Ming Dynasty, the weather in Liaodong was unusually cold, and even the endless sea shipping could only guarantee half a year a year: October to March was an ironclad ice period every year, and the ice period of the sixth year of the Apocalypse reached an unprecedented ten months. For inland waterways such as the Liao River, there is a freezing period of about one or two months before and after the river freezes, that is, Xiaoice blocks that have not completely thawed will cause fatal damage to boats traveling in the river. As a result, the freezing factor alone has led to the fact that the rivers in eastern Liaodong have only four or five months of possible navigation time per year. In addition, the water level of the river is also an important issue, and the minimum water level is the minimum water level for the entire length of the river and not the maximum water level for the entire duration of the river to meet the necessary conditions for navigation. When talking about the water level in the waters of eastern Liaodong, the data that the bigwig likes to cite the most is the data of extremely high water levels such as "there was a flood peak of up to 50 meters at the Tieling Hydrological Station in the 50s". However, the average water level of the Liaohe River basin is only 3~4 meters for a long time, and in 1985, when the Daliao River was flooded, the hydrological warning in Northeast China was "the highest water level of the Sancha River was 6.74 meters". The Sancha River is the downstream of the main stream of the Liao River, and the Hunhe River, which the **** boss wants to attack Shenyang on paper, is a tributary of the middle and upper reaches of the Liao River.

The "amphibious combat unit" established by Sun Chengzong, which was concocted by the bigwigs, was very whimsical and equipped with the ships of the Ming Dynasty navy. In the time when there are only four or five months of possible navigation every year, it is necessary to drive the warship sailing in the sea all the way to the middle reaches of the Hunhe River to attack Shenyang.

The big guy once argued that "the Fu boat is divided into several models, the largest Fu boat has a draft of about 6 meters, and can sail at will in the Liao River, and the shallow water level is not easy to stop the No. 4 Fu boat, its draft is only seven or eight feet, but the firepower is not small, the Haicang ship is the fourth in the Fu ship type, and the sentinel ship is about the same, the draft is about seven or eight feet, the wind is maneuvering, and the Fu boat is cooperative." The armament includes 4 jack Franc machines, 3 bowl-mouth guns, 6 Lumi guns, 50 spray cans, 80 smoke cans, 10 artillery, 50 fire bricks, 200 rockets, 6 medicine crossbows, 100 crossbow arrows, 53 crews, 9 sailors, and 44 soldiers. From the previous analysis, it can be seen whether the Liao River, which has a maximum water level of 6.74 meters downstream at the peak of the flood, can make the largest Fu boat with a "draft of about 6 meters" "sail freely in the Liao River". And the No. 4 lucky boat vigorously recommended by the **** boss has a "draft of only seven or eight feet", that is, less than 3 meters, which seems to be able to theoretically meet the average water level of the Liao River. However, it should be noted that the average water level of 3~4 meters is not the lowest water level of 3~4 meters, and the average water level of the main stream of the Liaohe River of 3~4 meters is not the lowest water level of the Hun River, a tributary of the Liaohe River, of 3~4 meters. Moreover, what is especially important is that the "Moon Formation" boasted by the **** boss needs to carry the chariots and firearms of the infantry army with the boat, so that they can set up a defensive formation along the river at any time and fight with the camera. However, how many chariots, firearms, and infantry could still be loaded with "4 jack franc machines, 3 bowl-mouth guns, 6 lumi guns, 50 spray cans, 80 smoke cans, 10 artillery pieces, 50 fire bricks, 200 rockets, 6 medicine crossbows, 100 crossbow arrows, 53 crew members, 9 sailors, and 44 soldiers"?

The above is an objective negation of the possibility of seagoing vessels entering inland rivers for operations. In fact, in the decades of war in Liaodong at the end of the Ming Dynasty, there had never been a case of a naval army entering from an inland river to cooperate with the army. Even Sun Chengzong, who touted the "affirmation" of training an amphibious combat unit by the **** boss, did not use the "legendary Moon Array" in the rescue of the Daling River in August of the fourth year of Chongzhen. August is a rare time period for ships to navigate! Next, from the shortcomings of the moon array itself, we will discuss the ridiculousness of **** on paper.

The essence of the invincible cavalry in the mouth of the big guy is the combination of land and water: the army on the shore adopts Qi Jiguang's method of vehicle warfare to defend the formation, and the navy in the river only plays a role in enhancing firepower under the protection of the army's vehicle formation. Compared with the Qi Jiguang-style vehicle warfare method commonly adopted in the late Ming Dynasty, there is actually no difference in the defense method, but it may have the advantage of stronger firepower, but it has increased the great disadvantage of combat terrain time and limitations - it can only be used during the navigation period of eastern Liaodong and can only be used near the river. But in fact, for the Houjin army, Qi Jiguang's method of car warfare has long been cracked - after all, Nurhachi was the dragon and tiger general of the Ming Dynasty, and the strengths and weaknesses of the Ming army have long been clearly understood by him - the way to deal with it is an extremely economical and cheap equipment: the car. According to the establishment and equipment of the Eight Banners Army recorded in the "Records of Taizu of the Qing Dynasty", each Niulu was equipped with two chariots during the Nurhachi period, and its role was to deal with the firearms of the Ming army. When the Ming army's firearms fired, the Houjin army hid behind the chariot and advanced, and then took advantage of the gap when the firearms were stopped, and the fast cavalry rushed into the Ming army's formation - Qi Jiguang's car formation was deployed in the first row of the formation with firearms to undertake the dual tasks of attack and defense, and the main role of the soldiers hiding behind the car formation was to operate the firearms and repel the enemy when they rushed into the formation. However, once the chariot formation was rushed by cavalry, it was difficult for the infantry within the protection of the chariot to repel the enemy's attack - unless these soldiers had excellent individual combat ability and tenacious will to fight - in the national army at the end of the Ming Dynasty, only the Zhejiang soldiers and Sichuan soldiers had such proud records. The Zhejiang soldiers are the Qi family soldiers of the Yan faction, and the Sichuan soldiers are mainly the stone pillar soldiers belonging to the famous female general Qin Liangyu's family. Since the weapon used by the stone pillar soldier is a white pole, it is also called a white pole soldier.

However, even with brave and combative troops such as the Zhejiang soldiers and the Sichuan soldiers as the main force of the vehicle formation, there are still two fatal flaws in the Qi-style tactics. First, there is the issue of continuous firing of firearms. Since the main firearms of the vehicle formation method are the various artillery guns loaded on the chariots, it is impossible to fire continuously without interruption - like the Anglo-French alliance in the Opium War, the way in which three rows of soldiers took turns to stand and squat down and put their guns were placed, which was absolutely impossible for the chariots arranged in a line with uniform specifications. Moreover, at this time, the Ming Dynasty did not have a mature ballistic shooting theory, and all firearms could only be fired forward with the gunner's experience, so the vehicle formation only had this method of arrangement. Thus, when the artillery firing was interrupted, the Houjin cavalry, hiding behind the chariot, had the opportunity to quickly rush into the chariot formation and attack the infantry inside the chariot's protection. The reason why Qi Jiguang was invincible against the Mongols when he was stationed in Jizhen was that the Mongols did not master the simple tool of the chariot. By the way, I would like to raise a question here: How did the **** bigwigs plan to combine the artillery on the warship with the artillery on the chariot? If the car is in front of the ship and behind the ship, it is obvious that the firearms on the ship will first knock down the infantry on the shore, and if the car is on the side of the ship, who will protect the warship? Second, the issue of the continuous ability of the firearms. After the cavalry was rushed into the car formation, the infantry with excellent individual combat ability and tenacious fighting will could still repel the attack of the Houjin cavalry, and in the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Zhejiang soldiers and the Sichuan soldiers did this many times. But even so, firearms could not deal a devastating blow to the Houjin army with the protection of the chariot in a short period of time, so the sustained ability of firearms was highlighted. In the Battle of Salhu and the Battle of the Hunhe River, although the tenacious Ming army repelled the enemy's attacks countless times, it was finally wiped out when the fire was exhausted. In the Battle of the Hunhe River, those who were tragically annihilated were Qi Jin, the heir of Qi Jiguang, and Qin Bangping, Qin Liangyu's own brother. And the No. 4 fortune ship of the **** boss has to carry naval equipment and infantry equipment, and the remaining space, how much fire can it carry?

In the end, the **** boss said that "riding by step" was invincible, but the only example that could be cited was Liu Yu during the Northern and Southern Dynasties. Military technology has been developed for more than 1,200 years, but the **** boss still regards the tactics of his ancestors as treasures, which is really arrogant. As everyone knows, in the Tang Dynasty, there were already cases of the Moon Array being broken.

26) This trick was brought out again, but fortunately, Huang Taiji's letter to Joseon in 1627 can still be found:

"The reason why we are fighting is because of the Ming Dynasty, and I am afraid that the Ming Dynasty will come again to sabotage the reconciliation, and in order to monitor the Ming Cai garrison! If you do not allow the Ming to enter your territory, then your royal brother will write a guarantee that the Ming will not be allowed to enter, and let the resident garrison come to Yiju, then I can retreat immediately. For example, before the militia of Juyiju comes to Yizhou, our soldiers will retreat, and I am afraid that Ming will take advantage of the gap to settle in. ["Old Manchurian Archives Translation Notes", July 19, the first year of Tiancong.]

The DPRK's reply said: "Now your country intends to retreat, and I will defend my own place, and I would rather let others steal the evidence." He immediately sent officials to accompany him to guard the field, so as not to worry about your country. [Wu Hanji, Chinese Historical Materials in the Records of the Joseon Li Dynasty, 8, p. 3365.] ]

It can be seen that North Korea said that it would never hand over Uiju to the Ming army in order to threaten the safety of Houjin, which is exactly what Huang Taiji wanted. Therefore, on September 12, all the Houjin soldiers who remained in Uiju were ordered to retreat, and Yoon Yeon-cho, the governor of Uiju in Korea, led his soldiers and civilians into Uiju City.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

I am very pleased to see that for the first time in history, the **** boss has found new evidence to prove his point, instead of just repeating the water as before. It's a pity that the **** bigwigs are still intercepting history.

This question is a question raised in response to what the **** boss said before, "North Korea was forced to form a 'brotherly alliance' with Houjin, expelled Mao Shuai's Dongjiang Town, Mao Shuai retreated to Phi Island, lost a large amount of tuntian in North Korea, and North Korea's support".

The Battle of Dingmao ended in April of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, and the "brotherly alliance" between Joseon and Houjin was signed at the end of March. When the covenant was signed, Houjin demanded that Korea "forever end the Southern Dynasty", but the Joseon king refused. And in April, the North Korean Changseong Army, in cooperation with Mao Wenlong, attacked the Houjin garrison at Bottle Mountain and won a small victory. Obviously, the Jin Dynasty Covenant signed by Ding Maonian was not fully implemented. A look at history shows that Korea only fulfilled its agreement with the Houjin (but it was obviously perfunctory in terms of the scale of the mutual market), and did not really dissolve the alliance with the Ming Dynasty. The two documents that the bigwig took out this time were in July of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, did the Koreans keep their promises this time? After Liu Xingqi returned to the Ming Dynasty in September of the first year of Chongzhen, the relationship between Mao Wenlong and Huang Taiji, which had originally been privately negotiated and peaceful, began to turn bad again. According to the "Renzu Record", in October of the first year of Chongzhen, "the soldiers under the capital governor's ticket captured seven Zhentars, beheaded one person, and five horses." In December, there were 80 Houjin merchants in Honyeongfu, North Korea, and Mao Wenlong wanted to use a large army to requisit, but the North Korean officials refused for fear of causing trouble. Then Jin also fought back, and in February of the second year of Chongzhen, he suddenly entered Shepu, where the Mao Department was ploughing, caught off guard, and fled in a hurry. Soon after, Jin entered Tieshan again and killed hundreds of Mao's officers and soldiers. At the same time, Kim stepped up diplomatic pressure on North Korea, threatening and intimidating him by violating his oath not to allow Mao to go ashore. That is, "Chongzhen Long Edition", there is also a record of "(Chongzhen in April of the second year) the Qing Dynasty sent troops to Tieshan, Suo Liu Aita brothers and Wang Deku, etc." (This paragraph is quoted from CAPO1234's article "Revisiting the Case of Yuan Mao Gong and Discussing with Bi Blood, Sweat and Qing")

Obviously, until April of the second year of Chongzhen, North Korea and Mao Wenlong were still in cooperative relations, and Mao was still in Tieshan, Shepu and other places. And the reply letter from the king of Joseon in July of the seventh year of the Apocalypse was just a dead letter.

27) Since the first time has already sent troops, why bother the court to urge the second time?

And it is untenable to say that the first time Lord Yuan is untenable, because when is "March"? Amin sent troops in the "first month", and Lord Yuan was already building Youtun at this time, if he sent troops from Youtun to Sancha River, would it take two or three months?

In those days, Nurhachi walked 600 miles from Shenyang to Ningyuan for only nine days, and Ningyuan to Jinzhou for 200 miles, and Jinzhou went to Shenyang to Da Lingshui, and Da Lingshui went to Shenyang to Youtun, how many days did it take for Yuan to go from Youtun to Shenyang? Why did Yuan take so long to reach the Sancha River? This can only show that the fact that Yuan took a negative response to Dongjiang Town and the DPRK and was perfunctory is clearly revealed.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

This article discusses the question of whether Yuan Chonghuan sent troops to contain him in accordance with the will of the imperial court during the Battle of Ding Mao. The original text of the big man is "In the Battle of Ding Mao, Lord Yuan began to refuse to respond, and he had to attack under the urging of the imperial court twice, but it was already four months later." What I questioned was that "the first time the imperial court gave an order, Zhao led the troops and set off." In March of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, it is not difficult to find. ”

Since the **** boss is still messing around here, let's take a look at what the real history is all about.

Because the electronic document of the "Xizong Shilu" in my hand is relatively vague, I am afraid that misreading will lead to misquotation errors, so I mainly quote the "Ming Shilu Classification (Military Historical Materials Volume)", and the unexcerpted part of the "Classified" is supplemented by the "Guoyi". Tan Qian's "Guoyi" is mainly based on the "Ming Shilu", plus the records of the wild history. Therefore, after roughly identifying the vague parts of the "Records of Xizong" and replacing them with the corresponding records in the "Guoyi", there will only be a small difference in individual words.

Let's take a look at the twists and turns of all the military departments related to Ning Jin's dispatch from February to April of the seventh year of the Apocalypse and the twists and turns of Yuan Chonghuan.

1. In February, Feng Jia, the secretary of the Ministry of War, said: The ministers of the superintendent Wang reported the slave soldiers to conquer Aizhou and Changcheng, and then went to the Iron Mountain, the Iron Mountain was the residence of Mao Shuai, and the original army was contained by the lonely army, and now it was attacked by its loneliness. ————Obviously, after Mao Wenlong's attacked Tangbao arrived in Beijing, the first reaction of the military department was to ask the governor of Dengzhou to "select generals and sail to respond", and Ning Jin was not considered at all. In this recital, the content about Ning Jin is only a supplementary salary, and there is no military order.

2. In March Xinwei, Yuan Chonghuan, the governor of Liaodong, said: After the frozen captives surrounded Tieshan, they reverted to Wang Jing with the old Korean foreign countries, and sent sailors to help Dongjiang, but still sent Fang Jinna to the chieftain, ordering him to urgently withdraw the soldiers who committed Xian. ("Xizong Records") ———— did not have any order from the Ministry of War to ask Ning Jin to send troops. Therefore, at this time, it was Yuan Chonghuan who took the initiative to request troops to reinforce the Dongjiang River. According to other records of the Ming Dynasty, Yuan Chonghuan sent a naval army of 500 people this time. Although this number is relatively small, the only water army on Juehua Island that can be deployed in Yuan Chonghuan's hands has already suffered a huge loss in the Battle of Ningyuan, and it should be difficult to send five hundred water troops at this time.

3. In March Wuyin, Feng Jia, the secretary of the Ministry of War, said: Li Song, the governor of Denglai, reported to Han Run, a traitor to North Korea, and others...... It is necessary to blame Ning Yuan for the period of the ministers, not to help the sailors, not to make a false plan. Then he ordered Liao Fu to elect Rui to take advantage of the void as a minister's discussion. This was ———— first request from the Ministry of War, and it was also the only time recorded in the "Records of Xizong" and "Guoyi" that the Ministry of War asked Yuan Chonghuan to send troops. Comparing the actual situation of North Korea and Houjin: At this time, the Korean war had ended for a month and a half, and on March 3, that is, eight days after that, Kim and North Korea had signed the first covenant, the "Ganghwa Oath," and Amin could withdraw his troops at any time. Moreover, Huang Taiji's Shenyang still has at least 40,000 or 50,000 troops, but Yuan Chonghuan's available troops are only 70,000, and it is impossible to fall out of the city. With the field combat ability of the Ming army, the results of a one-on-one blind war can be imagined.

4. In March, Feng Jia, the secretary of the Ministry of War, said: ...... Liao Fu was ordered to smash the nest, selected the elite as the three battalions of Lianzhu, Mangui and more than 3,000 simple and elite cavalry stationed in Qiantun to respond, and sent Xu Lian sailors thousands of sails to the east, as if this attack, the slave has to make up for the fear and hurriedly withdraw its new soldiers, take care of its lair? ("Xizong Records") ———— this sentence could not be clearer, Feng Jiahui reported that Yuan Chonghuan had sent troops in accordance with the requirements of the imperial court.

5. April Gengzi, Denglai Governor Li Songyan: Capture North Korea and Capture Yizhou...... Ordered the household military department Guan Ning Erfu to discuss it. Within and the paragraph, there is a purpose. Discussing with Japan, although Ning Zhen has a deep heart, he did not allow it in China and North Korea. Today, Guan Ning has no other scheduling, how can he not be humiliated by cunning. It is not a matter of the country. ———— At this time, it was the governor of Denglai who reported that the war in Korea was unfavorable and asked Kim to relieve the pressure on Korea and Dongjiang after the attack of Ningjin. Emperor Tianqi forwarded this letter to the two governors of Hubu and Guanning for discussion. When the transfer was made, Emperor Tianqi attached a request to Ning Jin to suspend the peace negotiations and further dispatch troops (to reinforce the Zhao Sect troops on the front line of the Sancha River). However, compared with the actual situation of the Battle of Ding Mao, in fact, the Korean War had already ended at this time, and the Korean War situation reported by Li Song was more than two months ago. At this time, the second alliance between the Later Kim and Koreans, the "Pyongyang Alliance", had also been signed, and the army of Amin Huishi crossed the Yalu River and returned to Shenyang on the 10th of April. And Li Song sent this report on the fourth day of April. Obviously, if the army was mobilized after the discussion between the Hubu Military Department and the two governors of Guanning and the two governors of Guanning, it happened to hit the muzzle of the gun where the whole army of Houjin met. In fact, the root cause of Li Song's urging of Ning Jin to attack Shenyang at this time was not North Korea's call for help, but Mao Wenlong's repeated lies about the military situation. According to Mao Wenlong's Dongjiangtang newspaper, it can be seen that from the end of March, Mao Wenlong continued to report that there were only less than 10,000 enemy troops in Shenyang, and in early April, he began to spread rumors that Huang Taiji was still increasing his troops in Korea. But in fact, as we have already analyzed, Houjin has always maintained at least 40,000 or 50,000 troops, and the actual situation in early April was not that Huang Taiji increased his troops in Korea, but that Amin returned to Shenyang.

6. In April, Ding Si, Yuan Chonghuan, the governor of Liaodong, said: Hearing that 100,000 captives plundered North Korea and 100,000 people lived in defense, what did they see and speculate about the vain caves...... ———— This letter has already been analyzed. On the one hand, it was impossible to forcefully deny the plundering of the 100,000 slave soldiers falsely reported by Mao Wenlong and Li Song on the eastern front, and on the other hand, Zhao Shujiao, who was stationed at the Sancha River, must have known very well that there were a considerable number of enemy troops on the other side, and in the face of this dilemma, Yuan Chonghuan could only report to the imperial court in this way. In fact, fortunately, Yuan Chonghuan shirked the blind command of the imperial court in this way, otherwise if he really sent a large army at this time, it would only be an appetizer for Houjin.

Finally, by the way, I took out the stupid words in the **** boss's reply this time and named them one by one.

"Since the first time the army has already been dispatched, why should the court come to urge the second time? Your rebuttal never cares about the end :)" ———— see Articles 3, 4, and 5, which could not be clearer and clearer. The strange thing is that the **** boss who picked up the dog's blood and poured his life on Yuan Chonghuan seems to have a vague understanding of this history at all.

"And it is untenable to say that Lord Yuan is untenable for the first time, because when is March? Amin sent troops in the first month, and Lord Yuan is already building Youtun at this time, if you send troops from Youtun to Sancha River, will it take two or three months?" ———— without the order of the imperial court, Yuan Chonghuan has the power to make a big move? Is it ignorance, or is it a deliberate confusion that is done knowingly?

"In those days, Nurhachi walked 600 miles from Shenyang to Ningyuan for nine days, Ningyuan to Jinzhou for 200 miles, Jinzhou and Shenyang are Da Lingshui, and Da Lingshui is Youtun when he goes to Shenyang, how many days does it take for Yuan to go from Youtun to Shenyang? Why did Yuan take so long to reach the Sancha River? This can only show that the fact that Yuan took a passive response to Dongjiang Town and the DPRK and was perfunctory is clearly revealed. —See articles 3 and 4. A word of advice to the **** boss, in the face of well-documented history, it will be embarrassing after all.

28) In September of the first year of Chongzhen (1628), the Ming Dynasty tried to win over Karaqin once, but in the end it was unsuccessful. After that, Lord Yuan insisted in the form of defense that opening a horse market for this tribe was "using grain to fund the Kou".

"Governor Yuan Chonghuan's Question" said: "Allow his life in Gaobaotong City outside the pass, but only allow Bumi to be exchanged for firewood, such as prohibited things, are strictly prohibited by law, and the karma is not connected with slaves." They all say that if the room is like a hanging chime, and if they don't sell one or two pieces of cloth in the east, why should they make a living by profiting? They would rather take their wives as hostages than dare not lure slaves into Jiliao. The pleading was prepared, and each of them put his wife and Gaotai Fort outside, and he went through the calendar. ”

What's the matter? Isn't this what Lord Yuan insisted on opening a horse market to "use grain for money"? He wrote so much that saying that those Mongolian tribes were pitiful was a complete lie, Chongzhen knew, but the locals also knew.

"Supplement to the Chronicle of the Ming History" recorded: "The Hanlin Academy edited Chen Renxi to make Liaodong, but before leaving the capital, reported that 100,000 soldiers from Jianzhou attacked Ningyuan, and did not see a horse when he arrived at the pass. Arrived at Nantaibao, knowing that Duo Yan Shu was not buying women for the Han Dynasty, for Jianzhou Jigu, Ningyuan Wujin Wang Zhenyuan and Chen Guowei entered Renxi. Said: The bunched people live outside the pass, and the yang enemy is inserted into the Han, in fact, Nizhi, and Jianzhou Xian. There are six or seven thousand people stationed outside Ningyuan Pass, and there are only 2,000 people in the city here. Jianzhou Sentinel counted more than 400 people in the department of Shu Bu, and did not ,...... the bow and arrow."

Let's see what Chongzhen said:

- "It is reported that Xiyi City is buying goods, obviously in response to Dongyi, and borrowing money to steal, how can it be allowed?"

- "Xiyi Tongnu, it is important to ridicule and defend. The city of Songnei bought cloth and silk in the east, and it was clear that it was to receive it, so why should it control slaves? ”

And in the end, it was these tribes who led the way for Houjin and raised food, according to the "Qing Historical Manuscript Taizong Benji": "(Tiancong 3rd year, 1629) June Yichou, discussed the Ming, ordered Korqin, Khalkha, Zalut, Aohan, and Naiman to join the troops, and ordered the pre-mining of wood and shipbuilding for the transfer of wages. Ding Mao, Karaqin Pur Gadu Dai Qing, Taiji Zhuoerbi, Tumut Taiji A Yushi and others sent envoys to pay tribute. ”

Look at this is the Karaqin and other departments that Lord Yuan promised in March that he would "never dare to lure slaves into Jiliao......

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Article 28 originally asked the **** boss to provide a complete context source for "Lord Yuan also guaranteed that these Mongolian tribes he helped 'would never dare to lure slaves into Jiliao'", so that I could debunk his dirty tricks taken out of context, but I didn't expect the **** boss to use the topic to play such a lot. Then let's do it one by one.

1. The problem of "never dare to lure slaves into Jiliao". The big guy has taken out a more complete context here, which is good. So let's take a look at this passage. It is obvious that the sentence "never dare to lure slaves into Jiliao" is a continuation of the previous "all Yi common words:". In Yuan Chonghuan's letter, "I will never dare to lure slaves into Jiliao" is completely a guarantee to paraphrase the Mongolian ministries. But in the hands of the **** boss, this sentence became Yuan Chonghuan's own guarantee to the emperor - a typical quote taken out of context. Moreover, there is also a sentence in Yuan Chonghuan's letter, "Only Jimen Lingjing is on his shoulders, and the troops are not increased, in case he is a guide, and the slaves are invaded, there will be unknowable disasters", but the **** boss will never mention it.

2, Karaqin is Duoyan Sanwei, also known as Duoyan Thirty-six Families, which means thirty-six tribes, which is not a tribe mentioned by the **** boss at all. In the early years of Chongzhen, Karaqin's position was actually at both ends of the Ming and Qing dynasties. In fact, during the Apocalypse, Karaqin was still a relatively loyal ally of the Ming Dynasty, and after the Ningyuan War, it was these tribes who took the initiative to pursue Nurhachi's defeated army. However, in the autumn and winter of the seventh year of the Apocalypse, the Chahar, the largest tribe in Monan Mongolia (basically present-day Inner Mongolia), fought against the Karaqin and other tribes, and the result was a crushing defeat for the Karaqin. For this situation, the Ming Dynasty, which was too busy to take care of itself, was powerless and unwilling to help, and Karaqin could only turn to the Later Jin for help. From February of the first year of Chongzhen's reign, Karaqin wrote a letter to Huang Taiji asking for help, until September, when the two sides jointly defeated the Chahar tribe entrenched in the old land of Karaqin, Karaqin and Houjin finally began to have common interests. Also in September, Karaqin accepted the reward of the Ming Dynasty, and these Mongolian tribes in the gap between the Ming and Qing dynasties began to live a two-sided life. In the first month of the second year of Chongzhen, Huang Taiji ordered the Mongolian ministries such as Horqin, Ao Han, Naiman, Khalkha and Karaqin to "obey the system of our dynasty" and set the flag, which is also a proof that the **** boss said that "after the surrender of Karaqin, Jin is almost known to passers-by". But in fact, this was a unilateral order of Huang Taiji, and the Mongolian tribes such as Karaqin were actually still in disobedience to the yang and yin, swaying between the Ming and Qing dynasties, and each tribe did its own thing. It is recognized in the historical circles that Karaqin really descended to the Qing Dynasty, which was actually a matter of the eighth year of Chongzhen, and it was not until this year that Karaqin accepted the banner of Houjinding, which was divided into the left wing of Karaqin and the right wing of Karaqin. The first banner lord of the left wing of Karaqin was the chief of Yuan Chonghuan's protagonist in the question of the enemy's capital. That is, in the first month of the second year of Chongzhen, some tribes in Karaqin robbed the border towns of the Ming Dynasty because of famine. In March, Karaqin asked Yuan Chonghuan to sell rice to them to survive the famine, and Chongzhen heard rumors that Karaqin was actually buying rice for Houjin, so he ordered Yuan Chonghuan to stop opening the market. Yuan Chonghuan explained the reason, and Chongzhen replied that he was only allowed to sell grain. Yuan Chonghuan's relayed "Don't dare to lure slaves into Jiliao" relayed by Yuan Chonghuan discussed earlier is from this letter. The complete correspondence between Chongzhen and Yuan Chonghuan is as follows:

Draft of "Commander Yuan Chonghuan":

The Ministry of War is a matter of the situation, and the case of the staff is submitted. The military department of the headquarters copied out the question of the commander Shangshu Yuan, and asked: The military department consulted the headquarters on the previous matters and other reasons.

In accordance with the holy order: It is reported that Xiyi City bought goods, obviously in response to Dongyi, and borrowed money to steal. How can you listen to it?! Your subordinate is acting as a superintendent and magistrate, stepping up vigilance, and still paying attention to Yuan Chonghuan and Yu An's temperament. Chin this. Chinzun.

Copied out to the ministry, prepared to consult the minister, the minister will be the governor of Jiliao Yu, Cha Deha stabbed the fear of the thirty-six families in Jiliao to appease the reward, hatred of the tiger and not with the slave. Since last year, the Tiger Chief attacked Boyan Huang Taiji, according to this point, Yan died and I can't rely on each other. He was self-entrenched by slaves. And the land is barren, there is no money for food, people cannibalize, and it will change.

Fu Liao has been able to resist slaves, but Jimen Lingjing shoulders and does not increase the troops, in case Yi is a guide, the slaves are invaded, and there are unknowable people. The minister is recruited, and he is allowed to spend his life in Gaobaotong City, but only Bumi is allowed to exchange for firewood, such as prohibited things, which are strictly prohibited by law, and the responsibility of karma is not to be communicated. They all say that if the room is like a hanging chime, and if they don't sell one or two pieces of cloth in the east, why should they make a living by profiting? They would rather take their wives as hostages than dare not lure slaves into Jiliao. The pleading was prepared, and each of them put his wife and Gaotai Fort outside, and he went through the calendar. When the ministers issued an edict, they saw what they had done in poverty, and if they were denied the way to live, they would be killed immediately. If you are willing to sit and wait to be killed, that is, if you are hungry, you can be empty, and if you are not empty, you don't have to complain and drive them to join with your slaves. In addition, I was defeated in the second year of the Apocalypse, and I was hungry inside and outside the Guan, and I supervised the king and the cadres to raise 36 families, and ordered their grain to be sold in the market, with hundreds of cars and dozens of cars every day, and the army and the people benefited. I apologize for eating, he apologizes and I don't have a good job. It's better to be virtuous and save a few kinds outside, and if he invades, I have to use his fence. If you can go to its violence and soften its heart, he will use it for me, and I would rather have his heart? He has been cared for for many years, and he has always believed that nothing has happened since this winter. At this time, my soldiers and horses are not prepared, only the cage, I repair the Zhou, and drive the raze to use it, if not for my use, there is another way to deal with it, how dare to capture the monarch's father and seal the territory?

In accordance with the holy decree: Xiyi is captured, and it is important to ridicule and guard. The governor strictly forbade it! It was recruited by the Yi, and it was found out how many tribes there were, and the amount of rice was allowed to be exchanged, and it was not allowed to sell cloth and rice grain or carry contraband. The road generals and other officials, double the reconnaissance, if there is any negligence, it will be punished as a crime!

The ministry knows, admiring this, admiring it.

Copy it out to the ministry, send it to the department, and the fitting behavior will be consulted.

The governor of Shuntian went to consult with him, and he was troubled to follow the internal affairs of the decree, and he complied with the investigation and implementation.

This also includes the two sentences of Chongzhen that were intercepted by the **** boss, "It is reported that Xiyi City bought goods, obviously in response to Dongyi, and borrowed money to steal." How can you listen to it", "Xiyi is captured, and it is important to ridicule and guard." The city of Songnei bought in the east, and it was clearly a response, so why should the slaves be controlled? The former sentence is Chongzhen's reproach when he suddenly asked about the report, and the latter sentence is Yuan Chonghuan's reply after his confession. However, Chongzhen's most important last sentence of instruction was selectively intercepted by the **** boss: "It attracts subordinates, it has hunger, find out how many tribes there are, count the amount of rice in exchange, and do not sell cloth and rice grain and carry contraband." The road generals and other officials will double their reconnaissance, and if there is any negligence, they will be punished as the crime of Tongyi!" It is very clear that Chongzhen finally allowed the sale of grain, but only demanded that "the amount of food should be exchanged for rice, and it is not allowed to sell cloth and rice grain and carry prohibited goods." After the big guy selectively intercepted Chongzhen's final reply, he added another charge to Yuan Chonghuan: "Lord Yuan still insists on opening a horse market for this tribe in the form of a defense, which is 'using grain to fund the Kou'." Tampering with history is another achievement.

Why did Yuan Chonghuan insist on selling rice? A careful reading of Yuan Chonghuan's recitals shows that the reasons are very clear. If you don't sell rice, Karaqin will definitely completely fall to the back gold, and if you sell rice, you can be a little more enveloped. When the Ming Dynasty was still struggling to deal with a post-Jin capital, did it still have to resolutely push Karaqin to the enemy? "At this time, I have no soldiers and horses, so I can only wrap up the network, and I will repair the Zhou Zhou, and use it by expelling it, if it is not used by me, there is another way to deal with it."

3. About the records in the "Addendum to the Chronicle of the Ming History". Originally, I asked this question in the 29th question, since the **** boss threw it out here, then let's solve it here.

Chen Renxi's envoy to Liaodong was in March of the second year of Chongzhen, and according to this record, it should be this Qincha Lord who reported that Chongzhen's subordinates were suspected of "responding to Dongyi" (Shu Bu was a tribe in the 36 families of Karaqin). So what is going on? As I said before, two out of three sentences by the two people who reported this information were false. The big guy's quotation is not complete enough, and there are occasional individual word errors, and the complete record is:

"Hanlin Academy edited Chen Renxi to Liaodong, did not go out of the capital, reported that 150,000 soldiers from Jianzhou attacked Ningyuan, and arrived at the pass without a horse, asked, said to go to North Korea. When he arrived at Nantaibao, he knew that he would not buy women for the Han Dynasty and build a valley for Jianzhou. Ning Yuan, Wu Jinshi, Wang Zhenyuan, Chen Guowei, and Renxi. Said: The people who don't live outside the customs, the yang enemy inserts the Han, in fact, it is nicknamed, and the state is also married. There were six or seven thousand people stationed outside Ningyuan Pass, and two thousand people were open here. Jianzhou outpost counted more than 400 people in the department of Shu Bu, did not use the bow and arrow, inserted the Han far away in the desert, rushed to help, beheaded and bed, and the enemy atmosphere could be rested. Missing this opportunity, the four khans arrived first in April, and the princes of autumn and winter all entered, and they would give up Liao and attack thistle and Xuanyi. ”

First of all, let's look at the first sentence "Hanlin Academy edited Chen Renxi to make Liaodong, before leaving the capital, reported that 150,000 soldiers from Jianzhou attacked Ningyuan, and arrived at the pass without a horse, and asked, said to go to North Korea." "Judging from this alone, it seems that Yuan Chonghuan lied about the enemy situation in Ningjin, but looking at the historical records during this time, there is no such astonishing news at all. What's more, since the war between the Ming and Qing dynasties, among all the reports in the Ming Dynasty, the most is only 100,000 reported by Li Song during the Battle of Ding Mao. In Yuan Chonghuan's enemy report, there are no more than 60,000. How could a 150,000 come out of nowhere? Therefore, the military intelligence of this 150,000 attack on Ningyuan is most likely due to folk rumors. The big guy probably also noticed the problem here, so when he cited it, he changed 150,000 to 100,000 (once again raising doubts about the credibility of his cited literature).

Then let's look at the latter sentence, "When I arrived at Nantaibao, I knew that I couldn't buy women for the Han Dynasty, and I built a valley for Jianzhou." The Han is the Chahar, the largest tribe in Southern Mongolia mentioned earlier. Since the seventh year of the Apocalypse, Karaqin has been inseparable from Chahar, so how can it be possible to "buy women for the Han Dynasty"? Where did Chen Renxi's information come from? The following is an explanation, "Wang Zhenyuan, a martial artist from Ningyuan, and Chen Guowei have joined Renxi. Said: The people who don't live outside the customs, the yang enemy inserts the Han, in fact, it is nicknamed, and the state is also married. It is really ridiculous to be able to say that the information of "Yang Hatred is inserted into the Han, in fact, it is nicknamed". Later, the rapprochement between Jin and the Mongol tribes was a means for him to win over the tribes, and it did not fully represent a firm alliance between the two tribes. I won't repeat the whole sentence in the following sentence, but the "Jianzhou outpost counts more than 400 people in the ministry of Shu Bu" in this sentence is often intercepted by some people with ulterior motives, so that the Houjin people went directly to Yuan Chonghuan's market to buy rice. In fact, the record here only says that "there are 6,000 or 7,000 people stationed outside Ningyuan Pass, and 2,000 people are stationed at the opening of the market here", while the 400 "Jianzhou outposts" only say that they are in the ministry of Shu Bu, not in the crowd that opened the market.

The later "Insertion Han is far away in the desert, and it is too late to help" is still based on the absurd premise that Shu Bu and Chahar are "actually nicknamed". And the last sentence "Lose this opportunity, the four khans will come first in April, and the princes of autumn and winter will enter, and they will give up Liao and attack thistle and Xuanyi" There is still a lie, and the "four khans" is Huang Taiji, where did Huang Taiji attack Ningyuan in April of the second year of Chongzhen?

Looking at the reports of these two warriors, there are many staggered ones, and the most critical mistake is that they can't even understand the relationship with Chahar. In fact, if you carefully analyze this account, it is not difficult to see that these two confused warriors regarded all the alien races as a group. On the one hand, there is the arbitrariness of "if it is not my race, its heart will be different", and on the other hand, it is the greed to ask "if you are not prepared, you will kill it by covering it at night......

4. And in the end, it was these tribes who led the way for Houjin and raised food, according to the "Qing Historical Manuscript Taizong Benji": "(Tiancong 3rd year, 1629) June Yichou, discussed the Ming Dynasty, ordered Horqin, Khalkha, Zalut, Aohan, and Naiman to meet the troops, and ordered the pre-mining of wood and shipbuilding for the transfer of wages. Ding Mao, Karaqin Pur Gadu Dai Qing, Taiji Zhuoerbi, Tumut Taiji A Yushi and others sent envoys to pay tribute. ”

Look at this is the Karaqin and other departments that Lord Yuan promised in March that he would "never dare to lure slaves into Jiliao......

————**** boss is a mess of the Mongolian tribes here, and Yuan Chonghuan sells grain to fund Karaqin, which is very clear in the previous letter. But the **** bigwig mixed together so many tribes of "Korqin, Khalkha, Zalut, Aohan, and Naiman". In fact, there are all other tribes here that have nothing to do with the 36 Karaqin families. Among the collaborators of Huang Taiji's June Yichou "Discussion and Defeat", there is no Karaqin at all. In June, Ding Mao had Karaqin's Bulgadu Daiqing and Taiji Zhuoerbi "sending tribute", but it does not mean that at this time, the Karaqin tribes already had the idea of jointly cutting down the Ming. In fact, Karaqin really showed its intention to cooperate with Houjin in August. Shu No, he sent an envoy to Shenyang in August, and then joined forces with Houjin to attack Liaodong.

Here, the **** boss once again tampered with the history books, saying that "I dare not lure slaves into Jiliao" as Yuan Chonghuan's guarantee. In fact, I have pointed out this problem twice a long time ago, but the **** boss still has to sell this kind of falsified pseudo-history everywhere, which proves that his character and style of study are unbearable.

The August and Houjin alliances do indicate that Yuan Chonghuan's appeasement policy failed, but it does not mean that Yuan Chonghuan's opening in March was wrong. Because one of them is that this is an effort that should be made to reduce the enemy. Second, Chongzhen had already instructed that there was basically no possibility of a capital enemy in the case of selling grain by ration, unless he would rather starve himself than leave the grain to Houjin, but judging from historical records, it was determined that cooperation with Houjin was a matter of August, and could the rice bought in March still be eaten until August? In fact, at the end of the Ming Dynasty, the annual harvest time in Liaodong was June, and Yuan Chonghuan could only supply the "less than 10,000" population who could not eat the rations in June. The reason why Huang Taiji "discussed the Ming Dynasty" in June and ordered the Mongolian ministries to "pre-harvest wood and build ships for the transfer of wages" was precisely because Houjin had already received the new year's harvest and could have military rations to prepare for military operations.

29) The above-cited "Qing Historical Manuscript Taizong Benji" not only shows that Karaqin has taken refuge in Houjin is ironclad evidence, but also shows that Karaqin is raising grain, because the source of the Daling River "Lingyuan" is on the chassis of Karaqin, and this tribe buys grain from Lord Yuan, and Ao Han and other departments were instructed by Houjin to "pre-mine wood and build ships for transfer of wages", that is, the grain transported from the Daling River.

Looking at the location of the Karaqin Left-wing Mongolian Autonomous County, Ao Han Banner, and Lingyuan in this map, it is not difficult to see that not far west of the source of the Da Ling River on the territory of the "Karaqin Left Mongolian Autonomous County" is the "Laoha River" flowing down from the "Ao Han Banner". Huang Taiji asked Karaqin to buy grain from Lord Yuan, transport it to Lingyuan ashore, and transfer it to the ships of Ao Han and other departments on the Laoha River to "pre-harvest wood and build ships for transfer", and then go down the river to cross the Great Wall near Zunhua.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

I have to admire the whimsy of the **** boss, looking at the map, you can imagine the grain transportation route of Houjin out of thin air. It's a pity that there are flaws everywhere.

1. How can the grain that Karaqin bought in March be kept until August, and it is still consciously starved until August without determining the alliance with the Houjin?

2. Where did the ships that transported grain from Karaqin come from? Karaqin was not included in the several Mongol tribes that Huang Taiji ordered to build ships, and at the time of June Yichou, Karaqin had not yet established an alliance with the Later Jin.

3. The only place in the Daling River Basin close to Ningjin is Jinzhou, Yuan Chonghuan opened the market in Ningyuan, how did Ningyuan get to Jinzhou in the 200 miles?

4. There are so many electronic maps on the Internet, and the **** boss wants to pick out this map where the administrative area line and the river water line are mixed together. Just look at any map of Inner Mongolia or Chifeng to see that the upper reaches of the Laoha River are the Heili River near Ningcheng (you can also check the water conservancy literature). The big guy had to fabricate a section of the river from Ningcheng to Chengde, so that the Laoha River, which should have started from the Heili River, changed direction, jumped hundreds of miles of plains out of thin air, and followed the Luan River into the Bohai Sea, which was really greater than Yugong.

5. It is not that there is a river on the map to be able to sail, the Daling River is in the upper reaches of the Linghe River near Lingyuan, and the Laoha River is in the upper reaches of the Heili River near Ningcheng, which are all source rivers.

30) Mao Shuai is the chief soldier of Dongjiang Town, Dongjiang Town is a military town, and it is stationed on the territory of North Korea, can the governors of Deng and Lai have jurisdiction over North Korea?

"Heavy literature and light martial arts" can be "heavy" to the ancestral system of "Daming Huidian"?

"Daming Huidian" - "If the chief soldier and the town guard officer commits a serious crime." It must be understood with the body, referring to the actual deeds, and having the purpose of the request. Don't insult yourself. He was guilty of a crime in his military position. There is a decree for the petition. The magistrate must also be courteous when he visits the place."

Look, not to mention that Mao Yu is also equipped with Shang Fang's sword, even if there is no Lord Yuan, he is not qualified to kill Mao Shuai.

In addition, in order to show the authority of Lord Yuan in "Ji, Liao, Deng, and Lai", Chongzhen took back the "Shang Fang Sword" of Man Gui and Wang Zhichen respectively, which was to ensure the highest authority of Lord Yuan in his jurisdiction, but Chongzhen did not take back Mao Wenlong's "Shang Fang Sword", which also shows that Mao Shuai's Dongjiang Town is not within the scope of "Ji, Liao, Deng, and Lai" at all.

Lord Yuan killed Mao Shuai without Chongzhen's will and authorization, which was completely against the rules and exceeded his authority, and the emperor did not kill Lord Yuan so hastily. Lord Yuan's actions were complete murder and lynching.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

It's time to discuss Mao Wenlong's problems again, one by one.

1. Dongjiang is stationed on the territory of Korea, so the governor of Denglai cannot control the Dongjiang River? So is it true that the Ming Emperor could not control the Dongjiang River and the territory of Korea? In fact, the argument that Dongjiang is stationed on the territory of Korea is wrong. Lushun also belongs to the town of Donggang, so it can only be said that Donggang is partly stationed on the territory of North Korea. In fact, the establishment of part of Donggang Town in North Korea was originally a last resort. In the first year of the Apocalypse, Mao Wenlong was ordered to attack the rear of the Houjin from North Korea and occupy Zhenjiang by taking advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness, but he was immediately defeated by the Houjin army that drove back, and he could only run back to North Korea. The purpose of the imperial court to establish the Dongjiang River was to restore the territory from behind enemy lines, and the forces it originally hoped to rely on were the four guards of southern Liaoning, that is, the four states of Jinfu covering the sea, and Lushun was a city in the territory of Jinzhou. Before the Later Jin invasion of the Ming Dynasty, the four guards in southern Liaoning belonged to Liaodong Town. Therefore, part of the Ming Dynasty territory of Dongjiang originally belonged to Liaodong Town, while part of the Korean territory was not part of the territory of the Ming Dynasty and could only be regarded as a temporary loan (similar to today's overseas bases of the United States). So in this sense, the Dongjiang River was originally supposed to belong to Liaodong Town, and the Ningjin area originally belonged to Xiwei Guangningwei of Liaodong Town. After the Liaoshen War, the area occupied by the Later Jin Dynasty isolated the Ming Dynasty's sphere of influence by land. The only way for the Ming Dynasty to support southern Liaoning was the sea route, and the closest naval base of the Ming Dynasty was Denglai Town, which was also the most important reason why Dongjiang was under the management of Denglai after the town was established.

Or back after the Liaoshen War, Nurhachi's army did not come out, and with only a notice, the four isolated towns in southern Liaoning surrendered to Houjin, and the Ming Dynasty's base in southern Liaoning was only Lushun. But in fact, the surrender of the four towns is not sincere, and many people are just a kind of equity strategy in an isolated situation. Therefore, Wang Huazhen, the governor of Guangning, sent Mao Wenlong to the enemy's back, hoping to contact the four towns in southern Liaoning with the power of the Ming Dynasty in mind and recover southern Liaoning. Although Mao Wenlong won first and then lost the battle in Zhenjiang, it brought hope to the Liao people in the enemy-occupied area. As a result, the uprisings in southern Liaoning came and went, which led to Nurhachi's revenge massacre. At that time, Xiong Tingbi was the strategy of Liaodong, and his original plan was a "three-way arrangement", that is, from the triple forces of Guangning, Shanhai, and Dengjin, plus the forces behind the enemy of the Chahar Department and the four guards of southern Liaoning, which were bought with gold and silver, hoping to defeat Houjin in one fell swoop. Although the actions of Wang Huazhen and Mao Wenlong had an inspiring effect on the part of the war, from the perspective of the overall war situation, the overly hasty early reaction, caused the loss of the recovery forces in southern Liaoning. This is the reason why Xiong Tingbi thinks that the battle of Mao Wenlong's Zhenjiang is not a miracle and is actually a miracle.

After such a blow, the possibility of Mao Wenlong wanting to establish a base for recovering Liao in southern Liaoning became very small, so he borrowed the territory of the subject country Korea as his base camp. When Dongjiang opened its town, except for Lushun, the rest of the city was basically the territory of North Korea, and there were also islands along the coast. Since there is only a small Juehua Island stationed in Liaodong Town, and the support of the Dongjiang River must rely on the sea route, after the opening of the town, the food and salary given by the Ming Dynasty to the Dongjiang River are mainly from Dengzhou, and it is more appropriate for Dengzhou to be responsible for the dispatch of troops and wartime reinforcements. Therefore, from the beginning of the opening of the town, the Dongjiang River was under the jurisdiction of Denglai, and the garrison commander of Port Arthur, the most important base of the Dongjiang River, was directly recommended and appointed by the governor of Denglai, and Mao Wenlong's recitals were basically transferred to the imperial court through the governor of Denglai. After Mao Wenlong was beheaded, in addition to Chen Jisheng, who was temporarily appointed by Yuan Chonghuan to lead the army, the subsequent Dongjiang generals from Huanglong onwards were also recommended by the governor of Denglai. In Mao Wenlong's Tang newspaper over the years, the complaining superiors, except for Yuan Chonghuan later, were the successive governors of Denglai. Especially the two governors six years before the Apocalypse, they were all said by Mao Wenlong to be extremely unbearable.

2. The article of the "Ming Huidian" is not enough to prove it. This provision does not at all include a special case for law enforcers to guard the sword of the Shang Fang. In fact, in the use of Shang Fang's sword, it was clearly stipulated that the general soldier had the power to dismiss him on the spot, and there was no need to "understand it, point out the actual deeds, and have a request".

3, Shang Fang's sword does not have a death-free function, and the low-level mistakes that have been pointed out again and again, but the **** boss always has to pretend to be stupid.

4. Why don't you take back Mao Wenlong's Shang Fang sword? Do you not want to accept it? You can't take it back at all! Chongzhen had just killed Mao Wenlong's godfather, Wei Zhongxian, and at this time Mao Wenlong was "hanging alone overseas" and was self-contained, and he had already disobeyed the orders of the imperial court and always refused to be sent by the imperial court to supervise the army. At this time, if Chongzhen ordered to take back Mao Wenlong's Shang Fang sword, it would be equivalent to * Wenlong immediately rebelling! According to "Mao Wenlong's Coming Book", the first five letters must have been written before Yuan Chonghuan took office, that is, when Chongzhen took back the Shang Fang sword of Wang Zhichen and Man Gui, Mao Wenlong really had a heart of disobedience.

At this point, the basic analysis of the content of the 30 questions has been completed, if the **** boss wants to continue to talk about the crooked reasoning, you might as well answer the following questions that have been avoided.

1. The trade-off of Jinzhou was determined after the "Ningjin War".

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

What is the conclusion? What are you doing hiding the final ruling of the Emperor of the Apocalypse? The remarks of some officials who are greedy for life and afraid of death who have been vetoed by the emperor have become a definitive conclusion in your mouth?

2. Although Huo Weihua, the squire of the military department, thinks that Jincheng cannot be easily given up, according to the objections of the generals, he cannot but summarize as: "If the thief arrives, he will wait for the wall." ”

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Playing the trick of taking quotes out of context again? The context is taken out for everyone to see.

3. You Shilu, the chief soldier stationed there, said that Jinzhou "was collapsed by rain and was unlivable"

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Can't understand the ancient text? Is this the reason why Jinzhou cannot be defended?

4. The general stationed in Tashan thinks that Tashan is not a place to defend and wants to "move to another place"

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Context, context! Are you tired of playing this kind of trick all the time?

5. Among the many opinions proposing to abandon Jinzhou, Yan Mingtai of the Governor Ji Liao was the strongest and the most severe

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

What kind of birdman is this guy, can you tell everyone? How did he get into trouble for the confiscation of the army, well? Just based on this guy's position, he opposes Sun Chengzong's strategy with his old life, what's so strange?

6. Yuan Chonghuan was unable to effectively reinforce Zhao Shujiao during the "Ningjin War", and Hong Chengchou was unable to rescue Zu Dashou during the "Songjin War" because of this geographical defect.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Can the famous Ningjin War and the Nuclear Songjin War still be broken blindly? Go back and make up for history. Yuan Chonghuan is tired of the Jin army, and he sent Mangui to see the number of 10,000 people who knew that it was contained; Hong Chengchou had already been able to rescue Zu Dashou, and the one that Dolgon beat was miserable, and he went to see how "Manchu Old Files" was written, and finally missed the opportunity to wait for Huang Taiji to come to help, which was completely overly conservative. Don't compare these two wars, one is 10,000, which is clearly contained, and the other is 130,000, first conservative and then blind, and all of them were stripped by you and the battle went to the geography, you are really a theoretical expert who complains about constipation and blames the toilet.

7. There is no Jinzhou Shanhaiguan can be defended, from 1622 to 1628, of which Jin has not been garrisoned for a few years, and after 1628, Jin also occupied Jinzhou, but it also felt boring, so it automatically retreated, because Jinzhou is an easy place to be surrounded, and whoever guards is unlucky.

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

Well, so Huang Taiji was Alzheimer's before he died, and it took more than three years to use the country's military and financial resources to lay down such an unlucky place.

8. 750/(19*4.8+26*10+35*10)*12=128,000 taels of silver/10,000 people/year

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

It seems that the DPRK did not provide money and grain for the DPRK to fight the war? Or does the money and grain provided by the DPRK not count as military expenses? In the last years of the Ming Dynasty, the standard for recruiting troops was 125 cents per month, and the salary paid when helping the DPRK fight the war was lower than this?

9. 71,000 (Guan, Ning, Jin), 800/7.1 = 1,126,000 taels of silver/10,000 people/year

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

I don't know how you fooled the figure of Wanli's aid to the dynasty, this can't escape my eyes. The source of your 7.1 is 71,000 "outside the Guan", and more than 40,000 "inside the Guan" refers to Shanhaiguan, but you are not ashamed to get one (Guan, Ning, Jin). Obviously, it is only the strength of the two cities of Ningjin, but you have counted the strength of the Shanhaiguan including the Shanhaiguan, and the Mongolian people have the skill.

There is also this 800, which is even more funny, it is calculated by the Liaoyu salary of 680 in the first year of Chongzhen and the total deficit of the imperial court in the seventh year of the Apocalypse of 120. Ten years ago in Chongzhen, the money for suppressing the peasant uprising in the whole country came out of Liaoyu, do you know? Chongzhen's first year of the southwest rebellion was a large expense, and the 6.8 million people from the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan were at least eaten, how did you eat it? The deficit in the Liaozhen year and the apocalypse year together is a joke in itself, not to mention that you count the deficit of the entire Ming Dynasty as being spent by Liaodong.

10. The "Songjin War" lasted for several years, and it was no wonder that there was no problem with the grain, and the Houjin let North Korea transport grain from the sea to the Daling River during the "Songjin War", and the grain of the Ming Dynasty could not be transported into Jinzhou at all, which was a good place for Yuan Da to choose

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

The Songjin War started in the twelfth year of Chongzhen, and the first two years were Zu Dashou alone in front. Dolgon also slowly surrounded Jinzhou before Zu Dashou's grain and grass began to have problems. After Hong Chengchou Chongzhen sent troops from Ningyuan in June of the 14th year, as soon as he arrived in Jinzhou, he and Zu Dashouli should cooperate with the outside world to beat Dolgon, which was extremely miserable. During this period, the grain of the Ming army was sent to Jinzhou. One of the people who protected the grain delivery was the famous Wu Sangui. On August 12, Huang Taiji increased his troops to Jinzhou to support Dolgon, and on the 24th, Hong Chengchou was beaten beyond recognition. Then there was a seven-month siege of the city, and at this time there was no way to send food -- what happened to the terrain when the city was besieged and couldn't send food? The most wasteful thing about Hong Chengchou was that Ning Jin directly cut off his retreat to Ningyuan, which naturally meant that Hong Chengchou also cut off Huang Taiji's retreat back to Shenyang. When the brave meet on a narrow road, the brave wins, but Hong Chengchou decided first, "Let's run away", the whole army did not listen to the command, and the whole line was defeated in a chaotic manner -- he was served dumplings and blamed the terrain for the situation?

Note: The article corresponding to these 10 questions is "Refutation of Fanqianyulei's Essay on the Defense of Yuan Chonghuan"

Click on the image link: